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
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
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
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THE

# FRANCO-GERMAN WAR, 1870-71.

Second Part:--History of the War against the Republic.

THIRD VOLUME: EVENTS IN SOUTH-KAST FRANCE FROM THE MIDDLE OF JANUARY TO THE TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES. REARWARD COMMUNICATIONS. THE ARMISTICE. HOMEWARD MARCH AND OCCUPATION, RETROSPECT.

#### TRANSLATED FROM THE

### GERMAN OFFICIAL ACCOUNT

FOR THE

INTELLIGENCE BRANCH OF THE QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT, HORSE GUARDS, BY

MAJOR F. C. H. CLARKE, C.M.G., R.A., PROFESSOR OF STAFF DUTIES AT THE STAFF COLLEGE, AND LATE D.A.Q.M.G.

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The translator begs to return his grateful thanks to Lieutenant-General Sir Beauchamp Walker, K.C.B., 2nd Dragoon Guards, Director-General of Military Education, for the friendly encouragement and the material help which he has been pleased to give during the progress of this translation, by revising the proofsheets from the commencement, and making many valuable suggestions and additions; also to Colonel Lonsdale Hale, late of the Royal Engineers, who, amidst other important professional work, has been good enough to look through the proof-sheets of the later sections, and has also made many valuable comments and rendered other assistance.

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
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- German Troops.
- **★** French Troops.

OCCURRENCES ON THE SOUTH-EAST THEATRE OF WAR FROM THE MIDDLE OF JANUARY UNTIL THE ARMISTICE FOR BELFORT, THE CôTE D'OR, DOUBS, AND JURA DEPARTMENTS.\*

Advance of the IInd and VIIth Army Corps from the line NOTERS-CHÂTILLON-SUR-SEINE TO THE UPPER SAONE VALLET.

THE Commander-in-Chief of the South Army had reached Versailles on the night of the 9th—10th January, where Colonel Count v. Wartensleben, who was accompanying him, was appointed Chief of the Staff.‡ The instructions given verbally to General v. Manteuffel at the Royal Headquarters could only be of the most general nature. It was evident that for the present he could give no immediate support to General v. Werder, who was already in contact with the enemy. But as the XIVth Corps was still holding its position in front of Belfort, it could not fail to be of great importance, should General v. Manteuffel succeed in operating upon the enemy's communications. All measures to accomplish this object were left, however, to that officer's unfettered discretion.

When General v. Manteuffel reached Châtillon-sur-Seine on the evening of the 12th January, the troops placed at his 12th and 18th disposal were as yet far from being assembled, but were January. scattered over a tract of country upwards of forty miles in breadth at the following points: the IInd Army Corps from the Armançon to the Serain,¶ at Nuits and Novers; the VIIth from the Aube to the Seine, at Montigny, Chatillon, and Mussy.\*\*

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See Plans No. 31, A to F, and General Maps 6 and 9.
 See Part II, Vol. II, p. 807. App. CLVII contains the Ordre de Bataille of the South Army.

<sup>1</sup> See Part II, Vol. II, p. 255, note 1.

App. CLVIII gives the composition of the force and a résumé of the general situation as handed over by the Royal Headquarters to General Baron v. Manteuffel.

situation as handed over by the Royal Headquarters to General Baron v. Manteunel.

[See sketch.]

The IInd Army Corps had received orders at Montargis on the 6th January to prepare to move eastward (see Part II, Vol. II, p. 307). On the 7th—8th January it proceeded to carry them into effect. The corps marched in several columns in the general direction, by Soigny and Tonnerre, to Nuits-sur-Armançon and Noyers, where it arrived on the 12th January without meeting the enemy.

The VIIth Army Corps had received news at Auxerre from General v. Werder on the evening of the 6th January, which caused it to prepare for its departure from that place. A cypher telegram received from Versailles on the 7th was mutilated and unintelligible. Early on 8th January orders arrived to move to Châtillon-sur-Beine (see Part II, Vol. II, p. 307). The corps guarded itself towards the south by despatching a flank detachment by way of Lichères-près-Aigremont, and marched through Chablis, Tonnerre, Laignes to the neighbourhood of Châtillon, which it reached on the 11th. Of the 14th Division, the first detachments already commenced to arrive by railway at Châtillon-sur-Seine on the 7th January. The menced to arrive by railway at Chatillon-sur-Seine on the 7th January. The arrangements for the siege of Péronne and the want of rolling-stock delayed the further transport. On the 11th January the Divisional Staff arrived; not until the 18th were the bulk of the troops assembled at Châtillon.

Part of the latter Corps was still in process of transport by

The great extent over which the forces were for the moment scattered formed no impediment to their further advance. was a point for some consideration whether the march should be directed upon Dijon, to which town led several good roads over the intervening mountains. The capture of the old capital of Burgundy would have made the more impression, as the French press had been recently attaching undue import-

ance to its re-occupation by their own troops.

But the pressing danger centred at Belfort. The Commander-in-Chief knew from the telegraphic reports of General v. Werder that that general was occupying the position Lure -Héricourt—Montbéliard—Delle, that the enemy was quiet on the 12th, but it was believed that he was on the point of completing his deployment between the Doubs and the Ognon. Evidently the IInd and VIIth Corps were not in a position to act in that direction for the present. But should the decisive action be delayed by only a few days, their advance would make itself felt. It was therefore of the first importance not to lose time, and the march upon Dijon would have been a détour.

In these circumstances General v. Manteuffel resolved, notwithstanding the many difficulties, to march straight against the enemy's main forces. Should the latter meanwhile succeed in driving back General v. Werder into Upper Alsace, General Manteuffel determined to throw himself with all possible speed upon the enemy's rearmost troops. On the other hand, should the XIVth Corps succeed in repulsing the enemy, and the latter move in retreat, the Commander-in-Chief intended, by a change of front to the right, to move against him and his communications.

The difficulties which remained to be overcome by the IInd and VIIth Corps in their advance were of no slight order. The march on Vesoul led across the southern part of the bleak plateau of Langres by country roads deep in snow and in all probability impracticable.

Numerous streamlets, which take their rise in the plateau, flow towards the Seine and Saône. They intersected the line of march, and their deeply-sunken valleys had to be crossed by steep paths, of which the icy smoothness seriously aug-

mented the difficulties.

The better roads across the plateau lie in the valleys, and

† App. CLIX contains the telegraphic correspondence between General v. Werder and General Baron v. Manteuffel for the period 12th—20th January, 1871.

<sup>• 74</sup>th Regt., Fus., 2nd Light, 3rd and 4th Heavy, 2nd and 3rd Fld. Pion. Cos. VII and the trains. The 1st Reserve Hussars was assigned to the Inspector-General of Etappen of the IInd Army, by order of Ilis Majesty the King. Only one squadron remained temporarily in rear, in order to be employed later as messengers between Chatillon-sur-Seine and the advancing headquarters of the South Army.

therefore run in general from north-west to south-east. In consequence they did not lend themselves to the march. At the same time the connection between the columns could not be easily maintained in this mountainous forest-clad country. Each column had to take its independent measures of security in every direction. The country offered little accommodation. Not until the eastern slopes are reached do we meet with signs of prosperity and high cultivation.

The march led midway between Dijon and Langres, both of which points were known to be occupied in force. Serious resistance was therefore expected in the difficult country.

Although the troops after their continuous marching were sorely in need of rest,\* none could be allowed them. same night of the 12th—13th both Corps were ordered to push forward their advanced guards to the line Montbard-St. Marc-sur-Seine-Leuglay-Aubepierre, and to attach pioneers The movement, commencing from the line Montbard to them. —Châtillon, would bring the army into the open Saône country at Selongey and Longeau. For this march, the Hud Army Corps had assigned to it the road through Chanceaux and Is-sur-Tille, the VIIth was to take any roads found suitable to the north of it.

Colonel v. Dannenberg's brigadet assembled in the course of the 13th January in the neighbourhood north-west of Baigneux-les-Juifs. It had up to that time been in observation towards Dijon, protecting the railway through Nuits-sur-Armançon, and also the arrival of the first troops at Châtillon and Nuits. In doing so, it had frequently come into collision with parts of the Vosges Army, which, after assembling round Autun in December, had pushed forward franctireurs into the district between Dijon and Châtillon-sur-Scine, whilst Ricciotti Garibaldi, with the 4th Brigade, had been watching the movements of the VIIth Corps, at first from Courson, afterwards from Avallon, and later from Précy-sous-Thil. On the 5th January Ricciotti had advanced to Sémur. Colonel v. Dannenberg occupied at this time Montbard, Nuits-sur-Armançon, and Châtillon-sur-Seine, but contemplated shortly uniting the whole of his force more to the front, between Alise Ste. Reine

Headquarters: Châtillon-sur-Scine.

At Châtillon: 1st and 2nd Battalions 60th Regiment. 3rd Squadron 5th Reserve Lancers. 3rd Light Battery VIIth Corps.

At Montbard: 72nd Regiment.

3rd and 4th Squadrons 1st Reserve Hussars. 4th Light Battery VIIth Corps.

At Nuits and Ravières: Fusilier Battalion 60th Regiment.

<sup>\*</sup> No halting-days could be allowed during the last severe marches, and there was no prospect of any. The men's boots and the horses' shoes were in very bad order.

† See Part II, Vol. II. p. 307, note ¶.

† On 4th January the distribution of Colonel v. Dannenberg's troops was as

follows :-

and Baigneux-les-Juifs.\* The Montbard garrison having been reinforced at the commencement of the movement, Captain v. Hertell advanced on 7th January with a mixed detachment from this town along the Sémur road, but as soon as he reached Champ d'Oiseau fell in with the enemy. Next morning Major Panse, with a battalion, squadron, and four guns, teft Montbard for Sémur. Ricciotti Garibaldi, at the same time, advanced upon Montbard, marched unobserved by the west of the Prussian detachment, and attacked the town. He was, however, repulsed, and Major Panse returned in all haste towards evening; Ricciotti, however, succeeded in eluding capture, and by way of the Brenne valley reached Flavigny, where he received support from other detachments of the Vosges Army.

In view of the detrainment taking place at Châtillon, Colonel v. Dannenberg on the 9th assembled his troops on the line Montbard—St. Marc-sur-Seine, but afterwards concentrated them towards the right flank, in order to protect Nuits pending the arrival of the IInd Corps. A companyl engaged on the 11th January in foraging at Baigneux-les-Juifs was driven back thence by Ricciotti Garibaldi. But on the advance of superior forces the franctireur leader retired on the 12th to Aignay-le-Duc, and on the 13th took post at Avot-le-

Grand.

For the moment Dannenberg's brigade was attached to the IInd Corps, as it was already well forward on the line of advance of the latter. To replace it, the 8th Infantry Brigade, under Major-General v. Kettler, reinforced by two squadrons and two batteries,\*\* was to remain behind, in order to secure the Châtillon—Nuits—Tonnerre railway, which was of so much importance for the troops on the Loire and Sarthe, and upon which the IInd and VIIth Corps must depend as a line of communication during their advance.†† The general received instructions to make such minor offensive movements as might serve to clear up the situation, and, if hard pressed, to retire along the railway to Blesme. In such case, he was to open

3 8rd and 3 4th Light

VII

1st and 2nd and 5th Light and 6th Heavy

III

III

<sup>††</sup> It was not until later that they could be moved to Epinal.

communications with the troops of the Government-General of Lorraine\* and the etappen troops, and thus reinforced he was to resume the offensive with as little delay as possible.† In spite of the inadequacy of the means, it was hoped that the troops and their leader would fulfil this comprehensive task, a confidence which was amply justified by subsequent events.

As during the next few days it would apparently be impracticable to issue orders with regularity, General v. Manteuffel announced his intentions beforehand. The most important matter for both Corps was to reach and secure the issues from the mountains with the least possible delay. Each column was then to deploy right and left, in order to facilitate the debouch of its neighbour. It was recommended that the men should have an abundant ration on the march, and all responsibility for any extraordinary measures for that object was assumed by the Commander-in-Chief. All details were settled on the 13th at Châtillon-sur-Seine in a verbal conference with the

generals commanding Corps.

The forward movement commenced on the 14th January in 14th January a dense fog, severe frost, and with roads like a looking-glass. The men's strength became speedily taxed; the marching columns lengthened out greatly, and the progress was much retarded. Not until late in the day did the troops reach their quarters: the IInd Corps, the neighbourhood of Lucenay-le-Duc and Montbard; Dannenberg's brigade, Billy-les Chanceaux; the VIIth Corps, Recey-sur-Ource and Arc-en-Barrois. east of the last-named place, near Bugnières, the advanced guard of the 14th Divisions met an infantry detachment which had been thrown forward from Langres, and repulsed it after a short skirmish. Night had already set in when the 2nd Battalion 77th Regiment, heading the column, seized with little loss the occupied village of Marac, captured a colour, and drove the defenders back on the fortress. The remaining columns had not been molested by the enemy.

The Army Headquarters were established at Boulaine.

On the morning of the 15th January the thermometer fell 15th January to 14 degrees; the difficulties of the march were even greater than on the previous day. Still the troops reached their appointed destinations: the Hnd Army Corps, the neighbour-

<sup>\*</sup> Of these, parts were posted to protect the railway against the strong garrison of Langres, which was estimated at 12,000—15,000 men; and, according to "Langres pendant la Guerre de 1870-71," p. 53, amounted to 15,600 men, and even reached 16,800 on 15th January.

App. CLX contains the text of the Army Order of 13th January, 1871, 5 p.m., with a merching table and the instructions for General v. Kettler's detachment.

I This was done by a letter from the Commander-in-Chief to Generals v. Zastrow

and v. Fransecky, dated 14th January, 1871, 4 a.m.

§ Ist and IInd 1st 15th Hus., and 2 2nd Heavy under Major v. Köppen.

App. CLXXI contains a return of casualties of the South Army between the 18th January and the conclusion of the armistice for Belfort and the Côte d'Or, Doubs, and Jura departments.

hood of Chanceaux; Dannenberg's brigade, Lamargelle; the VIIth, the neighbourhood of Auberive and Chameroi; Army Headquarters, Germaine. General v. Kettler had marched from Noyers in a southerly direction to l'Isle-sur-Serain and Montréal.

A flank detachment of the VIIth Corps,\* under Colonel v. Delitz, occupied Grancey-le-Château, in order to approach the columns of the right wing. The provious advanced guard of the 14th Division bent southwards from Maroc by way of Mardor and undertook at Courcelles-en-Montagne the duties of observation towards Langres. This detachment continued 16th January, also on the following day to watch the south front of the fortress. It drove some weak hostile patrols before it, but in doing so came under the artillery fire of one of the forts;† it rendered possible, however, in the evening, the destruction of the railway and telegraphs in the neighbourhood of the junction at Chalindrey, as had been ordered by Army Headquarters.

In the night of the 15th—16th a change took place in the weather, and the frost was succeeded by a violent storm. Thawed snow and rain stood in pools on the smooth ice of the roads. With no little difficulty the bulk of the army reached the line Moloy—Prauthoy—Longeau; the advanced guards, Diénay, Selongey, Dardenay, Chassigny-le-Bas, and Cohons.

The Hnd Army Corps had not as yet come into serious contact with the enemy, but on the right flank, chiefly in the Oze valley, discovered some French detachments, and in its front found traces of the retreat of Ricciotti Garibaldi's brigade to Dijon. The right flank detachment of the VIIth Army Corps also learnt at Selongey that 2,000 Garibaldians had reached this place on the 14th, and had left for Dijon on the 15th. The patrols found Is-sur-Tille clear of the enemy; on the other hand there were weak French detachments at Epagny.

On this same day General v. Kettler moved upon Avallon.

the inhabitants of which place had fired on his patrols.

The town was bombarded with shell and the barricaded entrance captured after a brief musketry action. The garrison, consisting of two battalions of Garde Nationale Mobile fled in disorder to the woods on the south, leaving behind some 60 killed and wounded, as also 2 officers and 58 unwounded prisoners. After placing the town under heavy contribution as a punishment, General v. Kettler resumed his march at noon and reached Montbard next day. His detachment had lost only 1 officer and 2 men.

General v. Manteuffel, who transferred his headquarters to Prauthoy, received the news early that morning of the first day's fighting on the Lisaine. It was, nevertheless, necessary, at once

See Telegram No. 8 in Appendix CLIX.

<sup>•</sup> Ist and IInd 1st 8th IIus. and 15th Heavy.

<sup>+</sup> Fort de la Bonnelle, situated on a height to the west of St. Geômes. 1 It remained there on the 17th and 18th January.

to bring forward the IInd Corps from the Ignon Valley, and give it time to come up abreast of the VIIth Corps, which meanwhile concentrated more closely and pushed forward its

advanced guards farther to the east.

On the 17th January, General v. Fransecky caused the 17th January mixed brigade leading the Hnd Army Corps to bend away to the right and take up to the south of Is-sur-Tille a position of observation towards Dijon. Under its protection the 3rd Division spread out in the more open country and occupied close cantonments in and around Is-sur-Tille. The corps artillery and the 4th Division moved up in rear as far as the issues from the mountainous region.

On the right flank, a detachment,\* under Colonel v. Ferentheil, had advanced partly along the Oze valley, partly in a parallel direction to the eastward, and, not without loss, † had dislodged some franctireur bands from Verrey-sous-Salmaise and from the heights east of Bligny-le-Sec. It subsequently marched that same night by way of St. Seine, along difficult roads to Vernot, for the purpose of rejoining its Division.

Of the VIIth Army Corps, the advanced guard of the 13th Division marched to Champlitte, where information was received that there had been recent movements of troops between Dijon and Langres. It there destroyed the railway and line of telegraph from Gray to Langres, while at Piémont a company of French infantry marching towards Langres was after a few shots compelled to turn quickly back and disperse.

In other respects the country towards the Saône was found

unoccupied.

The advanced guard of the 14th Division reached Chaudenay, and also scouted in the direction of Langres. A detachment from the main body reconnoitred from Longeau by way of Bourg towards the fortress. It dislodged one of the enemy's posts from Croix d'Arles\*\* by artillery fire, but fell under the fire of Fort de la Bonnelle, and at noon commenced its return march unmolested.

On the 18th January, in accordance with orders from Army 18th January Headquarters the whole of the Hnd Corps was assembled at Is-sur-Tille, Thil Châtel, and Selongey.

```
• IInd and Fus. 3rd 11th Drag. and 3rd Field Pion. Co.
   † 8 officers, 22 men.
   ‡ Hind and Hird, 7th Rifle Batt., 3rd and 4th, 5th Light, and 1st F. Pion. Co. VII,
under General Baron v. d. Osten Sacken.
   § Colonel Lobbia, with 1,200 men of the 2nd Brigade Vosges Army, had brought
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\*\* 11 miles north of Bourg.

ammunition into the fortress. (See "Langres pendant la Guerre de 1870-71," pp. 65-71.)

<sup>|</sup> Ist and IInd | 1st | 1st and IInd | 1st | 1st

A newly-formed advanced guard\* reached Bouhans, on the Fontaine Française—Gray road, and, in spite of its long march, sent away that same evening a detachment towards Gray. The detachment pressed onward as far as the bridgest of the town, which lies on the further bank of the Saône. The inhabitants were in consternation. After the railway and telegraph had been destroyed in the manner ordered, the detachment passed the night in Nantilly, a village situated to the west of Gray.

Of the VIIth Corps, the 13th Division moved up to Champlitte and Neuvelle-les-Champlitte. The advanced guard was despatched by General v. Bothmer as far as Pierrecourt, whence the Saône bridge at Savoyeux was reconnoitred.

General v. Senden moved with the 14th Division as far as Trettes, the advanced guard to Poinson-les-Fayl; the corps artillery marched to Leffond. A weak detachment charged with observing Langres repulsed at Brennes and Bourg, to the north of Longeau, a feeble attack directed from the fortress.

Although on the 18th January the IInd Corps was still one march to the rear in the movement eastward, yet the main difficulties were now overcome, and it was even probable that the passage of the Saône would not be contested. In spite of the unfavourable season of the year and the bad state of the roads, the passage of the mountains had been accomplished in a comparatively short time, without incident and with only slight loss. The enemy had made no serious attempt to interrupt the march, either from Dijon or from Langres. The rearward communications were alone the subject of anxiety.

Of the troops still absent at the commencement of the movement, the majority had during the last few days been detrained at Veuxaulles, north-east of Châtillon-sur-Seine, in order to follow the army by road. T But before they overtook the rest, a column of general transport had been captured on the 17th at Perrogney, south-west of Langres. In a further advance of the army this condition of things could only become

<sup>• 5</sup>th Inf. Brig., 1st and 4th 3rd Drag., II II, and 2nd Light, and 2nd F. Pion. Co. II, with entrenching tool column and light field bridge train, under Major-General v. Koblinski.

<sup>† 1</sup>st 1st 2nd F. Pion. Co. , under Major v. Normann.

† The railway bridge had been blown up on the departure of the XIVth Corps. But two other pussable bridges were found, one of which, built of stone, had been mined.

<sup>§</sup> This was rejoined by the two batteries hitherto attached to Dannenberg's mixed brigade.

 $<sup>\</sup>parallel \frac{\text{Fus.}}{53}, \frac{1}{VII}, \text{ and 26 hussars of the 3rd Squadron 15th Hussars, under}$ Captain Senckel.

T In succession: 3rd Heavy, 2nd Light, 2nd F. Pion. Co., Fus. Hind and Fus. 4th Heavy, and 3rd Field Pion. Co., and part of the trains.

aggravated. General v. Manteuffel resolved in consequence not to allow future detachments to be sent by the roads across the Langres plateau, but to move them by way of Epinal.\* In this way the permanent transfer of the lines of communication to Epinal, which was in contemplation, would at the same time be initiated. The Government-General of Lorraine was requested to co-operate in this matter.†

During the last few days a brisk exchange of correspondence had taken place between Generals v. Werder and v. Manteuffel.‡ The messenger-posts established between Châtillon-sur-Seine and the headquarters of the South Army enabled the news from the Lisaine to reach the Commander-in-Chief on the

following day.

Thus General v. Manteuffel had in his hands on the morning of the 18th the report of the third day's fighting, from which he could infer that the retreat of the French army was probable. This assumption was confirmed that same evening by a further telegram.§

The victory of General v. Werder had brought about a marked change in the military situation. The danger to the communications of the German armies with home territory was

for the present averted.

The distance was still far too great to deal a blow at once from the side of the Saône upon the vanquished enemy, yet the junction of all three corps might be effected in the direction of Rioz and Montbozon. From the point of view of their own security, this course appeared the most advisable; but in so acting no really decisive result would have been achieved. It is true that considerable losses might probably be inflicted on the enemy in a series of rear guard actions; but he would only be weakened, not annihilated, as he would be thrown back on his natural line of retreat. With the restless energy which was characteristic of the French preparations, the same army, newly reinforced, would before many days have to be again encountered.

A very different condition of things would result were General v. Manteuffel to act up to his original intention and throw himself with the IInd and VIIth Corps upon the lines of communication of the East Army. The latter could then only effect its retreat through the narrow zone between the Saône and the Swiss frontier, the practicability of which is much hampered by the parallel ridges of the Jura Mountains. General Bourbaki was obliged to follow with the mass of his army the roads along the Doubs. Besançon offered him the first point of support,

14th Division to detach a flying column towards St. Loup.

This arrangement applied to the 1st Battalion 74th Regiment, as well as to the greater part of the trains and columns attached to the 14th Division. The battalion did not join its corps until 5th February.

† On the motion of the Commander-in-Chief, General v. Zastrow ordered the

<sup>\$</sup> See Appendix CLIX. \$ See Telegrams Nos. 11 and 13 in Appendix CLIX.

and this direction brought him at once into collision with General v. Manteuffel. Should the Germans succeed in barring the valley of the Saône below Besançon and repulse a last attack, waged probably with the energy of despair, the only mode of egress left to the enemy would be the difficult defiles

In regard to the distances, it was possible to bar the adver-

sary's march, but the enterprise was replete with danger.

Although the French corps would probably be found in a shattered state, in point of numbers they were far superior to the two Prussian corps. The communications of these latter with the rest of the army and with home territory were even now insecure, and they must be entirely severed when the Saône, the Ognon, and the Doubs were crossed. Besançon would be in front, the fortress of Langres, the strongly occupied and intrenched Dijon, and the small fortress of Auxonne in flank and rear, and they must be prepared to accept decisive battle with their front facing their base of operations.

The march of the Corps would lie through a comparatively thinly-populated and inhospitable district, in which the daily quartering of the troops, a necessity at this inclement season, and their rationing, in the absence of supplies from the rear, would be difficult, while the practicability of the defiles was doubtful; so that they could not but look forward with absolute certainty to the greatest privations and hardships. Nevertheless, General v. Manteuffel resolved upon the bolder course,

as promising the greater results.\*

How far the adversary had progressed in his retreat, and whether he had taken the right or left bank of the Doubs, was not known; it therefore appeared necessary to secure the passages of the river below Besançon, so as to be able to encounter him in good time on both banks.

CHANGE OF FRONT TO THE RIGHT OF THE IIND AND VIITH ARMY CORPS, AND THEIR ADVANCE TO THE DOUBS.

The orders issued, before the arrival of the latest intelligence, by General v. Manteuffel for the 19th January, had still kept in view the continuation of the movement eastward, while at the same time initiating the change of front to the right which had

become probable.


On the 19th January† the advanced guard of the Hnd Corps found that Gray, which had been occupied up to the previous day, was now clear of the enemy. The troops crossed the two

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19th January.

<sup>\*</sup> General Count v. Moltke reported to the following effect to His Majesty:—
"General v. Manteuffel's movement is extremely bold, but it may lead to the greatest results. Should be suffer a check he ought not to be blamed, for in order to gain great successes something must be risked.'

† See Sketch.



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remaining intact bridges over the Saône, and occupied quarters in the town. The 3rd Division reached Autrey and its environs; Dannenberg's mixed brigade, Fontaine Française; the corps artillery, St. Seine l'Eglise; whilst half of the 4th Division remained at Thil Chatel, in order to observe the enemy at Dijon.

whose outposts were some nine miles distant.\*

The advanced guard of the 13th Division reached Savoyeux, where the railway bridge had been found quite passable; an additional means of passage had been commenced at Seveux with the aid of the light field bridge train. For this purpose, the 2nd Field Pioneer Company was transferred from the 14th to the 13th Division. Major Treumann superintended the work. About 8 o'clock that evening a military bridge, 62 yards long, was in readiness immediately above the place.§

The main body followed as far as Dampierre-sur-Salon; the right flank detachment proceeded to Vereux, with the object of forming a link with the IInd Corps. The 14th Division, on the left of the 13th, marched with the advanced guard to Lavoncourt, with the main body to Vaite, and sent forward a flying column towards St. Loup-les-Luxeuil in order to endeavour to establish connection with the troops on the new etappen line through Epinal and with Colonel v. Willisen. The corps artillery VIIth Corps moved to the neighbourhood of Champlitte. General v. Manteuffel transferred his headquarters from Prauthoy to Fontaine Française; he here received a telegraphic report from General v. Worder that he intended following the retreating foe on the 19th with the advanced guards, and on the 20th with the main body, and that he would advance in the direction of Lure, by way of Béverne, as also upon Saulnot and upon Arcey. A later despatch supplemented this news to the effect that the line Noroy-le-Bourg-Villersexel-Onans would be reached on the 20th.

On the 20th January\*\* the decisive change in the previous 20th January.

direction of march took place.

\* At Arceau, Norges-la-Ville, and Savigny-le-Sec.

T See Telegrams Nos. 16 and 17 in Appendix CLIX.

See Sketch.



<sup>†</sup> A destroyed arch had been repaired by the French.

A wire suspension bridge at Seveux was destroyed and could not easily be repaired.

<sup>§</sup> The great depth of water necessitated five floating supports, so that five halfpontoons had to be formed into rafts, and the bridge was only fit for infantry and cavalry. The ice drift necessitated the bridge being displaced after completion. In the night it became necessary to remove the bridge altogether, so that on the 20th the reconstruction had to be commenced afresh.

<sup>🛊 3</sup>rd and 50 men of the 39th Fusiliers, under 1st Lieutenant v. Wilamo-15th Hus. witz-Möllendorff. This officer, moving through the district which French raiding parties had made anything but secure, reached St. Loup on the 21st January, whence a garde mobile battalion was just retiring in the direction of Conflans. He then opened connection with the etappen troops and with Colonel Baron v. Willisen, and subsequently escorted some trains and reservists of the VIIth Corps to the South Army. After taking part on his way in operations against Auxonne, he rejoined his corps on 4th February.

By order from the army headquarters,\* which this day moved to Gray, the Hud Corps, forming the pivot of the change of front to the right, was to assemble in the course of the day with its main forces at Gray, chiefly on the left bank of the Saône, while the advanced guard was to be pushed forward to Pesmes. The VIIth Corps was likewise ordered to cross the river, and then move up abreast of the Hud at Sauvigney-les-Angirey and Citey. The advanced guard was to move upon Besançon, and to reconnoitre and watch in the direction of Rioz. General v. Kettler was entrusted with the operations against Dijon, while a detachment of the 7th Infantry Brigade was ordered to maintain connection with him for the time being.

In carrying out these movements the advanced guard of the IInd Corps came into collision with the enemyt at Pesmes. Some 200 mobile guards had established themselves on the south bank of the Ognon, and endeavoured to prevent the Prussian pioneers from constructing the bridge which they had

taken in hand on reaching the river.

The adversary was, however, quickly driven off by artillery fire, and the bridge completed. The main body of the 3rd Division and the corps artillery passed to the left bank of the Saône, Dannenberg's brigade followed to Gray, whilst half the 4th Division marched on Essertenne and Mirebeau-sur-Bèze,

leaving a detachment in Thil-Châtel.‡

The 13th Division, after crossing the Saône at Savoyeux, marched with its advanced guard to Choye and Gy; the main body assembled in rear. The 14th Division used the two bridges at Savoyeux and Seveux, despatched its newly-formed advanced guard to Mont-les-Etrelles and Frasne-le-Château, and followed with the main body to the neighbourhood of St. Gand. The corps artillery reached the same point. The detachment which had been temporarily left at Bourg for the purpose of observing Langres was brought up to Vaite with part of the remaining trains and the 3rd Field Pioneer Company.\*\*

The weak French forces retired before the Corps upon Besançon.

† See ante, p. 8, note .

§ Military bridge.

§ 39th Fusiliers, 4th VII, and 2nd Field Pion. Co., under Colonel


• Pannwitz.

<sup>\*</sup> Appendix CLXI gives the text of the Army Order, 19th January, 1871, 6 p.m.

<sup>‡</sup>  $\frac{Fus.}{49}$  and  $\frac{i}{11th}$   $\frac{i}{Drag.}$ , under Major v. Schon. This detachment was charged with maintaining communications with General v. Kettler.

<sup>¶</sup> See ante, p. 8.

•• This detachment had on the previous day marched from Bourg through Longeau to Frettes, and had despatched the 10th to St. Michel (south of Longeau), in order to lead the troops, &c., on their way to join the VIIth Corps from Châtillon-sur-Seine, in the directions indicated by the corps headquarters.



Connection with the XIVth Corps was also sought for on

this day.\*

The orders issued by General v. Manteuffel for the 21st 21st January. January† directed in general terms the advance of the IInd Corps upon Dôle, that of the VIIth Corps upon Dampierre, on the Doubs. In this movement every effort was to be made to guard themselves in the directions of Auxonne, Besançon, and Rioz, and to endeavour to open communications with General v. Kettler on the one side, and with the XIVth Corps on the other, while the railway and telegraph were to be destroyed at Dôle.

The advanced guard of the 1Ind Corps, under General v. Action at Koblinski, reached Dôle at 2.30 p.m., found the town occupied Dôle. by the enemy's infantry, and at once proceeded to attack it. The 2nd Grenadiers deployed, supported by the two batteries, and rapidly pushed forward into the outskirts of the town. The enemy was evidently taken by surprise. In the streets, however, a struggle continued, the inhabitants also taking part, until ultimately the resistance was overcome, and the adversary dispersed in all directions. The Doubs bridge was fortunately found untouched, and was at once used for pushing the outposts to the left bank. Forty-five prisoners were brought in. The strength of the enemy was estimated at some 1,000 men. A welcome booty fell into the German hands. 230 wagons, loaded chiefly with food and army requisites, had been left behind on the railway by the French, so that the South Army now reaped the benefit of large supplies apparently intended for Besancon.

The main body of the 3rd Division reached Moissey and the neighbourhood; Dannenberg's brigade, La Grande Résie.¶

A battalion was left to garrison Gray and secure the Saône bridges.\*\* The 4th Division crossed the river at Apremont,

• 30 troopers of the 15th Hussars and 20 men of the 53rd Regiment, under Lieutenant Count v. Bocholtz-Asseburg.

§ Order of March of the Advanced Guard IInd Army Corps. (21st January.)
Commander: Major-General v. Koblinski.

Vanguard: Colonel v. Ziemietsky.

1st and 4th Squadrons 3rd Dragoons.
2nd Battalion 2nd Gronadiers.
2nd Light Battery.
Fusilier Battalion 2nd Grenadiers.
1st Battalion ...

Main Body: 42nd Regiment.
2nd Heavy Battery.

<sup>+</sup> Appendix CLXII contains the text of the Army Order of 20th January, 1871, 5 p.m., and of a despatch sent from General Baron v. Manteuffel to General v. Werder, early on the 21st January.

1 Lieutenant v. Quast, 3rd Dragoons, had previously reached Dôle with his

<sup>1</sup> Lieutenant v. Quast, 3rd Dragoons, had previously reached Dôle with his division, occupied the nearest houses with dismounted men, and held his position until dearth of ammunition compelled him to retire.

<sup>||</sup> The losses of the advanced guard Hnd Army Corps amounted to 1 officer and 33 men.

The brigade passed henceforth under the command of Colonel v. dem Knesebook. The artillery and cavalry had already rejoined their corps.

<sup>\*\*</sup> Ina.

where there was a practicable bridge, and occupied quarters in and round Aubigney. The connecting detachment at Thil Châtel followed as far as Mirebeau-sur-Bèze, the corps artillery to the neighbourhood of Pesmes.

Engagements on the Ognon.

Whilst the IInd Corps was experiencing some resistance on the Doubs, the VIIth Corps, which was moving nearer to Besançon, fell in with the enemy on reaching the Ognon. The advanced guard of the 13th Division, reinforced for the day, and under the orders of General v. d. Osten Sacken, had to dislodge from Marnay a garde mobile battalion detached thither from the fortress; in its retreat, the battalion destroyed the Ognon bridge, although not effectually. The restoration was at once commenced, and on its completion the march was continued; Vertière and Andeux were reached towards 10 p.m. Some 50 prisoners had fallen into the hands of the advanced guard. The main body followed to Marnay.

The advanced guard of the 14th Division, under Colonel v. Pannwitz, drove across the Ognon at Etuz some 800 gardes mobiles, who likewise retired on Besançon and made an attempt to destroy the bridge behind them. But as it remained passable for infantry in single file, a detachment occupied Cussey-

gur- Ognon.

Whilst the bridge was being repaired under cover of this detachment, the main body of the advanced guard moved to the right upon Pin, where two companies of the 13th Division were already engaged.‡ The adversary retired at once on Emagny, and disappeared in the darkness; but the bridge was also destroyed. The advanced guard and the main body of the 14th Division, which likewise arrived, had in consequence to pass the night on the right bank of the Ognon.§ The corps artillery followed to Avrigney. Whilst a hussar patrol of the 14th Division, which was seeking connection with the XIVth Corps by way of Rioz, made some prisoners close in front of Montbozon, and learnt from them that a French corps, said to be 30,000 strong, was in the neighbourhood, a patrol of Baden dragoons from Noroy-le-Bourg arrived in the evening at

<sup>\*</sup> With Hind and Fus. and 6th Light VII

<sup>† 5</sup>th and 6th and ½ 2nd Field Pion. Co.

<sup>‡ 1</sup>st and 3rd 55

<sup>§</sup> The restoration of the Emagny bridge was completed next morning by 
§ 2nd Field Pion. Co.

II is difficult to determine what troops of the French army were at Mont-bozon on the 21st January. According to the orders issued for this day by General Bourbaki, extensive positions were to be occupied on the right bank of the Doubs from Bois-la-Ville through La Bretenière and Luzans to Châtillon-le-Duc and Miserey, with outposts pushed forward to the passages of the Ognon. (See Poullet, "La Campagne de l'Est," pp. 441-3.)

Marnay. It had found Vesoul clear of the enemy. The first connection between the two fractions of the South Army was now established.

#### PROCEEDINGS AT DIJON.

On the 21st January General v. Manteuffel had transferred his headquarters to Pesmes. Since 3.30 p.m. heavy firing had been audible there from the direction of Dijon, upon which

place General v. Kettler had meanwhile advanced.

Precise information was still wanting as to the strength of the hostile forces assembled near that town, and their proximity might shortly become of great importance. Some earlier intelligence had mentioned 12,000 men; on the other hand, a reconnaissance undertaken on the 18th January furnished a very different estimate. According to the statements of the inhabitants the adversary might number 30,000 men. apparent contradiction, however, to this report was the circumstance that these troops were totally inactive, that they had not only permitted the advance across the Langres plateau without molestation, but the Saône bridges were also abandoned to the advancing columns without any real resistance.

As a matter of fact the French Government were on the point of concentrating very considerable forces at the old Burgundian capital, with the intention of making it a strong pivot of support for further enterprises in Eastern France.

After the departure of Crémer's Division the forces left in Dijon consisted of some 20,000 men, under General Pelissier, and the Vosges Army, under General Garibaldi, of about the same strength. Of the latter force, Ricciotti's brigade of some 2,000 to 3,000 men was still posted on the 13th January at Avot-le-Grand. It had, however, on the approach of the German Army Corps retired through Is-sur-Tille on Dijon, without having attempted any resistance. Colonel Lobbia, who was posted on the 13th January with parts of the 2nd Brigade of the Vosges Army on the line of march of the IInd Corps at Billy-les-Chanceaux, retired through Selongey to Fontaine Française, in order, as we have already seen, to

On the same day Lieutenant Count v. Bocholtz-Asseburg, 15th Husears, reached (see aste, p. 13) Noroy-le-Bourg, where he found Colonel Baron v. Willisen's Cavalry Brigade.

† Generals Garibaldi and Pelissier, and erroneously Crémer, were named as

being present at Dijon.

† The Vosges Army had left Autum on 5th January in a strength of some 20,000 men, and reached Dijon and the neighbourhood after 7th January. (See

Appendix CLXIII contains the ordre de bataille of the Voeges Army in the middle of January, 1871, and a return of the composition and strength of the Division under General Polissier assembled at Dyon on 17th January, 1871. § See ante, p. 7, Note §.

escort an ammunition train to the fortress of Langres by a détour to the eastward.

In place of Ricciotti's brigade, parts of the 3rd Brigade, under the command of Menotti Garibaldi, as also other franctireurs, were pushed forward from Dijon to St. Seine, in order to observe the march of the Germans. These were the same who, on the 17th January, had offered a slight resistance to the right flank detachment of the IInd Corps, under Colonel v. Ferentheil.\* From this period General Garibaldi, who was in chief command, limited himself solely to holding Dijon and its immediate neighbourhood. As a matter of fact, part of his troops were insufficiently armed and equipped. It was not until the 18th that 12 position guns reached Dijon. In the subsequent days, however, the forces were considerably augmented, and the French War Ministry computed Garibaldi's strength at the end of the month at 50,000 men and 90 guns.

Although this number may probably have been overestimated, yet, in any case, the General had such considerable means at his disposal that he might perfectly well have attempted to check General v. Manteuffel's march and deployment from the mountain defiles. Such was also the intention of the Government of the National Defence.† General Pelissier was to secure Dijon, while Garibaldi was to employ his troops for enterprises in the open field and in the neighbouring moun-

Colonel Bombonnel occupied Gray with a weak detachment. Informed as early as the 15th January, by advices from Langres, of the advance of the Germans, he had made constant appeals to Dijon for reinforcements, but had always been refused, under the pretext that the town itself was believed to be threatened. In consequence, and against his better judgment, he was forced to abandon the entirely unprotected line of the Saône. In order to do his best under the circumstances he assembled on his retirement from Gray all the detachments he could lay his hands upon for the defence of Dôle, where he opposed General v. Koblinski on the 21st January.

In fact, it was not until the 19th January that General Garibaldi started with the Vosges Army, at the time when the Prussian Corps had already crossed the Saône. He led his troops in three columns to a distance of four or five miles to the north of Dijon. Had this movement been continued even as far as Is-sur-Tille,‡ it must have led to engagements with parts of the 4th Infantry Division, and might have probably caused the Germans some delay. But the entire business remained an

See ante, p. 7.
 + See "Enquête Parlementaire, Rapports," Versailles, 1874, Vol. 2, and "Dépositions des Temoins," Versailles, 1878, Vol. 3.

The movement of the expedition as far as that place had been originally intended. See Bordone, "Garibaldi et l'Armée des Vosges," p. 440, and Janin, "Journal de la Guerre de 1870-71 à Dijon et dans le Département de la Côta d'Or," Part II, p. 158.

ineffective demonstration. The General contented himself with observing from a height near Messigny some movements of the 4th Division,\* and then returned to Dijon with his troops playing the Marseillaise.

Although, in this wise, not only the mountain defiles, but also the passages of the Saône, had been left open to the Germans, yet the defensibility of Dijon had meanwhile been very materially increased by working diligently at the defences.

The town, as is well-known, tlies at a short distance from the foot of the Côte d'Or, at the confluence of the Ouche and the Suzon. Between these two streams, above the town and about two miles distant from its centre, stand out two rugged conical hills, on which are built the villages of Talant and Fontaine-les-Dijon. They had been arranged for a stubborn defence, and provided with heavy field artillery, so that they formed, as it were, two forts protecting the town on this side, and presented a very strong position, commanding the high road from St. Seine. The northernmost village dominated at the same time the country towards the east, and the road leading from Langres. On this side, also, St. Martin was arranged for defence, and a large earthwork thrown up, which had been connected by shelter-trenches with La Fillotte on the west, and with the fortified border of the town, at La Maladière and La Boudronnée, on the east. The road leading from Gray to Dijon was barred by the position at St. Apollinaire. This position had been strengthened with earthworks, and was connected by way of Mirande with the works on the south side, which had been commenced by the Germans and completed by the French. In rear of this front line of defence, numerous large buildings offered another line of defence, so that the defenders could have held the town even against a far greater number of troops than those at General v. Kettler's disposal.

The preparations made for strengthening Dijon were very incompletely known by the Germans. The difficulties they would present were destined to become apparent during the attack itself.

In pursuance of instructions,‡ General v. Kettler intended reaching Sémur on the 19th January. For this purpose, after leaving behind small detachments for the protection of the railways and the trains following the Hud Corps, he had already quitted Montbard, when other orders arrived from

<sup>•</sup> It was making reconnaissances in force from Is-sur-Tille, Thil Châtel, and Lux, as far as Marsannay. (See Part II, p. 11.)

† See Part II, Vol. I, p. 222, and Sketch facing next page.

‡ The order to demonstrate in the direction of Autum and Sombernon, issued

<sup>†</sup> The order to demonstrate in the direction of Autun and Sombernon, issued from Army Headquarters at Prauthoy on the 16th, reached him at Montbard on the 18th January.

the 18th January.

§  $\frac{5th \text{ and } 6th}{21}$  in Montbard.

 $<sup>\</sup>parallel \frac{\text{Fus.}}{61} \text{ and } \frac{1\text{st}}{11\text{th Drug.}}$ , under Mujor v. Conta.

Army Headquarters.\* In pursuance of these, he marched that same day to the neighbourhood of Dampierre-en-Montagne, and on the 20th January to Turcey and St. Seine. Here he received orders to take steps for the capture of Dijon on the 21st. On the morning of this day General v. Kettler left for that place.

Major v. Conta, who was escorting the train of the IInd Corps, had received instructions to hand them over at Is-sur-Tille to the 4th Division,† and after doing so to advance also

on Dijon.

Thus, in the course of the 21st January, the 5½ battalions, 2 squadrons, and 2 batteries, which were for the moment at General v. Kettler's disposal, were now approaching the town in three columns from the west and north.

# Engagements at Talant—Fontaine-les-Dijons, and Messigny, 21st January.

Immediately on debouching from St. Seine, the detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Weyrach found itself in presence of some franctireurs and gardes mobiles, who, however, disappeared after a few shots. The same thing happened at the deeply sunken valley of the Suzon, where some 400 Frenchmen were discovered, and who also retired after a slight skirmish. At 1.30 p.m., the heads of the German columns on reaching the farmstead of Changey were received from Talant and Fontaine-les-Dijon with artillery fire. The 1st Battalion 61st Regiment occupied the heights on either side of the road, the 6th Heavy Battery unlimbered to the south of it, and the

† To Major v. Schon's detachment, which on the 21st marched to Mirebeausur-Bèze. (See ante, p. 14)

1 Order of March of General v. Kettler's Brigade

on 21st January.

Column on the St. Seine—Dijon road.
 Lieut.-Colonel Weyrach's Detachment;

1 2nd Squadron 11th Dragoons.
1st Battalion 61st Regiment.

6th Heavy Battery IInd Army Corps.
7th and 8th Companies 21st Regiment.

Colonel v. Lobenthal's Detachment:


Fusilier Battalion 21st Regiment (except 11th Co. detached to baggage). 5th Light Battery IInd Army Corps.

Column on the Turcey—Dijon road, under Major Kroseck.
 2nd Squadron 11th Dragoons.
 1st Battalion 21st Regiment.

2nd Battalion 61st Regiment.
3. Column on the Is-sur-Tille—Dijon road, under Major v. Contalist Squadron 11th Dragoons.
Fusilier Battalion 61st Regiment.

§ See Sketch.

<sup>\*</sup> Namely the order issued at the headquarters in Prauthoy on the 18th, that General v. Kettler was to occupy the line Sombernon—St. Seine with his main forces on the 20th.



two companies of the 21st captured Daix after a brief struggle. Strong hostile bodies of infantry were visible on the position Talant—Fontaine. In consequence, General v. Kettler, who was accompanying the central column, ordered up Colonel v. Lobenthal, caused the 5th Light Battery to come into action next the 6th Heavy Battery, but instructed the infantry to await the result of the artillery fire. Towards 4 p.m., the enemy took the offensive towards Daix, but was repulsed and pursued by the 21st almost up to his entrenchments. An attempt to take in flank our left wing was speedily foiled by the musketry fire from Daix, whither the 10th Company had also been despatched.

Major Kroseck had meanwhile, with little difficulty, defeated the numerous attempts of the franctireurs to oppose his march, and made prisoners of 7 officers and 177 men, who, while moving in the Ouche valley along the Sombernon-Dijon road, were surprised by the 2nd Battalion 61st Regiment.\* afternoon between 4 and 5 o'clock, he carried by storm the village of Plombières, in spite of the vigorous defence of the

enemy.

General v. Kettler now caused the fire of his two batteries to be exclusively directed upon Talant, in order to prepare an attack on this strong point. The two fusilier companies of the 21st Regiment, hitherto held in reserve, as also two companies of the 61st belonging to Major Kroseck,† were brought up, and at 5.30 p.m. the whole line dashed with loud cheers upon the enemy. The latter was completely driven from the outlying ground, and thrown back upon his entrenchments, the pursuing detachments, at the same time, seizing the houses at the foot of the conical hill. Any further advance was prevented by the darkness; moreover, a closer acquaintance had manifested the immense strength of the enemy's position. expenditure of ammunition, which could not be at once replaced, had been considerable. At 6 o'clock the fire ceased on both

General v. Kettler, however, resolved to leave the troops for the night in the positions which they occupied close in front of the superior forces of the enemy. The 1st Battalion 21st Regiment was alone despatched to Hauteville to cover the left flank. It found the place still occupied, and the companies had therefore to capture it before they could go into quarters.

During these proceedings on the west side of Dijon, the

gundian Canal, whilst the 5th had been detached to escort a wagon train.

The prisoners found themselves hemmed in between the steep declivities of the Bois de la Combe au Diable and the Burgundian Canal. Captain Kumme had made their retreat from thence impossible by his fire; 1st Lieutenant v. Zitzewitz, in company with some men, crossed the Ouche in a boat they found, passed the canal by the gates of a sluice, and brought the gardes mobiles across one by one after breaking up their arms and throwing the latter into the water.

† 6th and 7th. The 8th was still engaged in collecting prisoners at the Bur-

column under Major v. Conta had also carried on a no less vigorous action. Advancing from Is-sur-Tille along the Dijon road, it found the villages of Messigny, Norges-la-Ville, and the country south of these places strongly occupied by the enemy. In order to establish connection as soon as possible with General v. Kettler, in pursuance of his instructions, the major attacked the vineyards and farmstead of Messigny with the 9th and 11th Companies, whilst the 12th Company occupied the Bois de Norges, repulsing an attack made by the enemy from the Asnières heights. The 10th Company posted itself at Sevigny-le-Sec, in order to meet an outflanking movement which threatened from the direction of Norges-la-Ville. Whilst the engagement at Dijon could be distinctly heard in the south, every inch of ground of the strongly-held Massigny had to be gained at the point of the bayonet.\* When the defenders at 4.30 p.m. had lost the last farmstead, they retired over the Suzon to Vantoux, breaking down the bridge behind them. But as the enemy was still holding Norges-la-Ville, and was thence threatening the weak detachment in rear, Major v. Conta, carrying off his wounded with him, proceeded for the night to Savigny-le-Sec.

The losses of Kettler's brigade in the actions of the 21st January amounted to 19 officers and 322 men.‡ The day's fighting had entailed upon the enemy a loss in prisoners alone of 7 officers and 430 men. The strain had been very considerable upon the troops, who on the days immediately preceding had accomplished marches of considerable length, in unfavourable weather and by difficult roads. Neither before nor during the engagements had they been able to cook their food.

General v. Kettler resolved to go into quarters on the 22nd for the purpose of recruiting the meu's strength. The enemy, on perceiving movements made with this intention, opened a useless artillery fire, and attempted to assume the offensive from his strong position; but was at once repulsed. In contravention of the Geneva Convention, he broke up a field hospital established at Changey Farm. Otherwise the day passed without incident. The brigade resting in quarters was able to replenish its ammunition from an ammunition column which had arrived.

<sup>\*</sup> Here fell 1st Lieutenant Count v. Schwerin, commanding the 11th Company 61st Regiment; Captain Baudach was wounded.

<sup>†</sup> He did not succeed in establishing communication with General v. Kettler. ‡ Staff Surgeon Major Dr. Born, 61st Regiment, fell mortally wounded in the head by a ball.

Major Priebsch of the same regiment died after a few days in consequence of a wound received in the skirmishing line. Captain v. Pirch had also been mortally wounded, as also 1st Lieutenant Count Prebentow v. Przebendowski, 21st Regiment.

#### ENGAGEMENT AT POUILLY ON 23RD JANUARY.\*

On the 23rd January, General v. Kettler came to the determination to transfer his troops by a movement to the left from the hills to the plain, where the more prosperous villages offered greater resources in respect of food. The enemy remained perfectly quiet, and the flank march was executed close in front of him.

The 1st Battalion 21st Regiment belonging to the advanced guard had surprised a detachment of garde mobile on the road from Hauteville to Ahuy, dispersed it, and captured a number of prisoners. The brigadet afterwards reached, without molestation, at 11 a.m., Valmy Farm, to the north of which it first took up a position, and pushed forward detachments of cavalry towards Ruffey. The country people and prisoners affirmed that on the previous day considerable forces had moved from Dijon in a south-easterly direction to Auxonne, and that this movement was still proceeding. The conspicuous inactivity of so large a hostile force tended to confirm these statements, no less than the circumstance that the villages of Bellefond and Ruffey, which were strongly occupied on the previous day, were now evacuated by the enemy.

In consequence of the importance of holding fast the troops opposed to him, General v. Kettler determined to clear up the

situation by resuming the offensive.

At 1.30 p.m. the fusilier battalion 21st Regiment received orders to dislodge the franctireurs from the heights north of After a brief engagement, they were driven down Pouilly. into the village which was strongly occupied by the enemy, and which was now briskly cannonaded from the heights by the two batteries. On the report that the enemy was deploying against Ruffey in considerable force from St. Apollinaire and Varois, six companies and a squadront advanced upon Epirey Farm. But the enemy made no serious attack, and returned after a short time to St. Apollinaire, so that a battalion could be recalled to Pouilly, against which village the fusiliers had meanwhile deployed. The 21st now dashed towards the outer wall of the village, but had to carry each separate house by storm. The enemy defended the château with especial tenacity. It was not until the place was set on fire that the numerous garrison, which had taken refuge in the upper storey, surrendered. The French artillery now opened fire from Fontaine

† Major v. Conta had rejoined it on the march.



See Sketch facing page 18.

<sup>‡</sup> Ist, 7th, and 8th and 2nd 11th Drag, a division of which was despatched to the line Bellefond—Ruffey in order to cover the flank.

<sup>§ 18</sup>t.

<sup>||</sup> Parts of Ist and Fus.

upon Pouilly. To the north also of the town, on the high road, two hostile field-guns came into action, but were speedily

compelled to retire.

Between Pouilly and St. Martin, on the west side of the high road, lies a substantially built factory entered from an open courtyard. This, as also La Fillotte at the foot of the Talant heights, and the connecting shelter-trenches across the intermediate ground, appeared to be strongly occupied by the enemy. Notwithstanding this circumstance, the fusiliers and parts of the 1st Battalion 21st Regiment advanced from Pouilly and, supported by the fire of the batteries which had followed as far as this village, approached within 500 paces of the hostile lines. Here, however, after the adversary had also succeeded in deploying some artillery to the east of the Langres road, they were forced to halt by the converging fire to which they were exposed.

General v. Kettler now brought forward two more battalions of the 61st Regiment from Valmy Farm. The 1st Battalion deployed between the Suzon Valley and the high road; the 2nd moved along the valley,† drove the enemy from his positions between the factory and La Fillotte and threw him back towards the suburbs. To cover the right flank from the French skirmishers which were advancing to the east of Fontaine, a division of the 6th Company ensconced itself at the Suzon brook. With the 7th Company 1st Lieutenant Luchs, in spite of considerable loss, pressed forward at once along the newly laid line of rails, which terminated in an excavation to the north-west of the factory, and scarcely 200 paces from it. The 5th Company and two divisions of the 6th followed in the same direction. The flanking fire from the factory impeded, however, the subsequent advance, and several attempts to effect an entrance failed.

A heavy fire from three sides was now directed upon the 61st. The commander of the 2nd Battalion, Captain Kumme, as also the commander of the 6th Company, Lieutenant Straube, were speedily placed hors de combat from wounds. 1st Lieutenant Luchs; assumed the command of the battalion. The 7th Company was reduced to some seventy bayonets, and only the 5th Company, brought up from the reserve, was still to a certain extent intact; the evening was closing in, fog and powder smoke concealed the view; the enemy, as the firing showed, was receiving reinforcements. In spite of that, Lieutenant Luchs decided to renew the attack. Whilst maintaining his front towards St. Martin with the 6th and 7th Companies in order to guard against a hostile attack from that direction, he ordered 1st Lieutenant Weise with the 5th Company to advance once more against the factory.

<sup>•</sup> Exclusive of the 8th Company, despatched to Ruffey to cover the left flank.
† 6th and 7th Companies in first, 5th in second line.

<sup>1 1</sup>st Lieutenant Luchs was also wounded, and his horse killed.

This officer, after explaining to his company the task they had before them, at once led the way into the shower of bullets. By his side, carrying the colour of the battalion, was Sergeant Pionke, who fell dead before he had proceeded many yards. Lieutenant Weise, also wounded, had to be carried to the rear. As the edge of the excavation was steeply scarped in the direction of the attack, and at the time was very slippery, only some forty men were able to follow at first. 2nd Lieutenant Schulze, raising the colour aloft, led them forward, but likewise sank to the earth pierced by two bullets. Several musketeers,\* who in succession bore the colour, met a glorious death, as also did the adjutant of the battalion, Lieutenant v. Puttkamer, who, pressing forward, fell immediately in front of the factory.

The fact that there was no entrance to the building on the west side could not be perceived from the excavation.† The men who, in spite of the murderous fire, charged close up to it, could in consequence do nothing, and most of them succumbed to the enemy's fire. The sergeant-major of the company led back the few survivors to the excavation. Here, for the first time, the colour was found to be missing, but in spite of the darkness and the continuous heavy fire, many volunteers went in search of it. But only one‡ of them returned, and he was wounded; the others lost their lives in the vain attempt. As the men fighting near Lieutenant v. Puttkamer had all been killed, there was still doubt as to whether the last bearer of the colour had not fallen in with another body of troops.

As a matter of fact, the only colour which the Germans lost in this war was discovered by some men of Ricciotti Garibaldi's brigade, under a heap of dead bodies not far from the factory,

riddled with bullets and steeped in blood.

When it was quite dark General v. Kettler, who was convinced from the strength of the resistance that the enemy was in full force in and near Dijon, gave orders for the fighting to be discontinued. Under a continuous but fruitless fire from the adversary, he assembled his troops to the south of Pouilly, whither the 2nd Battalion 61st Regiment had already been obliged to cut their way through. Up to 8 p.m. the troops remained at the rendezvous, and then, leaving two companies



<sup>\*</sup> Who they were could not be noted, as all the men near the colours were killed.

<sup>†</sup> The main building of the factory forms the west face of the premises, which are surrounded by massive buildings and high walls. As the lower windows of the double-storied building were about twice as high as a man from the ground, the west side presented no means of ingress. This circumstance, however, could not be ascertained from the excavation, as a fold of the ground concealed the lower part of the building. On the enemy's side preparations had been made for producing the greatest effect of fire by turning to account the numerous windows and making loopholes in the surrounding walls.

Musketeer Schumscher.
 This brigade had defended the factory and its neighbourhood.

<sup>| 11</sup>th and 12th | The wounded that could be moved were transferred to Is-sur-Tille.

behind to protect those in search of the wounded, moved into

quarters behind the line Vantoux—Asnières.\*

The struggle on the 23rd January had, however, entailed a loss of 16 officers and 362 men on Kettler's brigade.† Eight officers and some 150 prisoners were captured from the

enemy.

General v. Kettler with 4,000 infantry, 260 cavalry, and 12 guns had been unable to wrest the fortified town of Dijon from the enemy, who was very much superior in force. But his energetic attacks on the 21st and 23rd, and the boldness with which the small detachment maintained itself afterwards close in front of the enemy,‡ led General Garibaldi to believe that a considerable part of the German Army of the South was opposed to him, and that he must confine himself to a careful defence of his position. The attacks were so far successful that a French Corps was chained to the spot, thereby ensuring to General v. Manteuffel full liberty of action, without fear of molestation from that quarter.

# DEPLOYMENT OF THE IIND AND VIITH ARMY CORPS ON THE DOUBS.

Whilst these events were taking place in front of Dijon, General v. Manteuffel had continued his march without interruption.

On the day of the fight at Pouilly he was already on the direct line from Besançon to Lyons, thus barring to the enemy

the shortest line of retreat to the south of France.

22nd January.

The leading troops of the IInd Corps having reached the Doubs on the 21st, the Commander-in-Chief gave orders for the VIIth Corps to advance as far as the river on the 22nd, and gain possession of the bridges in the neighbourhood of Dampierre.

In consequence of this, the advanced guard of the 13th Division marched from the neighbourhood of Lantenne, Vertière and Audeux, to the right as far as St. Vit, which village it reached at noon without meeting the enemy. It destroyed the railway and telegraph at that place, captured a

<sup>\*</sup> Two companies of the 49th had, by order of Major v. Schon, moved from Mirebeau-sur-Béze by way of Arc-sur-Tille to open communication with General v. Kettler. But, in spite of the thunder of the guns causing them to hasten their march, they did not reach Varois until it was dark and the fight over. They afterwards returned to Mirebeau.

<sup>†</sup> Among them 20 missing.

‡ General v. Kettler at the same time extended the quarters occupied on the evening of the 23rd January somewhat to the eastward.

<sup>§</sup> Tind and Hird, 7th Rifle Buttalion, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th VII, and 1st Field Pion. Co., under Major-General v. d. Osten or Sacken. The advanced VII

guard was further strengthened that evening by Ist and IInd and 5th Heavy VII

large number of wagons—among these were thirteen full of provisions—and then continued its march to Dampierre. The nearest bridges over the Doubs\* had been found intact by the scouts, a circumstance which was the more important as the pontoon column of the VIIth Corps had not yet arrived; it was only expected by way of Epinal. In any case, the material of a light field bridge train would not have sufficed to bridge the Doubs, which was some 80 to 120 mètres in breadth at this point.† The four bridges were quickly occupied; nowhere did the advanced guard meet with resistance, and apparently the enemy after his defeat on the previous day had entirely withdrawn to Besançon.‡

Meanwhile, in order to observe Besancon, the 14th Division had pushed its advanced guard§ across the river by the restored

bridge over the Ognon near Emagny.

Whilst the main body of the IInd Corps halted for the most part on this day, the advanced guard, which was assembled at Dôle, reconnoitred south of the Doubs as far as Le Deschaux. The bridges over the Clauge, the Loue, and the Orain were found intact. It is true that in the numerous passes there were barricades of every description, which, properly occupied, might have presented a serious obstacle. But the enemy did not attempt to defend them, and had either not provided them generally with guards or had withdrawn these in consequence of the sudden appearance of the Prussian columns at Dôle. The neighbourhood of Auxonne, where a regiment de marche was said to be posted, was clear of the enemy. Only towards the left, on the south bank of the Loue, was Villers Farlay apparently occupied.

The detachment despatched on the 20th to open communication with General v. Werder arrived at Pin on the 22nd. It had found Colonel v. Willisen's troops at Noroy-le-Bourg, and, without coming across the enemy, had returned by way of

Vesoul and Rioz.

General v. Manteuffel received intelligence of the present position of the XIVth Army Corps¶ and of the movements of the French army, which, bearing away southwards in its retreat, might be partly expected between the Doubs and Ognon in the direction of Besançon, while part might have retired behind the Doubs. The already reported presence of considerable hostile forces at Montbozon\*\* appeared to indicate the defence of the passage against the two advancing corps.

See subsequent description.

See ante, p. 14.

One at Fraisans, two at Rans, and one at Orchamps.

<sup>+</sup> Steps had already been taken to secure the help of the Had Army Corps, but this was now unnecessary.

<sup>1</sup> It was not until Torpes and Osselle that the patrols discovered strong bodies of the enemy. Opposite Audeux the French occupied Pouilley-les-Vignes.

<sup>§</sup> Its composition is given in ante, p. 12, note ||. || See ante, p. 13, note \*.

It was to be presumed that the whole of the French army would endeavour to reach Lons-le-Saunier, and thus secure the communications with the south.

General v. Werder was now recommended to delay the enemy's retreat by a vigorous offensive, and in any case to prevent the Corps supposed to be at Montbozon from advancing to Gray, so that the IInd and VIIth Corps united could bar the roads leading to the south.

To these last-named Corps had been assigned as their first destination the road and railway from Besancon to Lons-le-Saunier, while the attention of the VIIth Corps had been specially directed to the importance of the railway bridge at Abbans Dessous and the Loue bridge at Quingey. Both points

were to be reached in force by the 23rd at the latest.\*

13rd January.

Action at

Quingoy.

The orders issued for this day regulated the advance of the main forces up to and across the Doubs. The VIIth Corps, with one Division in the neighbourhood of Dampierre, and the other at Quingey, had to show front towards Besancon, and, by means of scouting parties despatched towards Amancey and Ornans, watch for any movements between Besançon and the Swiss frontier. Only a small detachment was to be left on the Ognon, for the purpose of guarding the passage at Pin, maintaining communications with the XIVth Corps, and reconnoitring along the Besançon road, as also towards Rioz. The IInd Corps was ordered to push forward its advanced guard as far as Mont-sous-Vaudrey for the purpose of reconnoitring the three roads leading from thence to Salins, Arbois, and Poligny, as also of destroying the railway and telegraph between Besançon and Lons-le-Saunier. With a view to employment on either bank of the Doubs, the main body of the Corps was to remain provisionally at Dôle, to which place Army Headquarters were transferred this day; one of its brigades was to take post in rear as far as Pesmes, and keep up communication with Gray. This point was to remain occupied until the arrival of the etappen troops expected from the Government-General of Lorraine.

The advanced guard of the 13th Division first dislodged some hostile detachments from Byans and then occupied Quingey after a slight skirmish. The enemy, who was in no small force, retired in disorder behind the Loue as well as towards Besançon, leaving not less than 800 prisoners in the hands of the rapidly advancing Prussian vanguard. railway bridge at Abbans Dessous was destroyed and a train of 400 convalescents was captured on the line.

The main body of the 13th Division followed as far as Byans. The corps artillery in rear of it crossed the Doubs by

<sup>•</sup> The Army Headquarters had remained on the 22nd at Pesmes.

† For this duty were appointed Ist, 13rd | 13rd | 15th Hus. | 15t

v. Brederlow.

the bridges at Rans and endeavoured to find quarters on the left bank.

The 14th Division assembled at St. Vit and pushed forward Artillery an advanced guard\* on the right bank of the Doubs to Danne- cannonade of marie, where its outposts were attacked in the afternoon from Dannemarie, Besançon as well as from the north. But the affair was limited

to an artillery engagement, which lasted until dark.

After a slight skirmish at Parrecey, the advanced guard of the Hnd Corps reached Vandrey. The country, which had been prepared at all points for defence, appeared at first to be entirely free of any enemy; but at Villars Farlay the scouting detachments met with opposition and were unable to reach Mouchard. The patrols also which were despatched from Mont-sous-Vaudrey towards Arbois and Poligny came under fire from the woods, and failed to make headway. The main body of the 3rd Division reached Dôle. Knescheck's brigade occupied quarters along the Pesmes road, with the object of watching Auxonne and protecting the rearward communications.

Hitherto only franctireurs, gardes mobiles, and garrison troops from Besançon had been met with, but to-day we had to deal with detachments of the field army, thereby throwing a

clearer light on the military situation.

### PROCEEDINGS OF THE XIVTH CORPS AFTER THE ENGAGEMENTS ON THE LISAINE.

General v. Werder, as already stated, had set apart the 19th January for reorganising the regiments and corps belonging to his command and for commencing a pursuit with

advanced guards.

Before Colonel v. Willisen received the orders on this 19th January subject, he had already taken the offensive, \$ had met with weak French infantry detachments at Roye and Lure, and, after a few rounds of shell, had forced them to retire. He then went into quarters at Lure and caused reconnaissances to be made in the direction of Vesoul and Villersexel. Strong French columns were seen retreating to the south of the Scey brook, while Villersexel was found to be occupied in force. At La

<sup>\* 53</sup>rd Regiment, 4th 15th Hus. 2nd Light, and 2nd F. Pion. Co., under Colonel

v. Cosel. † The small detachment under Major v. Schon remained at Mirebeau-sur-Bèze, and, as already mentioned, took the offensive this day towards Dijon with part of its forces. (See ante, p. 24, note \*.)

\$ See Part II, Vol. II, p. 361.

With the Eupen battalion, 1st and 4th, 2nd Reserve Dragoons, 1st Reserve Lancers, 1st Baden Body Guard Dragoons, Baden, XII, A. B. Light Reserve VII besides 5th and 8th 1 2nd Total- 10 companies, 121 squadrons, 3 6th Baden 2nd Bad. Drag. batteries.

Vergenne and Athesans collisions occurred with hostile detachments, which were speedily overthrown. The attempt to communicate by way of Saulx and Port-sur-Saône with the troops advancing under General v. Manteuffel had not at present met with success.

The Baden Division had sent forward its advanced guard\* from Chenebier across the Rognon to Frotey-les-Lure, while the rest of its troops extended their quarters in front of Frahier as far as Etobon.

General v. d. Goltz occupied Champey; the 4th Reserve Division moved with the advanced guard as far as Aibre, throwing forward outposts to and across the Rupt brook. The main body remained at Héricourt.

At all points prisoners were captured, and numerous sick

and wounded men, besides strugglers, were met with.

Action at Ste.

Murie.

Colonel v. Zimmermann, who was charged with the duty of reconnoitring from Montbéliard along the right bank of the Doubs, advanced with 3½ battalions, 1 squadron, and 2 batteries in two columns,‡ by way of Allondans and Dung. After surprising and making prisoners of 100 Frenchmen at Mont Chevis Farm,§ both columns appeared about the same time before Ste. Marie, brought their batteries into action, and drove the enemyl from the village, as also from the copse in rear. Upwards of 400 prisoners fell into the hands of the landwehr. The lancers pursued the fugitives. Bavans and Voujaucourt, on the Doubs, were found to be still occupied.

As the whole of Colonel v. Zimmermann's detachment¶ had been transferred to the siege corps before Belfort, and part of it was at once to be employed before the fortress, it returned in the evening to Bussurel and Montbéliard.

Although the main body of the XIVth Army Corps was still on the Lisaine on the evening of the 19th January,\*\* this

\* 2nd Baden Infantry Brigade, 1st and 5th 3rd Bad. Drug., and 2nd Light and 5th Heavy under Major-General Baron v. Degenfeld.

<sup>†</sup> For instance, 300 unwounded prisoners, 700 sick and wounded men, fell into the hands of Colonel Baron v. Willisen. The latter were given medical assistance and proper shelter. Much the same happened to the remaining troops of the XIVth Army Corps.

<sup>†</sup> Through Allondans: Insterburg battalion, Gih and 7th, 3rd Res. Lan.

4th Light
4th Res. Div.; through Dung: the Loetzen battalion, 6th and 7th
Wehlau, Breslau Had'
and 2nd Heavy
4th Res. Div.

<sup>§</sup> By the 3rd Insterburg. That same morning 48th Goldap had already surprised Mont Chevis Farm and captured therein two officers and 60 men, but subsequently being hotly fired upon from the westward and, night falling, they evacuated it. The French re-occupied the farm.

<sup>||</sup> Estimated at two battalions.

T East Prussian Landwehr Brigade, 1st and 3rd and 4th Lt. and 2nd Hvy.

3rd Res. Lan. 4th Res. Div.

<sup>\*\*</sup> Sce Sketch facing page 11.

day would have removed all doubts as to the retreat of the enemy. His feeble resistance, the large number of prisoners, who for the most part voluntarily surrendered themselves, and the abandoned arms and stores of every kind distinctly showed

the adversary's condition.

In the course of the day General v. Werder had received instructions from the Royal Headquarters to resume with vigour the siege of Belfort, and personally to take the offensive vigorously against the retreating hostile army. To the last operation he was also urged by General v. Manteuffel, who added that he would be with his main forces at Gray and in front of the town on the 20th January, ready either to advance against the enemy's flank or bar his retreat to the southward.\*

General v. Werder accordingly gave orders that only four battalions of Colonel v. Zimmermann's troops were to be employed for the siege,† while the rest were to form part of the

left column under General v. Schmeling.

From the reports of the advanced troops, but more especially from the circumstance that the enemy was still on the Doubs close in front of Montbéliard and had offered some resistance at Ste. Marie, General v. Werder inferred that the French army contemplated retreating to and across the Doubs above Besancon. He, therefore, decided to wheel his corps to the left towards the river during the two following days. purpose Colonel v. Willisen was to advance as far as possible with his cavalry along the Vesoul road and spread out on the 21st as far as Frotey and Vallerois-le-Bois, while the Baden Division was to move to the line Lure - Villers exel on the Upper Ognon, and to concentrate on the 21st at Villersexel and Esprels. General v. d. Goltz was first to gain Secenans and St. Ferjeux on the 20th, while General v. Schmeling was as soon as possible to reach Onans with the advanced guard and Arcey with the main body, and to reconnoitre towards l'Isle-sur le-Doubs. During this time, Colonel v. Zimmermann's 4 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 2 batteries, t once more withdrawn from the siege corps, would cover the left wing. General v. Werder made no further arrangement with regard to the troops of his left wing, as they would soonest come into contact with the enemy.

Colonel v. Willisen's patrols, in their advance next morning, 20th

20th January.§

and Marienburg battalions. § See Sketch facing page 12.

<sup>\*</sup> See Telegram No. 14 in Appendix CLIX.

<sup>+</sup> It was assumed at the Royal Headquarters that a reinforcement of the 1st Reserve Division by General v. Debschitz' troops would suffice for this purpose. General v. Werder hereupon reported that he considered it necessary to leave parts of the 4th Reserve Division for the present before Belfort.

1 The following moved under Colonel v. Zimmermann:—The Tilsit, Wehlau,

<sup>†</sup> The following moved under Colonel v. Zimmermann:—The Tilsit, Wehlau, Insterburg, and Danzig battalions, 1st and 3rd 4th Light and 2nd Heavy 3rd Res. Lan. 4th Res Division
The following remained in front of Belfort:—The Gumbinnen, Loetzen, Goldap,

found the entire country to the north clear of the enemy, and

on the Vesoul road only fell in with stragglers.

Villersexel was also evacuated by the enemy and a few shells sufficed to cause him to abandon Marat and Esprels. The reconnoitring troops were not checked until they reached the Ognon below Villersexel, where the enemy held Pont-sur-l'Ognon and Bonnal in force, on the opposite bank. A column of French troops which advanced from Villargent towards Villersexel, finding itself fired upon from the height east of the latter place, brought into action twelve guns and several battalions near Villers-la-Ville, whilst the remaining troops bent away The enemy likewise disappeared from towards the south. Villers-la-Ville in a southerly direction, just as the advanced guard of the Baden Division from Moffans appeared on the Scey brook. The advanced guard crossed the brook and took post on the Villersexel heights. Le Petit Magny was not abandoned by the enemy until evening. The outposts of the Baden Division remained at Villersexel and Beveuge, whilst the rest of the advanced guard went into quarters north of the Scey brook. The quarters of the main body of the Division extended rearwards as far as Lure. Generals v. d. Goltz and v. Schmeling, as also Colonel v. Zimmermann, after a slight encounter with hostile detachments, reached their appointed destinations; their advanced troops gained the line St. Ferjeux—Faimbe—Beutal. The French evacuated all the villages as far as the Doubs, where, however, they held l'Isle in strong force.

The headquarters were transferred on the 20th to Saulnot. The instructions from Army Headquarters, which reached headquarters at Brévilliers by telegraph during the last night,† necessitated operations which would probably lead to serious collisions with the enemy. General v. Werder was to hold him in check, in order to gain time for the movements of the Hud and VIIth Corps. The general resolved, in consequence, to concentrate the mass of his forces on the line Villersexel—Melecey-The movements to this end were executed on ا January. Courchaton. the 21st without any opposition, and outposts placed on the line Cubrial—Geney—Onans. Colonel v. Willisen proceeded to Noroy-le-Bourg.‡ The patrols sent on in advance found

† They were dispatched at 9.30 a.m. on 19th January from Army Headquarters at Prauthoy.

By two guns under Captain Rayle, who had proceeded from Vouhenans with the th and 6th, 2nd Bad. Drag, and Light Res., and who, in view of the superior 5th and 6th hostile forces advancing against him, withdrew through St. Sulpice.

<sup>†</sup> The Eupen Battalion remained with the two étappen batteries at Lure and Ronchamp, in order to proceed from thence to Epinal. The two reserve rifle companies also returned shortly (23rd January) to the command of the Governor-General of Lorraine, whilst 5th and 8th reached their regiment, and the 6th Bad.

<sup>1</sup>st Reserve Lancers rejoined the 4th Reserve Division. After the 23rd, therefore, Colonel Baron v. Willisen had only at his disposal the 2nd Reserve Dragoons, the Baden (1st) Body Guard Dragoons and the Baden Horse Artillery Battery. As already mentioned, the first officer's patrol of the VIIth Army Corps reached Colonel v. Willisen on the 21st. (See ante p. 15, note \*)

Montbozon, Rougemont, and the whole country as far as the Doubs unoccupied; the enemy had even abandoned L'Islesur-le-Doubs that morning, blowing up the bridge behind him.

However desirable it might now be that the enemy should be pursued without delay, General v. Werder considered it essential for the mass of his troops to rest on the 22nd of

January.

Although the distances accomplished in the last few days 22nd January by the XIVth Corps had not been great, yet they had entailed considerable effort, owing to the badness of the roads, severe cold, insufficiency of food, and the close quarters, which were but little removed from bivouacs in respect to the accommodation they offered. The searching of villages and woods delayed the march, and the maintenance of a constant state of readiness for fighting was very trying. It was also necessary to await the arrival of the ammunition and commissariat train.

The detachments sent forward to reconnoitre found Clerval and Baume-les-Dames on the Doubs still strongly occupied by

the enemy.

For the next day, the 4th Reserve Division was ordered to move upon Soye, west of L'Isle,\* in order to cover this point of passage, whilst General v. d. Goltz was to advance to Mésandans and cause Baume to be watched by his advanced The Baden Division was instructed to march with two brigades left and right of the Ognon to Avilley and Montbozon, and with the thirdt to Rougemont, while Lure and Villersexelt were to be held by weak detachments.

After these orders had been issued, more detailed written communications, dated 21st January, arrived from the Army Headquarters at Gray. General v. Manteuffel expressed his intention of making a movement to the right and placing himself on the enemy's communications, and, at the same time, hoped that General v. Werder would remain within striking distance of the adversary and follow his main forces whither-

soever they might retire.

In order to compensate for the deficiency of cavalry with the IInd and VIIth Corps, it was further ordered that Colonel v. Willisen should move by forced marches to Pesmes with the two regiments and horse artillery battery still left to him, passing for a time from the command of the XIVth Corps.§

This officer, accordingly, moved next day by way of Vesoul, 23rd January where he met with some French stragglers and franctireurs, who, after a few rounds from the horse artillery battery, were easily

† With the corps artillery.

§ See Appendix CLXII.



A reconnaissance of the passage there had shown that, by utilising the whole of the material of the Corps, a bridge could be constructed in four or five hours, while the restoration of the permanent bridge would require 36 hours.

The following were appointed for the purpose: Fus. 5th Bad. 2nd Bad. Drag.

dislodged by some dragoons dismounted for the purpose. In the evening, after a march of 25 miles, he reached Frasne-le-Château.

Of the Baden Division, the head of the 1st Brigade was entering Cognières towards noon, when the squadron trotting in advance reported that it had been fired upon from Montbozon, and that the nearest villages and woods were also occupied by the enemy. The latter, after receiving a few shells whilst the column was deploying, retired, but it was then too late to carry out the intention of pushing forward the advanced guard to Loulans.

The remaining troops of the Division, without meeting with the enemy, moved into the prescribed cantonments and placed their outposts. Two squadrons proceeded to Vellefaux, in order to maintain communication from that place with the

VIIth Corps, in lieu of Colonel v. Willisen's cavalry.\*

On reaching Mésandans, General v. d. Goltz received verbal orders from General v. Werder to seize this day, if possible, the town of Baume-les-Dames. In consequence, Colonel Wahlert with two battalions, a squadron, and two batteries,† moved off for that place at 3.30 p.m. He found the enemy in a strong position on the steep heights south of Autechaux. Received with artillery fire from the hill south-west of La Bréville, he deployed the 3rd Battalion of the 34th in the direction of the heights, on and to the west of the high road, and, so far as the advantageous position of the enemy would allow, caused the guns to play upon it from various points; he then sent the 8th Company by way of La Bréville to support the right, and the other three companies of the 2nd Battalion by way of Autechaux to support the left wing. The French guns speedily disappeared, and after a short but somewhat brisk fight the companies of the right wingt captured the Montagne de la Boussenotte; those of the left gained possession of an extensive barricade of stones, which had been made on the road abreast of the enemy's fighting line. The adversary retired in disorder to the Aigle Heights.

It was now dark, and the barricade prevented the guns from being brought forward; the further advance was therefore postponed until next day. The troops occupied scanty quarters in Autechaux. Some prisoners stated that there

Engagement Autechaux.



<sup>\*</sup> That same day Lieutenant Brandeis rode from Vellefaux through Montbozon and Rioz to Pin, in order to open communication with the VIIth Corps. In spite of many détours, which he was forced to make in order to avoid franctireurs, he attained his object, and rejoined his regiment on the following day after a ride of 75 miles.

 $<sup>\</sup>frac{9\text{th and 11th}}{34}, \text{ followed by } \frac{8\text{th}}{34}.$ 

<sup>§ 10</sup>th, 12th, and 5th

<sup>||</sup> Captain Sintenis and Licutenant Baron v. Wolzogen were killed in the

were still two Divisions of the 15th French Corps at Baumeles-Dames.\*

A detachment of the 4th Reserve Division, while advancing to reconnoitre towards Clerval, also came into collision with the enemy. French infantry were holding the shelter-trenches north-west of the town, but abandoned them after a brief skirmish, and blew up the Doubs bridge in their rear. The advanced guard of the 4th Reserve Division meanwhile proceeded beyond Soye as far as Fontaine.

Colonel v. Zimmerman's column entered l'Isle-sur les-Doubs without resistance. It then, partly by a ford and partly by pontoons, passed to the left bank an advanced guard, which established its outposts on the line Rang-Blussans. But when the patrols were proceeding onward, they found themselves in presence of hostile forces drawn up to receive them. The two pioneer companiest at once repaired the destroyed bridge.

From the various reports which reached him, General v. Werder was led to believe that the enemy must have left a strong rearguard at Baume-les-Dames in order to check the pursuit, and to give the beaten army time for further movements. He therefore made arrangements for a serious attack

on this point.

In the event of the XIVth Army Corps crossing the Doubs Engagements above Besançon, it would become necessary to take measures at Roches and of precaution as well against that part of the French Army which was left at Blamont. Lieutenant-General v. Tresckow Hnd had therefore been requested to attack the town with those troops which were not indispensable for carrying on the siege. On the evening of the 23rd, General v. Debschitz left, in pursuance of this plan, with 3 battalions, 11 squadron, and 23 batteries, formed in three columns.

Left Column: Captain Count v. d. Schulenburg.

Apenrade Battalion.

3rd Squadron 6th Reserve Lancers. 2nd Light Beserve Battery VIIIth Army Corps.

Central Column: Captain v. Schmidt.

IInd Breslau Buttalion. 🕯 2nd Squadron 6th Reserve Lancers.

1st Light Reserve Battery VIIIth Army Corps.

1 2nd Light Reserve Battery VIIIth Army Corps.
Right Column: Major Kierstein.
Lauban Battalion.

1 2nd Squadron 6th Reserve Lancers.

Ist Light Reserve Buttery IInd Army Corps.

These latter were placed at General v. Debschitz' disposal for the enterprise. The Liegnitz Battalion with 31 divisions of 3rd Squadron 6th Reserve Lancers maintained during the night of 23rd-24th January the position previously hold by General v. Debschitz.

Compare subsequent narrative of the proceedings of the French Army after the Battle on the Lisaine.

<sup>†</sup> Fus. 2nd 2st Lan., and 1st Light 4th Res. Div., under Major v. Spangenberg.

<sup>1 2</sup>nd Fort. Pion. and Baden Pontooneer Company. The material on the spot was not sufficient to make a military bridge.

Two of these advanced through Bondeval and Herimoncourt upon Roches, which place was occupied after a few rounds. The enemy was already in retreat. There were signs of numerous abandoned bivouacs, and upwards of 300 prisoners were captured.

The third column which was advancing further on the left upon Glay through the deeply sunken Meslières Valley was less fortunate. The column was attacked in flank and rear in the complete darkness. Its leaders having been wounded\* it

was obliged to retire to Croix.

General v. Debschitz learned at Roches that strong bodies of the 24th French Corps were still in his front, and at the same time received information of the check sustained by the detachment dispatched towards Glay. He therefore abandoned the attack on Blamont contemplated for that night, and returned to his previous positions. His losses amounted to 3 officers and 53 men.t

## PROCEEDINGS OF THE FRENCH ARMY AFTER THE BATTLE ON THE LISAINE.

18th, 19th, and 20th January.

On the 18th January General Bourbaki had transferred his headquarters to Arcey. The armyt had remained at first in its positions in front of the Lisaine, where it endeavoured as far possible to find quarters. The left wing, which was most threatened, was alone withdrawn and placed nearer to the 20th Corps. Crémer's Division, which was subsequently to cover the retreat, was posted in the evening between Etobon and Athesans. Even at this stage the Commander-in-Chief directed his attention chiefly to a movement of the Germans against his communications. He had asked the War Ministry whether their march was directed upon Vesoul, Gray, or Dijon. General Rolland, Commandant of Besancon, received orders on the approach of the Germans to destroy the bridges across the Saône and Ognon, to occupy the line of the latter river from Voray to Marnay, and to bring up to Besançon the 3rd Rhone Legion of the 24th Corps, which was supposed to be at Baume-les-Dames. On the other hand, the bridges of the line of the Doubs from Clerval to the fortress, were to be maintained in good order. Lastly, he was ordered to strengthen his post at Blamont on the Upper Doubs; in consequeuce, all the garde mobile battalions, which could be dispensed with at Besançon, with nine mountain guns, proceeded to this place.

Captain Count v. Schulenburg was mortally, 1st Lieutenant Zabeler severely wounded.

<sup>†</sup> Details are given in Appendix CLXXIII.

† See Appendix CXXXIV.

§ So far as can be gathered, six in number. (See "Enquête Parlementaire Rapports," Versailles, 1874, Vol. II, p. 715.)

General Pelissier, at Dijon, had been ordered by the Commander-in-Chief to reinforce the garrison of Auxonne with two battalions, and the commandant of this fortress received instructions to destroy the bridge at Pesmes.

After making these preparations, which, as we have seen, were carried out very imperfectly, General Bourbaki organised

his retreat."

It was to be covered on the left bank of the Doubs by the whole of the 24th Corps, which had to occupy the defiles of the Montagnes du Lomont, a rugged ridge, which, south of the Clerval - Pont de Roide road, forms a complete chord to the bend made by the river towards Montbéliard. The corps finished its deployment on the line in question on the 19th,† and on the following night. On the right bank, the 15th Corps this day! gained on the further side of L'Islo-sur-le-Doubs a position behind the Soye brook, north of Clerval; the 20th reached the neighbourhood south of Rougemont; the Army Reserve arrived at Avilley, whence it observed the Ognon down-stream. The 18th Corps, with Crémer's Division attached, occupied the road through Rougemont, as far as Servigney. In its retreat, this latter Division, as already described, came frequently into contact, at Villers-la-Ville, and south of Villersexel, with the detachments which Colonel v. Willisen had despatched to that neighbourhood.

On the 21st the retreat of the army was continued. The 21st January 15th Corps reached Baume-les-Dames, the 20th the neighbour-hood west of this town. Further on the left the 18th Corps, with Crémer's Division, halted at Chaude Fontaine and Marchaux, whilst the Army Reserve posted itself at Châtillon-le-Duc, facing the Ognon. The headquarters were established at

Baune-les-Dames.

General Bourbaki had received the approval of the War Ministry for the measures which he had hitherto adopted, but they expressed the hope that the army, after its reorganisation under the walls of Besançon, would once more resume the offensive. They indicated the possibility of concerted action with Garibaldi, and suggested an offensive movement upon Troyes and Chaumont of the 25th Corps left in the Loire district, the precise moment for which was left to his discretion. With nearly the whole of his forces closely concentrated between the Doubs and the Ognon, and with the fortress of Besançon close in rear, General Bourbaki also wished to remain stationary for the present and await further instructions from Bordeaux. He

<sup>\*</sup> The movements of the 18th and 19th January were ordered by the Army Order of 17th from Aibre; as regards the 19th, other counter-orders were sent, but their nature is not known. (Compare Poullet, "La Campagne de l'Est," 1870-1.)

Appendix CLXIV contains the wording of the order of march for the 18th and 19th January from Headquarters, Aibre, 17th January, 1871.

<sup>†</sup> See Sketch facing page 11. ‡ See Sketch facing page 12.

See ante, pp. 29-30.

issued orders to Army Intendant Friant to collect eight days' provisions, at Clerval for the 24th Corps, and at Baume-les-Dames for the rest of the army. But as there was a deficiency of the necessary supplies at Besançon, this measure could not have been carried into effect, even had the Commander-in-Chief been able to persevere in his resolution. That same day, however, his plan had been frustrated by the news that the line of the Ognon was lost, and that the adversary had even crossed the Doubs.

In such circumstances, General Bourbaki resolved to resume his advance without delay to Besançon; he informed the War Ministry thereof, shortly before midnight, adding that he would lose no favourable opportunity of attacking the enemy. Should no such opportunity, however, offer, he would cross to the left bank of the Doubs, in order not to expose himself to the dilemma of being obliged to fight with a river at his back. That same evening, the 1st Division of the 15th Corps received orders to move off to Quingey, in order to secure this important point; the infantry was to be forwarded by rail, the remainder to march. That night, also, the trains of the army left for 22nd January. Besançon; the troops followed during the 22nd January. The Army Reserve posted itself in the evening at Pouilley-les-Vignes on the Besancon—Gray road; the 18th Corps and Crémer's Division occupied the ground between Marchaux, Auxon Dessus, and Besançon; the 20th followed the movement to Corcelle and Marchaux; the main body of the 15th Corps\* marched to Roulansle-Grand and Luzans, whilst the 3rd Division of this corps remained at Baume-les-Dames, and the 24th Corps on the Lomont: The trains of the 15th and 20th Corps were parked at Besancon on the left bank of the Doubs, those of the 18th and of the Army Reserve on the right, but on the glacis of the fortress. The headquarters proceeded to Roche.†

23rd January.

On the 23rd January certain movements were made, which concentrated the corps round the fortress. But it had already become necessary to show front in two directions.

Whilst to the north side of the fortress the 20th Corps was deployed on the right bank of the Doubs on the line Chalèze—Miserey, the position of the 18th Corps to the west side bent back southward from Miserey to Francis, towards the Dôle road. On this latter, at St. Ferjeux, was posted the Army Reserve.

The infantry of the 2nd Division, 15th Corps, crossed the Doubs at Chalèze and, passing round the east of the fortress, reached the neighbourhood of Larnod. Cavalry, artillery, and train traversed the town and moved as far as Beure; the cavalry pushed forward detachments to Thoraise in order to watch the bridges there. The 24th Corps was also ordered up to Besançon. Only certain detachments of it were to remain

† About 41 miles from Besancon.

<sup>\* 2</sup>nd Infantry Division, cavalry, artillery of the Corps, &c.

behind at the passages of the Doubs and at the Lomont, in support of the mobile guard battalions, which had been sent away from the fortress to Blamont, and to which the defence of the mountain passes had now been confided. At the same time General de Bresolles received orders to relieve the 3rd Division 15th Corps with the least possible delay, at Baumeles-Dames, so that it might join the main body of the army.

But the whole of the movement could not be carried into effect. The detachment of the 24th Corps at Blamont was, as already mentioned,\* attacked on the evening of the 23rd by part of General v. Debschitz's force. The news that the Germans had crossed the Doubs increased the confusion.† Comagny's Division, part of which had been severely handled in the actions at Roches and Glay, moved to St. Hippolyte and continued its march next morning to Le Russey, following in consequence the Pontarlier road. The other two Divisions of the 24th Corps likewise abandoned the Lomont ridge and the Doubs, and retired to Sancey-le-Grand and Servin. The gardes mobiles,‡ which had also arrived at various points to relieve the 24th Corps, joined the general retreat, on finding that the defiles of the Doubs and Lomont were already abandoned.

The Division at Baume-les-Dames continued to hold the Autechaux heights on the right bank of the river on the 23rd January with nine companies and two guns. These were the troops which Colonel Wahlert repulsed in the afternoon upon l'Aigle; as the result of this engagement the Division moved off towards Besançon. Two battalions, which remained for the night at Baume, followed in the morning, after destroying the bridges. The 3rd Rhone Legion, arriving at Baume on the 24th January to relieve the troops there, and permanently occupy the place, found the town in the occupation of Prussian troops, and returned with its mission unaccomplished.

Whilst the line of the Doubs above Besançon was lost on the 23rd January and the following night, Quingey, which was of still greater importance, also fell into the adversary's hands.

We have already seen that on the evening of the 21st the French Commander-in-Chief, upon receipt of the first bad news from the Ognon and from Dôle, ordered the 1st Division 15th Corps to occupy Quingey. When on the morning of the 23rd January other orders followed to secure Arc-et-Senans, and to prevent the destruction of the railway bridge over the Loue, the Division was already in retreat. For want of rolling stock Minot's Brigade could alone be forwarded by rail; it reached the railway station at Byans, near Quingey, partly on the 22nd January and partly on the night of the 22nd—23rd. But the troops were in such bad order that it was not possible even to place outposts. A train which followed early on the 23rd was

<sup>\*</sup> See ante, p. 33.

<sup>†</sup> See ante, p. 33.

<sup>1</sup> Under Coionels de Vezet and Bousson.

received with Prussian shells. Shortly after, the heads of the German columns advanced upon Quingey, and this place which was to be defended to the last, was abandoned without any real resistance.

The flight-like retreat upon Busy blocked the way for the guns, and produced so bad an impression upon the reinforcements which were arriving, that General Dastugue abandoned

all attempts to re-occupy Quingey.

On the right bank of the Doubs, General Bourbaki had in the afternoon sent forward Bonnet's Division, from the position of the 18th Corps, a short distance towards Dôle, and reinforced it with Crémer's Division. This enterprise, which brought on the artillery engagement at Dannemarie, also failed, and General Crémer was recalled to St. Ferjeux just as he was preparing a

night attack.

Between the 15th and 17th January nine more battalions of Garde Nationale Mobile with a detachment of lancers had reached Besançon, in order to replace the troops given up by the garrison to the 15th Corps. But the mobiles were armed with Enfield rifles, for which there was no ammunition in the fortress, so that the men merely augmented the number of mouths to be fed. General Rolland, therefore, sent them away to the south without further delay.\*


## CONCENTRATION OF THE IIND AND VIITH ARMY CORPS SOUTH-WEST OF BESANÇON.

The country, into which the first operations of the IInd and VIIth Corps were about to lead, is intersected by spurs from the Jura Mountains. Along the line from Bourgt by way of Lons-le-Saunier to Besançon, these spurs fall in steep slopes towards the plains of the Lower Doubs and Saône. East of this line, the country bears the character of a plateau, over which stretch the numerous mountain chains running from north-east to south-west, that are only furrowed at certain spots by deeply sunken cross valleys. In these latter are found defiles extending often for miles, and enclosed by precipitous walls of rock. In spite of the numerous longitudinal valleys, enclosed by parallel chains, the number of roads leading to the south, following the general direction of the mountains, is limited. For the French Army in its present circumstances those leading from Besançon by Arbois, and from Ornans by Salins, to Lons-

† Between Lyons and Lons-le-Saunier.

<sup>\*</sup> Moving by way of Nozeroy and Champagnole, they subsequently reached the command of the French General at Lone-le-Saunier.

The narrative of events as regards the French rests chiefly on the statements contained in the Parliamentary Commission of Enquiry. (See "Enquête Parlementaire sur les Actes du thouvernement de la Défense Nationale," Versailles, 1873-4-5.)



le-Saunier were of chief importance; next, that from St. Hippolyte by way of Pontarlier and Champagnole; and lastly the eastern roads through Mouthe and Foncine-le-Bas upon St. Laurent. The transverse communications unite radially at Pontarlier; they traverse the well-known "Cluses," which present to an army moving from west to east, or vice versa, the greater difficulties, as the enclosing wooded heights are but sparsely populated and are difficult of access. At this time they were, moreover, covered with a foot deep of snow.

The most direct road from Besançon to the south was already barred by the Prussiaus at Quingey, while that from Ornans through Salins and Pont d'Héry was seriously threatened. The only prospect of escape for the French Army was for it to make a détour by Pontarlier. It was the duty of the South Army to intercept all these roads, while at the same time not losing sight of the possibility that the adversary might attempt to cut his way from Besançon towards the west.

The dispositions of General v. Manteuffel for the 24th January were therefore drawn up with the object of meeting with the VIIth Corps, in the first instance, any sorties of the enemy from Besançon on either bank of the Doubs. On the other hand, the IInd Corps was to advance at once along the Dôle-Salins road south of the Loue, pushing the leading troops to Mouchard.

The 14th Division despatched a reinforced brigadet to the south bank of the Doubs; this brigade took up its quarters in the angle of the river between Dampierre and Villars St. Georges; the rest of the Division; alone remained in front of Dampierre, under cover of the outposts at St. Vit. A detachment despatched by the 13th Division to reconnoitre on the left bank of the Doubs, advanced in the direction of Besançon as far as Busy, and, from the numbers of watchfires, drew the inference that a considerable body of troops was assembled in that vicinity. To the right of Quingey the line of the Upper Loue was found in the enemy's occupation.

After expelling a French detachment from Port Lesney, connection was established at Mouchard with the Hnd Corps. The head of this Corps, in accordance with orders, had already reached Mouchard at noon, and brought up its rearmost troops to Nevy-les-Dôle.§

Colonel v. Willisen reached Mottey, whence, next morning, he

Occupation of

Mouchard.

<sup>\*</sup> See Sketch.

<sup>† 28</sup>th Infantry Brigade (except  $\frac{Ist}{77}$ , which was still detached to Pin),  $\frac{1}{4}$  8rd and 4th, and  $\frac{2nd \ Heavy \ and \ 2nd \ Light}{VII}$ , under Major-General v. Woyns.

<sup>‡ 27</sup>th Infantry Brigade (except  $\frac{1}{74}$ , which had not yet rejoined),  $\frac{1}{15}$  and  $\frac{2}{15}$  Hus. 15th Hus. 15

<sup>§</sup> Exclusive of Knescheck's Brigade, left on the Dôle—Pesmes road.

marched to Pesmes, and at the same time assumed command of

Knesebeck's Brigade.

It was a favourable circumstance at this time for the South Army that the old line of communications of General v. Werder was occupied by troops belonging to the Government-General of Lorraine, and the line of messenger posts through Châtillon could therefore be dispensed with.

Army Headquarters had moved on the 24th January to La Barre not far from Dampierre, in order to be nearer to the

events which were occurring at Besancon.

The situation of the French Army had now become such

that rapid and vigorous action could alone save it.

General Bourbaki might possibly still have attempted to cut through in the direction of Auxonne towards Dijon. But, in such event, he would in the first place have had to encounter the resistance of the 27th Infantry Brigade, and afterwards of that of the strong detachment under Colonel v. Willisen. Meanwhile, the remainder of the two Corps could also re-cross to the right bank of the Doubs. The army, which, hurriedly put together, had not a sufficient train for the transport of its food, would thereby have increased its distance from the line of railway that had hitherto been the chief means of its subsistence. It was scarcely possible to contemplate concerted action with General Garibaldi's force, which, held in check by a few Prussian battalions at Dijon, had up to the present time remained wholly inactive.

Of still less promise would be a movement in a more northerly direction, as commissariat difficulties would have

been further increased.

On the other hand it was impossible to remain long at Besançon. The fortress was neither suited to receive a large

army, nor were its supplies adequate to feed one.

The most probable line of action for the French was to make the attempt to force their way southward, and regain the railway communication which was so vital a matter to them.

On the German side it was of great importance not to allow themselves to be deceived by any weak forces thrown out in advance, but to discover in time the real intentions of the adversary. The Commander-in-Chief therefore empowered his Generals, in the event of time not admitting of orders being awaited, to act independently on their own judgment, but communicated to them beforehand his wishes in regard to those cases which might most probably happen. Should the enemy attempt to escape by the roads leading southward between Villers Farlay and Pontarlier, the IInd and VIIth Corps were at once to throw themselves on his flank or cut him off; should he attempt to break through by way of Dampierre and Quingey, the VIIth Corps was to oppose him on both banks of the Doubs, the IInd was to take part by an attack in rear, whilst the XIVth was in all cases to press

vigorously the French rear-guards. Should the enemy endeavour to break through in the direction of Gray, the 14th and the Baden Divisions were to operate against his flanks, in order to hold him fast," while the troops further in rear were to anticipate him on the right and on the left. Should he once more show front to the XIVth Corps, it only remained for the IInd and VIIth Corps again to advance from the south. Should be move towards the Swiss frontier, all these Corps were to follow at once, in order to force him to accept battle or to cross the frontier. In the event of the enemy remaining under the walls of Besancon, there was no necessity to attack him, as hunger would speedily compel him to make desperate attempts to get free.

Further, the 28th Brigade, in view of more complete 25th January. security against hostile enterprises between the Ognon and Doubs, was again withdrawn on the 25th January to Dampierre and Orchamps on the right bank of the Doubs; it was thus at the immediate disposal of the Commander-in-Chief. At the same time the 27th closed towards its outposts at

St. Vit.

This day reconnaissances in force were made by order of

General v. Manteuffel.

Detachments of the IInd Corps advanced towards Salins and Arbois, as well as towards Poligny. Whilst no enemy was met with at the last-named village, at Arbois the Germans came across some 400 infantry soldiers, who, after being driven back on Salins, were there supported by strong reinforcements. Although the two forts of St. André and Belin, situated on high ground near the town, have, it is true, their main fronts towards the Swiss frontier, they at the same time command the ground towards the west and south, and cannot be attacked without some strength in artillery. They were armed. The town itself was said to be occupied by a garrison of some 2,000

The three infantry brighdes of the Corps, which had already crossed the Doubs, drew closer together between Mouchard and

Villers Farlay.

Of the VIIth Corps, the 13th Division sent detachments forward on the right towards the Loue, and also to the front in the direction of Besançon. They encountered the enemy at all points, and two companies; in particular became vigorously engaged at Vorges. The enemy brought field artillery into Action at action, and took the offensive with three or four battalions, so that these two companies had to be supported by bringing up

<sup>\*</sup> As also Colonel Baron v. Willisen's troops,
† Appendix CLXV gives the text of the despatch addressed by the Commander-in-Chief to Generals v. Zastrow, v. Fransecky, and v. Werder from La Barre on the 24th January.

<sup>1 10</sup>th and 11th

strong detachments.\* No inconsiderable losses were sus-

tained.

On the right bank of the Doubs, an officer's patrol of the 14th Division advanced to within 3½ miles of Besançon without meeting the enemy in any force. Some prisoners were, however, made, who stated that the 15th, 18th, and 24th French Corps were still near the fortress, whilst the 20th had already moved away to the southward. From Pin, Major v. Brederlow reported that the enemy had entirely disappeared from the Ognon, and that on the preceding night nothing had been seen of the numerous watchfires which had previously been visible there.

During the night, and in the forenoon of the 25th, fresh intelligence from the XIVth Corps had reached Army Head-quarters.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE XIVTH ARMY CORPS ON 24TH AND 25TH JANUARY. JUNCTION OF THE SOUTH ARMY ON THE 26TH JANUARY.

!4th January,

We have followed the movements of the XIVth Corps up to the 23rd, on which day General v. Werder had made arrangements for taking the offensive in force towards Baume.

For this purpose, General v. d. Goltz's detachment was ordered to be at Verne by 10a.m. on the 24th, and the 4th Reserve Division at Voillans. The latter, however, was to leave its

rearguard at L'Isle and Soye.

Further, the Baden Division was to hold part of its troops; in readiness at Mésandans; besides this, it was to reconnoitre on either side of the Ognon towards Rioz and Corcelle. No fight occurred, for the enemy had already evacuated Baume at 4 a.m., and had blown up the bridge over the Doubs to the southward.

General v. d. Goltz occupied the town at noon, but, shortly after, received orders from General v. Werder to move away to the westward, whilst in his place General v. Schmeling was to proceed to Baume, and with the aid of the Baden Pontoon

Column to throw a bridge across the Doubs.

But before this latter operation could be carried into effect a company of the Thorn Landwehr Battalion had crossed the destroyed bridge at Cour by means of ladders, and found the defile of Pont-les-Moulins on the further bank abandoned by the enemy. It was ascertained that the 15th and 20th Corps had been in the neighbourhood of Baume on the 22nd, that strong



<sup>\*</sup> IInd, 5th, 9th, and 12th, 3rd and 4th 7th Rif.

<sup>† 4</sup> officers, 68 men. Captain Baron v. Bülow was killed.

1st and 11nd Fus. † 4th

5th Bad. ' 6th Bad.' 3rd Bad. Drag.' and Baden

Baden

forces were still there on the 23rd, but that all had then withdrawn to Besancon. Thirty stragglers belonging to all the French Corps, which had taken part in the recent struggles,

were captured.

An advance of the bulk of the XIVth Corps across the Doubs appeared no longer desirable after the rapid retirement of the enemy. There were also prospective difficulties in respect of marching and of food. General v. Werder resolved to make his further action dependent on the orders of the Commander-in-Chief.\* About noon two letters dated the 22nd arrived from headquarters at Pesmes,† particularly enjoining General v. Werder to prevent the advance of hostile forces upon Gray.‡ He resolved, in consequence, to move off at once to the right with the Baden Division and Goltz' Brigade, but in doing so to quit the very wooded and mountainous ground between the Ognon and the Doubs, for the defence of which it was known that the enemy had made considerable preparations.§

On the evening of the 24th General v. d. Goltz marched to Loulans. The Baden Division likewise extended its quarters as far as this place and to Avilley. The 1st Baden Brigade moved up close to Rioz. Some cavalry reached this town. The 4th Reserve Division remained at Baume-les-Dames, and

occupied Soye and L'Isle-sur-le-Doubs.¶

On the 25th January General v. Werder marched with the 25th January. Baden Division and Goltz' Brigade to the district north of Voray and Etuz. The quarters extended to the rear as far as Rioz. 'Two squadrons\*\* advanced as far as Gy; their patrols found the country about the Ognon free of the enemy, and most of the bridges destroyed. On the right, the 1st Baden Brigade established connection with Major v. Brederlow's Detachment at Pin,†† whilst the 2nd remained in contact with the 4th Reserve Division. The detachments‡‡ left behind at Villersexel and Lure could be called in, as the communications of the corps could now be transferred to Epinal by way of Vesoul.

At L'Isle-sur-le-Doubs and Baume-les-Dames the military bridges were established. At the latter place the main body of

<sup>\*</sup> On the 28rd General v. Werder had been advised by telegram from Army Headquarters of detailed written instructions of the 22nd being on their way, but these had not yet arrived.

<sup>+</sup> See aute, p. 26.

The enemy as we know was in considerable force at Montbozon on the 21st.

See aute, p. 14.

See ante, p. 14.

§ See Part II, Vol. I, p. 280.

 $<sup>\</sup>frac{1}{2nd} \frac{1}{2nd} \frac{1}$ 

**T** The former by the Danzig Battalion, and  $\frac{\frac{1}{4} \text{ 1st}}{\text{Res. Lan.}}$ , the latter by Colonel

v. Zimmermann's Detachment. (See Sketch facing page 89.)

<sup>2</sup>nd and 3rd 2nd Bad. Drag.

<sup>††</sup> See ante, p. 26.

<sup>11</sup> See ante, p. 31.

the 4th Reserve Division, driving, after a slight skirmish, the enemy's rear guard beyond St. Juan d'Adam, passed to the south bank of the Doubs.\*

General v. Werder had expressed his belief to the commander of the siege corps before Belfort that the enemy's evacuation of Baume would be succeeded by that of Blamont. In order to throw light on this matter General v. Debschitz again advanced on the 25th January, occupied the town after a feeble resistance, but afterwards returned to his previous position at Exincourt-Croix.†

General v. Manteuffel was informed of these movements. Although executed on the basis of the Commander-in-Chief's arrangements of the 22ndt they were no longer in conformity with the general instructions, which had meanwhile been given to the Generals commanding Corps on the 24th. The Commander-in-Chief had in issuing these instructions presumed that the XIVth Corps would have followed closely after the enemy on the Doubs, and in this way he hoped to receive the earliest information of the French army commencing its movement to Pontarlier. The weak forces of the 4th Reserve Division, which were still left between the Doubs and the Swiss frontier, did not appear sufficient for the purpose. On the other hand, the approach of the XIVth Corps offered the advantage of a closer co-operation of all the fractions of the army, so that, for instance, not merely the IInd Corps, but the VIIth Corps as well could launch forward in the Jura to the south and south-east of Besançon, and bar the way to the enemy.

General v. Manteuffel hastened, therefore, on the afternoon of the 25th to request General v. Werder to direct his subsequent march on the 26th by way of Marnay, in order to effect a junction with the VIIth Corps. Until this was accomplished the latter must continue to remain in the position which it was holding close in front of Besancon. The IInd Corps had, however, already received orders to advance to Salins, and to recon-

noitre towards Pontarlier.

In executing these movements the advanced guard of the IInd Corps∥on the 26th January,¶ fell in with the enemy to the

26th January. Action at Salins.

† Pont-de-Roide was still held by the enemy.

Commander: Major-General v. Koblinski. Vanguard: Colonel v. Ziemietzky. Fusilier Battalion 2nd Grenadiers. 1st Battalion 2nd Grenadiers. 2nd Light Battery. 2nd Field Pioneer Company. 2nd Battalion 2nd Grenadiers. 1st and 4th Squadrons 3rd Dragoons. Main Body: 42nd Regiment. 2nd Heavy Battery.

¶ See Sketch.

<sup>\*</sup> Colonel v. Zimmermann remained at L'Isle-sur-le-Doubs.

See ante, p. 26.
General v. Werder did not receive these until the afternoon of the 25th Order of March of the Advanced Guard of the IInd Army Corps (26th January).



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south-east of Pagnoz, where a direct mountain path to Salins leaves the main road. Both batteries came into action at the cross roads, and opened fire upon Fort St. André; in consequence, however, of the elevated position of this work and of its armament of heavy guns, the fire produced but slight effect. The struggle, therefore, speedily devolved upon the infantry alone.\*

Whilst the 10th Company Fusilier Battalion 2nd Grenadiers followed the mountain road, the other three advanced along the main road. The latter lies in a deep rocky valley, and was raked by a brisk fire from the forts and by the enemy's skirmishers. It was only possible for small bodies to advance by rushes, and the losses were by no means inconsiderable. Gradually, however, the steep mountain slopes on either side of the road were scaled.

It was not until the entire Grenadier Regiment was deployed for the attack, that at 2.15 p.m. a successful entry was made from the north and along the railway into the station, and also

along the road into the suburb of St. Pierre.

To facilitate this attack General v. Koblinski had, meanwhile, advanced with the 42nd Regiment and a squadron; by way of St. Thiébaud. He left a battalion, at Saisenay to observe Ornans, and reached Salins a short time after the grenadiers had entered the town.

A white flag was hoisted over the town, and the resistance shortly came to an end. In consequence of a request from the mayor, the commandant of the forts agreed not to bombard the town. The advanced guard took up its quarters therein, and placed outposts on the roads to Pontarlier and Champagnole.

The engagement at Salins had entailed a loss of 3 officers

and 109 men.

The main body of the 3rd Division had advanced to Pagnoz, but as the advanced guard no longer required support, and as Fort St. André recommunenced shelling the outskirts of the town, it withdrew beyond range of the fortress artillery,¶ towards Mouchard and Villers Farlay.

Further to the south, the 4th Division had marched to

 The artillery remained in position for the rest of the action at the cross-roads in front of Pagnoz.

<sup>†</sup> The companies of the regiment entered in the following order, commencing from the left wing:—1st, 2nd, and 12th from the north against the station, 8th along the railway to the same place; the 9th followed on the railway; the 11th, 8rd, 5th, 6th, and 7th on the high road; the 4th had been despatched to the mountain path, in support of the 10th.

t 4th 8rd Drag.

<sup>11</sup>nd 42.

<sup>||</sup> Ist and IInd

<sup>¶</sup> General v. Hartmann, commanding the Division, had proceeded to Salins,

Arbois. Its patrols made incursions as far as Poligny and Champagnole without finding any trace of the enemy. strong column, which was despatched to Pont d'Héry, fell in with a French requisitioning party at Ivory, and drove it back upon Salins. The snow which covered the plateau a foot in depth prevented, however, any pursuit in this direction. The troops went into quarters between Ivory and Pont d'Héry.†

The reconnaissances which had been ordered on the part of the VIIth Corps also led to an action and to several encounters with the adversary. From the 13th Division, Lieutenant-Colonel v. Langen again advanced on the Loue, and found the river opposite Charnay and Rouhe, as also the Château of Châtillon-

sur-Lison, in the enemy's occupation.

Four battalions, under General v. d. Osten-Sacken, had advanced against the place by the two roads leading from Quingey to Besançon. They found the enemy firmly posted at Busy and Vorges, and the long musketry action which ensued cost them an officer and 32 men. On the other hand, they captured 50 men belonging to the 15th French Corps.

On the north bank of the Doubs the 14th Division was carrying its reconnaissances towards Besançon. A number of

prisoners were made at Francis.

At the XIVth Corps, Colonel v. Zimmermann received orders from General v. Schmeling to move from L'Isle-sur-les-Doubs to Baume-les-Dames, but too late to carry out this march on the 26th. His patrols found Pont-de-Roide evacuated by the

Action at Busy and

Vorges.

General v. Schmeling had advanced with the main body to the south of Baume, as far as St. Juan d'Adam. He had occupied Aissey and Passavant with advanced guards. The detachments, which were at once sent on ahead to reconnoitre. pressed forward in the direction of Besancon, as far as Bouclans and Etalans. It was not until they reached these points that they fell in with the enemy. At Orsans and Ouvans some slight skirmishes also occurred. In all 200 prisoners were captured. A mixed detachment established the connection with the rest of the XIVth Corps.

General du Trossel.  $\frac{7th}{9}$  was with the baggage.

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When the struggle was already at an end, an inhabitant, dashing forward from one of the houses, endeavoured to shoot the General at close quarters; but, before his carbine could go off, he was knocked down by the aide-de-camp and killed by

some soldiers who came to the rescue.

Some soldiers who came to the rescue.

Some soldiers who came to the rescue. e Ist, 5th, 6th, and 8th, 3rd 11th Drag. 6th Light, and 1st Field Pion. Co., under

<sup>†</sup> With IInd 73, 8th Hus., and \$\frac{1}{2}\$ 5th Light V11

‡ IInd 13, 1st 15, 1Ind 55, and 7th Rifle Battalion.

<sup>§</sup> See subsequent narrative.

<sup>||</sup> The Danzig Battalion, 2nd 3rd Res. Lan., and 1 2nd Light 4th Res. Div., under Major Du-

General v. d. Goltz, who had been pushed forward to Voray and Etuz, in order to secure the further movement to the right of the XIVth Corps, made reconnaissances from these places towards Besançon. Châtillon-le-Duc was found strongly occupied, and it was also discovered that the villages nearer the fortress, especially St. Claude, were crowded with troops.

The Baden Division extended itself past Rioz, leaving a weak detachment there, as far as the neighbourhood of Marnay; at the same time it pushed forward smaller detachments to the Ognon, and also charged them with observing the fortress. The troops under Major v. Brederlow, which were thereby set free, moved by way of Audeux to Corcelle Ferrière, on the left wing of the 14th Division; during the march strong bodies of the

enemy were observed in rear of Pouilley-les-Vignes.

In the course of the day the detailed reports of the engagements at Dijon reached Army Headquarters. The entire VIIth Corps having now become available for the advance south of the Doubs, General v. Manteuffel felt himself strong enough for an enterprise which he had hitherto only contemplated undertaking after the decisive battle with the enemy's main forces should have taken place. He ordered General Hann v. Weyhern to renew the attack upon Dijon, for which purpose the troops under General v. Kettler, Colonel v. Willisen, Degenfeld's Baden Brigade, and the small detachment of Major v. Schon were placed at his disposal.

## MOVEMENTS OF THE FRENCH ARMY BETWEEN THE 24TH AND 27TH JANUARY.

The results of the numerous reconnaissances made from different quarters tended to show with certainty that by far the largest part of the French Army was crowded together in a comparatively small area, on both banks of the Doubs, round Besançon.

After the unexpected loss of Quingey, and the failure of the attempt to take the offensive towards Dannemarie, the French Commander-in-Chief could no longer be blind to the danger of

his position.

Besides the embarrassments from without, there came reports from all sides showing the internal disorder of the troops. General Bourbaki could not have failed to become personally convinced of the fact on reaching Besançon on the 23rd January, when the picture of the prevailing disorder unfolded itself before his eyes. Army Intendant Friant brought the news that the supplies of food were not as they ought to be.

treux, moved to Larians, Ollans, and Rougemont, where they remained for the present.

They would only last for five days, or, with the help of the

fortress magazines, for fifteen to eighteen days.

In order to come to some decision in these difficult circumstances, General Bourbaki had called together a council of war on the 24th January at Château Farine on the Dôle road. The chief commanders were present, with the exception of General Martineau Deschenez, commanding the 15th Corps, and General de Bressolles, commanding the 24th Corps. General Borel, Chief of the Staff, had gone to General Martineau Deschenez for a verbal conference.

General Bourbaki explained to those present the critical state of the army, which was not only cut off from its line of retreat on the south, but must also be considered seriously

threatened on the north.

General Martineau reported that of his 30,000 men scarcely 15,000 were effective, and even these would in the event of a

collision with the enemy run away instead of fight.\*

The opinions of the other corps commanders were to the like General Billot declared that of his 25,000 men, only some 16,000 were really effective; General Clinchant 10,000 out of 22,000. How matters stood with General de Bressolles could be gathered from the events on the Upper Doubs. General Pallu de la Barrière, on the other hand, believed that he could answer for the Army Reserve in the event of a fight.

In these circumstances the Commander-in-Chief considered that the only possible choice lay between an attempt to break through in the direction of Auxonne or a retreat to Pontarlier. He himself proposed this latter course, affirming that no good result could be expected from an offensive movement in the exhausted condition of the troops and the growing state of The only spokesman in favour of the bolder indiscipline. course was General Billot, who thought it possible to break through to Auxonne. General Bourbaki pledged himself to follow with the army, should the 18th Corps succeed in reoccupying the lower course of the Doubs. General Billot having remarked that the whole army must be launched in the enterprise, General Bourbaki declared himself ready to give up the chief command to him, but that he himself would not resolve upon the attempt. General Billot, on his part, declined the offer made to him, saying that only a commander like Bourbaki could carry through so difficult a task.

Ultimately the retreat upon Pontarlier was decided.

After a telegram to this effect had been sent to the War Ministry, which had just been advising prompt decision and



<sup>&</sup>quot; Je reçus une lettre du Général Martineau-Deschenez, Commandant le 15° Corps, lettre dans laquelle il me dissit que je ne devais pas me faire d'illusion, qu'on s'organisait pour fuir et non pour combattre, et cette lettre était accompagnée de pièces à l'appui." (Statement of General Bourbaki. See "Enquête Parlementaire, Dépositions des Témoins," Versailles, 1873, Vol. III, p. 353.)

† Appendix CLXVI gives the telegraphic correspondence between the French War Ministry and General Bourbaki on the afternoon of 24th January, 1871. (See "Enquête Parlementaire Rapports," Versailles, 1874, Vol. II, pp. 744 and 747.)

impracticable sorties, the Commander-in-Chief first took the necessary steps to protect the flanks of the army, which would be seriously menaced during the march to Pontarlier. In the forenoon of the 24th January General de Bressolles had received orders to re-occupy the Lomont passes and the passages of the Doubs. The 18th Corps, with Crémer's Division, and the 20th Corps were brought up close to the gates of Besançon; the Army Reserve crossed the Doubs within the walls of the fortress, and advanced to Beure in order to serve as support to the 15th Corps.

The 1st and 2nd Divisions 15th Corps were to stand fast at Busy, and thence up-stream behind the Loue, and entrench themselves; the 3rd Division was to move by the 26th to Epeugney and Scey-en-Varais, while the cavalry of the Corps was to press forward in the district between the Loue and the Lison, to the south and south-east of Ornans. The 18th and 20th Corps were instructed to remain fast on the 25th January in their positions on the right bank of the Doubs, but to hold themselves ready to move on the evening of that day or the following night.

Lastly, the difficult task of protecting the retreat of the army on the most endangered wing towards the south,\* devolved upon General Crémer, who had for this purpose the 3rd Division 20th Corps, the Army Reserve, and his own Division.†

All these detachments, after crossing the Doubs above and below Besançon, reached Cléron, Ornans, and Etalans on the 25th. On the 26th the Army Reserve posted itself in readiness at Ornans, and sent forward its cavalry to the Etalans plateau.

The other two Divisions moved off in a south-westerly direction, in order to reach the mountains at Salins, and thus

secure the roads to Champagnole and Pontarlier.

Colonel Poullet had commenced his march to Salins at 7 a.m., but on reaching Nans-sous-Sainte Anne received the news that Salins was occupied.‡ His scouts were fired upon at Saisenay,§ and the inhabitants stated that General Manteuffel, with 20,000 Prussian troops, had arrived at Arbois, and with 15,000 at Salins. He, therefore, left only some franctireurs at Nans, and retreated south to Villeneuve d'Amont, on the Salins—Pontarlier road. The 3rd Division 20th Corps had followed Colonel Poullet's movement as far as Déservillers.¶

<sup>\*</sup> Appendix CLXVII contains the orders for the match on the 25th January.

<sup>†</sup> The latter passed under the orders of Colonel Poullet, hitherto his Chief of the Staff.

<sup>†</sup> At the time this was premature, but, as we know, became soon after the case. § This could only have been from the patrols of the 2nd Batta'ion 42nd Regiment, which was posted at Suisenay.

<sup>||</sup> Salins was not defended by Colonel Poullet's troops, but by the local Carde Nationale and certain detachments of infantry and artillery previously posted there.

<sup>¶</sup> See Sketch facing page 41.

The Cavalry Division of the 15th Corps formed a veil from Levier as far Nozeroy,\* for the purpose of watching in the direction of Salins and Lons-le-Saunier. The gardes mobiles, who had been sent away from Besançon, passed along its front.†

The intention of General Bourbaki to gain more freedom of

movement came to nought in the north, as in the south.

General de Bressolles, in accordance with the orders recently received to re-occupy the passages of the Doubs and the Lomont passes, proceeded on the 24th January in the direction of Baume-les-Dames, and instructed d'Aries' Division of his Corps to advance on Pont-les-Moulins. But only the van of the Division made a weak attempt to dislodge the Prussian outposts, and then abstained from any further enterprises. The Division with the reserve artillery of the Corps retired upon Vercel. The bulk of the 3rd Division 24th Corps, under General Carré de Busserolle, had meanwhile once more advanced into the passes of the Lomont, had found them free, and occupied them. In consequence, however, of the illsuccess at Pont-les-Moulins, he withdrew early on the 26th January to Landresse and Pierre Fontaine, whilst the rest of the Division had already moved away on the 24th by way of Fuans in the direction of Morteau.

General Bourbaki was extremely disturbed at the retreat of the 24th Corps; he ordered it to renew its attack on the 26th upon the Prussian force visible to the south of Baune, and resolved to support it by bringing up the 18th Corps from Besançon. This Corps, however, in consequence of the icebound roads, occupied the whole day appointed for the attack in merely passing from the north to the south bank of the Doubs. 1 It was not until nightfall that it reached Bouclans; it found General v. Schmeling's patrols in its front and, in consequence of the lateness of the hour, abstained from any further enterprise. Meanwhile, General de Bressolles, who, by General Bourbaki's orders, had on this day again led forward against Passavant the troops standing at Vercel, had in vain awaited the arrival of the Corps. His officers were unanimous in deprecating any attempt at taking the offensive, which must inevitably lead to the break-up of his force; he that same evening retreated by way of Vercel to the Pontarlier road. That part also of Busserolle's Division which had only returned from the Lomont on the 26th, had made another forward movement towards the Doubs, but, hearing no action in that direction, abstained from any further advance. The entire Division now likewise took the direction of Pontarlier, whither also Comagny's Division had meanwhile continued its march, utterly indifferent to

<sup>\*</sup> This, however, was not entirely accomplished until the 27th January.

<sup>†</sup> See ante, p. 38.

† On this occasion General Billot made another attempt, but in vain, to induce the Commander-in-Chief to make an attack on Auxonne.

what was happening elsewhere. It was evident that all the commanders of the army hesitated to bring their troops in any

form in contact with the adversary.

Meanwhile the War Ministry had definitely refused its consent to the general retreat of the army to Pontarlier, and in lieu thereof merely reiterated impracticable proposals for the transfer of the army to another theatre of war,\* thereby only aggravating the want of confidence of the Commander-in-Chief. The appearance of the 18th Corps as it toiled painfully across the Doubs under his eyes, robbed him of his last hope. General Bourbaki despaired of accomplishing his task.

A telegram, superseding him in the chief command by General Clinchant, a measure he had conditionally requested, was already on its way. The same telegram brought also the supersession of General de Bressoles in the command of the

24th Corps by General Comagny.

The new Commander-in-Chief took over the direction of the army in circumstances which scarcely permitted the hope of even a fairly successful issue. He had, it is true, at his disposal between Besancon and the Swiss frontier some 100,000 combatants, but, owing to the condition of the troops, scarcely half could be considered effective, whilst the others were more a hindrance than a gain. After a consideration of all the possible courses still open to him, General Clinchant saw that a concentration of the whole army under the walls of Besançon must lead to its dissolution within a brief period from mere But such concentration must precede any want of food. attempt to break through, whether by way of Auxonne in order to gain Dijon, or by way of Quingey in order to reach Lons-le-Saunier, while such concentration could not be hidden from the Germans. Moreover, the small offensive power of the troops must also be taken into consideration. So that the only course open to the new Commander-in-Chief was to continue what his predecessor had commenced, and carry out the march to Pont-

In spite of the gloomy prospect, he considered that he ought not to refuse the chief command. On the morning of the 27th he entered upon the duties, but held generally to the arrangements already made.

E 2

<sup>•</sup> See "Enquête Parlementaire, Rapports," Versailles, 1874, Vol. II, p. 756. The end of the telegram (Bordeaux, 25th January, 1871, 2.30 p.m.) ran:—"Maconviction bien arrêtée, c'est qu'en réunissant tous vos corps et en vous concertant au bésoin avec Garibaldi, vous serez pleinement en force pour passer soit par Dôle, soit par Mouchard, soit par Gray, soit par Pontailler; vous laisseriez en suite le 24° Corps et le Corps Crêmer en relation avec Garibaldi et vous continueriez votre mouvement en prenant, autant que possible, pour objectif les points indiqués dans mes dépêches précédentes (Nevers or the neighbourhood of Joigny, Tonnerre, and Auxerre), et si l'état de votre armée ne permettait réellement pas une marche aussi longue, vous vous dirigeriez vers Chagny pour y stationner ou pour vous y embarquer.— C. de Freycinet."

Occupation of the Roads leading from Pontarlier to the South of France by the South Army, and Retreat of the French East Army towards the Swiss Frontier between the 27th and 29th January.

On the 25th the Germans were in a position to assume that there were at least two French Corps on the right bank of the Doubs. On the 26th the assembly of large masses between the Loue and the Doubs became evident, and at the same time there could be no mistake that the batteries, which had been hitherto seen at Busy, had disappeared.

In general the Army Headquarters believed that even now the retreat of the adversary on Pontarlier was, if not certain, at any rate very probable. The prisoners were under the impression that their army was already completely surrounded and lost beyond hope of recovery. They exhibited every

appearance of deep discouragement.

The orders issued for the 27th January contemplated the holding in readiness of sufficient means to obtain, if necessary by force, the desired information. The XIVth Corps was to advance to the Doubs in relief of the 14th Division, in order to render the whole of the VIIth Corps available for employment against the line of the Loue which was occupied by the enemy; while the IInd Corps was to hold itself in readiness at Mouchard and Salins, either, if required, to move up to Quingey, or to advance in the directions of Ornans and Pontarlier. The orders were, in part, anticipated by events. A squadron\* belonging to the advanced guard of the IInd Corps, which had proceeded on the evening of the 26th January, after the action at Salins, by way of Ornans, fell in with strong bodies of the enemy† near Villeneuve d'Amont, and ascertained that they belonged to two different Corps.


When this news reached General v. Fransecky in the course of the night, he had no doubt that the adversary contemplated reaching the roads leading from Pontarlier to Southern France. In the sense of the instructions issued by General v. Manteuffel on the 24th January, he resolved to act at once independently and to reach without delay the cross roads in the mountains before the enemy, or, failing this, to attack the flank of the

columns while on the march.

As the deeply sunken passes leading through Salins, notwithstanding the capture of the town, were barred by the fire of the two forts on the heights, he resolved to take in preference the roads leading through Arbois. Consequently, Major-General du Trossel received orders to assemble the 7th Infantry Brigade

<sup>\* 1</sup>st 8rd Drag.

<sup>†</sup> General Crémer's troops.



on the 27th January at Pont d'Héry, and to bring up thither as well the battalions which had been pushed forward by General Koblinski along the roads to Pontarlier and Champagnole, as also the cavalry from Salins. With the troops still remaining to him, the last-named general was to take up a position to the north-west of Salins, at the point of bifurcation of the roads to Quingey and Mouchard, in order to protect the movements of the Corps against any attack from Salins.

Such an attack was in reality considered by the general commanding as far less likely than that the enemy discovered at Villeneuve d'Amont would endeavour to reach Champagnole by way of Pont d'Héry. All the rest of the Corps were ordered

to Arbois.

The concentration at Pont d'Héry† took place without 27th molestation from the enemy, and the troops in the evening occupied quarters in this locality and the neighbourhood. dragoons in advance reported that strong hostile detachments were said to have passed near Censeau, on the Pontarlier— Lons-le-Saunier road, and this was confirmed by the tracks in the deep snow.t French cavalry were reported at Cham-

pagnole.

The main body of the Hnd Corps had assembled near Arbois, and General v. Koblinski had again concentrated his troops§ in the morning from Salins in the direction of Pagnoz; during the march they suffered little loss. The Commander-in-Chief, entirely approving the measures taken by General v. Fransecky, ordered the immediate relief of General v. Koblinski by troops of the 13th Division. The latter arrived in Mouchard on the night of the 27th—28th. The remaining detachments of the 13th Division had extended themselves to the eastward towards the Loue, which had been abandoned by the enemy; the bridges over the river were found to be destroyed.\*\* The

Colonel v. Barby.

\*\* According to the statements of the inhabitants the enemy had already retired in the morning in the direction of Amancey. Only Chenecey was still occupied by

<sup>•</sup> See Sketch. † 7th Infantry Brigade (except Fus. 49, at Mirebeau-sur-Bèze), Ist and Hnd and 1st and 4th (of General v. Koblinski's advanced guard), 3rd 11th Drag. 3rd Drag. 5th Henry and 6th Light, and 1st Field Pion. The command of all troops of the 4th Division not assigned to Lieut. General Hann v. Weyhern was confided to Major-General du Trossel. As troops of the French field army had not reached so far, this news could only refer to the march of the gardes mobiles sent away from Besaucon by General Rolland, and which certainly must have passed here in considerable strength.

§ 2nd Grenadiers, Fus. 2nd Light and 2nd Heavy, 2nd Field Pion. entrench-

14th Division, on relief by the XIVth Corps, crossed the Doubs and the Lower Loue, and established itself on the Quingey— La Chapelle road; the troops previously on outpost duty followed as far as Courtefontaine and Fourg. The corps

artillery gained the right bank of the Loue at Liesle.

The XIVth Corps reached with the Baden Division the positions hitherto occupied by the 14th Division at St. Vit, and Lantenne Vertière, facing towards Besançon. General v. d. Goltz, who, in position on the Ognon, had covered the flank movement, marched to Marnay, whither also the corps headquarters were transferred; the detachments on the Ognon\* maintained the connection with General v. Schmeling.

This officer had remained at St. Juan d'Adam, as news had reached him of a renewed advance of the French upon

Belfort.

General v. Werder, who did not consider such an enterprise at all probable, left him unfettered to act in conjunction with Lieutenant-General v. Tresckow IInd, and if necessary to withdraw again to Montbéliard. Colonel v. Zimmermann received orders to reconnoitre towards Maiche and St. Hippolyte.† General v. Debschitz, induced to renew his advance, occupied in the evening Blamont and Pont-de-Roide; # whilst General v. Schmeling, in consequence of further disquieting rumours of the march of strong French forces upon St. Hippolyte, had resolved on the following day to move to the left to Sancey-le-Grand.

On the evening of the 27th January, the XIVth Corps was thus guarding the entire right bank of the Doubs, and at the same time watching the ground between the Upper Doubs and the Swiss frontier; the VIIth Corps was posted at that part of the Loue which the enemy had abandoned, with the object of

v. Weinzierl.

These two last detachments, which had been drawn forward from Rioz, also stood fast for the present on the Ognon.

<sup>\*</sup> At Pin: HITrd 34, 2nd Res. Hus., and 1 1st Light Res., under Major v. Runstedt. This detachment remained in the same position for the next few days. In Etus: 3rd 10th 4th 2nd Bad. 7 and 1st Heavy, under Captain

In Voray: 2nd and 4th 6th Bad. and 2nd Bad. Drag., under Captain Baron Schilling v. Canstadt.

<sup>†</sup> Colonel v. Zimmermann left in consequence the Insterburg battalion,  $\frac{1}{3}$  3rd  $\frac{1}{3}$  3rd  $\frac{1}{3}$  2nd Heavy, at Isle-sur-le-Doubs, and advanced with the rest of his troops by way of Glainans to Chasot.

<sup>†</sup> With the Lauban, Breslau Hnd, and Liegnitz battalion, 5rd 6th Res. Lan. 1st and 2nd Light Reserve, whilst the Apenrade battalion and 2nd 6th Res. Lan. followed to Roches.

<sup>§</sup> The constant reports of a fresh offensive movement on the part of the enemy to the Upper Doubs were no doubt occasioned by the movements of the 18th and 24th French Corps.

subsequently advancing across it or of moving upon Ornans; while the Hnd Corps was holding itself in readiness at Arbois and Pont d'Héry to prevent the enemy moving through

Pontarlier and Champagnole on Lons-le-Saunier.

Although the despatch of General Hann v. Weyhern towards Dijon had removed all danger which from that direction might have compromised the advance, the Army Headquarters had received reports which showed that the adversary, indefatigable in organising new forces, was bringing up reinforcements from Lyons. The Hnd Corps, which in spite of the return of General v. Koblinski's force, only numbered three brigades, was consequently charged with the duty of covering on the south the march of the army. The cavalry, making a wide sweep, was to reconnoitre in the direction of Lons-le-Saunier, and compel any troops that might possibly arrive by rail to detrain as far off as possible.

General v. Fransecky had become convinced by the events 23th January of the 27th January that the enemy was already in retreat on Lons-le-Saunier. He therefore ordered General du Trossel with all his troops\* to reach Champagnole at 10 a.m. on the 28th, and in the event of his finding the enemy there to attack

him vigorously.

For his support, the main body of the corps under General v. Hartmann was to advance from Arbois to the Montrond defile, the Corps Artillery to Arbois, while General v. Koblinski with his detachment was to reach Poligny by 11 a.m. A squadron was specially detailed to advance in the direction of Lons-le-Saunier until it met with resistance.

These movements were completed without coming into

serious collision with the adversary.

General du Trossel occupied Champagnole without a struggle, and sent forward his cavalry at once in the direction of Pontarlier. In spite of the fire directed upon it by the enemy occupying the hills, a squadron,† under Lieutenant-Colonel v. Guretzky, reached Nozeroy. They found the place strongly occupied by the French, but captured near Onglières 56 commissariat wagons with a treasure chest, taking the escort, 1 officer and 70 men, prisoners. At Le Magasin they fell in with hostile cavalry in retreat, belonging, according to the prisoners, to the 15th Corps.

By order of the general commanding, General du Trossel remained at Champagnole; General v. Hartmann on the other hand, after letting his men cook their dinners at Montrond, continued his march in a southerly direction to Pont-du-Navoy. General v. Koblinski's column and the corps artillery advanced to Poligny. The cavalry which had been sent towards Lonsle-Saunier advanced to within a distance of 4 or 5 miles of this

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<sup>\*</sup> See ante, p. 53, note †.

<sup>† 3</sup>rd | Tith Drag., Captain v. Flemming.

town, and found the neighbourhood in the enemy's occupa-

The decisive action, which General v. Fransecky expected this day, did not take place, but the IInd Corps was only a day's march distant from the adversary's last lines of retreat.

Of the VIIth Corps, General v. Zastrow caused the 14th Division to advance south of the Loue. Any columns of the enemy which might be found on the march, were to be attacked and compelled to deploy; a struggle with superior forces was, however, to be avoided. The Division only fell in with stragglers; it reached Déservillers without a struggle, and placed outposts at Bolandoz. The 13th Division meanwhile remained at the Quingey position. Towards Besançon, Vorges was found to be evacuated by the French, while Busy was only weakly occupied.

As all the bridges over the Loue were destroyed, a detachment of 3 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 1 battery\* joined the 14th Division south of the river. Some patrols which had succeeded in crossing by means of the meagre material found on the spot, learnt that about 6,000 men of the 15th Corps had only the day before marched away from the vicinity

of Rurey for Ornans. When the news of General v. Fransecky's advance reached Army Headquarters in the early morning, General v. Manteuffel ordered the XIVth Corps to relieve the 13th Division at Quingey, and the VIIth to move in a southerly direction nearer to the IInd Corps. This order reached General v. Zastrow in the afternoon, and, the relief having been carried out, the 13th Division concentrated that same evening at La Chapelle and Saisenay.† The 14th Division at Déservillers received orders to push forward its advanced troops to Levier and Silley; while engaged in so doing, they captured some 100 stragglers of the 15th, 18th, and 20th French Corps, who stated that their corps had marched from Besancon for Pontarlier. The last échelons of the French army were said to have only quitted early in the morning the district reached by the 14th Division. In point of fact the burning embers found in several of the bivouacs confirmed this statement.

The corps artillery had followed the movement of the other troops along the Arbois road as far as Sainson; it had to push forward the horse artillery batteries as far as Myon and Alaise, in view to a subsequent junction with the 14th Division. The general commanding took up his headquarters at Montfort, and, as he contemplated uniting his Corps at Villeneuve d'Amont

<sup>\* 7</sup>th Rifle Battalion, IInd and IIIrd, 2nd and 4th 8th Hus., and VII vile.

<sup>†</sup> General Baron v. d. Osten-Sacken's detachment was brought up to Saisenay, and from this point it kept up communication both with Colonel v. Barby at Salins and also with the 14th Division.

and Levier, he caused the roads leading to these places to be reconnoitred.

On the morning of this day General v. Werder had reached in person the Army Headquarters at La Barre. On being informed of the state of affairs, he decided to replace at St. Vit the 1st Baden Brigade, which had left for Quingey, by the 3rd, which should continue to occupy at the same time Corcondray and Recologne. General v. d. Goltz marched to Orchamp. General v. Schmeling reached Sancey-le-Grand by a movement to the left and effected a junction with Colonel v. Zimmermann, while General v. Debschitz occupied St. Hippolyte with his advanced troops.\* Patrols found the enemy at Maiche. The headquarters of the X1Vth Corps remained at La Barre, those of General v. Manteuffel proceeded to Château-de-Roche near Arc-et-Senans.

The intelligence which reached the Commander-in-Chief during the day had indicated with tolerable certainty that up to the present time only inconsiderable hostile forces could have passed beyond Champagnole, and also that the bulk of the French army was now in full retreat to Pontarlier. Further, the reports from the advanced parties of the XIVth Corps, which had discovered French troops at St. Ferjeux, showed that the 20th Corps, or at any rate parts of it, had still remained at Besançon. Lastly, it could be gathered from the information received from General v. Schmeling that a considerable body of troops of the 24th Corps had likewise taken the direction of Pontarlier.

In consequence, General v. Manteuffel ordered for the 29th

a general advance upon Pontarlier.

The 14th Division, which had already pressed forward in this direction, without awaiting the concentration of the entire VIIth Corps, was to resume its march at early dawn in order to reach the enemy as soon as possible. The rest of the corps was to follow.† The IInd Corps was instructed to occupy Les Planches-en-Montagne with a detachment, while the bulk of its forces was likewise to advance upon Pontarlier. Of the XIVth Corps the troops under General v. d. Goltzt were to march to Arc-et-Senans, in order to serve as army reserve in the movement eastward. With the Baden Divisions General v. Werder had to watch Besançon, towards which place strong reinforcements were to be pushed, on both banks of the Doubs.

<sup>§</sup> Except Degenfeld's Brigade, assigned to General Hann v. Weyhern.

General v. Schmeling was summoned to join from the north the general advance on Pontarlier, and to participate in the

engagement which might take place.

January.

On the evening of the 28th General v. Fransecky had become convinced that the enemy had given up the idea of escaping by way of Champagnole, and that instead of doing so would retreat through Nozeroy and Les Planches-en-Montague to St. Laurent. Accordingly, he had already taken steps to advance next morning, not merely with a detachment, but with his main forces against Les Planches. The officer despatched with the necessary orders from the headquarters at Poligny was, however, wounded on the way by franctireurs. The Corps orders never reached the hands of the troops, and those from Army Headquarters could be carried out the more completely.

Against Les Planches advanced only Colonel v. Wedell from Pont-du-Navoy with four battalions, half a squadron, and

a battery,† taking the road by Loulle and La Billaude.

After having dispersed some dismounted French cavalry on the Champagnole—St. Laurent road, he reached Les Planches without molestation, and found here also only dismounted cavalry. After a slight skirmish, the riflemen captured the village, and detachments were at once pushed forward on the Champagnole and Nozeroy roads and also towards Mouthe and St. Laurent. Those movements led to frequent collisions with French detachments. The prisoners stated that cavalry belonging to the 15th Corps, and some 8,000 newly organised infantry had passed on the previous day through this district to St. Laurent, and on the 29th had continued their march to Lons-le-Saunier.

General v. Koblinski had started in the night from Poligny, and reached Champagnole at so early an hour that the battalions belonging to the 5th Brigade, which since the action at Salins had been attached to the 7th, could rejoin their own command. At 7 o'clock General du Trossel commenced his advance for Pontarlier, and reached Censeau without meeting the enemy. General v. Hartmann also arrived at Champagnole with those troops left to him after detaching Colonel v. Wedell; with the forces assembled here, which now constituted the main body of the corps, he advanced to Nozeroy

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<sup>\*</sup> See Sketch.

† 2nd Rifle Battalion, Fus., IInd and Fus., ½ 2nd 3rd Drag.


‡ See ante pp. 38 and 53, note ‡.

§ 5th Inf. Brigade, 3rd and 4th Light, 14 54 7 3rd Dragoons

1st and 2nd Light, 2nd Heavy, 3rd Light, 3rd and 4th Heavy, 2nd and 3rd H. A. B.

11

and 2nd Field Pion.; 1st was with the baggage, 2nd was at Champagnole, 3rd Field Pion. was at Dôle, which place it was to prepare for defence.



and Onglières in the course of the afternoon.\* The corps

artillery also followed to the same place.

Of the VIIth Corps, the 14th Division did not receive its orders to advance upon Pontarlier until late. It started from Déservillers at noon; † its march was much delayed in consequence of the deep snow on the roads. The last troops of the Division did not reach Levier until 3 p.m., just as the leading troops of the 13th Division, coming from Villeneuve d'Amont, entered the place ‡ after experiencing great difficulties.

Meanwhile the advanced guard of the 14th Infantry Division under Colonel v. Cosel & had resumed its march from Levier towards Pontarlier, and at first only fell in with stragglers. General v. Zastrow gave orders to General Schuler v. Senden to gain the line of the Drugeon at Houtaud.

Near Le Souillot, however, the advanced guard met with some 4,000 to 5.000 French infantry, which continued their

retreat on Pontarlier after a few rounds of shell.

In its further advance it again fell in with the enemy at the wood south of Sombacourt, and detached a battalion, a division of hussars, and two guns | under Major v. Brederlow towards

the village which lay on the flank.

As the darkness and mist rendered the employment of Engagement artillery impossible, and the adversary was dislodged from the at Chaffois wood, Major v. Brederlow sent back the two guns to the main and Sombabody, and advanced with the rest of his troops. The march of the small column was repeatedly molested from the ridge on the south-east of the road, but the enemy was always repulsed and lost some 40 prisoners. The 2nd Company 47th Regiment had already been sent forward from Levier, by way of Sept Fontaines, and after driving in some stragglers, and pursuing a weak rear-guard of cavalry and infantry, now arrived before Sombacourt. Without a moment's hesitation Captain v. Vietinghoff, with his men, dashed with a cheer into the stronglyoccupied village, but, although the enemy was at first completely surprised, soon found himself surrounded by superior forces. Major v. Brederlow, with the three other companies, however, speedily arrived, and without delay forced his way into the village. Fifty officers, including 2 generals, and 2,700 men,

<sup>\*</sup> Part of Koblinski's Brigade, which after a rest of a few hours at Poligny, was called to arms by order of the general commanding the corps, accomplished this

day some 33 miles, in spite of the slippery and snowed-up roads.

† Reinforced by the two horse artillery batteries of the corps artillery.

† The guns and trains, in order to follow had to make the détour by Myon. There remained to the north-west of Salins: Hind Ist 13rd 8th Hus. and 6th Heavy VII under Lieut.-Colonel v. Pannewitz; Colonel v. Barby joined the Division with the rest of the troops.

<sup>§</sup> Ist and Fus. 1st 1st 1st Heavy, and 2nd F. Pion. Co. VII. 

besides 10 guns, 7 mitrailleuses, 48 wagons, 319 horses, and 3,500 stand of arms, here fell into the hands of the Hanoverians, who suffered but slight loss.\* The battalion remained for the night at Sombacourt guarding its numerous prisoners.

At night-fall the rest of the advanced guard of the 14th Division drew near to Chaffois, but found the village strongly occupied by the enemy. The 1st Heavy and shortly afterwards the 2nd Horse Artillery Battery, which was brought forward from the main body of the Division, came into action on either side of the road against the village, and opened a vigorous fire. Notwithstanding that the mist and twilight prevented the effect of the shot from being estimated, the two battalions still left to the advanced guard deployed at once for the attack. Colonel v. Cosel ordered the 3rd Company of the 53rd to straightway storm Chaffois; after surprising the picquet in front of the village, it succeeded in capturing the nearest The three other companies of the 1st Battalion followed with the object of turning the village on both flanks and taking part in the action as might be required. The further advance of the musketeers was now however so vigorously opposed, that the 10th Company of the fusilier battalion, held in reserve, had to be sent forward in support on the right, and the 9th Company on the left flank. The 2nd Battalion 77th Regiment was further brought forward as reserve from the main body of the Division. After a brisk action which lasted for an hour and a half, the enemy suddenly ceased firing, and voluntarily laid down their arms. Many officers, 1,800 men, and 2 guns, fell into the Prussian hands.

The enemy claimed an armistice as already concluded, and shortly after an officer of the French Staff arrived, bearing a letter from General Clinchant to General Thornton. According to its contents, the French Commander-in-Chief had received official notice of a twenty-one days' armistice,† signed on the 27th January, and had therefore ordered the firing to cease, and suitable communications to be made to the Germans.

On the German side, nothing had been heard of an armistice, and, in consequence, only a provisional suspension of hostilities was granted on the basis of the present situation. Chaffois, with the exception of three farms on the eastern outskirt, in each of which was posted a weak French company, remained to the victors. The prisoners, without their arms, were given up on the authority of the general commanding.

The Germans sustained a loss in this action of 6 officers and

46 men, all belonging to the 53rd Regiment.

That evening the main body of the 14th Division endeavoured to find quarters in and near Chaffois, so far as the



<sup>\* 2</sup> killed, 5 wounded.

<sup>†</sup> The signatures were appended, as is known, on the 28th (see App. CLVI). There was probably an error in the date of the letter from General Clinchant to General Thernton. Appendix CLXVIII contains the text of this letter, as also the telegram which formed the basis of the letter.

accommodation permitted. The 13th Division followed with its head as far as Sept Fontaines, whilst its rearmost troops remained at Villeneuve d'Amont.

The corps artillery,\* in consequence of the difficulties of the

ground, only reached Déservillers.

The Army Reserve, under General v. d. Goltz, had continued its march in the morning past Arc-et-Senans; its leading troops, after considerable effort, reached Arbois, whither General v. Manteuffel transferred his headquarters this day. General v. Werder watched Besançon with the Baden Division, and caused some slight enterprises to be made from St. Vit and Marnay, with the object of reconnoiting towards the fortress. The detachments sent forward with this object; came speedily, however, across the adversary's fortified and strongly occupied positions, the defence of which could, moreover, be aided by the guns of the outworks. The detachments left on the Ognon also limited themselves to the duty of observation. The troops which were at Pin also occupied Marnay.

General v. Schmeling had remained in the neighbourhood of Sancey-le-Grand, as General v. Debschitz was obliged to decline cooperation in an attack on Maiche. Lieut.-General v.

Tresckow IInd had recalled him to Belfort.

In the course of the 29th, Maiche was, however, occupied by Colonel v. Zimmermann,¶ after dislodging some hostile stragglers; part of the main body of the 4th Reserve Division followed his movement as far as Belleherbe. Reconnaissances were pushed towards Besançon, without meeting with the enemy.

In order to obtain speedy and precise intelligence of the proceedings of the widely separated columns, General v. Manteuffel had during the course of the day sent away staff officers to the different parts of the army; the columns, on the

ante, p. 56). It joined the corps artillery on the 30th.

† A small detachment had been sent from the Upper Loue in order to seek connection towards Pierre Fontaine, with General v. Schmeling, who was supposed to be in the neighbourheod. It, however, fell in with a hostile column, moving from Ornans to Pontarlier, and could make no headway.

This officer had been reinforced by the Thorn Buttalion, arrived from Bolfort.

<sup>\*</sup> For the present only 3 batteries strong. Besides the two horse artillery batteries attached to the 14th Division, the 3rd Heavy Buttery had also been detached. It had been, since the 28th January, with the 13th Division, with which it had served as reinforcement to the troops despatched to hold the Quingey position (see ante, p. 56). It joined the corps artillery on the 30th.

<sup>§</sup> By the  $\frac{11\text{th}}{34\text{th}}$  and  $\frac{\frac{1}{2} \text{ 2nd}}{2\text{nd Res. Hus.}}$ 

<sup>†</sup> This order was the consequence of the instructions given by General v. Werder to attach once more to General v. Schmeling the four battalions of Zimmermann's Brigade which had remained before Belfort on the 20th January. Licut.-General v. Tresckow Had desired to bring up Debschitz's detachment to the fortress, in order to relieve those four battalions.

basis of the general instructions communicated to them, were

left to act on their own independent judgment.

At 5 p.m., General v. Manteuffel received at his new headquarters at Arbois, a telegram from the Royal Headquarters that an armistice had indeed been concluded, but that the whole district comprised in the Côte d'Or, Doubs, and Jura Departments, was expressly excepted; therefore, the South Army would have to press its operations to a decisive conclusion. An army order communicated this information to the troops, and that same evening the Army Headquarters ordered, for the 30th, the continuation of the advance on Poutarlier by the IInd and VIIth Corps. Both were to maintain connection with each other.

General v. d. Goltz received orders to march with the Army Reserve by way of Pont d'Héry to Villeneuve d'Amont. General v. Werder was instructed to continue the offensive towards Besançon with the Baden Division, and to cause General v. Schmeling to drive with his troops towards the two Corps in the south any French detachments which might still be left on the Upper Doubs.

Reports had not yet reached Arbois of the success gained at Sombacourt and Chaffois.\*

In order to secure Besançon, General Clinchant had, on his withdrawal, left at that place the 1st Division of the 20th Corps, which was the most familiar with the district, and also the 2nd of the 15th Corps.

27th January.

On the evening of the 27th, the 18th Corps gained Nods and Fallerans; the 2nd Division of the 20th, Ornans, the 15th, Sept Fontaines, Evillers, and Bolandoz; while the leading troops of the 24th Corps, coming from the north, had already reached Pontarlier, but in a most pitable condition. General Crémer had arrived at Sombacourt with the 3rd Division of the 20th Corps, and with Poullet's Division at Levier; the Army Reserve was still to the rear at Chantrans.

The Commander-in-Chief had hastened, in person, to Pontarlier, having sent on in advance some engineer troops and staff officers for the purpose of summoning the inhabitants to clear the roads of the snow. He ventured to hope that the tactically strong position of Pontarlier would give rest to his troops, at any rate for a time. If the defiles at Vaux, Les Planches, and Morillon could be held, a communication, even if extremely difficult, would always remain open to the south, through St. Laurent and through La Chapelle-des-Bois. Up

<sup>\*</sup> They did not arrive till the next morning. + See sketch facing p. 53.

to the present time no large bodies of the adversary had been met with on the march, the ammunition columns had been safely brought through, and the Army Intendant had guaranteed at Pontarlier sufficient supplies of food, which could be further augmented by convoys from Switzerland.

But on arrival it was found that the existing supplies would only suffice for a few days, and General Clinchant therefore resolved to continue his march along the frontier so soon as

his Corps were concentrated.

That same night, 27th-28th, General Crémer received orders to advance forthwith upon Les Planches, St. Laurent, and Morez,\* with three cavalry regiments of the 15th and 24th Corps, which were posted on the Mouthe road; these points were to be reached before the Germans. The general executed this difficult task, and after a toilsome march along snow-blocked mountain roads, reached, with the cavalry, the prescribed destinations on the afternoon of the 28th.

The 24th Corps and Millot's Brigade of Poullet's Division 29th and 29th were to follow at once. The rest of the army, with the excep-January.

tion of the two Divisions left at Besançon, was concentrated round Pontarlier by General Clinchant on the 28th and 29th

January.

On the evening of this last date, the 18th Corps was in and to the north of Houtaud; the 2nd Division of the 20th at Chaffois and Bulle: the 3rd of the same Corps was at Dompierre and Frasne, with the rest of Poullet's Division, of which two more battalions were pushed forward to Bonnevaux for the protection of the important Vaux defile. In and near Pontarlier was the 3rd, at Sombacourt the 1st Division of the 15th Corps.† The latter, as we have seen, was completely dispersed there by the attack of Brederlow's battalion and for the most part taken prisoners, before the Army Reserve, which was close by at Goux and Bians, could give it any assistance. Similarly, as we know, Chaffois was lost that same evening. During the 29th, the main forces of the 24th Corps and Millot's brigade continued their advance to and beyond Mouthe, in order not to lose connection with General Crémer. But at Foncinele-Bas they fell in with detachments of Wedell's column which, as already mentioned, had driven off the cavalry posted there by General Cremer. Thus the last road open to the army for large bodies of troops was already intercepted, and General Comagny determined to attack Les Planches on the 30th January, in order to force a passage. Meanwhile the news of the armistice also reached him; he therefore gave up the attack and merely issued orders for the infantry of the 1st Division to continue its march along the mountain road

<sup>•</sup> Morez lies 5½ miles south-east of St. Laurent and 7 miles south-west of La Chapelle-des-Bois.

<sup>†</sup> See sketch facing p. 58. † The Army Reserve retired to Pontarlier.

through La Chapelle-des-Bois on Morez, so as to enable the 24th Corps to maintain connection with General Crémer in St. Laurent, when the line of demarcation should be fixed. The source of the armistice news had been in this case also the telegram addressed by Jules Favre to the Government Delegation and which had reached the hands of the civil authorities at Pontarlier, by way of Bordeaux; it made no mention of the clause excepting the Departments of Côte d'Or, Doubs, and Jura. There was the same deficiency in the official communication, which had been dispatched at 3:30 p.m. on the 29th, from the French War Ministry to the Generals Commanding Army Corps.\*

General Clinchant had, consequently, in perfect good faith, demanded the cessation of hostilities, and the commencement of negociations for the determination of a line of demarcation.

<sup>\*</sup> See Appendix CLXVIII.

CONTINUATION OF THE MARCH OF THE SOUTH ARMY ON PASSAGE OF THE FRENCH INTO PONTARLIER. TERRITORY 30TH JANUARY—2ND FEBRUARY.

Better informed from Versailles than the French Com- 30th January. mander-in-Chief from Bordeaux, General v. Manteuffel had ordered the immediate resumption of hostilities. instructions on this head could not reach the Corps early enough to prevent altogether the false news from causing an interruption in their movements.

General v. Zastrow supposed that the enemy, in his own country, would have earlier news than that reaching the South Army by circuitous routes; he, therefore, modified the orders for the advance to Pontarlier on the 30th, by instructing the VIIth Corps to remain in general stationary for the present. The batteries of the corps artillery were to concentrate at Levier, while the trains were to close up to Déservillers and A wider distribution of the troops in quarters, which

was urgently necessary, was also kept in view.

These instructions were in process of execution when, at 10.30 a.m., the orders arrived from Army Headquarters. At the time of their issue, the reports of the VIIth Corps of the previous evening could not have been received. It was known that French staff officers were on the road to Army Headquarters with a view to negociations, and General v. Zastrow deemed it desirable to await supplementary or explanatory orders from the same quarter. Moreover, the VIIth Corps stood close in front of Pontarlier, and it appeared a proper course to cause the IInd also to come up with it.

Before very long, fresh instructions, issued at 9 a.m., arrived from the Commander-in Chief of the Army. They repeated that the news of an armistice concluded for the South Army The advance on Pontarlier was therefore to was untrue. be continued, every attempt on the part of the enemy to retreat to the south or north was to be prevented, and any partial attack avoided; in other respects, negociations with the enemy were only to be entertained on the basis of an unconditional

surrender.

General v. Zastrow now caused the French troops in his front to be informed of the resumption of hostilities, and demanded the complete evacuation of Chaffois, which was complied with. The 14th Division in consequence entered into possession of the remaining farmsteads during the night.

During the latter part of the afternoon the noise of a weak Action at cannonade had been heard in the direction of Frasne. General Frasne. v. Fransecky had ordered the advanced guard of the IInd Corps, while guarding its right flank towards Bonnevaux, to

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press forward on the 30th through Frasne in the direction of Pontarlier, in order to ascertain beyond doubt whether the main forces of the French East Army were still there. General du Trossel had, therefore, quitted Censeau at 8 a.m.; he was delayed some time by the appearance of a French parlementaire, but after receiving from General v. Fransecky a verbal explanation of the situation, had attacked the wood occupied by the French south-west of Frasne.

The 6th Light Buttery Hnd Corps, having fired a few rounds, the 1st Battalion 49th Regiment, leading the advance, deployed on both sides of the road facing the edge of the wood. The enemy retired on Frasne; but it was nightfall ere the place was reached and a position taken up before An assault was most successfully made amid the mist and darkness. Lieutenant-Colonel v. Guretzky moved off with a combined squadron and a company towards Frasne. latter captured the heights close to the west side of the place without difficulty; the dragoons followed the retreating foe, caught up the rear-guard, consisting of several companies, which they surrounded, and then forced their way into Frasne, where many more prisoners were captured. Some hostile detachments, appearing on the scene, now pressed hard upon Lieutenant-Colonel v. Guretzky, with his handful of horse, but the company arrived at the double, and the enemy abandoned all further opposition. 12 officers, 1,500 men, and 2 colours fell into the hands of this small column, whose loss was inconsiderable.

General du Trossel ordered quarters to be occupied, partly at Censeau, partly at Frasne. Parts of the 5th Infantry Brigade, which had been ordered up in expectation of a heavy engagement, also arrived in this neighbourhood. The rest of the troops of the IInd Corps remained in their positions of the

previous day.

During the course of the day, French parlementaires also appeared at Les Planches with news of the armistice. Colonel v. Wedell rejected the proposals made to him, with the observation that he was without instructions from his superiors. On this occasion he learnt that General Cremer was at St. Laurent, and that considerable French forces, estimated to number 10,000 men, were still at Foncine-le-Haut.



<sup>\*</sup> This parlementaire, like others which arrived at Les Planches and Poligny, were brought to General v. Fransecky. They presented various documents and telegrams, among which was the one addressed by Jules Favre to the Government at Bordeaux, and claimed the armistice. The parlementaire from the advanced guard was granted a suspension of arms until evening by General v. Fransecky, but only on the condition that Frasne, whither he had intended to advance this day, should be abandoned by the French, and that the latter should neither continue their retreat opposite Les Planches nor at any other point. Shortly afterwards, the army orders arrived from Arbois, and the operations resumed their course.

<sup>+</sup>  $\frac{4}{3}$  3rd and  $\frac{1}{4}$  5th and  $\frac{6}{49}$ , joined later by a detachment of the 2nd Squadron 3rd Dragoons.

The French parlementaires were also turned back at the

outposts of the XIVth Corps.\*

Reconnaissances made towards Besançon had shown that there were no longer any large detachments of the enemy on the right bank of the river. But what forces remained in the fortress it was difficult to ascertain, as the troops forming the garrison belonged to various corps.

The Army Reserve, passing to the south of Salins, reached These with its leading detachments; with the rearmost.

Arbois.

General v. Schmeling, who had received on the morning of the 30th an order from General v. Werder to advance upon Ornans,† commenced this day the southward movement, and reached the neighbourhood of Vercel and Pierre Fontaine.‡

General v. Debschitz, who, early on the 30th had likewise received orders to resume the march southward, gained the neighbourhood of Maiche with 5 battalions, 2 squadrons, 2 batteries, and half a pioneer company. He was reinforced for the prosecution of his march by the Loetzen and Marienburg Battalions, which advanced to Blamont and Roches in the

course of the day.

The Commander-in-Chief proceeded this day by way of Pont d'Héry and Lemuy to Villeneuve d'Amont; on the road he received a letter from General Clinchant, claiming the armistice also for the army operating in South-East France. General v. Manteuffel at once rejected this proposal, but, in order to avoid further bloodshed, declared himself ready for negotiations on the basis of the existing situation. From information at his disposal, he was convinced that a mass formed of all corps of the hostile army had been driven together round Pontarlier, and that up to the present only weak detachments had effected their retreat through Mouthe upon St. Laurent. On the other hand, the enemy might be expected to be reinforced from the north, and a final desperate resistance of all the forces assembled at Pontarlier was by no means unlikely. Their position, which left no choice between fighting or laying down

† Here also it had been notified in all the villages that an armistice was concluded.

F 2

<sup>•</sup> General v. Werder found an opportunity in the course of the day to inform General Hann v. Weyhern and the etappen commandant at Dôle of the real nature of the so-called armistice.

<sup>†</sup> The last orders of the Commander-in-Chief, whereby General v. Schmeling was to advance in a southerly direction by forced marches, in order to drive towards the 11nd and V11th Corps any French forces that might be north of the Pontarlier—Besançon road (see ante, p. 62), did not reach the general until the evening of the 30th January.

<sup>§</sup> The Breslau Hnd. Striegau, Lauban Battalions, as also the Gumbinnen and Goldap Battalions of the 4th Reserve Division, which were brought up to the latter, besides the 2nd and 3rd to the Reserve Division, which were brought up to the latter, besides the 2nd and 3rd to the Res. Lan. The

two last-named battalions had been assigned from Belfort to General v. Debschitz.

|| These battalions, hitherto employed before Belfort, were also to rejoin the 4th Reserve Division.

their arms, demanded a supreme effort. In order to have at his disposal sufficient means to meet this eventuality, the Commander-in-Chief ordered all the forces to close up to the front

on the following day.

The VIIth Corps was to concentrate in its entirety in the space between the roads leading from St. Gorgon and Levier to Pontarlier, to watch also the road from Morteau, and seek connection with General v. Schmeling; this general officer had to continue his advance towards the Ornans—Pontarlier road, whilst General v. Debschitz was still to keep the direction of Morteau. The IInd Corps was to post itself along the Frasne road, and at the same time to bar to the enemy the last issues in the Upper Jura.

31st January.

On the 31st January,\* the heads of the advanced guard of the Hnd Corps proceeded as far as St. Colombe and Bulle; they captured nearly 500 prisoners, and found the Frasne high road strewed with arms and stores of every kind. The 3rd Company Kolberg Grenadiers, under 1st Lieutenant Protzen, moving from La Rivière surprised that same evening the village of La Planée, and made 22 officers and 500 men prisoners. A right flank detachment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Liebe, consisting of two battalions, a division of dragoons, and a battery,† fell in with the enemy at Vaux, after it had crossed without incident the first high chain of the Jura by the narrow Bonnevaux ravine. The leading battalion at once deployed against the village, surrounding it from the north and west, forced their way in, capturing 2 officers and 886 men,‡ and drove out the defenders on Les Granges Ste. Marie. Lieutenant-Colonel Liebe followed them up, heedless of the protest of a parlementaire. The enemy abandoned this defile as well, and retired upon St. Antoine. The main body of the Corps reached the neighbourhood of Dompierre.§

The resumption of hostilities having been again made known to the adversary, the 14th Division of the VIIth Corps occupied without a struggle the villages of Dominartin and Vuillecin, on the Drugeon, as also Goux and the defile of La Vrine. During this movement some more officers and 130 men fell into its hands. At nightfall, a weak hostile column, which was marching from Arçon to Pontarlier, fell back in consequence of artillery fire. The 13th Division moved to Sept Fontaines, its advanced guard to Amathay and Reugney, the corps artillery

 $\frac{\frac{1}{4} \text{ 3rd}}{\text{3rd Drag.}}$ , and  $\frac{\text{3rd Heavy}}{11}$ .

Action at Vaux.

See sketch. + Ist and IInd

<sup>1</sup> Altogether some 4,000 prisoners fell into the hands of the IInd Corps this

<sup>§</sup> Poligny and Champagnole remained in the occupation of detached companies; the garrison of Poligny was reinforced on the 31st January to two companies.

<sup>| 41</sup> miles north of Pontarlier. La Vrine was occupied by 6th and 7th

<sup>1 4</sup>th 1 1st Heavy



to Levier.\* A mixed detachment,† which had to sweep the country as far as the Loue of hostile troops, advanced to Chantrans, but only met with some stragglers. Ornans was said to be still weakly occupied.

Another detachment of all arms, which was despatched to Onhans, opened communication in the evening at St. Gorgon with the troops of General v. Schmeling, so that now the 4th Reserve Division was also in immediate connection with the

main body of the South Army.

General v. d. Goltz reached Villeneuve d'Amont and the neighbourhood; the 4th Reserve Division, from Vercel and Pierre Fontaine, moved forward to Nods; its advanced guard to St. Gorgon. It was only at Nods that slight collisions occurred with small hostile detachments. General v. Debschitz proceeded along the Morteau road as far as Le Russey, his ad-

vanced guard to La Chenalotte.

The Baden Division in position before Besançon, where the French remained entirely inactive, had been instructed to secure the important etappen station at Dôle, which was only weakly occupied by Knesebeck's Brigade, and was threatened from the side of Auxonne. For this purpose two battalions, reinforced by artillery and cavalry, were sent thither on the 31st.§ The mere threat of hostilities, however, sufficed to cause the commandant of the small fortress to withdraw the detachments which he had pushed forward.

At an early hour that morning a French parlementaire had presented himself before General v. Manteuffel, for the purpose of requesting a suspension of hostilities on the basis of a despatch from the War Minister, but was turned back with a refusal. About 9 a.m. the French Colonel Varaigne arrived with the proposition that there should be a thirty-six hours armistice for the purpose of clearing up the doubts with regard to the differences of opinion which prevailed. Colonel v. Wartensleben, who conducted the negotiations, declined also this suggestion, as on the part of the Germans there was no doubt as to the correct state of the case. He consented, however, to send a report to Versailles, but at the same time declared that there would be no cessation in the movements of the South Army,

<sup>\*</sup> Part of the trains of the VIIth Corps in search of quarters at Bolandoz, mot there a French detachment; the latter, however, in the belief that the armistice was in force, made no attempt to molest them. The train then found shelter at Déservillers.

<sup>+</sup> Ist and Fus. 1Ind 1st 5th Light, under Colonel v. Delitz. 78', 8th Hus. VII , under Colonel v. Delitz.

<sup>†</sup> Its march had been frequently delayed by hostile stragglers, who claimed the armistice, and in some cases had to be driven away by force.

<sup>§</sup> Ist 1st 1st Bad. Drag., and 3rd Light under Major Bleibtreu, to Orchamps, whence on the 1st February they moved towards Auxonne; Fus.

Bad. B. G. Regt.

<sup>2</sup>nd 4th Heavy, under Major v. Vogel, to Raynaus.
Buden

pending the arrival of the answer from the Royal Headquarters. In the cypher telegram on this subject, which the French Colonel agreed to forward by the more certain route through Bordeaux, General v. Manteuffel, at the same time, reported

that he would attack Pontarlier next day.

At 4 p.m., he issued the necessary orders to this effect. In pursuance of these, the VIIth Corps was to close up in the space already assigned to it between the roads leading from St. Gorgon and Levier to Pontarlier, the Hud on both sides of the Frasne—Pontarlier road. Each was to form its independent reserve, and at noon to pass to the attack. A suitable cooperation of Lieutenant-Colonel Liebe's detachment was to be ensured by the Hud Corps. General v. d. Goltz's troops were to form up at the same time to the east of Levier as a general reserve. General v. Schmeling also received orders to march on Pontarlier. For the expected battle General v. Manteuffel drew particular attention to the necessity of mutual support and to an effective employment of the artillery.

General Clinchant, acting on the belief that the armistice also applied to the Army of the Jura, had stopped the movements of his troops on the 30th. He limited himself to posting cavalry detachments along the Ornans—Pontarlier road, in order to maintain the connection with the fortress of Besançon in view of the expected tracing of a line of demarcation. After the loss of Sombacourt, Chaffois, Dompierre, and Frasne, the army concentrated entirely on the right bank of the Drugeon; Vaux and Bonnevaux were occupied for the security of the mountain road, along which Crémer's Division was continuing its march to Mouthe.

The Commander-in-Chief had meanwhile commenced to have doubts whether the armistice applied to his troops; the defiles of Vaux and Les Granges Ste. Marie were lost, and the prospect was very small of getting even the infantry through to the south. He therefore assembled the army in position at Pontarlier on the 31st January for the purpose of making a last and serious stand, and caused the baggage, the ammunition columns, with the sick and the exhausted men, to be sent back to the protection offered by the Château de Joux. In the last resource, he contemplated the passage into Swiss territory.

News having arrived in the afternoon from Bordeaux that the East Army was in reality excluded from the armistice, General Clinchant summoned a council of war. The assembled Generals declared that they could no longer answer for their troops. Negotiations had already been commenced with the Swiss authorities for their passage, which was to take place on the following day by the three roads through Les Verrières de Joux, Les Fourgs, and Hôpitaux. In the evening General Clinchant

proceeded in person to Les Verrières in order to sign the convention. The Army Reserve was to hold Pontarlier until all the trains should have passed along the road through La Cluse, while General Billot, with the 18th Corps, was to take post between Fort Neuv and Château de Joux, in order to cover the retreat of the army. Works for strengthening this position were at once taken in hand. Full power was given to the 24th Corps and to General Crémer to escape with the most advanced detachments to Morez; with the rearmost, if necessary, to pass into Swiss territory. As a matter of fact, the bulk of the Cavalry Division of the 15th Corps had already proceeded so far that it was beyond reach of the advancing Prussian columns.

## ENGAGEMENT AT PONTARLIER-LA CLUSE.

At 11 a.m. on the 1st February, when the advanced guard of the Hnd Army Corps\* was leaving Ste. Colombe, the scouts reported that Les Granges Narboz were no longer occupied by the enemy. At the Pontarlier railway station General du Trossel met with but slight resistance, which the advance of the 1st Battalion 9th Regiment sufficed speedily to overcome.† The town was occupied without further opposition, and a large number of men of the French Army were made prisoners.

General v. Fransecky, who was with the advanced guard, gave orders to follow up the French at once in their further retreat towards the Swiss frontier. The road leading to La Cluse was found to be blocked by French vehicles of every description, and the neighbouring ground being deep in snow, it was only with great difficulty that the 1st Battalion 9th Grenadiers managed to force a passage, driving at the same time some hostile detachments in front of it. The pioneers, assisted by infantry, set about removing the obstacles, but it

<sup>•</sup> Oth Kolberg Grenadiers, Ist, 5th, 6th, and 8th 1st and 4th 3rd and parts 5th 3rd Drug. Tith Drag. 5th Henry and 6th Light and 1st Field Pion. The 7th was with the baggage. † Order of March of Advanced Guard IInd Army Corps. Commander: Major-General du Trossel. Vanguard: Colonel v. Ferentheil u. Gruppenberg. 4th Squadron 3rd Dragoons. 1st Battalion 9th Grenadiers. 6th Light and 5th Heavy Batteries. 5th, 6th, and 8th Companies 49th Regiment. 1 1st Field Pioncer Company # 4th and 1st Squadron 3rd Dragoons. 3rd and 1 5th Squadron 11th Drugoons. Main body of Advanced Guard: Fusilier Battalion 9th Grenadiers (passed shortly to vanguard). 1st and 2nd Battalious 49th Regiment. 1 1st Field Pioneer Company.

was some considerable time before the fusilier battalion with the artillery could follow the 1st Battalion. Meanwhile the latter had reached the point where the road, passing between steep walls of rock, turns east towards the entrance of La Cluse. At this point the Doubs Valley widens into a basin, which is completely commanded by the strong Château de Joux situated on an isolated peak. When the leading grenadier companies emerged from the defile, they were received by a brisk musketry fire; four guns of the 5th Heavy Battery which were brought forward with the greatest difficulty had speedily to give way before the heavy guns of the fort. French infantry of the line now advanced with great resolution, and pressed back the grenadiers to the bend of the road. Meanwhile, however, three fusilier companies had scaled the heights on the east, and opposed the flanking attack of the enemy.

The main body of the advanced guard had meanwhile reached the Pontarlier railway station, and was now brought up by General du Trossel in order to outflank the enemy's right on the Larmont heights. The 1st Battalion 49th Regiment,‡ followed by the 2nd Kolberg,§ deployed on the fissured plateau to the left of the fusiliers; they repulsed the enemy with the bayonet, and gained possession of the farms on

the plateau.

At the wayside inn, in reserve, stood the 2nd Battalion 49th Regiment, and later on the 2nd Grenadiers also arrived there. But the configuration of the ground, so eminently favourable to the enemy, prevented the deployment of large masses for the attack.

At the right wing, on the other hand, the 2nd Company 49th Regiment, and somewhat later the 12th of the 9th Grenadiers, had, with a great effort, scaled the steep mountain side west of the railway. The fire from this commanding height drove back two hostile battalions in disorder upon La Cluse, and defeated all further sorties from that direction, whilst in the centre of the fighting line the 1st and Fusilier Battalions of the 9th Grenadiers held their own against the enemy's efforts.

On the left wing, Colonel Laurin had driven the adversary from the wood. Ultimately the 49th overcame with the bayonet the vigorous resistance of some French skirmishers ensconced behind a wall on the high ground above the defile,

<sup>\*</sup> The 2nd Battalion was engaged in collecting the prisoners at Pontarlier.
† 9th, 10th, and 11th. The 12th assisted at first the pioneers in removing the obstacles on the high road.

<sup>‡</sup> Except the 2nd Company, which turned to the right.

§ This regiment had meanwhile finished collecting the prisoners at Pontarlier.

 $<sup>\</sup>frac{5th}{49}$  followed at once the  $\frac{IInd}{9}$  to the plateau.

The consequence of this the  $\frac{6\text{th and 8th}}{49}$  advanced into the fighting line, in order to fill a gap between the  $\frac{1\text{st}}{49}$  and  $\frac{11\text{Ind}}{9}$ .

and followed the retreating foe with a brisk fire. Several skirmishing divisions scrambled down the steep slopes towards La Cluse, and the 9th Grenadiers advanced close up to Fort Neuv. Nothing more could be done, and the troops remained during the night on the ground which they had won. Their loss, which chiefly fell on the 9th Grenadiers, amounted to 19 officers and 365 men. The enemy sustained a loss of 23 officers and 1,600 men taken prisoners,† besides some 400 wagons mostly laden with food.

General v. Fransecky, who was present at the action in front of La Cluse, ordered the main body of the Corps, which could find no employment here, to advance from Les Granges

Narboz to Oye and Les Granges Ste. Marie.

In consequence of the almost insuperable difficulties presented by the intervening mountains covered foot-deep in snow, General v. Hartmann contented himself with sending in the first instance only two companies by the direct road to Oye, as he hoped to reach his goal with the rest of the troops along the better road through Pontarlier. But as the action in front of La Cluse had grown to an extent quite unexpected, he was detained at Pontarlier,‡ in order to support General du Trossel in case of need. The corps artillery also followed to Pontarlier.

Towards the end of the day, Captain v. Keyserlingk, on the Action at other hand, had with the 10th and 11th Companies 2nd Grena- Oye. diers ascended with great difficulty the steep slopes of the Jura, but in his further advance upon Oye met with the enemy in the wood. Several French columns returning along the road from Pontarlier to Les Granges Ste. Marie deployed such large forces that the small band had to retire upon Granges-dedessus; here it was supported by the 39th Regiment, which General v. Manteuffel, who was at Pontarlier, had ordered in that direction.

The VIIth Corps assembled this day, in accordance with orders, on the Drugeon: the 14th Division and corps artillery at Houtand, the 13th at Pont Rouge. The latter had been already anticipated at Doubs\*\* by the 4th Reserve Division, General v. Debschitz reached Morteau, and General v. d. Goltz had posted his troops in reserve about two miles in front of Levier. But as a general engagement was no longer probable,



<sup>\*</sup> Some hostile battalions withdrew at once from the village; this latter was not however, occupied by the Prussians. Besides numerous prisoners brought in before the fight.

The 2nd Grenadiers had also been brought forward from the St. The cavalry of the 18th Corps and a regiment of African light infantry.

<sup>10</sup>th and 11th then rejoined their regiment.

Detachments thereof were despatched to Arçon and Grange Maillot. General v. Schmeling had received orders to march on Pontarlier early in the morning; he had assembled his troops, and reached Doubs at noon, whence he moved on to Pontarlier without finding use for his services. A detachment of the 4th Reserve Division had also been at Ornans, and found it unoccupied.

General v. Manteuffel ordered the latter to place his troops in quarters. It was clear that the affair at La Cluse was merely an action with the rearguard of the retiring adversary. The remaining troops were also placed for the night, so far as possible, under some sort of cover in and near Pontarlier.

Lieutenant-Colonel Liebe had found on all the roads evident signs of great disorder in the adversary's ranks, and had captured several hundred prisoners; finding, however, St. Antoine and Rochejean strongly occupied, he halted at Les

Granges Ste. Marie.

The enemy, who had been opposed to Colonel v. Wedell at Foncine-le-Bas, had disappeared, and there were no more traces of him on this side of La Chaux Neuve and St.

Laurent.

No intelligence of these events having as yet reached Army Headquarters, they were in doubt there as to the size of the French force which might still be posted on the southern mountain road; and in consequence General v. Manteuffel ordered the IInd Corps to advance next day in sufficient strength by way of Les Granges Ste. Marie and Mouthe, and to use the rest of the troops as a flanking force along the road through Frasne. The 4th Reserve Division was to relieve! General du Trossel as early as possible, and to continue in observation towards Les Verrières.

At the same time the Commander-in-Chief had in view a decisive action with General Garibaldi, whom he supposed to be still at Dijon. To this end he proposed to assemble the VIIth Corps at Arbois, the IInd at Lons-le-Saunier, and General v. d. Goltz's troops at Poligny. The duty of completing the success achieved at Pontarlier, and the removal of the mass of captured war material and prisoners, was to be entrusted to the 4th Reserve Division and General v. Debschitz's detachment.

That same night of the 1st—2nd February, General v. Manteuffel received news at Pontarlier, by way of Berlin, that a convention concerning the passage of the East Army into Switzerland had been concluded between General Herzog of the Confederation and General Clinchant. The whole of the 1st February had been employed by the French columns in passing the frontier. General Pallu de la Barrière, who intended defending the foremost chain of the Jura at Pontarlier, saw his troops carried away almost at the outset by the disorderly stream of drivers of the long columns of train. until they reached La Cluse did he succeed in halting them.

At that place the 18th Corps had also deployed, and the resistance of both these bodies of troops had brought on the

He had retreated on the preceding night to Morez.
 The forts impeded by their fire not only this relief, but also the search for wounded. A parlementaire sent for the purpose was fired upon.

† App. CLXIX contains the text of this convention.

somewhat obstinate fight. In the night the 18th Corps, and latter on the Army Reserve, followed by way of Les Verrières-de-Joux\* the mass of the East Army which had retired into

Swiss territory.

As a matter of fact, the following troops had escaped to the Ain Department, which lies on the south frontier:—General Crémer's cavalry, the Cavalry Division of the 15th Corps, some other regiments of cavalry; further the 1st Division 24th Corps, with an effective, it is true, of only some hundreds, and lastly a number of officers of rank.† 80,000 men laid down their arms in Switzerland.

The East Army had disappeared from the theatre of war, the issue of the siege of Belfort could no longer be doubtful, and no danger henceforth threatened the communications of

the German army.

On the 2nd February when General v. Koblinski was advancing with the 42nd Regiment and the 3rd Squadron 3rd February. Dragoons by way of Les Granges Ste. Marie, he found the district entirely deserted by the enemy. The detachments, some thousands strong, which Colonel v. Wedell had had in front of him at Les Planches, had, on the night of the 31st January—1st February, retired into neutral territory at Morbier, with a protest against the non-recognition of the armistice.1

The IInd Corps took up quarters to the east of the Pontarlier—Champagnole road as far as Les Granges Ste. Marie. The VIIth Corps remained at Pontarlier, and General v. Debschitz at Morteau, while General v. d. Goltz marched to Andelot-en-Montagne. Ornans was occupied by the 4th Reserve Division, in order to maintain the connection with the Baden Division. Army Headquarters remained at Pontarlier. Here the news had arrived that General Hann v. Weyhern had occupied Dijon. A further enterprise in this direction would have therefore been useless, and the only matter still remaining to be done by General v. Manteuffel was to occupy the whole of the departments excluded from the armistice.

† Here also all the reads were blocked with war material.



<sup>\*</sup> General Pallu and Colonel Poullet, with a few resolute men, reached the Ain Department along bye-paths.

<sup>†</sup> Among these were Generals Billot, de Bressolles and Carré de Busscrolle, Colonels Goury, Poullet, and Bourras, the latter of whom had succeeded in escaping from St. Hippolyte with some 1,000 men.

<sup>§</sup> General Baron v. Manteuffel caused 1,000 stand of arms, which had been surrendered at Chaffois in the belief of an armistice, to be handed over to the Swiss authorities with a view to their restoration to General Clinchant.

## OPERATIONS OF GENERAL HANN V. WEYHERN AGAINST DIJON.

Although the French War Ministry had never ceased in their endeavours to reinforce General Garibaldi's troops, and had put an end to the differences between him and General Pellissier commanding at Dijon, by recalling the latter on the 25th and giving the former the command of all forces in the Côte d'Or, Garibaldi considered that he ought to limit his efforts to holding Dijon. On the arrival of the news announcing that General v. Manteuffel was moving with considerable forces against the communications of the East Army, General Garibaldi was urged to undertake an energetic expedition against Dôle and Mouchard. He, however, satisfied himself with despatching 700 franctireurs against Dôle, but they made little attempt to

make their presence felt.

To co-operate in Garibaldi's enterprises, the War Ministry had on the 26th January appointed 15,000 gardes mobiles, whom General Crouzat was ordered to push forward with the available field artillery from Lyons to Lons-le-Saunier. the same object, a brigade of the 26th Corps, then in process of formation, was to be sent by rail from Châtellerault to Beaune. On 27th January, Garibaldi received a second intimation to hold Dijon with only some 8,000 to 10,000 men, and to lead forward the mass of his army at once beyond Dôle. Instead of this, he despatched a part of the 3rd Brigade to St. Jean de Losne; another part of it, as also the 1st Brigade, he assembled at Bourg\* by the 29th January, utilizing the railway for the purpose, and occupied the main points on the slopes of the Côte d'Or. The Chief of the Staff Bordone conducted the defence of Dijon, where, on the 29th January, twelve position guns arrived.

Garibaldi's inactivity had permitted General v. Kettler to remain with his brigade in position to the south of Marsannay; the patrols despatched towards Dijon always found the enemy quiet there. On the 25th January a mixed detachment! had been sent to Prauthoy, where a raiding party belonging to the

Langres garrison had captured the messenger-post.

On the 28th, General v. Kettler, hearing that Châtillon-sur-Seine and Nuits-sur-Armançon were threatened from Langres and Avallon, marched away without impediment towards Is-sur-Tille and Thil Châtel.§ This information proved to be exaggerated.

despatched to Is-sur-Tille to guard the hospital there. § It is supposed that the movements of General de Pointe de Grévigny had given the ground for these reports. (See later narrative.)



<sup>\*</sup> On the railway between Lyons and Lons-le-Saunier.

<sup>†</sup> See ante, p. 24.

<sup>‡ 5</sup>th, 7th and 8th, with some dragoons, under Captain Kriess. The 6th was

The line of cavalry messenger-posts through Châtillon having Surprise of been broken up by order from Army Headquarters, the detachment sent to Prauthoy was on the point of quitting the place, when it was surprised in the morning by troops from Langres. The three companies, which were attacked by greatly superior forces, succeeded by a movement eastward in cutting their way through to General v. Kettler, but they sustained a loss of 5 officers, 77 men killed and wounded, and had to abandon their wagons, the horses of which had been killed.\* Kettler's Brigade returned the next day to the line Savigny le Sec—St. Julien, in front of Dijon.

The other forces at General Hann v. Weyhern's disposal, 29th Colonel v. Willisen's cavalry, besides Knesebeck's and Degenfeld's brigades, had meanwhile crossed the Saône at Apremont, and were assembling in the neighbourhood of Essertenne and Mirabeau-sur-Bèse. At the latter place had been hitherto posted Major v. Schon with the fusiliers of the 49th Regiment, in order to cover the concentration.‡ He was now pushed forward as far as the Tille.§ Some troops were left behind for the protection of the etappen line between Gray and Dôle.

General v. Manteuffel had recommended an advance against the south and south-east side of Dijon, as, by so doing, the adversary's communications would be threatened, and it would be also possible to destroy the railways to Auxonne and Châlons-sur-Saône. The previous attacks of General v. Kettler had also shown that Dijon was very strongly fortified on the west and north sides. General Hann v. Weyhern therefore

29th January.†

<sup>\*</sup> Captain Kriess and 1st Lieutenants Luchs and v. Zitzewitz were among the wounded.

<sup>†</sup> See sketch facing p. 58.

<sup>†</sup> On 27th January, on which day General Hann v. Weyhern assumed at Dôle the command of the troops appointed to advance against Dijon, Knesebeck's mixed brigade with the 4th Light, as also Colonel Baron v. Willisen's cavalry with the

Baden Horse Artillery Battery, were posted on the Gray—Dôle road, for the purpose of protecting the communications of the South Army. Of the XIVth Army Corps the 2nd Baden Infantry Brigade, with the 1st Heavy Battery, were appointed to the enterprise, and set in movement for Pesmes. General Hann v. Weyhern established his headquarters at Dôle on the 27th. As a reconnaissance had shown that the Saône bridge at St. Jean de Losne was destroyed, the advance originally contemplated by the south of Auxonne had to be abandoned, and concentration at Mirabeau was chosen, using the bridge at Apreniont for the purpose.

§ Major v. Schon had meanwhile, after the arrival of Willsen's brigade on the

<sup>§</sup> Major v. Schon had meanwhile, after the arrival of Willsen's brigade on the Etappen line Dôle—Gray, been reinforced by the 2nd 2nd Res. Drag.; the detachments of the 11th Dragoons assigned to him, as well as to Knesebeck's Brigade, rejoined the regiment. Shortly after, the 3rd 2nd Res. Drag. which in consequence of the surprise of Prauthoy had made a reconnaissance from Gray, in that direction, joined Major v. Schon.

 $<sup>\</sup>parallel \frac{\text{Ist}}{60}, \frac{\text{IInd}}{72} \text{ and } \frac{1\text{st and 4th}}{2\text{nd Res. Drag.}}, \text{ as also two battalions formed of new levies for}$ 

the IInd and VIIth Corps.

¶ General Baron v. Manteussel moreover was of opinion that the capture of Dijon was not absolutely necessary; on the contrary, if it should entail great sacri-

resolved, by a movement down the Tille, to proceed to the district between Auxonne and Dijon, either for the purpose of attacking this place, or from the Burgundy Canal to sever its communications with the south.

30th January.

On the evening of the 29th parlementaires appeared at the outposts. Early on the 30th, General Bordone arrived in person, requesting that a line of demarcation might be fixed on the basis of the armistice. General Hann v. Weyhern rejected the proposal. The concentration of Kettler's Brigade on the left wing and an advance of the bulk of the remaining forces to the Tille were ordered; it was not until behind the Norges that the enemy's outposts were met with.

Slst January.

On the 31st January, Kettler's Brigade established itself at St. Julien, the remaining troops at Arc-sur-Tille. Major v. Schon received orders to sever the communications between Dijon and Auxonne. Early in the morning the Chief of the Staff of the Vosges Army came to Mirebeau, but his proposals were again rejected, the more so as that same night positive orders to continue the movements arrived from Army Headquarters.

At 10 a.m. Kettler's Brigade advanced upon Varois, whilst Col. v. d. Knesebeck's Brigade marched by way of Couternon upon Quetigny. The enemy, after receiving a few rounds of shell, retired upon his strongly entrenched main position on the line St. Apollinaire—Mirande, which, on account of the late hour of the day, could not be attacked. Degenfeld's and Willisen's Brigades were left as reserve at Arc, on the left bank of the Tille. Major v. Schon, who had pressed on towards the Ouche, seized the Fauverney Bridge, the enemy retiring partly to Dijon and partly to Auxonne. He further assisted a detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Kraus, despatched to observe Auxonne, in driving the adversary from Genlis.

General Bordone, finding all his attempts useless to bring about a cessation of hostilities, determined to evacuate Dijon on the following night and retire to the district actually included in the armistice. Under cover of Ricciotti Garibaldi's Brigade, he caused his troops, so far as they could not use the railway,

to march by the roads to Autun, Beaune, and Seurre.

Accordingly, early on the 1st February, General Hann v. Weyhern found the position St. Apollinaire—Mirande abandoned. Kettler's Brigade entered Dijon without opposition; it was followed by the Baden troops, whilst some dismounted men of the 1st Squadron 11th Dragoons, after a few shots, gained possession of the railway station just as the last railway train was moving away. Several ammunition wagons and other

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1st February.

fices, the isolation of the adversary would suffice until a decisive action had been fought with the French East Army, when the enterprise could be resumed with perfect certainty.

\* See sketch facing p. 68.

<sup>†</sup> Fus. 5th Bad. Bad. B. G. Drag., and ½ 2nd Heavy Bad.

material fell into their hands. Knesebeck's mixed brigade had meanwhile moved off by way of Mirande and Longvic towards the Beaune road. Major v. Schon had at an early hour crossed the Ouche at Fauverney, and afterwards the Burgundy Canal at Ouges. A squadron sent in advance, aided by some pioneers carried in wagons, destroyed the railway at Perrigny-les-Dijon, but the last train coming from Dijon had already passed this place.

Colonel v. Lobenthal was detached with the 21st Regiment, a squadron, and a battery,\* to Plombières. General v. Kettler,† under whose orders were also placed Knesebeck's mixed brigade and Major v. Schon's detachment, advanced as far as Gevrey.

On the 2nd February, Sombernon and Nuits were occupied, 2nd but the enemy was no longer seen. Patrols also established the February. fact that Beaune was free of French troops. The Army of the Vosges had this day abandoned the Côte d'Or Department.

Willisen's and Degenfeld's Brigades remained at Dijon.

By his enterprising activity General v. Manteuffel had succeeded in a three weeks' campaign in crushing, with unimportant exceptions, the hostile forces which had been forced to retreat by the obstinate resistance of the XIVth Corps.

The resolute action of his generals and the unsurpassed endurance of the troops! had, despite the most unfavourable conditions of ground and weather, overcome all difficulties. Once again in this war France found herself deprived of a numerous army.

<sup>9</sup> companies of 21st Regiment (2 left at Nuits, 1 at Is-sur-Lille), 11th Drag. and 5th Light

<sup>†</sup> With 11 companies 61st Regiment (1 in Thil Châtel), znu inth Drag. and 4th Heavy

ΪĨ 1 The Had Corps had accomplished the long distance from Paris to the Swiss frontier in almost one continuous march: the 5th Brigade, for instance, had only had two halting days in thirty-four, and had marched 400 miles, exclusive of the marches to and from the places of assembly. In the expedition to Avallon the 8th Brigade marched on the 16th January nearly 25 miles. Major v. Normann's detachment, which on the 18th January pressed forward to the bridges at Gray, had marched that day 31 miles. The VIIth Corps, especially during the movements for the assembly of the South Army from Auxerre to Châtillon-sur-Seine, also made very severe marches. But it was not so much the distances to be contended with, as the circumstance that in the mountains the marching had to be mostly done along roads frozen like glass, or deep in snow. Neither, in consequence of the sudden commencement and the unbroken continuance of the operations, was it possible to look after the clothing and food so carefully as otherwise would have been the case. The men's boots especially fell into bad order. On entering the Jura the baggage—even that of some of the higher staffs—had to be left behind.

OCCUPATION OF THE JURA AND COTE D'OR DEPARTMENTS BY THE SOUTH ARMY.—3RD TO 14TH FEBRUARY.

The corps of 15,000 men,\* which at the end of January had been despatched by order of the French War Ministry from Lyons to Lons-le-Saunier, had there joined, under the command of General Pelissier, the mobilized national guards sent away

from Besançon by General Rolland.†

These forces, though considerable in point of numbers, had, however, made so little progress in their military organization that they were manifestly unsuited for employment in the open field, while as regards the insignificant remnant saved from the East Army, it could not be looked upon as a reinforcement of any value. General Pelissier could in these circumstances have attempted nothing more in support of the East Army, but confined himself to endeavouring to obtain a line of demarcation which would leave him in possession of his positions. General v. Manteuffel rejected this proposal, as also those meanwhile tendered by the Commandant of Salins, and suggested to General Pelissier a voluntary abandonment of the Jura Department with a view to avoiding further bloodshed. Meanwhile, the South Army had already commenced its prescribed march in the direction of Arbois-Lons-le-Saunier, whilst at the same time parts of it were moving southwards in the Jura, and parts had been left behind in the direction of the Swiss frontier.

3rd February.

On the 3rd February, General v. Koblinski, supported from the side of Les Planches by Colonel v. Wedell, had moved with the advanced guard Ilnd Army Corps without opposition, from Les Granges Ste. Marie as far as Mouthe; 6 guns and 20 limbers, which had been abandoned by the French, were found during the march.

General v. Hartmann\*\* had followed as far as the neighbourhood of Fraroz, at the foot of the Haut Joux Forest, General du

Trossel\* to Bonnevaux, while the corps artillery had remained at Frasne.

The VIIth Corps had moved the 14th Division to the neighbourhood of Pont d'Héry, the 13th to Levier and the villages to the south-west, the corps artillery to Thésy, Lemuy, and Villeneuve d'Amont. Small parties remained in observation in front of Salins.†

General v. d. Goltz had arrived at Poligny, and remained stationary for the time, watching in the direction of Lons-le-Saunier; the 4th Reserve Division had by orders from Army Headquarters been again reinforced by the four battalions which had been assigned to General v. Debschitz.‡ General v. Schmeling had detached Major-General v. Tresckow with 8 battalions, 3 squadrons, and 3 batteries.§ to watch the Swiss frontier between Les Allemands and the Les Granges St. Marie—Ballaigue road; while Colonel v. Knappe with 5 battalions, 4 squadrons, and 3 batteries.¶ was to observe the east side of Besançon. Headquarters remained at Pontarlier. At Les Allemands, Captain Jouanne, of the 3rd Reserve Lancers, found three guns which had been abandoned by the enemy in his flight. The total number of field guns taken from the East Army now amounted to twenty-eight.

On the 3rd February the Army Headquarters were at

Frasne.

The 4th February was employed by the IInd Corps in 4th February. re-organizing the units which had become much disjointed during the recent operations; the 6th Infantry Brigade, with two batteries and half a squadron, was despatched to St. Laurent, the rest of the 3rd Infantry Division to Le Francis, Moulin-du-Haut, and Les Planches en Montagne. General du Trossel moved with the troops of the 4th Division under his orders to Pont-du-Navoy and Champagnole. The corps artillery reached its quarters at Champagnole on the left bank

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<sup>\*</sup> With 9th Grenadiers, Ist and IIud, 3rd and 5th Light and 5th Heavy, 11th Drag.

and  $\frac{1st \text{ Field Pion.}}{11}$ .

<sup>†</sup> Hind, Ist, 13 and 6th Heavy, under Licut.-Colonel v. Pannewitz.

† The Division was thus united in its entirety, with the exception of the small

<sup>†</sup> The Division was thus united in its entirety, with the exception of the small detachments at Larians, L'Isle-sur-le-Doubs, and Baume-les-Dames, under the command of General v. Schmeling.

<sup>§</sup> Fus. Ortelsburg, Tilsit, Wehlau, Gumbinnen, Loetzen, Goldap, and Marien-

burg Battalions, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd, 1st and 3rd Light, 2nd Heavy 3rd Res. Lan. 4th Res. Div.

<sup>||</sup> Ist and IInd | Osterode, Graudenz, and Thorn Battalions, 1st Res. Lancers, and 1st Heavy, 2nd and 4th Light

<sup>4</sup>th Res. Div.

1st and 3rd Heavy and 2rd Drag.

of the Ain. General Hann v. Weyhern completed the occupa-

tion of the Côte d'Or Department.

The patrols of the 3rd Division found no further trace of the enemy. On the other hand, a squadron\* despatched by General du Trossel met with French cavalry in front of Mirebel, repulsed them, and found the village occupied by infantry.

Of the VIIth Corps the 14th Division reached Arbois, the 13th Andelot-en-Montagne, whilst the corps artillery took up its quarters on the Pont d'Héry—Arbois road. The trains which had been despatched in good time by way of Epinal, also arrived under escort of the 1st Battalion 74th Regiment.

The Army Headquarters proceeded to Champagnole.

General v. Manteuffel did not contemplate seeking a tactical decision with the hostile forces still present in the Jura Department, which in any case had lost their importance since the defeat of the East Army; he proposed to give his troops every possible rest after the excessive efforts of the last few days, and not to expose them to further losses. He therefore ordered the IInd Army Corps to reconnoitre next day in the direction of Lons-le-Saunier, but to avoid a serious action. The day was to be employed in arranging the supplies, and, so far as possible, placing the clothing and equipment in good order.

5th February.

The orders from His Majesty the Emperor and King, which arrived by telegraph at Army Headquarters on the 5th February, likewise left it optional to grant the troops the rest to which they were entitled after such great successes; at the same time the siege of Belfort was to be vigorously prosecuted. The transport of the prisoners and the removal of the captured stores having been completed at Pontarlier, six battalions of the East Prussian Landwehr Brigade with two batteries, all belonging to the 4th Reserve Division, were sent away in the next two days to join the siege corps, whilst General v. Schmeling took up other positions with the troops remaining under his orders.

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<sup>5</sup>th 11th Drag.

<sup>†</sup> See ante, p. 9.

<sup>‡</sup> The Tilsit, Wehlau, Gumbinnen, Loctzen, Goldap, and Marienburg Battalions, with 2nd Heavy and 8rd Light
4th Res. Div.

<sup>§</sup> There remained at Pontarlier: Fus. Ortelsburg and Osterode Battalions, lst, 3rd, and 4th, and 1st Light; at Ornans: Ist and IInd, Graudenz and Thorn Battalions, 1st Reserve Lancers, and 1st Heavy, 2nd, and 4th Light. The Insterburg Battalion was at L'Isle-sur-le-Doubs, the Danzig Battalion, 2nd 3rd Res. Lan. and 12nd Light at Larians.

A small detachment,\* which General du Trossel sent to Mirebel, found the village free of the enemy, and saw only some wagons with a cavalry escort moving from Crancot to Lons-le-Saunier.

Meanwhile, General Pelissier, seeing the approach of the 6th February. heads of the German columns, determined to retire to the district included in the armistice; he abandoned Lons-le-Saunier, in order, on the following night, to reach Beaurepaire, and afterwards to move to Bourg.

In consequence General du Trossel found Lons-le-Saunier clear of the enemy on 6th February, and occupied it. The 3rd Division followed to the line Châtillon—Clairvaux, the Corps

Artillery to Pont-du-Navoy.

The VIIth Army Corps pushed forward the 14th Division to the neighbourhood of Vaudrey, brought up the 13th to Arbois, and cantoned the Corps Artillery at Mathenay and Molamboz.

General Hann v. Weyhern had meanwhile caused his troops to occupy Précy-sous-Thil, Saulieu and Pouilly-en-Auxois on the west, Beaune and Seurre on the south; and made arrangements for the investment of Auxonne.! The commandant of this fortress had meanwhile pushed forward detachments of the garrison to Frasne and Peintre. By order of General v. Manteuffel, Colonel v. Knesebeck in consequence left Seurre for the fortress with some troops on the 6th, but found that the enemy had returned to the positions which he had held prior to the 28th January; no encounter therefore took place even at this point.

On the 6th February both Arnay-le-Duc and Sémur were occupied, and from thence connection was established with the Etappen troops which had to guard the railway passing through

Nuits-sur-Armancon.

The Army Headquarters remained on the 6th February at

Poligny.

The Departments of the Doubs, Jura, and Côte d'Or, which 7th February. had been excluded from the armistice, being on the 7th February entirely in the hands of the South Army, General v. Manteuffel could spread his troops over a wider area with a view to better accommodation, while preserving their readiness for action; at the same time the necessary measures of security were taken in the direction of the region occupied by the enemy. To the IInd Corps was assigned the Jura, to the VIIth the Côte

§ Fus. and \(\frac{1}{72}\) and \(\frac{1}{11}\).

G 2

<sup>\* 4</sup>th and 11th Drag. † The let remained in the Mirebel Pass.

<sup>‡</sup> To this were appointed: Hind and Fus. Baden B. G. Drag. and 2nd Heavy Bad. under Lieut.-Colouel Kraus.

d'Or, and to the XIVth the Doubs Department. An army reserve was constituted under General v. d. Goltz, consisting of his former command, the 1st Baden Infantry Brigade, and Willisen's Cavalry Brigade, and was assembled in the neighbourhood of Dôle. Its function was to maintain the connection between the VIIth and XIVth Corps, and watch Auxonne and Salins. It was the duty of the XIVth Corps to keep watching Besançon, to push the siege of Belfort with vigour, and provisionally to continue in occupation of Pontarlier.

The Army Headquarters proceeded on 7th February to

Mont-sous-Vaudrey.

These orders had in general been put into execution by the 10th February.\* Meanwhilet General v. Manteuffel had been also entrusted with the supreme direction of the investment, and, if necessary, of the siege of the fortress of Langres, the Commandant of which had at first refused to recognise the armistice, although the fortress was not situated within the area of the three Departments excluded from its provisions. Colonel v. Krenski's troops, now on the march from Longwy, consisting of 6 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 2 batteries, as also the siege park to be brought from that place, and 10 landwehr battalions of the Government-General of Lorraine were also to cooperate. General v. Manteuffel moved off Knesebeck's Brigade to the vicinity of Gray, for the same purpose. On the 8th, however, news arrived from the Government-General that the Commandant had recognised the armistice, and His Majesty the Emperor and King had thereupon ordered that the present distribution of the forces should not be disturbed, unless a general recommencement of hostilities rendered it necessary. In order to be able in this event to act at once with vigour against the fortress, Goltz's Brigade had moved off through Gray to the neighbourhood of Champlitte, Prauthoy, and Fontaine Française. It was still in those positions when, on the 14th, news arrived of the armistice concluded on the previous day for South-east France.‡

From this time forth complete tranquillity prevailed also in this region; after the winter campaign, so full of hardships, repose was very acceptable to the troops. General v. Manteuffel had on the 10th February transferred his headquarters by way of Dôle and St. Jean de Losne to Dijon, where since the 9th had also been those of the VIIth Corps; on this later date the headquarters of the IInd Corps had proceeded to

Poligny, those of the XIVth to Dôle.



8th—14th February.

The relief of the troops under General Hann v. Weyhern by the VIIth Corps was delayed for several days.

<sup>†</sup> On 6th February.

† App. CLXX gives the text of the protocol drawn up at Versailles on the 15th February, with reference to the armistice concluded on the 13th for the south-east of France.

In an Army Order of the 14th February, General v. Manteuffel expressed to the soldiers of the South Army his satisfaction with their services, and recommended that gentleness and forbearance should be shown to the enemy who had been so completely vanquished.

CONTINUATION OF THE SIEGE OF BELFORT AFTER THE BATTLE ON THE LISAINE. SURRENDER OF THE FORTRESS ON 18TH FEBRUARY, 1871.\*

After the termination of the engagements on the Lisaine, Lieutenant-General v. Tresckow Hnd had resumed the attack upon Belfort with renewed vigour. By the addition of the Loetzen, Goldap, Marienburg, and Gumbinnen Battalions,† the strength of the siege corps was raised to 27 battalions, 6 squadrons, and 6 field batteries, besides 24 fortress artillery and 6 fortress pioneer companies. On 21st January, the combatant strength of these troops numbered 17,602 infantry, 707 horses, and 34 field guns. The ration list of the fortress pioneers amounted to 1,166 men, that of the fortress artillery to 4,699 men.

To the north of the fortress, Colonel Gericke, with 2 battalions, ½ squadron, and 2 guns, now occupied the line Forêt d'Arsot—Valdoye—Cravanche, whilst on the west side between the Haut-du-Mont and the Savoureuse the fortress was invested by Colonel v. Ostrowski with 4 battalions and ‡ squadron¶ and on the south and east by General v. Buddenbrock with 9 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 3 batteries.\*\* To carry out the works of attack, 3 battalions of the 4th Reserve Division # were, in addition placed at disposal at Trétudans, and 6 battalions of General Debschitz', ## at Bourogne. The latter

(1) 1st Reserve Division, including the Bavarian Sortie Battery ..... 15 bns., 4 sqns., 4 batts. (2) General v. Debschitz's troops ..... " 2 8

(8) Of the 4th Reserve Division .....

Total . . . . . . . 27 § See App. CXXXI. The Bavarian fortress batteries are included in the number of companies.

|| The Neuhaldensleben and Pr. Stargardt Battalions, 2nd Res. Lan. 1 1st Light Res.

II ¶ Fus. Gnesen, Deutsch-Crone and Inowrazlaw battalions, and 2nd Res. Lan-

ee Ist and IInd, Konitz, Schneidemühl, Bromberg, Neustadt, Burg, Stendal and

1st and 2nd Light Res., and Bavarian Halberstadt battalions, 2nd Res. Lan.

<sup>\*</sup> See Plans 31B and No. 37. † In the first instance, as we know, the whole reinforced brigade of Colonel v. Zimmermann had been attached to the siege corps; but on the 19th January a change occurred, four battalions only being left in front of the fortress (see aute, p. 29).

Sortie Battery (4 guns).

†† Goldsp, Marienburg, and Loetzen battalions.

‡‡ Lauban, Breslau Hnd, Striegau, Oels, Jauer, and Hirschberg battalions.

with 2 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 2 batteries had remained in his position between Exincourt and Croix, whilst Colonel v. Bredow, with a battalion, a squadron, and four gunst guarded the Lisaine between Héricourt and Montbéliard,

The siege guns, which had been employed on the Lisaine, as also the guns of two batteries established on the Allaine,1 were brought back to the parks at Moval and Banvillard.

As soon as the new batteries constructed at the Grand Bois should have produced sufficient effect, General v. Tresckow intended to open the first parallel against the Hautes Perches and Basses Perches forts. But before anything could be done, it was necessary to capture Le Haut Taillis and the village of Pérouse, which were still in the hands of the French.

CAPTURE OF LE HAUT TAILLIS, AND STORMING OF PÉROUSE, IN THE NIGHT OF THE 20TH-21ST JANUARY.

After the batteries at the Grand Bois had been completed and armed by the evening of the 20th January, and a vigorous preparatory fire had been maintained during the course of the day from Batteries Nos. 13, 14, and 20, General v. Tresckow ordered the positions in question to be stormed. At midnight Colonel v. Zglinicki¶ caused the 2nd Battalion 67th Regiment\*\* to advance from Chêvremont against the east and south-east side of Le Haut Taillis, and the 1st to follow in support, whilst two landwehr battalions from Bessoncourt were to attack Les Fourches and the Morveaux wood an hour later.

Colonel Denfert, rightly conjecturing from the brisk fire directed upon the Pérouse position that a night attack was impending, occupied strongly the village and the neighbouring woods with the best troops from the fortress, ## and had arranged

<sup>•</sup> Liegnitz and Apenrade battalions, 2nd and 3rd that and 2nd Light Res. Communication of the Res. Lan.

<sup>†</sup> Gumbinnen Battalion, 2nd Res. Lan., and 3 1st Light Res.

<sup>1</sup> At Bourogne and Joncherey.

See Part II, Vol. 2, p. 360.

Fire was opened from Battery No. 21 on the 29th, from Batteries 22, 23, 24, and 25 on the 21st January.

T Colonel v. Zglinicki directed the attack, for which the  $\frac{\text{Ist and 1Ind}}{67}$ , the Burg and Halberstadt battalions, and the Württemberg Fortress Pioneer Company, had

been placed at his disposal.

\*\* With the Württemberg Fortress Engineer Company.

11 By the 3rd Battalion 57th Gardes Mobiles (Haute Saône), 7 companies of the 84th, 1 of the 45th Line Regiments, 3 companies Gardes Mobiles of the Rhône, besides "Franctireurs of Altkirch," not found in the "Ordre de Bataille" (App. CXXX), as also a company of Gardes Mobiles of the Saône and Loire, which did duty as engineers (see Thiers et De La Laurencie, "La Défense de Belfort," p. 315,

these localities for a stubborn defence. The quarries north of Pérouse in particular had been transformed into a very strong

position for infantry and guns.

In spite of the adversary's extensive preparations, Major Schramm succeeded with the 2nd Battalion 67th Regiment in capturing, without firing a shot, the border of Le Haut Taillis.\* In the interior of the wood, a brisk fight ensued, but the adversary was speedily repulsed upon Pérouse. The 1st Battalion had meanwhile followed, and with three companiest occupied the wood, which was at once arranged for defence by the pioneers; one company; remained as reserve at Chêvremont. From the Forts Hautes Perches, de la Justice, and de la Miotte, now opened a brisk artillery fire, and from Pérouse a vigorous musketry fire, upon the advanced posts which had been lost.

The landwehr battalions, under Lieutenant-Colonel v. Schütz, had been received from the copses north of Pérouse with a heavy fire. Notwithstanding this circumstance, they succeeded in forcing their way in, but in the interior the opposition aided by obstacles, consisting of ditches, abattis, and wire entanglements, could only be gradually overcome, and not without considerable losses. The 5th Company Burg Battalion, followed by the 6th, advanced with great difficulty along the road leading from Roppe to Pérouse, eventually reaching the south border of the wood. The 8th Company, and behind it the 7th, had as their object the Morveaux wood. These two companies, supported by the 1st Company of the Halberstadt Battalion which had likewise reached the wood, threw back the stubborn enemy upon the quarry entrenchment. A brisk stationary musketry action now ensued against this entrenchment. An advance from Les Fourches, whither two more companies of the Halberstadt Battalion had followed, failed against the gallant resistance; another attack, made by the landwehr, who had gained a firm footing in Morveaux wood, was held fast under a heavy fire from the enemy.

Meanwhile Major Schramm, perceiving the fight at the quarry intrenchment, had renewed his advance, and, in spite of the brisk fire from the earthworks at the south-east angle of Pérouse, penetrated into the village. The French continued

right along an open valley.

† 1st, 2nd and 4th.

<sup>\*</sup> He had sent forward  $\frac{7 \text{th and } 8 \text{th}}{67}$ , in first line. The  $\frac{5 \text{th}}{67}$ , and the Württemberg Engineer Company followed in second line;  $\frac{6th}{67}$  took a separate road to the

<sup>‡ 8</sup>rd. The Burg battalion in first, the Halberstadt in second line.

<sup>2</sup>nd and 8rd. With  $\frac{6\text{th} \text{ and } 7\text{th}}{67}$ , which were supported at the right time by the  $\frac{5\text{th}}{67}$  following in second line. General v. Mertens had issued special instructions for the surprise, which served as a basis for the movements of the assailants.

their defence in the interior, house by house, but they began to field more quickly when the 8th Company 67th Regiment, which had cleared the Bois des Perches of the enemy, penetrated into Pérouse from the south. By 2.30 a.m., the eastern half of the large village had fallen into the hands of the 67th, a circumstance which was so threatening to the flank and rear of the defenders of the quarry intrenchment, that this hitherto stubbornly defended point was abandoned by the French. Towards 5 a.m., Colonel Denfert caused the western part of Pérouse to be evacuated. The 2nd Battalion 67th Regiment completely occupied the place, and threw forward pickets towards Belfort.\* The copses north of Pérouse were, it is true, evacuated at this time by the recall of the landwehr to Bessoncourt, but were again occupied on the 24th January.

On the French side 5 officers, 93 men became prisoners of The German loss amounted to 8 officers and 178 men.

On the 21st January and the succeeding night, the new Opening of batteries at the Grand Bois, in conjunction with the other first parallel siege batteries, maintained a regular fire upon the Château, the Hautes and town fronts, and the forts de la Justice and de la Miotte.

General v. Tresckow now proceeded to establish the first Percheson parallel, which stretched from the railway north of Danjoutin the night of to near Le Haut Taillis, a length of 1,900 yards, through a January, very rocky and deeply frozen soil. Five battalions and two pioneer companies had to complete this heavy piece of work. But as the advance of the working party from Moval across the Bosmont was delayed in consequence of the icy and steep roads, it was impossible, not withstanding the circumstance that the enemy did not disturb the works,\*\* to make the parallels everywhere of the prescribed breadth in the allotted time.

<sup>\*</sup>  $\frac{1st}{67}$ , of which one division had taken part in the struggle, remained at Haut Taillis wood, the  $\frac{2nd}{67}$  at Bois Bailly.

<sup>†</sup> Captain Baron Schenck zu Schweinsberg was killed, Captain Hellmuth was wounded.

<sup>‡</sup> App. CLXXIII contains a return of the losses among the troops besieging Belfort between 19th January and 19th February, 1871.

<sup>§</sup> See ante, p. 87, note ||. Altogether some 3,575 yards of trenches, inclusive of communications, were thrown up. As guards-a company was posted on the flanks of the parallel, while in addition a chain of posts was pushed forward some 40 or 50 yards beyond the trace, and intrenched themselves.

There was an engineer depôt here.

The artillery parks were at the time at the following points:-

Prussian Park at Moval and Banvillard.
 Bavarian Park at Rechotte.
 Baden Park at Charmois, Méroux, and Vezelois.

<sup>\*\*</sup> At 5 s.m. on the 22nd January, the workmen were relieved by three battalions and two pioneer companies; later on, a battalion was sent as working party every day, and two battalions as guard of the trenches. The widening of the parallel was continued for some days longer.

General v. Tresckow, inferring from the defender's inactivity that he was beginning to flag, believed that he could comply with General v. Werder's request by not only employing General v. Debschitz with 3 battalions, 1 squadron, and 16 guns,\* for an advance upon Pont du Roide and Blamont,† but could hasten the progress of the siege by assaulting the Perches Forts. It was reported that their profile was weak, that the works were considerably damaged already by the fire of the siege batteries, and that the troops occupying them were not only insufficient, but were untrustworthy. The reconnaissances of the ditches and gorges made on the nights of the 23rd—24th, and 24th—25th January could not be repeated, as the garrison had become vigilant, and the success of the attack depended mainly on surprising the adversary.

## ATTEMPT TO STORM THE PERCHES FORTS ON THE NIGHT OF 26TH—27TH JANUARY.

The forts of Hautes and Basses Perches were constructed as demi-redoubts, with a front of 185 yards; their ditches, 13' to 19' 6" in breadth, were excavated perpendicularly to a depth of 9' 9" in the rocky soil; their parapets were 11'4" in height, and 16'3" in thickness. At the gorge of each work were two bomb-proof block-houses, 44 yards long. At the Hautes Perches, these block-houses were connected by a palisade, whilst the gorge of Basses Perches was closed by a ditch. Hollow traverses gave a certain amount of protection to the interior. The armament of each work consisted of seven 12-cm guns. Basses Perches lay a little withdrawn from the crest of the hill. The south slope, with the exception of the railway cutting, was swept by a cross-fire from both forts. The wood, extending towards the Hautes Perches, had been cleared away for a distance of 650 yards along the ridge, and on its south slope for a distance of 325 yards. The pointed stumps of trees, 1 or 2 feet high, had been connected by wire entanglements, forming an

‡ The front line consisted in the case of Hautes Perches of a flat salient, with small redans to flank the ditch at the shoulders; in the case of Basses Parches of two bastions, connected by a flat curtain broken outwards.

<sup>\*</sup> Breslau II, Lauban and Apenrade battalions, 2nd 6th Res. Lan.

<sup>†</sup> The advance undertaken on the evening of the 23rd January led to the actions at Glav and Roches; (see ante, p. 33). The Lauban and Breslau II battalions returned to General v. Debschitz's command after the opening of the first parallel.

‡ The front line consisted in the case of Hautes Perches of a flat salient, with

of two bastions, connected by a flat curtain broken outwards.

§ The parapet was formed of stone rubble, covered with earth. As the earth required for this purpose had been taken from the immediate vicinity of the works, the naked rock at those spots showed on the surface.

excellent obstacle in the western part of the wooded plateau.\* Both forts were supported by trenches. Colonel Denfert transferred to Le Fourneau a battalion which had become available after the fall of Pérouse. This battalion reinforced the garrison of Basses Perches with two companies. Two guns of the sortie battery placed at Le Fourneau prevented any movement for turning the Perches ridge along the Savoureuse. At night two companies occupied the ground between the two works, which was protected by numerous entrenchments. In rear of the works, reserves were also held in readiness.

On the evening of the 26th January, the construction of the first parallel was so far advanced that it could receive large bodies of troops. Without further delay, General v. Tresckow commenced the attack. Each of the storming columns consisted of a battalion with a pioneer company, and a division of

artillery.†

After the batteries of attack had ceased their fire on the Perches Forts, Captain v. Manstein caused, at 7 o'clock, the 5th and 7th Companies of the Schneidemühl Battalion, each accompanied by a detachment of pioneers, to advance from the parallel against the flanks and gorge of Basses Perches.

Five minutes later, the 8th Company, appointed to attack in front, moved forward with the rest of the pioneers and artillery-

men, whilst the 6th followed in reserve.

The enemy received with a brisk musketry fire the approaching landwehr, who had to traverse a distance of more than 550 yards up the open slope; the 8th Company was forced to lie down when within 65 to 110 yards from the Basses Perches, and to carry on a stationary action. Only its skirmishing division, under Lieutenant Schick, and part of the pioneers, under 1st Lieutenant v. Richthofen, reached the ditch, and jumped into it without a moment's hesitation. The 6th Company, following the 8th, had halted about 50 paces behind the latter. Meanwhile, the companies destined to turn the position had, under a brisk flanking fire from the defenders, arrived abreast of the gorge of the fort, and had carried the trenches at the first rush. Parts of the skirmisher divisions of both companies reached the rear of the work, and jumped into the ditch at the gorge.

\$ Battery No. 12, which swept the valley behind the two Perches forts, continued its fire.

<sup>\*</sup> See Wolff, "Geschichte der Belagerung von Belfort im Jahre 1870-71," pp. 25, 316, et seq., as also Thiers et De la Laurencie, "La Défense de Belfort," Paris, 1871, pp. 83-84.

 $<sup>\</sup>dagger$  (1) Against Fort Basses Perches, under Captain v. Manstein: Schneidemühl Battalion,  $\frac{2nd \text{ Fort. Pion.}}{X}$ , and a detachment of the 1st Co. 6th Fortress Art. Regiment.

<sup>(2)</sup> Against Fort Hautes Perches, under Major v. Laue:  $\frac{Fus.}{67}$ ,  $\frac{1st \ Fort.}{11}$  and a detachment of 15th Co. 4th Fortress Art. Regiment.

Besides these the Striegau, Bromberg, Goldap, and Loetzen battalions held themselves in readiness to connect the works by a trench after they were captured.

<sup>§</sup> Each of one officer and 22 men.

But the remaining works of the fortress now opened a heavy artillery fire upon the south slope of the Perches, and prevented the advance of fresh troops.\* A renewal of the attack in front, attempted by the two companies, was at once checked.

Meanwhile, the French detachments driven from the trenches had re-assembled, and, in conjunction with a battalion held in readiness in rear, had advanced against the west side of the work. They there surprised the 7th Company of the Schneidemühl Battalion, surrounded it, and took most of the men prisoners, after a brave resistance. Of those who had jumped into the ditches, the greater part, led by 1st Lieutenant Michaelis, succeeded in escaping. The 6th and 8th Companies now also retired to the parallel before the pressure of the detachments moving round the west side of the fort.

Major v. Laue had deployed his fusiliers for an enveloping attack† upon Hautes Perches, whilst the 6th Company of the Marienburg Battalion‡ advanced against the ruined house

between the two works.

The 9th Company 67th, which moved through the Bois des Perches, was unable to pass the obstacles under the musketry and artillery fire; it posted itself under cover in the wood, whilst its skirmisher division remained under fire

opposite the left flank of the fort.

The 12th Company, which had taken the direction of the west side, and afterwards, driving the adversary from several trenches, had moved against the gorge, found itself also detained by entanglements and by the murderous fire of the garrison. After losing its officers, and being also attacked by the French reserves which took part on this side, it retired. The landwehr company abandoned the ruined house, in order to join in the retirement. In front of the work, the skirmishers of the 11th Company and the pioneers who had advanced with them, were detained by the obstacles on the glacis. Major v. Laue, informed moreover of the failure of the attack on Basses Perches, withdrew all the detachments to the deep railway cutting.

<sup>\*</sup> Captain v. Manstein had given orders to the Marienburg, which although belonging to the guard of the trenches was under him, to follow the Schneidennühl towards the right flank of the Basses Perches; at the same time, he asked General Baron v. Buddenbrock, whom he knew to be in the first parallel, for further reinforcements. Neither the one nor the other could be complied with.

 $<sup>\</sup>dagger$   $\frac{9 \text{th}}{67}$  against the left,  $\frac{12 \text{th}}{67}$  against the right flank,  $\frac{11 \text{th}}{67}$ , followed by the  $\frac{10 \text{th}}{27}$ , against the front. The pioneers and artillerymen were distributed among the companies. The advance commenced here from the railway cutting; there were some 1,080 yards before the fort was reached.

<sup>‡</sup> Belonging to the guard of the trenches. § 1st Lieutenant v. den Brincken and 2nd Lieutenant Pfannkuch were killed.

No further attempts to storm the works were made. The failure to carry the position had entailed a loss of 10 officers

and 427 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners.

After the engagements at Roches and Glay,\* and after a renewed advance on Blamont, where no enemy could be found, General v. Debschitz had again returned to his original position at Exincourt—Croix. On the news of the advance of strong French forces along the Morteau—St. Hippolyte road, however, he was pushed forward on the 27th January, for the third time, to Pont de Roide and Blamont, for the purpose of destroying the Doubs bridges between St. Hippolyte and Pont de Roide, and of rendering impassable the roads leading from the south-west. Thence, he advanced upon Pontarlier with 3 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 2 batteries, whilst the rest of his troops\*\* remained in front of Belfort. Meanwhile the four battalions of the 4th Reserve Division, which had also been employed in front of the fortress, had rejoined their command. so that the siege corps now numbered only 20 battalions, 4 squadrons, and 4 field batteries.##

Although the political importance of the capture of Belfort had been pointed out by the Royal Headquarters, General v. Tresckow, owing to the considerable diminution of his forces,

found himself restricted to the engineer attack.

Since the night of the 27th—28th January the approaches Advance to against the Perches forts had been resumed by constructing the second trenches, without any material hindrance on the part of the parallel. enemy. §§ Consequently, in the course of the next few days, the work was carried on almost exclusively by flying sap, the sap-heads making an average progress each night of some 325 yards.

In consequence of the difficulty of the ground, these works required so large a working party that the eight battalions available for this service did not suffice owing to their weak effective, and the guard of the trenches had to be utilised to supplement them. Notwithstanding this circumstance, the construction of the batteries was also continued. On the 31st

\* See ante, p. 34.

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<sup>†</sup> On 25th January. 1 See ante, p. 54.

<sup>§</sup> Striegau Battalion rejoined him. § 1st Fort. Pion. was attached to him.

<sup>||</sup> See ante, pp. 57, 61, 67 -68.

T Lauban, Breslau IInd and Striegau, 6th Res. Lan. and 1st and 2nd Lt. Res. VIII

<sup>\*\*</sup> Jauer, Liegnitz, Hirschberg, Oels, and Apenrade battalions.

<sup>††</sup> Loetzen, Goldap, Marienburg, and Gumbinnen battalions (see ante, p. 61, note  $\parallel$ ).

<sup>11</sup> Including the Bavarian Sortic Battery.

<sup>§§</sup> The latter on the night in question pushed forward his outposts to the south border of the Bois des Perches, but when 10th and 11th advanced towards the wood on the following night, they were able to occupy it without meeting any resistance from the enemy.

January and 1st February two new mortar batteries, opened fire upon the Perches Forts from the flanks of the first parallel; at Taillis Wood, a gun battery† came into action against Hautes Perches. At the eastern edge of Bavilliers Wood the construction of a new battery! to fire upon the town fortifications was commenced. Further, Lieutenant-Colonel v. Scheliha had on a previous occasion discovered on the ridge in the Bois-des-Perches a very favourable site for the construction of three batteries to fire upon the Château, as also upon Forts de la Justice and de la Miotte. But as Fort des Hautes Perches was only 550 yards distant from the place of construction, and Fort de la Justice was firing vigorously in this direction, the works progressed but slowly and with many interruptions. To engage the last-named work two new batteries were commenced at the end of the month in the cutting of the road from Pérouse to Bessoncourt, south of Morveaux Wood.

On the night of the 31st January—1st February the second parallel, half way between the first parallel and the forts, of which portions had already been opened, was completed. A commencement was even made of the approaches The construction of two batteries for light mortars, †† to fire against the Perches Forts, was also taken in hand.

During the further progress of the works, the difficulties materially increased. A brilliant moon, which threw its light over the snowfields, rendering them visible to a considerable distance, made it easy for the defenders to disturb the works by their fire. This was more particularly the case on the night of the 1st-2nd February, during which the French were expecting a renewal of the assault. The works had to be pushed on as if using the sap-roller, the sap-heads protected by sand-bags, and the flanks by gabions; while the earth to fill them had frequently to be brought up from far in rear.# After the thaw on the 3rd February, the water flowing down the slopes filled the trenches, time and labour being sometimes fruitlessly expended in attempting to drain away the

Batteries Nos. 37, 38, and 39: each of four 15-cm. guns.

| Battery No 31: 2 S.B. 60-prs. and 2 S.B. 27-cm. mortars; later, 6 S.B. 60-pr. mortars. Battery No. 32: 4 S.B. 12-cm. guns.

Blastings were frequently necessary in the rocky soil. †† Battery No. 29, 8 S.B. 15-cm. mortars; Battery No. 30, 4 S.B. 15-cm.

Battery No. 26, north of Danjoutin: 4 S.B. 28-cm. mortars. ,, 28, on extreme right flank near Le Haut Taillis: 4 S.B. 60-pr

On 31st January, Battery No. 11 ceased fire owing to excessive scoring of the guns, which was also the case with Battery No. 15 on the 1st February. Battery No. 7, the last battery in action in front of Essert, ceased firing temporarily.

† Battery No. 27: four 12-cm. guns.

‡ Battery No. 33: four 12-cm. guns.

§ Batterie No. 37: No. 37 we and 30. ceah of four 15 cm.

The works which the enemy was throwing up between the two Perches had been disturbed or at any rate molested by minor infantry attacks by day, and at night by artillery fire.

<sup>11</sup> As the summit was approached, the ground became always stony.

Moreover, the rain damaged those works which were completed. The parapet of the first parallel collapsed completely in places, the banquette gradually disappeared, and the connecting trenches became so impassable that communication had to be carried on across the open. To what extent the health of the troops suffered in these circumstances may be

easily imagined.

From Fort des Hautes Perches, the enemy, moreover, endeavoured, by bringing single guns into action and as suddenly withdrawing them, to hinder in many ways the progress of the works. In order to keep the garrison in check, it was not only necessary to continue the bombardment of the Hautes Perches Fort by night, but, before and during the commencement of the night works, a vigorous musketry fire had to be maintained against the parapets and embrasures. The want of pioneers was much felt. Notwithstanding that on 3rd February two fresh companies arrived from Strassburg, this arm was much overworked. On the 4th February the guns from Fort Bellevue and the railway entrenchments commenced to batter the western approaches directed on Basses Perches, so that next day epaulements had to be thrown up as protection against this fire. Later on, different parts of the approachest were cannonaded from those two works and from Fort de la Justice, and the works, in spite of the self-sacrificing devotion of the senior officers of engineers, and the untiring zeal of the men, could make each day but little progress. Seldom was it possible, as in the case of the right wing on the night of the 3rd-4th February, to complete a considerable length by means of flying sap.

Since the departure of General v. Debschitz and the troops of the 4th Reserve Division, 7 battalions had maintained the investment in the east, north, I and west; 13 were engaged in the attack on the south front, so that only 9 battalions were

disposable for the arduous duty of the trenches.\*\*

but he as well as 4 pioneers and 11 infantry soldiers were wounded.

The two field guns of let Light Res. in position on the north side were employed in cannonading La Forge, which could not be reached from the siege batteries. Offement had been cannonaded on 30th January by two 9 c.m. guns, which had been transferred from Roppe to a new position 200 metres north-west of this village.

\*\* The following were the positions:—(1.) In the east, at Bessoncourt and Roppe, the Neustalt and Halberstadt battalions; (2.) In the north, the Prussian Stargardt and Neuhaldenaleben battalions; (3.) In the west, the Inowrazlaw,

<sup>•</sup> On the 2nd and the following night six pioneers were wounded before Fort des Hautes Perches alone. Many men and officers fell sick in consequence of the arduous work.

<sup>+ 1</sup>st and 2nd Fort. Pion. VIII

<sup>‡</sup> Even those in front of Fort des Hautes Perches.

§ Captain Koch, while urging on his men in the works under a heavy fire, had been wounded on the night of the 1st—2nd February by a case shot. In the night of the 5th-6th February Lieutenant Müller, while conducting the attack in front of Basses Perches with great intrepidity, was mortally wounded.

|| At this point, Lieutenant Adam completed this night 148 yards of approaches,

Since the commencement of this period, some 1,500 rounds were fired each day at the fortress, whilst the enemy's artillery hardly answered any but the batteries at the Grand Bois, but vigorously cannonaded the trenches. On 2nd February, fire had been opened from Battery No. 30, and on the 3rd from Batteries Nos. 29, 31, 32, and 33. At the same time, a new emplacement for mortars to act against the enemy's position between the two Perches Forts\* had been commenced in the second parallel, and also one for a gun battery on the

highest point of the first parallel.

On the 4th February this battery was able to open fire, and at times to reduce to silence the guns in Fort Hautes Perches, which were cannonading the sap-heads. But as fresh guns were always appearing at that point, Battery No. 35,‡ in the western approaches between the parallel, was completed by next morning, and at once commenced to bombard the right flank of Hautes Perches. On 6th February, besides Battery No. 19, three guns of Battery No. 25, hitherto in action against the Esperance Hornwork, directed their fire against Fort de Bellevue, which had been such an inpediment to the works in front of Basses Perches. In the following night, on the extreme left wing of the second parallel, another gun from Battery No. 35§ was mounted against the same work, so that the latter was twice reduced to silence on the 7th February. The attention of Fort des Barres, which was able to act against the approaching works of attack on the left wing, had again to be diverted from this point. Battery No. 7 was actively directed against this fort after the 8th February.

Meanwhile, on the 6th, Battery No. 34 had been also enlarged for the reception of two heavy mortars, because Battery No. 28 was obliged to cease firing at Fort Hautes Perches owing to the proximity of the works of attack. At the same time the construction of two batteries for heavy

mortars was commenced in the second parallel.

The superiority of the artillery of the attack was now placed beyond question. The Perches front was completely subdued and remained silent.\*\* Only the works to the rear and flanks continued in action against the attack.

Deutsch-Crone, and Bromberg battalions; (4.) On the front of attack:—At Pérouse and the abutting woods, the 67th Regiment; in Danjoutin, the Konits Battalion; besides these the Burg, Stendal, Schneidemühl, Gnesen, Jauer, Liegnits, Hirschberg, Oels, and Apenrade battalions, as also the fortress artillery and pioneer companies, were quartered in rear of the front of attack as far as Dambenois and Bourogne.

Battery No. 30 for four 15-cm. S.B. mortars.

<sup>†</sup> Battery No. 34 for two 9-cm. guns.

For two 9-cm. guns.

One 9-cm. gun, as Battery No. 36. Batteries No. 40 and 41.

Like the communications, the batteries suffered very considerably from the thaw, and it was only with extreme effort that they could be maintained in service-

<sup>\*\*</sup> Except the separate guns engaged against the saps.

During the night of the 5th—6th February, in spite of the enemy's heavy fire, the works of attack in front of Basses Perches had been pushed forward up to the ditch,\* and in the course of the day they reached also at Fort Hautes Perches the line appointed for the last entrenchments in front of this work.†

The supply of the two Perches Forts with ammunition and food had become exceedingly difficult for the defenders. Water could only be procured from the Vernier pond under the assailant's fire.

All circulation, and especially cooking inside the works, became almost impossible. In consequence of the proximity of the works of attack, the artillery of the town enceinte could no longer give any assistance. Fort de la Justice was fully occupied with the German batteries at Morveaux Wood. Moreover, whilst in the fortress discouraging reports were in circulation, on the German side the news of the fall

of the enemy's capital gave impetus to fresh efforts.‡

On the 3rd February, Colonel Dentert had given orders to commence the removal of the material from the Perches Forts. Openings were made in the gorges; on the 4th, the projectiles were removed, and on the 6th those guns, the carriages of which were suited for the purpose. As garrison to each fort there remained one company, which, in the event of an attack, was to withdraw firing. The configuration of the heights hid from the assailant's view the movements necessary to carry out these measures; moreover, the Germans believed that the noise behind the works indicated the arrival of fresh reinforcements.

## OCCUPATION OF FORTS HAUTES AND BASSES PERCHES ON 8TH FEBRUARY.

On the 8th February, perfect silence reigned in Fort Hautes Perches; § about 1 o'clock Captain Roese threw some gabions into the ditch; in company with five pioneers he descended and scaled the rampart by means of steps rapidly cut in the escarp wall. Not until the traverses were reached did they suddenly light upon some twenty Frenchmen, the majority of whom escaped. A detachment of infantry also penetrated

<sup>•</sup> The escarps cut out of the solid rock were still untouched.

† The approaches were at this time so heavily punished by the artillery of the station works, Forts Bellevue and de la Justice, that on the left wing an entirely new trench had to be made more withdrawn from fire.

<sup>†</sup> With the permission of Lieut. General v. Tresckow Hnd, Colonel Denfert had despatched an officer to Switzerland in order to obtain clear information as to the state of affairs in France. He did not, however, return for some time.

<sup>§</sup> The pioneers were able without danger to advance by flying sap.

|| Thirty men, led by Lieutenant Klos, commanding Battery No. 29, who had already that morning made an accurate reconnaissance of the work.

into the work. It was immediately followed by some men of the guard of the trenches. Shortly after, two companies occupied the fort, two otherst with the pioneerst commenced to arrange it for defence and to open communications to the rear. Four damaged guns, several broken carriages, and other material lay in the devastated work, of which only the blockhouses in the gorge and the hollow traverses were tolerably intact. From Battery No. 29 were now brought up four 15-cm. S.B. mortars, which opened against the ground between Basses Perches and the Château. It was not until 3 p.m. that the enemy directed a brisk fire from the fortress against the fort, disturbed the work, and compelled the garrison to seek shelter for the most

part in the front ditch.

The news of the successful occupation of Fort Hautes Perches led to a like enterprise against Basses Perches. From the left bastion of the work the enemy, it is true, offered some resistance to the entrance of the pioneers and landwehr, but when Lieutenant v. Weltzien and Vice-Sergeant-Major Liebeskind at the head of 50 or 60 mens dashed with a cheer into the interior, the fort guard retired upon a company left in support at the gorge. Both bodies at once withdrew, firing, in the direction of Le Fourneau, and abandoned to the assailant the half-destroyed work with five guns and some damaged material. In this case also the face towards Belfort was at once entrenched, and the gorge occupied | The enemy at first compelled by his fire the cessation of this work. Here likewise the men were partly obliged to take shelter in the ditches, but by 5 o'clock fire was opened upon Le Fourneau from four 15-cm. S.B. mortars brought up to the works from Battery No. 30. To batter Fort de Bellevue, and especially as protection against sorties, two 9-cm. guns were transported with great difficulty from Batteries Nos. 36 and 35 to the elevated spur west of Fort des Basses Perches.¶

The Konitz Battalion advanced to the railway and pushed forward along the trenches a company to each fort, whilst the Schneidemühl Battalion held itself in readiness at Danjoutin and the 67th Regiment on the right wing of the works of attack; the Gnesen Battalion protected the flanks of the second

<sup>+ 1</sup>st and 2nd
Hirschberg

t 1st and 2nd
Oels

<sup>‡</sup> Captain Roese had brought up his company, the 1st Fort. Pion.

<sup>§</sup> Belonging to the Oels and Hirschberg battalions, and to 1st Fort. Pion.

<sup>||</sup> By the 4th Hirschberg.

T During the transport the carriage of one of the guns was hit. Both were mounted in an easily made emplacement (Battery No. 36a), where during the night of the 8th—9th they remained to oppose any sortie. In the day time they were withdrawn.

parallel. The garrisons of the forts, each consisting of two companies of the Hirschberg Battalion and an artillery detachment,\* were each reinforced later by a company of the Schneidemühl Battalion.

The besieger was now able under the most favourable conditions, to continue the attack direct upon the Château.

The negotiations for an armistice which Colonel Denfert had entered into with General v. Tresckow before the return of the officer sent by him to Switzerland, had been abortive of result, the surrender of the fortress having been refused. In the forenoon of the 9th February, Batteries Nos. 37, 38, 39 in the Bois des Perches opened fire upon the Château as well as upon Forts de la Justice and de la Miotte. On the day after, Battery No. 40† from the second parallel commenced to shell the Château, and was supported on and after the 12th February by Battery No. 41,‡ whilst a battery newly erected not far from La Tuilerie§ had, on the 11th, taken up the cannonade with the ever active Fort de Bellevue.

Meanwhile, the restoration of the two forts was complete, and, on the night of the 9th—10th February, the connecting trenches for a distance of 680 yards were converted into a third parallel.¶

On the Perches ridge only seven new batteries with\*\* a total armament of 28 guns were originally to have been erected, but later on three more heavy batteries were added.

Close on the west side of Fort des Hautes Perches an artillery position to meet sorties had also been taken in hand.

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One officer, 4 non-commissioned officers, and 24 men.
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<sup>†</sup> With two, later with four 27-cm. S.B. mortars, and two 22-cm. S.B. mortars.

<sup>\$</sup> Six 60-pr. S.B. mortars.

<sup>§</sup> Battery No. 42, four 15-cm. S.B. mortars.

<sup>||</sup> Batteries Nos. 26, 28, 29, 30, 30a, 34, and 35 erected against the Perches forts were silent from the 8th February, also Battery No. 23. Battery No. 13 had already ceased firing on 2nd February; Battery No. 12 was obliged to cease firing on the 9th as its guns were very heavily scored.

T Each of the Perches forts had received 150 men, the second parallel 500 men as guard. For the works a daily working party of 500 men was employed. Owing to the weak effective, these duties claimed six battalions every twenty-four hours.

\*\* Battery No. 43 for four 12-cm. guns.

<sup>45</sup> long 15-cm. guns. ,, 47 short 49 12-cm. guns. 61 long 15-cm. guns. " 52 short (French). †† Battery No. 46 for four S.B. heavy mortars. 48 12-c.m. guns. 50

<sup>11</sup> Battery No. 34a for two 9-cm. guns. The officer constructing the battery, Lieutenant Schirmer, was killed.

On this account Batteries Nos. 14, 17, 18, and 27 ceased to be used on the 10th February, so that 55 guns remained in action,\* which on an average threw from 1,300 to 1,400 shell each day into the fortress. Fort de la Justice and the Château suffered more particularly from the fire of the Bavarian Batteries Nos. 37, 38, and 39.1

In order to be able to employ, almost entirely against the Château, the group of batteries at the Bois des Perches, the construction of a new batterys in the connecting trench south of Pérouse to act against Forts de la Justice and de la Miotte was commenced.

The construction and arming, however, of all the new batteries were most scriously impeded by the state of the communications, in spite of the efforts of detachments of pioneers to improve the worst places. Field batteries and ammunition columns had to give up their teams to bring up ammunition

for the siege artillery.

Meanwhile General v. Debschitz, after the removal of the prisoners, had again returned to Belfort on 8th February. He was followed on the 10th and 11th by the 6 battalions and 2 batteries of the 4th Reserve Division, under Colonel v. Zimmermann, so that 29 battalions were available against the fortress. Of these, 4 guarded the line of investment on the west between the Savoureuse and Le Haut du Mont, 3 in the north between the Haut du Mont and Vetrigne, and 6 in the east and south from Vetrigne to Danjoutin; whilst 151 battalions were available to prosecute the siege. To Owing to the wet weather, the health of the men was so indifferent that the battalions frequently had but 300 men fit for duty.\*\*

Not until frost set in again on the night of the 11th—12th February did matters mend, and by the employment of all available strength, Battery No. 34a, with 2 guns, No. 44 with 3,†† and Batteries Nos. 43, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, and 52 with 4 guns each, were by the morning of the 13th February placed in readiness to open fire. Battery No. 53 was to be completed in the following night, and only Battery No. 46 remained in an

unfinished state.

On the 12th February General v. Tresckow had been empowered by telegram from Versailles to guarantee unimpeded withdrawal from Belfort, should the commandant offer to surrender the fortress upon these conditions.

Battery No. 53 for four long 15-cm. guns.

See ante, p. 82.

†† The fourth gun intended for Battery No. 41 became imbedded in the ground during the removal.

<sup>\*</sup> In the Batteries Nos. 7, 9, 21, 22, 24, 25, 31, 32, 33, 36, 37, 38, 39, and 40. † The ramp leading down from the cavalier of the château to the town had also been rendered impassable by destroying the bridges. They had been connected with the south end of Pérouse by a trench.

§ Battery No. 53 for four long 15.000.

Two companies were still at Montbéliard and Morteau.
•• One of the Fortress Pioneer Companies had 94 sick and wounded on 10th

After overcoming all difficulties, there were by the 13th 97 guns,\* each provided with 80 rounds, ready to open an annihilating fire on the following morning, whilst the engineer attack was to continue its progress. But, before doing so, Colonel Denfert was summoned, after such a glorious defence, to open the gates under the favourable conditions now offered to him. The French Government itself empowered him shortly after to take this step, by means of a telegram† sent through the Chancellor Count v. Bismarck to General v. Tresckow.

But Colonel Denfert required a summons from his Government addressed to himself personally, and to seek this an officer was sent to Basle. A provisional suspension of arms

was agreed upon.

On the 15th the Convention was signed at Versailles, which extended the armistice of the 28th January to the three departments which had been hitherto excepted therefrom and to Belfort. Article I. stipulated the surrender of the fortress.

Colonel Denfert having now received his instructions in the desired form, while meanwhile the engineer attack from the Basses Perches had progressed another 110 yards, the final negotiations commenced on the evening of the 15th and

terminated on the following afternoon.

In the course of the 17th and 18th February, the garrison, with arms and trains, quitted the fortress by the roads through L'Isle-sur-le-Doubs and through St. Hippolyte, intending to reach the territory occupied by French troops at Bletterans and Beaurepaire. The withdrawal was effected in échelons of some 1,000 men each, which followed at 5 kilomètres intervals, and carried with them their supplies drawn from the stores of the fortress. Colonel Denfert left with the last échelon the fortress which he had so stubbornly defended At 10 a.m. on 18th February it was taken over or, the part of the Germans by a special commission, and two hours later was occupied by 3 battalions, 1 squadron, and the requisite detachments of fortress artillery and pioneers. At 3 p.m. Lieutenant-General

§ The supplies were carried by 150 German commissariat wagons.

<sup>\*</sup> Batteries Nos. 7, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 31, 32, 33, 34a, 36, 37, 38, 39, 4), 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52. The total number of guns in these batteries now amounted to 105, but part were so damaged that firing was stopped, or, at any rate, ordered to be only occasionally resumed.

<sup>†</sup> The telegram which was to be transmitted to Colonel Denfert ran as follows:—
"Le commandant de Belfort est autorisé, vu les circonstances, à consentir à la reddition de la place. La garnison sortira avec les homeurs de la guerre et emportera les archives de la place. Elle ralliera le poste Français le plus voisin.

"Pour le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères,
"Ennest Picabo."

The request of the commandant to withdraw with all the fortress artillery could not be acceded to by the Germans. Appendix CLXXII contains the text of the Convention for the surrender of the fortress.

The Garde Nationale Sédentaire was disarmed and remained in Belfort.

The Hirschberg, Jauer, Oels, 5th Res. Lan. combined detachment of 6th Res. Lan.

Fort. Art. Regiment, 2nd Fort. Pion. and 2nd Fort. Pion. Bad.

v. Tresckow IInd made a formal entry at the head of detachments from all the troops of the siege corps. 341 guns, of which 56 were dismounted by fire, 356 carriages, of which 119 were likewise broken, 22,000 stand of arms, numerous stores, and a comparatively large quantity of ammunition and food were found in the place. The garrison originally had a strength of 372 officers, 17,322 men, but from death, wounds, sickness, and losses from prisoners, other casualties, &c., had suffered a diminution of 32 officers and 4,713 men.† On the other hand, the total loss of the siege corps was limited to 88

officers and 2,049 men.t

The town presented a picture of desolation, especially in the south part and the suburbs of Montbéliard and Le Fourneau; 34 houses had been destroyed by fire, and most of the others damaged. Of the works of the fortress the Château had more especially suffered, the only access to its upper tier of guns being by means of ladders. The cut-stone facing of its front walls had mostly fallen into the ditches, half of the iron-plated embrasures in the cavalier were broken down, the expense powder magazine in the middle enceinte blown up, and a number of hollow traverses pierced. The same appearance was presented by Fort de la Justice. There could be no doubt that the continuance of the siege would, in a very short time, have led to complete success.

On the 23rd February the 1st Reserve Division, reinforced from the siege corps to an effective of 3 line and 12 landwehr battalions, 4 squadrons, 4 batteries, and 1 pioneer company, moved away through Rioz to Dôle, the troops under Colonel v. Zimmermann having previously joined their headquarters.

The troops of General v. Debschitz remained at Belfort. They passed later on under the Government-General of Alsace, upon which now devolved the occupation of the fortress. Preparations were at once made for restoring and arming the fortifications, and levelling to the ground the works of attack.

§ In the neighbouring villages 164 houses had been set on fire, chiefly from the fortress.

According to the report handed over by Colonel Denfert to General v.
 Tresckow.

<sup>†</sup> Besides 336 civilians killed, of whom 50 died of wounds.

<sup>†</sup> Including 5 officers and 245 men who were freed by the capitulation. App. CLXXIIIa contains a statement of the total losses in the siege corps between 2nd November, 1870, and 19th February, 1871.

PROCEEDINGS IN REAR OF THE GERMAN ARMY.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION FROM THE BEGINING OF NOVEMBER, 1870, UNTIL THE ARMISTICE.

The advance of the 1st and IInd Armies, which commenced after the fall of Metz, had occasioned radical changes in the rearward communications of the German Army.\*

For instance, the appropriation of the railways, to which, after the capture of Soissons, was to be added the line Rheims—Soissons—Paris, was re-adjusted on 9th November as follows by the Royal Headquarters:—

To the 1st Army was assigned the line of rail leading from Saarbrücken by way of Metz, Frouard, Epernay, and

Rheims.

To the Army of the Meuse was appointed the same line with the use of its continuation, the line Rheims—Soissons—Paris.

The IIIrd Army was to use the line Weissenburg—Vendenheim—Frouard—Epernay—Château Thierry—Paris. The South German Corps, after the re-establishment of communication between Kehl and Strassburg,† were to use the same line, joining in at Vendenheim.

To the Hnd Army was assigned the railway Weissenburg—Frouard—Blesme—Chaumont-en-Bassigny, and, in conjunction with the road from Nancy to Neufchâteau, the line Neufchâteau

-Chaumont.

The circumstance that all the railways leading to Germany united along the portion from Frouard to Blesme, greatly limited, as before, their carrying capabilities. Consequently it required at the outset considerable efforts on the part of the field railway divisions; before the railways could be effectively used for the increased work now demanded of them.

The line Epernay—Rheims—Soissons had been made practicable by No. 1 Field Railway Division before the end of October, whilst the 1st Section of No. 4 Field Railway Division§ had carried out the necessary repairs on the line Vierzy—Crépy-en-Valois—Sévran by the 27th October. The

§ Whilst the division was moving on the 30th to the line Soissons—Rheims, it was attacked by franctireurs in the wood north of Villers Cotterêts.

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See Map, No. 38.

With regard to the previous communications of the German Armies, see Part I, Vol. II, pp. 456—469. Part II, Vol. I, pp. 135-7, 179-180, 212, 248, 260, Vol. II, pp. 33 and 101.

<sup>†</sup> The line Kehl—Strasburg could be used for troop trains from 12th November. ‡ As it became evident shortly after the commencement of the war that the railway network to be used in common by all the armies required unity of administration, the railway troops received their orders, as a rule, direct from the Executive Commission of the Royal Headquarters. Only in those cases where the lines served for a single army was the management left in its hands.

railway Crépy—Chantilly—Gonesse had also been placed in working order during October with the aid of French matériel

and personnel.

The 2nd Section No. 4 Field Railway Division had, on the 9th October, commenced to clear the tunnel at Vierzy which had been blown up in two places. To assist them, part of No. 1 Field Railway Division had also been employed for a short time. But in spite of the greatest exertious continued day and night, the tunnel could not be re-opened for traffic until the 18th November. From the 20th the trains of the Meuse Army were brought up to Mitry and Gonesse.\*

The Ist Army, in its advance from Metz to the Champagne, had arranged as etappen lines the roads leading through Briey—Damvillers—Dun-sur-Meuse—Vouziers to Réthel, and through Etain—Verdun to Rheims. Whilst the army was advancing, in the latter half of November, to cover the investment of Paris, it maintained its rearward communication by railway to Soissons, and from thence by the roads leading

through Novon and Compiègne.

The branches leading from the Crépy—Chantilly line past Creil to Compiègne, Clermont, and Beauvais, had been already restored during October.† During its march against Amiens and Rouen, the Ist Army re-opened for traffic, in the first half of December, the slightly damaged railways Clermont—Amiens and Amiens—Rouen; the former by part of No. 1 Field Rail way Division, the latter by a detachment of the 1st Field Pioneer Company VIIIth Army Corps. In this way it opened for itself a line of railway leading from home territory to its theatre of operations, and at the same time considerably facilitated the important communication between the troops operating on the Somme and the Seine.

In order, as much as possible, to relieve the part of the line used in common by the Ist and Meuse Armies as far as Chantilly, the restoration of the railway leading from Rheims to Laon had been commenced in the middle of November. After the fall of La Fère, it was put in working order as far as this fortress, but the communication with Amiens was not completed until the 3rd January, as the work of the 3rd Field Railway Division, employed in the operation, had been interrupted, on the 9th December, by the surprise of Ham.‡

The line of railway assigned to the IIIrd Army likewise required extensive works between Nogent l'Artauds and the army investing Paris. The two broken bridges over the Marne below and above Esbly, as also the bridge at Trilport, were again made passable by parts of Nos. 2 and 3 Field

By the middle of December, the traffic to Sévran was opened for the siege guns of the Meuse Army.

<sup>†</sup> At first only a temporary bridge could be made over the Oise. No permanent bridge was available until the 22nd December.

<sup>1</sup> See Part II, Vol. II, p. 26.
1 It had been made practicable as far as this place after the fall of Toul.

Railway Divisions, the Bavarian Field Railway Division, the 3rd Fortress Pioneer Company VIIIth Army Corps, and the Bavarian Etappen Engineer Company. The restoration of the blown-up tunnel at Armentières was completed on the 11th November by part of No. 3 Field Railway Division. Meanwhile, the 1st Section No. 2 Field Railway Division was endeavouring to repair the Nanteuil tunnel, which was completely destroyed at its northern entrance. As this tunnel subsequently fell in again on the 6th November, it was avoided by a new line which had been commenced on the 19th October.\* On the 18th November, this line was available for traffic, and on the 23rd the whole line was opened.

Lagny became the advanced depôt of the HIrd Army. Esbly and Meaux served as detraining stations.† In lieu of the etappen road hitherto used, Epernay-Montmirail-Coulommiers-Tournan, with its continuations towards Corbeil and Villeneuve St. Georges, the roads leading from Meanx and Lagny to Corbeil and Villeneuve were employed shortly after

by the troops located on the south side of Paris.

The rearward communications of the IInd Army were less favourable than those of the HIrd Army. In order as soon as possible to open a line of rail in lieu of the etappen road from Naucy by way of Chaumont-en-Bassigny, the Army Headquarters had as early as the 6th November caused the Blesme -Chaumont railway to be restored at the same time that the army was marching to the line Troyes-Chaumont. On the line Joinville—Chaumont, the bridges above and below Villierssur-Marne were destroyed, as also to the north of Froncles. The repairs were executed by the 1st Section No. 4 Field Railway Division, assisted by the 1st Fortress Pioneer Company Vth Army Corps, and were completed by the 7th December. For want of escort these troops found themselves compelled at first to take independent measures of security against the raids of franctireurs.

The army having meanwhile advanced to Pithiviers, the next step contemplated was the continuation of the railway communication to the westward by way of Châtillon-sur-Seine and Troyes to Montereau. On the 9th December, this was carried into effect as far as Troyes by the 1st Section No. 4 Field Railway Division. But its restoration beyond this town had to be abandoned, owing to the extensive damage to the bridges over the Seine at Nogent and Montereau.§ In conse-

† A detraining place for the siege guns of the Meuse Army had been made at Vaires.

The permanent bridge at Corbeil had been restored by the 28th December, by

order of the Inspector-General of Etappen of the IIIrd Army.

The Bavarian Field Railway Division, together with part of the Bavarian Etappen Engineer Company, had worked at restoring the bridge over the Seine at Montereau from 20th November till 22nd December.

<sup>\*</sup> To help in these works the 1st Fortress Pion. Company XIth Corps had arrived from Strassburg, and the 2nd of the VIth, as well as the 2nd and 3rd of the XIth, from Germany.

<sup>†</sup> With regard to the passages of the Seine above Paris. see Part II, Vol. I, p. 99, Note †, Vol. II, p. 138, Note †, and Vol. II, p. 363, Note ††.

quence, all the available hands found employment on the railway leading from Chaumont through Chatillon, Nuits-sur-Armançon, Moret, Montargis, and Juvisy to Orléans. But as at this place also there were considerable difficulties to be surmounted, Joinville at first, and Troyes from the middle of December, became the most westerly railway station of the Hand Army. From the last-named point, the etappen road led by way of Sens and Nemours to Pithiviers. In consequence of its length and insecurity, the Royal Headquarters allowed the Hnd Army, at the end of November, to draw its food and ammunition from the magazines of the IIIrd Army and its railway trains to proceed as far as Lagny. But even from that place the wagons of the army, which was advancing towards Orléans, had still upwards of 80 miles of road before them.

The restoration of the branch from Juvisy had been commenced by part of the Bavarian Field Railway Division\* immediately after the first occupation of Orléans. But as it was not until the 7th November that a locomotive could be placed in working order, this portion of the line was only ready for slight traffic by horse draught up to the date of the engagement at Coulmiers. Nevertheless, on the occasion of the evacuation of Orléans, two long provision trains standing in the station there were saved by means of this engine. By the 20th November, the traffic from Corbeil through Juvisy to Etampes

was in working order.

Meanwhile the 1st Bavarian Corps in its further operations had extended its line of communication to Chartres; since the beginning of November, the 2nd Section of the Bavarian Field Railway Division had already opened as far as Chartres, for horse traffic, the line Rambouillet—Versailles for the troops

despatched to the west of Paris.†

After the recapture of Orléans, the headquarters of the Hnd Army organised a regular service, partly by horses, partly by steam power, along the line Corbeil—Juvisy—Orléans. In this way, at any rate, better communication was maintained with the IIIrd Army, and more particularly with its advanced depôt at Lagny, although the arrangement did not compensate for the want of a through railway. Moreover, there was a deficiency of rolling stock. Only two indifferent locomotives and 80 wagons were available.

By the advance of the Hnd Army upon Le Mans, the rearward communications became more and more extended. Consequently it was no small advantage that on the 13th January, the railway from Chaumont to Juvisy could be opened.§ Its

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See Part II, Vol. I, p. 164-5.

<sup>†</sup> The traffic was extended to Courville on the 24th November.

<sup>‡</sup> Some material was captured by the 6th Cavalry Division in Vierzon, and conveyed by road to Orléans (see Part II, Vol. II, p. 52). In the beginning of January, another engine was brought from Chaumont to the line Juvisy—Orléans. § In consequence of the extensive destruction, the intended restoration of the line Brétigny-Vendôme was not undertaken.

restoration had been much delayed by numerous hostile enterprises and unfavourable weather. The line Corbeil-Montargis -Moret, on which the bridge at Souppes was destroyed, and the line Moret-Brienon, were at the end of December and beginning of January placed in order by the 1st Section of the Bavarian Field Railway Division.\* The Armançon bridge, east of Brienon, which had been likewise destroyed,† was also restored between the 5th and 10th January by No. 2 Field Railway Division and the 2nd Fortress Pioneer Company VIth Army Corps. The task of repairing the Armançon bridge at Nuits, which had been made impassable in nearly its whole extent by blowing it up in two places, had been committed to the 2nd Section No. 4 Field Railway Division, after completion of the tunnel at Vierzy; the main works, however, could not be commenced until the 10th December, in consequence of the insecurity of that neighbourhood. This duty was also shared in from the 18th by the 1st Section. On the 12th January, the bridge was completed, and thus an unbroken communication established between Orléans and Germany. True, that the distance by this route amounted to double that by the direct route Nancy—Orléans, that is to say, some 450 miles.

Meanwhile, a second through line of rail had become available by the fall of Mézières. Prior to the surrender of Metz, the Royal Headquarters had contemplated the restoration of the line Metz-Thionville-Mézières-Rheims, and in the middle of November, while Thionville and Montmedy were besieged, had caused the work to be commenced between the respective fortresses by No. 1 Field Railway Division. After making the line Metz-Longuyon practicable, the division reached Longuyon on the 17th November; but, in consideration of the weakness of the troops pushed forward towards Longwy, and the activity of the garrison of that fortress, found itself compelled to limit its procedure until the 26th to securing the material and the railway. Whilst part of the division went away on the 30th to the 1st Army, the part remaining behind continued the work until the 20th January, and restored the bridge over the Chiers at Colmey, as well as the tunnel near Montmédy. The section Longuyon--Cons Lagrandville, which became of importance for the siege of Longwy, was also made

line was restored, but on his departure again made impassable.

§ Part of the 1st Section and the 1st Fortress Pioneer Company Vth Army Corps were employed for some time longer at a bridge near Villiers-sur-Murne, which had been damaged by floods.

<sup>•</sup> On the line Corbeil—Montargis, No. 2 Field Railway Division and the 2nd Fortress Pioneer Company VIth Corps, which had previously been employed for a short time on the line Juvisy—Orléans, also carried out some works.

<sup>†</sup> Two miles east of Brienon, near Crécy.

† The section which had reached Chaumont on the 25th November destroyed, on the 27th, the line leading to Langres on the other side of Foulain. When General Baron v. d. Goltz took post before the fortress at the end of December, the line was restored, but on his departure again made impassable.

practicable by the aid of some pioneers. Montmedy and

Mézières furnished serviceable rolling stock.

The opening of a new line being probable about the middle of January both in the north and in the south of the theatre of war, a new distribution of the French railways was made by

the Royal Headquarters on the 11th January.

To the 1st Army and the Army of the Meuse was exclusively assigned the northern line, Saarbrücken—Metz—Thionville—Mézières—Rheims—La Fère—Amiens—Rouen, with the branches leading by way of Soissons and Compiègne to Mitry and Gonesse.† The central line leading from Strassburg and Weissenburg by way of Vendenheim, Nancy to Lagny, including also the section Blainville-la-Grande—Epinal, was to serve generally for the IIIrd Army, and, at the same time, as far as Blesme for the IInd Army, and for the Southern Army under General v. Manteuffel. From Blesme the IInd Army had to use for its communications the southern line Blesme—Nuits—Juvisy—Orléans, a railway which was at the same time utilised by the IInd and VIIth Corps.

The northern line having been opened to traffic on the 21st January, the condition of the communications could be regarded as much more favourable, the more so as the restoration of the branches immediately affecting the theatre of operations

was making considerable progress.

On the railway Compiègne—La Fère, a detachment of No. 1 Field Railway Division restored one line of way by the 10th January, and the other by the 18th, thus establishing a shorter line of communication between the troops of the 1st Army on

the Upper Somme and the Army investing Paris !

By the end of December the IIIrd Army had, by means of the 2nd Section Bavarian Field Railway Division caused the Versailles—Houdan railway to be made available for horse draught, in order to serve the purposes of the 5th Cavalry Division detached to the west of Paris.§ By the 21st January the same section had opened to traffic the bridge over the Eure east of Dreux.

After the occupation of Le Mans by the IInd Army, the restoration of the line Chartres—Le Mans was actively taken in hand. No. 2 Field Railway Division, brought up for the purpose, and the 2nd Fortress Pioneer Company VIth Army Corps placed the section Nogent-le-Rotrou—Le Mans in work-

† The 16th Infantry Brigade, which was sent to Tergnier for the decisive action expected at St. Quentin (see Part II. Vol. 11, pp. 259 and Note \*, p. 264), had been obliged to take the road through Rheims.

<sup>• 3</sup>rd Fort Pioneer.

<sup>†</sup> To the northern line belonged also the sections Metz—Frouard—Rheims— Rpernay, Rheims—Clermont-en-Argonne, and the railways from Amiens and Beauvais, which join in at Creil.

<sup>§</sup> Lieut. Riegel had succeeded with great difficulty in transporting two engines from Marcilly-sur-Eure through Dreux to Houdan, but they could not be placed in working order until the end of January.

ing order by the 17th January, and afterwards its branch to Conlie by the 19th. The Eure bridge at Courville, for which the preparatory works had been already commenced at the end of November, by the 2nd Section Bavarian Field Railway Division, was completed by the 24th January. The entire line from Versailles could be handed over to traffic on 29th January with the plant captured at Le Mans.

with the plant captured at Le Mans.

The regular traffic between the Nu

The regular traffic between the Nuits—Juvisy and Versailles—Le Mans railway along the Versailles—Juvisy road had to be kept up by general transport. This etappen line was to serve as a line of communication for the troops in the neighbourhood of Le Mans, while for the troops on the Loire was left the line Nuits—Juvisy—Orléans, which was placed in working order as far as Blois, on the 24th January by the 1st Section

Bavarian Field Railway Division.

Whilst the railway network used by the German Army was thus gradually extended to the west, some further important interruptions had recently taken place upon two lines in the east. On 22nd January the bridge on the central line at Fontenoy-sur-Moselle\* was blown up by franctireurs, so that all trains of the Hnd and Hlrd Army had to be brought by way of Metz and Rheims to Epernay. Three days later, the enemy destroyed on the southern line the bridge at Brienon, which had only just been repaired, and also that near La Roche,† and tore up the rails there in several places. No. 5 Field Railway Division succeeded by the 31st in restoring the Fontenov bridge sufficiently for wagons to be pushed across it. But it was not completely fit for traffic until the 4th February. The bridge at Brienon, of which the woodwork was damaged and the permanent way destroyed, was repaired on the 5th by the 2nd Section No. 4 Field Railway Division. Of the bridge at La Roche, one arch was entirely blown up. It was restored on the 9th by the 1st Section Bavarian Field Railway Division, and the 1st Fortress Pioneer Company Vth Army Corps. In consequence, the Hnd Army was compelled up to the time of the armistice to share with the IIIrd Army the use of the railway to Lagny.

This line already over-worked had now to serve as well the

Corps operating in the south.

In the advance of the XIVth Army Corps to Dijon, its communications had been opened from Blainville-la-Grande by way of Epinal, Vesoul, and Gray. On the branch railway from Blainville, the restoration of the bridges at Bayon and Langley, and of the viaduct north of Epinal by No. 5 Field Railway Division‡ had progressed so rapidly, that the traffic could be

<sup>\*</sup> East of Toul. (See also subsequent narrative.)

<sup>†</sup> Between Brienon and Joigny. (See also subsequent narrative.)

1 General v. Werder had at the commencement of October formed, for the service of his corps, a railway-troop out of pioneer detachments—under Superintending Engineer Krohn and 1st Licutenant Walter—which was transformed at the end of November into No. 5 Field Railway Division.

opened as far as Epinal on the 14th December. The bridge at Aillevillers was also completed by the same division at the beginning of January, but the railway south of Epinal remained for a considerable time closed to traffic in consequence of the

great destruction at the Xertigny viaduct.

When in the month of January General v. Werder was compelled, in consequence of his movement to the left, to change his line of communication,\* he first used the line from Epinal by way of Plombières and Lure. Whilst most of the columns of the Corps moved by this road, the supplies were sent forward through Lunéville and Strassburg along the communications of the corps besieging Belfort. In the latter part of October, by order of the Government-General of Alsace, the 2nd Fortress Pioneer Company VIIIth Army Corps, had restored the Strassburg-Colmar railway which had been destroyed in several places, and this now served as the etappen line of the 1st and 4th Reserve Divisions. At the end of November the service was extended to Mülhausen, and shortly after to Dammerkirch and Sentheim. During his engagements on the Lisaine, General v. Werder caused communications to be opened with these places; but on resuming the offensive, he resolved on re-opening the old etappen line through Epinal.

It was to this side also that General v. Manteuffel intended transferring the communications of the IInd and VIIth Army Corps. On the concentration of those corps west of the Langres plateau, they had been assigned by the Royal Head-quarters the southern line, which had been appointed for the IInd Army, and had been used by the VIIth Corps since its advance on Châtillon-sur-Seine.† The restoration of the section from Nuits-sur-Armançon to Dijon was also commenced.‡ But as all the communications in proximity to the plateau appeared to be threatened by Garibaldi's troops and the Langres garrison, the headquarters of the South Army abandoned the idea for the present of arranging an etappen line starting from the Nuits--Châtillon railway, and directed the troops still on the march, the columns and the trains by way of Epinal.§

The roads running southward from this town having been re-opened after the victory on the Lisaine, General v. Manteuffel caused an etappen line to be established for the IInd and VIIth Army Corps through St. Loup-les-Luxeuil and Vesoul to Gray, whilst the supplies for the XIVth Corps were directed at first along the Epinal—Xertigny—Bains—St. Loup Lure road, but when the movement to the right was commenced,

<sup>•</sup> See Part II, Vol. II, p. 310.

<sup>†</sup> See ante, p. 108.

† The 2nd Section No. 4 Field Railway Division commenced this work on the 21st January, made the Armançon bridge at Buffon, of which an arch was blown ap, passable by the 25th, but on the 26th was called away to Brienon.

<sup>§</sup> See ante, p. 9. § See ante, p. 27, et seq., and also subsequent narrative.

were also sent through Vesoul. Only the 4th Reserve Division

retained its communication through Dammerkirch.

Meanwhile, on the 21st January, No. 5 Field Railway Division had resumed the works on the Epinal—Vesoul—Gray railway which had been suspended in consequence of the advance of the East Army, and made such progress that the section south of the Xertigny viaduct was ready for traffic to Vesoul within six days.\* But as the viaduct itself was still impassable,† the South Army found itself during the whole duration of its operations against the French East Army limited to the ordinary

etappen road leading through Epinal.

It was only a short time before the armistice was extended to this part of the theatre of war, that the communications became rather more favourable on this side. The works on the line Nuits—Dijon, which had to be temporarily suspended,‡ had been actively pushed forward since the 7th February. In the night of the 2nd—3rd February, the bridge near Buffon, which had been repaired at the end of January, was again destroyed by the enemy. The 2nd Section No. 4 Field Railway Division now restored the communication for the second time, and so hastened the work that by the 11th February the railway to Dijon was in working order. In this way the South Army also became ultimately possessed of a line of rails leading to the theatre of its operations.

## ADMINISTRATION OF THE RAILWAYS.

The supreme control of the whole of the railways of the German Army was entrusted to an Executive Commission forming part of the Royal Headquarters. From this Commission emanated the general measures in reference to the entire transport, the restoration of the railways and the arrangements for traffic within the enemy's country. For the railways used in France, Field Railway Commissions were appointed, which, like those in Germany, had to look after the military interests on the different lines, and to arrange and control the transport. The special arrangement and maintenance of the traffic on the restored lines, the control and employment of the staff and material, as also all technical matters on the various sections, which in time of peace devolve upon the railway administrations, were confided to Railway Traffic Commissions. These latter were placed under the Prussian Ministry of Commerce.

In January, 1871, each of the three main lines was administered by a Field Railway Commission at Rheims, Epernay, and

note ‡.

<sup>•</sup> On 12th February, the section Vescul—Gray became fit for traffic.

<sup>†</sup> The works at the viaduct were also delayed by the 5th Field Railway Division being called away to repair the Fontenoy bridge.

1 The section working there had been called away to Brienon.

See ante, p. 110,

Chaumont-en-Bassigny; later on, during February, a fourth was created at Versailles, for the railways which unite at that place.\* Traffic Commissions were established at Rheims for the northern line west of Mézières; at Strassburg, for the railways of Upper Alsace and for the central line as far as Nancy; at Nancy, for the central line from Nancy onward; and at Chaumont-en-Bassigny for the southern line. On the northern line between the frontier and Mézières the Railway Direction at Saarbrücken carried on the work of a Traffic Commission.†

A Field Railway Director was attached to the staff of the Inspectors-General of Etappen of the 1st, IInd, and IIIrd Armies.

The duties required of the railway authorities were very important. Supplies, recruits, and equipment, besides enormous quantities of siege material, had to be brought up to the army, while wounded, sick, and prisoners had to be removed to the rear. In the course, also, of the campaign, it was frequently necessary to convey large bodies of troops from one part of the theatre of war to another. For this purpose the capability of the lines was always limited, as in some parts only one line of rails could be placed in working order. Moreover, it was not always practicable to unload the supply trains quickly, and thus the wagons accumulated faster than they could be got rid of, and frequent derangements in the traffic ensued. Further, the slow process of entraining the sick and the care bestowed on the hospital trains not infrequently encumbered the lines in the cramped stations. To this may be added the insecurity of the communication, which, nevertheless, was never interrupted, even when, in consequence of the destruction of the Fontenoy bridge, a complete diversion of the main traffic had to be made for a space of eight days.

Comparatively little French plant had fallen into the hands of the Germans. Of serviceable locomotives, only 50 had come to hand to the end of January. As up to this time no French personnel had been employed except upon a few sections, the German Railway Administrations had to be largely drawn upon for working the French railways. At the end of January the service was carried on by 3,600 German railway officials and a certain number of men lent from the army. Besides the locomotives captured and some 75 purchased, the home administration furnished 280 more.‡ It was not until the conclusion of the armistice that any effective assistance could be rendered in

furtherance of the service.

† In February the Line and Traffic Commissions at Chaumont were transferred to Corbeil. To the latter Commission was left the supreme direction of traffic on the railways belonging to the Line Commission at Versailles.

<sup>.</sup> The railways in Upper Alsace were not placed under a Line Commission.

<sup>†</sup> The number of the wagons furnished cannot be accurately stated in consequence of their constant going and coming, but during the latter half of the campaign there could not have been less than 30,000 axles withdrawn from home traffic.

## PROTECTION OF THE COMMUNICATIONS.

The difficulty of protecting the communications augmented in direct proportion with the distance separating the theatre of operations and home territory, and with the spread of the franctireur movement.

On the 31st October a fresh distribution of the Government troops and Etappen troops took place.\* On the 4th November. an order from His Majesty the King extended the jurisdiction of the Government-General of Lorraine as far as the west border of the Meuse Department, the west, south-west, and south borders of the Haute Marne Department, and the west and south borders of the Haute Saone Department; whilst the Government-General of Rheims was thenceforth to consist of the Departments of the Aisne, Ardennes, Marne, Aube, Seine and Marne, and Seine and Oise.† At the same time, the duty of protecting the etappen lines running through their districts was again imposed upon the respective Governments-General. But as the troops newly assigned to them only became by degrees available, etappen troops had in the first instance to be employed for the purpose, and even parts of the field army. It was not until the end of November that the new distribution of the Government and Etappen troops came into real operation.

The Inspector-General of Etappen of the Hnd Army, following the march of his army to the Loire, was unable until the middle of November to withdraw part of his troops from the etappen line to which they had previously belonged, and push them forward in the direction of Troyes and Châtillonsur-Seine.‡ Consequently, at first, detachments composed of men with slight ailments had to be employed for the protection

Protection in the south of the theatre of war.

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• The new distribution would place the following at disposal:-
                                     Ist Army
                                                  1 battn., 1 sqn.,
                                                                     - battery.
                                     HInd
                                                             2
                                     IlIrd
                                                 16
     Inspector-General of Etappen.
                                                             8
                                     Meuse
                                                      ,,
                                                 25 battns., 14 sqns., 2 batteries.
                                      Alsace
                                                 28 battns., 9 sqns., 21 batteries.
                                     Lorraine
                                                 20
                                                             6
                                                                ,,
     Government-General . .
                                     Rheims
                                                 17
                                                                    3
                                                 60 battns., 19 sqns., 71 batteries
   As regards the previous distribution of the Etappen and Government troops,
see App. LXXII.
   † In addition, the Government-General of Lorraine gave up the Schirmeck and
Saales districts of the Vosges Department to the Government-General of Alsace.
   1 Distribution of the etappen troops of the Hnd Army on 18th November:
                                                    3rd
                                                   Unna ;
   Troyes: Inspector-General; Bar-sur-Seine:
                                                            Chatillon-sur-Seine:
1st, 2nd, and 4th Unna and 2nd 5th Res. Hus.; Château Vilain: 6th Unna; Chaumont-en-Bas-
             ; on the Bologne-St. Dezier and Bologne-Colombey roads:
                                                                   I
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of the line of communications. The last field troops of the Hnd Army had meanwhile already reached St. Florentin. General v. Kraatz's Detachment was still watching Langres from the north and north-west,\* whilst the XIVth Corps was posted at Dijon, three days' march from Châtillon.

Surprise of Chatillon-sur-Seine.

On the French side, Garibaldi, with his volunteers, had been despatched in the first half of November from the neighbourhood of Dôle to Autun, for the purpose of protecting the roads leading to Nevers.‡ On the 11th November he reached Autun, and some days afterwards caused his 4th Brigades to advance on Montbard, with orders to push reconnoitring parties well to the front and harass the enemy. Ricciotti Garibaldi reached Montbard on 17th November, and resolved to undertake a coup-de-main upon Châtillon-sur-Seine. On the 18th he advanced to Coulmiers-le-Sec, and next morning at five o'clock arrived before Châtillon.

This place had been occupied since the 17th November by three companies of the Unna Battalion and a squadron of the

5th Reserve Hussars, under Colonel Lettgau.

The infantry pickets and cavalry patrols, pushed forward during the night, had just returned on the morning of the 19th, when, at half-past six o'clock, the volunteers moved forward in two columns upon Châtillon. T On the first shots from the guard at the entrance to the town, the alarm was at once sounded, but the landwehr were fired upon from the houses while in the act of assembling, and many were surprised inside. A brisk street fight ensued, in which the Prussian detachment at first held their ground in the Mairie and the Prefecture. On the news, however, that the enemy was threatening the retreat on Château Vilain by a turning movement, Colonel Lettgau commenced evacuating that part of the town which lies on the left bank of the Seine. But as the enemy shortly afterwards broke off the contest and retreated, the whole of the town was re-occupied by the Prussians. The German loss amounted to 8 officers and 186 men.\*\*

§ 600 men and some mounted éclaireurs. (See Thiébault, "Ricciotti Garibaldi

et la 4º Brigade," p. 15).

|| See ante, p. 113, note ‡. The 3 companies of the Unna Battalion numbered 460 men; the squadron, 94 horses.

¶ The attacking columns numbered 400 men (see Thiébault, p. 21).

<sup>1</sup>st Soest Battalion and 5th Res. Hus.; in and near Pont-a-Mousson: Detmold and Paderborn battalions.

The 1st Fortress Pion. Co. Vth Corps was despatched to reinforce the 4th Field Railway Division (see ante, p. 105).

\* 6 battns., 2 sqns., and 2 batteries (see Part II, Vol. I, p. 284, note 1).

† See Part II, Vol. II, p. 32, et seq.

See Part II, Vol. I, p. 227, and App. CIV; and also Bordone, "Garibaldi et l'Armée des Vosges," pp. 107 and 155.

<sup>\*\*</sup> Including 1 officer 13 men killed, and 2 officers 9 men wounded. Among the

On learning that the adversary was preparing to renew the attack with stronger forces,\* Colonel Lettgau retired next day to Château Vilain. Here, on the 21st, arrived General v. Kraatz on his way to the Loire,† and ordered the detachment to move with him to Châtillon.‡ On the 23rd, the detachment was further joined by four companies of the Soest Landwehr Battalion and half a squadron;§ the first of these had had a brush at Plaines with a band of franctireurs. General v. Kraatz continued his advance to Joigny on the 24th.

After their success at Châtillon the volunteers became emboldened. As the Othe Forest, situated to the south-west of Troyes, appeared more particularly to serve as the starting point of their raids, Lieutenant-General v. Tiedemann despatched on the 24th a strong detachment from that town to

clear the wood in question.

After a slight skirmish with volunteers at Maraye-en-Othe on the 25th, this detachment proceeded on the 26th to Auxon, where, on the morning of the 25th, the etappen troops had been surprised by a strong band.\*\* The garrison, consisting of some 100 convalescents of the 18th Division, was forced to abandon the place after a stubborn resistance. After being reinforced by a company from Troyes it again advanced to the village, now deserted by the enemy, just as the detachment from Maraye appeared. This latter continued its march by way of Brienon to Sens, and arrived there on the 29th. It had only met with some weak hostile bands, which took to flight after a short skirmish.

The country north of Châtillon-sur-Seine had likewise been again harassed by volunteers. On the 29th, a band several hundred strong succeeded in barring at Autricourt the march of the 3rd Company Soest Battalion on its way from Bar-sur-Aube to Châtillon.

Whilst, for these reasons, the Joinville—Troyes road was only kept open with difficulty, the continuous advance of the

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1 2

killed was Major v. Alvensleben, 5th Reserve Hussars; among the wounded Captain

Bardeleben, Unna Battalion.

App. CLXXIV contains the return of casualties of the troops employed on the communications from the commencement of the campaign until 31st January, 1871, as also of the Field Railway officials.

Ricciotti Garibaldi's Brigade had meanwhile, as a matter of fact, retired on the 19th to Coulmiers-le-Sec, and on the 20th to Montbard.

<sup>†</sup> After leaving 2 battalions, 1 squadron, and 1 battery, in front of Langres, under Colonel v. Ehrenberg (see Part II, Vol. I, p. 325, note †).

<sup>‡ 6</sup>th Tona remained at Château Vilain.

<sup>§ 1</sup>st, 2nd, 5th, and 6th and 1st 1st 5th Res. Hus.

Seest The former had moved to Bar-

sur-Seine on the 21st, and from thence been despatched to Châtillon.

|| Situated between the roads leading from Troyes to Sens and St. Florentin.

| The Detmold Battalion, besides 316 infantry and 103 sabres of the 25th Divi-

sion, under Major v. Massow.

\*\*According to Bordone, "Garibaldi et l'Armée des Vosges," p. 175 and 284, 170 Franctireurs of the Doubs carried out the surprise.

Hind Army rendered necessary a further movement of the etappen troops to the westward. Moreover, the district further south had now to be protected, so that the railway beyond Châtillon might be restored. The Inspector-General of Etappen, therefore, applied to Army Headquarters for a support to Colonel v. Ehrenberg's detachment\* in front of Langres, and also requested reinforcements from the Governments-General of Lorraine and In consequence, the Governor-General of Rheims, Lieutenant-General v. Rosenberg-Gruszczynski,† caused Troyes to be occupied by a mixed detachment from Vitry-le-Français.1

The railway Blesme—Chaumont—Châtillon lay for the most part within the jurisdiction of the Governor-General of Lorraine. As the latter could not dispose of a part of the troops assigned to him on the 31st October before the end of November, it was not until during this month that the etappen garrisons of the IInd Army as far as Bologne could be

relieved.

In consequence of the surprises of Châtillon and Auxon, the Governor-General of Lorraine, General v. Bonin, for the better protection of the threatened line of rail, despatched a mixed detachment under Colonel v. Dannenberg to Chaumont, where it arrived on the 29th and 30th November.

On hearing of the events at Châtillon, General v. Werder had also moved troops in that direction. They, however, speedily returned, as their support was no longer necessary.

Meanwhile the Royal Headquarters despatched so much of the VIIth Army Corps as was present at Metz to Châtillon-sur-Seine, in order to secure the etappen line of the IInd Army,

§ The 4th Saxon Garrison Battalion relieved the Soest Battalion on 16th Novem-

The support was sanctioned, but the detachment returned to the army shortly after.

<sup>†</sup> The Government-General in Rheims had only the 2nd Landwehr Division at its disposal in the middle of November. It was distributed in such wise that 5 battalions, 1 squadron, and 1 battery were posted on the section of the railway Blesme—Epernay; 74 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 2 batteries on the etappen roads of the 1st and Meuse Armies; 33 battalions, with 1 squadron held Sedan, Laon, and the camp at Chalons. On the 23rd November, the IInd Reserve Rifle Buttalion, assigned shortly before to the Government-General, arrived from Germany at Vitry-le-Français. Besides these the 1st Squadron 1st Lancers was at Sedan.

<sup>†</sup> The Prenzlau Buttalion, 3rd 14th 1st Hy. Res. Cav., and 22nd Lt. Res. 1 4th

ber. (See ante p. 113, note ‡, and p. 115, note §.)

At the beginning of December the troops of the Government-General of Lorraine were distributed as follows:—On the railway section Avricourt—Nancy— Bar-le-Duc: 30 companies, 2 squadrons; on the etappen road of the XIVth Army Corps: 22 companies, 14 squadrons, 1 battery; on the etappen line of the IInd Army: 16 companies, 14 squadrons, 1 battery; on the etappen roads of the Ist and Meuse Armies: 32 companies and 1 squadron. Total, 100 companies, 6 squadrons, and 2 batteries.

Ist and Fus. and Heavy Res. The 4th Saxon Garrison Battalion was placed

under Colonel v. Dannenberg. On the 5th December the  $\frac{2^{th}}{4^{th}}$  Res. Hus. this detachment, while Ehrenberg's Detachment had already left on the 30th November. (See Part II, Vol. II, p. 71, note †, and note \* above.)

¶ See Part II, Vol. II, pp. 35 and 37.

and to maintain the connection between the Hnd Army and the XIVth Army Corps.\*

A mixed detachment, under General v. d. Osten-Sacken, was sent in advance of the 13th Division; it reached Donjeux on the 30th,† and thence advanced in two columns towards Tonnerre and Ravières. On the 5th December it occupied Châtillon. The remainder of General v. Zastrow's troops were concentrated on the 9th December in and round Chaumont.

Meanwhile, Garibaldi's troops had been held in check by the XIVth Army Corps. But there now commenced a series of systematic attacks upon the etappen line by the Langres garrison, which at the beginning of November numbered upwards of 12,000 men, one-third being troops of the line. The commandant of the fortress, General Arbellot, who conceived that his chief duty was to harass the German communications, formed special companies for this purpose.‡

On the 6th December, a requisitioning partys despatched from Chaumont to Nogent-le-Roi was surprised by these troops and was forced to retire with some loss. In consequence, a mixed detachment advanced on the 7th towards Nogent, but limited itself to a short cannonade of the town which was full

On the evening of the 8th, the garrison of Château Vilain was attacked by superior hostile forces. The Captain Hauses, with the 5th and 6th Companies of the Unna Landwehr Battalion, offered such a vigorous resistance that the enemy, after some hours' fighting was forced to retire, leaving 46 killed and wounded on the field. The adversary had only damaged the railway very slightly. Next morning, he renewed his attack, but at once retired when a battalion came up from Chaumont.\*\*

In order to put an end to these attacks on the line of communications, parts of the VIIth Army Corps secured the country south-east of Château Vilain on the 10th December, and on the 12th, Colonel v. Dannenberg despatched two columns†† by way of Biesles and Lusy towards Nogent-le-Roi. They, however, only fell in with weak bands, which after a slight resistance retired on Montigny-le-Roi. The enemy, who was kept well informed by the peasantry, retired at all points

<sup>\*</sup> See Part II, Vol. II, p. 37.
† 4 battalions, 1 squadron, and 1 battery. Of these one battalion did not reach Donjeux until the 1st December.
‡ See "Langres pendant la Guerre," 1870-71, p. 28, et seq.
§ One Vice-Sergeant-Major with 63 men of the 60th Regiment.

2nd and 11th
‡ 4th
nand
Heavy Res.

VIII

Tour companies. (See "Langres pendant la Guerre," 1870-71, p. 33.)

\* Fus.
55, which had just arrived by rail from Donjeux.

† 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 11th
60

† 4th
Res. Hus.

Heavy Res.
VIII

10th and 12th
60

† 4th
Res. Hus.

\* Will

10th and 12th
4th
Res. Hus.

\* Will

as soon as he was met by superior forces, and, whilst the VIIth Army Corps was advancing beyond Chatillon, remained quiet

to the west of Langres.

When this corps had taken over the protection of the Chaumont—Nuits—Tonnerre railway,† the Inspector-General of Etappen caused his troops to move forward in order to guard the line of communications by road of the IInd Army. This measure was urgently necessary in view of the advance meanwhile of the army beyond Orléans, and the more so as some volunteers had appeared in the neighbourhood of Sens.

On the night of the 3rd—4th December, a detachment of 152 men; intended for the IIIrd Army Corps, who on the march from Sens to Nemours had taken by mistake the Courtenay road, and were passing the night at Egriselle-le-Bocage, were attacked by a band some 170 strong. Keeping together in the church, the detachment repulsed the enemy with a brisk fire although he had set fire to the building. At daybreak, the fire having attained such proportions as to necessitate the evacuation of the church, the adversary was driven off. The detachment followed him some distance in the direction of Courtenay, and then marched back to Sens.§

On the news that there were also hostile detachments at Beaune-la-Rolande, Captain v. Monbart IInd, 56th Regiment, who was a convalescent in the hospital at Beaumont-en-Gatenais, made an expedition to the neighbourhood of Beaune on the 11th, with twenty convalescent wounded men and a few troopers, but only came across some French field hospitals. On the 15th, after putting to flight some franctireurs, he released a large number of German prisoners at Montargis, equipped them as well as his resources would admit, and brought

back to the Xth Army Corps a detachment of 250 men.

Meanwhile the Inspector-General of Etappen had arrived at Orléans on the 14th December, by way of Nemours and Pithiviers. His troops followed in such wise that by the end of the month they were distributed on the roads leading from Brienon and Estissac to Sens, Nemours, Pithiviers, and Toury.

From this position, a battalion with a squadron¶ was

The troops of the Government-General of Rheims (see ante, p. 116) had, in consequence of the communications being threatened in the north, been temporarily called away from Troyes.



<sup>\*</sup> See Part II, Vol. II, p. 38.

<sup>†</sup> The corps took over the protection beyond Château Vilain. Its position on the 16th December was as follows:—In and near Ravières: General Baron v. d. Osten-Sacken with 4 battalions, 2 squadrons, 1 battery; in and near Châtillon: General v. Bothmer with 7 battalions, 6 squadrons, 7 batteries, and 1 pioneer company; in Château Vilain: 1 battalion; at Bar-sur-Seine and Troyes: 1 battalion, 4 squadrons.

<sup>‡</sup> They were commanded by 1st Lieutenant v. Bischoffshausen, Depot Battalion 35th Fusiliers.

<sup>§</sup> The detachment lost two men missing. The enemy left 1 officer and 12 men dead on the ground.

<sup>||</sup> South-west of Nemours.

The Detmold Battalion and 2nd 5th Res. Hus.

despatched on the 24th to Montargis as reinforcement to the garrison,\* which had been weakened by the departure of General v. Rantzau's detachment to Briare.

In consideration of the long line of communications of the Hnd Army, the Royal Headquarters had on the 7th December ordered the reinforcement of its etappen troops by five landwehr battalions belonging to the etappen troops of the HIrd Army, whose duties at this period had been simplified by the transfer of the advanced depôt to Lagny. At the same time, however, the occupation of the district round Melun, Fontainebleau, and

Montereau was entrusted to the IInd Army.

At the beginning of November, a mixed detachment, under Major v. Kuylenstierna, had been despatched to this district by the etappen authorities of the IIIrd Army, at the instance of the Royal Headquarters, for the purpose of depriving the enemy of the Moret-Montereau railway, and of securing it for use in view of the advance of the IInd Army to the Loire. After some slight brushes with volunteers on the 2nd and 3rd November, Major v. Kuylenstierna had occupied the villages of Melun, Fontainebleau, Moret, and Montereau. From these points raids on a small scale were undertaken for the purpose of clearing the district. In the middle of December, as already mentioned, part of the detachment was transferred to the Inspector-General of Etappen of the IInd Army.

Meanwhile, General v. Werder in pursuance of instructions from the Royal Headquarters had charged General v. d. Goltz with the duty of observing Langres.\*\* But as on the 17th December, General v. Zastrow left with his main forces for Auxerre, †† a complete investment of that fortress with the means available was impracticable. Although, for the present, the garrison did not attempt any enterprises on a large scale, a weak detachment succeeded on the night of the 24th-25th in tearing up the rails at Bricon, derailing a train coming from Chaumont, and attacking it. Battalion 72nd Regiment, t which was in it, however, drove

See also Part II, Vol. II, pp. 95-96.
 The Aschersleben, Halle, Bitterfield, Torgau and Mühlhausen battalions. Part of these troops did not pass to the Und Army until the end of December. 1 See ante p. 105.

<sup>§ 1</sup>st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th 5th, 6th, 7th, 9th, and 10th 1st and 3rd ' 3rd Bav. Landw.' Aschersleben Halle

<sup>3</sup>rd Res. Dragoons, and 8th 4-Pr. The latter which had been assigned to the Inspector-General of Etappen for the enterprise, rejoined its Division on the 27th November.

The bridge at Montereau had been destroyed by the enemy (see ante, p. 105.) The franctireurs could not be entirely expelled from that district. In the Valence wood, north-west of Montereau, two small detachments of the Aschersleben Battalion were surprised on the 25th December by a band of upwards of 100 men,

and for the most part killed.

\*\* See Part II, Vol. II, p. 99, et seq.

†† See Part II, Vol. II, p. 97.

‡‡ With regard to the assignment of this regiment to the VIIth Army Corps (see Part II, Vol. II, p. 97, note ¶).

off the enemy, who sustained a loss of 11 killed and 12

prisoners.

In order to relieve the field troops still employed on etappen duties, the Royal Headquarters had on the 23rd December instructed the Government-General of Lorraine to undertake as well the protection of the railway in the Côte d'Or Department. In consequence of this, the Government pushed forward their troops, so that by the beginning of January, the section between Blesme and Châtillon was protected by 6½ battalions,

1 squadron, and 1 battery.\*

Beyond Châtillon the immediate control of the railway again came under the Inspector-General of Etappen of the IInd Army, who distributed three of the newly-assigned battalions along the sections Châtillon—Troyes and Châtillon—Nuits—Tonnerre. On the west he had to occupy Orléans, and about the middle of January, in consequence of the advance of the IInd Army to Le Mans, Beaugency as well. In the same way, to the south of Paris, the etappen stations, Etampes, La Ferté Aleps, and Juvisy, which had been previously occupied by troops of the IIIrd Army, came under his jurisdiction.

On the other hand, line troops of the IInd Army had been brought up to protect the Le Mans—Chartres railway, which had been opened for traffic after the engagements at Le Mans; whilst the Chartres—Versailles section was protected by the

IIIrd Army.

Between the Loire and the Upper Seine, General v. Rantzau's detachment at Briare, and Colonel v. Dannenberg's troops' to the south of Châtillon, and between these the Hnd and VIIth Corps, gave sufficient protection during the first days of January against hostile enterprises on a large scale. On the departure of these two Corps eastward, General v. Manteuffel confided to Kettler's Brigade the protection of his communications and particularly of the Châtillon—Nuits railway. When on the 19th General v. Kettler advanced upon Dijon, only two companies remained behind at Montbard. In other respects, from this time forth, the protection of the communications between the Loing and the Upper Seine devolved solely upon the etappen garrisons of the Hnd Army. In consequence of their weakness, only the etappen points themselves and the most important railway stations could be permanently occupied; the roads and railways were secured by constant patrolling.

<sup>\*</sup> The Neisse, Beuthen, and Rosenburg battalions (troops of the Government at Mets, assigned to the Government General in lieu of the 60th Regiment, see Part II, Vol. II, p. 97, note ¶), the Andernach, Deuts (5th Co. at Neufchâteau), 4th Saxon Garrison Battalion, 1st, 8rd, and 4th, 4th 4th Res. Hus. Heavy Reserve VIII.

The command of these troops was entrusted to Lieut.-Colonel Hensel.

<sup>†</sup> See Part II, Vol. II, p. 307. ‡ See Part II, Vol. II, p. 306, et seq.

<sup>5</sup>th and 6th (See ante, p. 17.)

After the evacuation of Auxerre by the VIIth Army Corps. General de Pointe de Gévigny, in command at Nevers, pushed forward troops into that neighbourhood. On 19th January, the General, as also General Garibaldi, were requested by the War Delegate, M. de Freycinet, to blow up the bridge over the Armançon at Nuits.\* In consequence, General de Pointe caused several attempts to be made, on the 25th January, against the Buffon—Nuits—Sens railway.

A column despatched for the purpose advanced shortly after 6 a.m. upon Brienon, surprised the guard at the railway station, made the majority prisoners, and destroyed the railway bridge east of the place,† as well as the telegraphs. Several attacks made upon the château, which had been arranged as an alarm post, were repulsed by the 3rd Company Paderborn Landwehr Battalion! with such vigour that the enemy once more retired

At the same time, the railway station at La Roche was attacked on three sides by a garde mobile battalion. garrison, consisting of only 1 officer and 30 men of the Paderborn Landwehr Battalion, soon found itself, in consequence of the enemy's superior forces, reduced to the defence of the station building. After a protracted resistance in the lower story, it had to be abandoned. From the upper story, the weak garrison continued the struggle until it was ultimately forced to surrender by the enemy setting fire to the building. Yonne bridge at La Roche had meanwhile been blown up by the French, after dislodging the guard posted there.

Some of the enemy's troops had also moved against Joigny, but had halted near Basson on meeting a detachment sent ou

to reconnoitre from Joigny.

On that same evening, a detachment of gardes mobiles The Armançon bridge, which had just moved upon Buffon. been restored at that point,\*\* was occupied by a Prussian guard of 32 men, pushed forward from Montbard. This guard was, it is true, driven off on the night of the 25th-26th by the gardes mobiles, but the bridge was saved from destruction by two companies marching as reinforcement from Montbard to Nuits, before whom the enemy quickly retired.#

In order to defeat any further enterprises, the Royal Headquarters ordered an infantry brigade of the VIth Corps, reinforced by cavalry and artillery, to unite with Rantzau's



<sup>\*</sup> See Garnier, "Les Volontaires du Génie dans l'Est," p. 241. † See ante, p. 109. ‡ Captain v. Ehrenstein. § From the 4th Company, under Lieutenant Poelmahn. j See ante p. 109.

Paderborn, with 12 hussars.

<sup>\*\*</sup> See ante, p. 110, note 1.

<sup>††</sup> See aute, p. 120, note §. †† See Garnier, "Les Volontaires du Génie dans l'Est," p. 276, and "Enquête Parlementaire, Rapports," Part III, p. 318.

detachment,\* and clear the district north of Auxerre of franc-

The brigade was placed under General v. Fabeck's orders; one column, under Colonel v. Briesen reached Montargis by rail on the 28th January, another under Colonel v. Bock

arrived at Joigny on the 29th.†

As considerable bodies of the enemy were said to be massed about Auxerre, General v. Fabeck contemplated a concentric advance upon the place, and for this purpose entered into communication with General v. Rantzau, who had informed him that he would march on the 28th from Ouzouer-sur-Loire to Chatillon-sur-Loing.

Briesen's detachment was sent forward by way of Château Renard and Aillant-sur-Tholon, Colonel v. Bock to Appoigny, and General v. Rantzau was requested to take the direction of Charny—Toucy. On the 29th the three columns reached Château-Renard, Joigny, and Charny. On the 30th, General v. Fabeck advanced to Sepaux with Briesen's detachment.

On the march thither, the news arrived of an armistice, in consequence of which Colonel v. Bock was left for the 30th at Joigny. General v. Rantzau reached Toucy. During the night of the 31st January—1st February, General v. Fabeck received the official communication of the conclusion of an armistice, by virtue of which the Department of the Yonne was to be occupied by the Germans.

When General v. Werder, in consequence of the intelligence of the advance of strong hostile bodies to raise the siege of Belfort, was concentrating his forces at Vesoul, General v. d.

Goltz was also summoned from Langres.

Owing to this circumstance, the garrison of the fortress, which at that time had reached a strength of some 16,000 men, I was encouraged to fresh enterprises. They continually harassed the German troops of observation, without achieving any special successes. One of the detachments, however, sent from Langres succeeded on the night of the 11th—12th January in removing some rails near Courban, \*\* and causing the derailment of a provision train.

The advance of General v. Manteuffel exercised such a paralysing influence upon the garrison, †† that when, on the 16th

See Part II, Vol. II, pp. 95 and 226.

<sup>† 23</sup>rd Regiment,  $\frac{3rd}{15th Drag}$ , and  $\frac{4th Light}{6}$ , under Colonel v. Briesen; 18th Regiment,  $\frac{8rd}{8th Drag}$ , and  $\frac{1}{2}\frac{3rd Light}{VI}$ , under Colonel Baron v. Bock.

<sup>1</sup> At Auxerre there were some 2,000 men under General du Temple.

On 2nd February, the French evacuated Auxerre, which place was occupied by General v. Fabeck (see subsequent narrative).

<sup>||</sup> See Part II, Vol. II, p. 104.

¶ See ante, p. 5, note \*. General Meyère had become commandant in succession to General Arbellot.

<sup>\*\*</sup> About 8 miles north-east of Châtillon-sur-Seine.

<sup>++</sup> See ante, pp. 7 and 8.

and 17th January, German troops\* moved from Chaumont and Foulain towards Rolampont, they encountered but slight resistance. The enemy had retired with his main forces to the fortress. On the 27th, Lieutenant Colonel Hensel caused two columns to advance upon Nogent-le-Roi and Rolampont,† which

dispersed several hostile detachments.

A few days previously an expedition had also been made from Neufchâteau upon Langres. The volunteers, who continued their raids north of the fortress, had gained so much ground to the front that the Government-General of Lorraine decided at the beginning of January to reinforce the weak garrison of Neufchâteau. When General v. Werder, after the battle on the Lisaine, resumed the offensive, General v. Bonin deputed Lieutenant-Colonel v. Dobschütz, commanding at Neufchateau, to advance upon Langres. This officer marched on the 20th with his detachment, consisting of three companies and half a squadron, to Bourmont, and next day to Lamarche. At the wood south-west of Vrécourt, he fell in with a hostile battalion. The riflemen, supported by the Landwehr Company, drove it back upon Vrécourt, after a brief skirmish. Those who endeavoured to escape to the southward were driven back or captured by the hussars. Vrécourt having been also captured at the first rush, the enemy fled with serious loss to the mountains on the north. Lieutenant-Colonel v. Dobschütz returned the same day to Neufchâteau. The expeditions made from this place shortly afterwards were unattended with success, as it was an easy matter for the volunteers to evade pursuit in wooded country.

As the fortress of Langres evidently served as the point of support for these bands, the Royal Headquarters, on the 25th January, resolved upon a closer investment and, if possible, to lay siege to the place. The arrangements made to that end were, however, never carried out in their entirety.\*\* The

Beuthen and Deutz battalions, 2nd 4th Saxon Gar. 4th 4th Res. Hus.

<sup>†</sup> Upon Nogent: Rosenberg Battalion, and the Ros. Hus., under Major Grüner; upon Rolampont: Beuthen Battalion, under Major Geibel, which was further supplemented on the 28th by the Ros. Hus., and Hus.y Ros.

<sup>† 5</sup>th Deutz, a garrison company formed out of 300 to 400 convalescents of Xth Corps, and 4 3rd 

\*\*The reinforcement consisted of 2nd and 3rd 

1 2nd 

\*\*The reinforcement consisted of 1 2nd and 3rd 

1 2nd 

\*\*The reinforcement consisted of 1 2nd and 3rd 

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\*\*The reinforcement consisted of 1 2nd and 3rd 

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\*\*The reinforcement consisted of 1 2nd and 3rd 

1 2nd 

\*\*The reinforcement consisted of 1 2nd and 3rd 

1 2nd a

<sup>\$ 2</sup>nd 4th Res. Hus. Which troops had been on the etappen line of the XIVth Army Corps.

<sup>\$ 2</sup>nd and 3rd 5th \$ 2nd and \$ 3rd 1st Res. Rif.' Deuts 4th Res. Hus.

<sup>||</sup> The Gard Battalion of Gardes Mobiles (see Rambaux, "Le Pont de Fontenoy,"

p. 20, et seq.).

¶ The enemy left behind 1 officer and 40 men killed and wounded, besides 56 unwounded prisoners, whilst our losses amounted to 11 men.

\*\* See ante, p. 84, et seq.

armistice, meanwhile concluded, put an end also to hostilities before Langres, before the whole of the troops intended for the purpose had arrived before the fortress.

To the east of Langres, the line of communications of the XIVth Army Corps during November was protected as far as St. Loup-les-Luxeuil by troops of the Government-General of Lorraine; \* further south, it was protected by the XIVth Corps itself.

At the beginning of December, when General v. Werder had assembled his forces at Dijon, Colonel v. Schmieden, who had been charged by the Government-General of Lorraine with the business of the Etappen Inspection at Epinal, caused Vescul to be also occupied, as it appeared to be threatened from Besancon.

At this period the neighbourhood of Lamarche having become far from safe,‡ a mixed detachments proceeded on the 6th December from Epinal in that direction. Part of it was attacked at Dombrot on the morning of the 9th by a body of franctireurs some 150 strong, but one company repulsed the enemy after a brief struggle. On the 11th, the detachment after a slight action reached Lamarche and returned to Epinal on the 14th. Nothing more was attempted by the enemy for some time in this neighbourhood.

See Part II, Vol. I, pp. 212 and 230.
 The distribution of the Government troops on the etappen line of the XIVth Army Corps on the 9th December was as follows:-In Blainville-la-Grande and Rosières-aux-Salines: 5th Neuss; in Bayon, Charmes, Châtel-sur-Moselle, and Mirecourt: 1st, 2nd, and 5th; in Epinal: 2nd Saxon Düsseldorf Garrison Battalion, 5th, and 1 Gar.; in Xertigny: 1 2nd Ist Res.Rif.; in St. Loup: 5th, 6th, and 8th in Vesoul: 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 6th, and 1 Heavy Res.; Eupen VII ; 4th Württ. Eupen pushed forward towards Lamarche: 1st, 1 2nd, 3rd, and 4th 4th 1 Gar.

Ist Res. Rif. Düsseldorf' 5th Hus.' and Heavy Res. Vii 1 On 2nd December, a detachment of the Düsseldorf Battalion, consisting of

one Vice-Sergeant-Major and fifteen men, sent to gather taxes, was captured near

<sup>§</sup> Major v. Paczinski-Tenczin, with 1st, 3rd and 4th 1st Res. Rif. 5th Hus. Heavy Res. from Epinal, 1st Res. Rif. from Xertigny; these troops were joined 🖠 2nd next day by Düsseldorf from Mirecourt.

<sup>||</sup> Belonging to the Chasseurs des Vosges who, under the command of Captain Bernard, had, since the middle of November, been making the neighbourhood of Lamarche the starting point of their raids, and, as it appears were independent of the fortress of Langres (see Rambaux, "Le Pont de Fontenoy," pp. 9 and 10).

<sup>¶ 1</sup>st Res. Rif., under Captain Baron v. Wilczeck.

The etappen troops under Colonel v. Schmieden received by the middle of January numerous reinforcements:\* on the other hand, the detachment despatched at the end of December from Vesoul to Port-sur-Saône passed in January under the immediate orders of the XIVth Army Corps and, as already

described, shared in the operations of this Corps.†

In consequence of the movement to the right of the French East Army, the Royal Headquarters found it necessary on the 6th January to issue special instructions! to the Governments-General of Lorraine and Alsace in the possible case of the main lines of communication of the German armies being threatened by General Bourbaki. The Government-General of Lorraine should, in such event, concentrate the troops now scattered at the various etappen points; the Government-General of Alsace was to prevent any attempt at rising in the rear of General v. Werder. The fortresses were to be occupied in good time with sufficient forces, and preparations were to be made for destroying the railways upon the enemy's line of advance.

In consequence the Government-General of Alsace caused the garrisons in the south to be reinforced, and took steps to

secure the Vosges passes.

When the enemy afterwards took the direction of Belfort with his main forces, numerous bands of franctireurs advanced at the same time from Vesoul and Langres against the line Luxeuil—St. Loup.

On the evening of the 16th January the company at St.

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Brd and 6th Düsseldorf' News 1st and 2nd 4th Res. Hus., and Light Res. On the
                           Neuss
other hand, 2nd and 3rd, and 1 2nd 1st Res. Rif. and 4th Res. Hus.
                                  1 2nd
                                            - were despatched to Neufchâteau on
11th January (see aste, p. 123, note ‡).

† See Part II, Vol. II, p. 301, note *, and p. 308, note *.

‡ App. CLXXV contains the text of the order in question.

§ The troops of the Government-General of Alsace were distributed as follows
on the 8th January :---
                                                 6 battns., 1 sqn., 1 battery.
       Straseburg.....
       Schlettstadt .....
       Neu-Breisach .....
       Upper Alsace (including Mülhausen) .
       Vosges Passes west of Strassburg and
         Schlettstadt .....
       Weissenburg-Vendenheim-Avricourt
       81
                                                   ł
         etappen stations ......
                                                       ,,
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Total .. 231 battns., 81 sqns., 2 batteries. The Government-General had, at the end of December and beginning of January, received from home 10 depôt battalions, on the other hand 8 Landwehr battalions, 2 squadrons, and 2 batteries, under General v. Debechitz, were handed over for the siege of Belfort (see Part II, Vol. II, p. 299).

By the Royal Cabinet Order of 30th September, 1870, Lieut.-General v. Ollech

had been appointed Governor of Strassburg.

Loup\* was attacked by superior forces and repulsed upon Plombières; in consequence it was obliged to abandon this place and Luxeuil. On the 17th Colonel v. Schmieden called up two more companies from Epinal to Xertigny, where he assembled 9 companies and 1 squadrons. Next day he again pushed forward two companies to Aillevillers. On the 19th they were, however, forced by a strong hostile detachment to retire to Xertigny. But when on the 21st the successes of General v. Werder and the advance of the South Army became felt, they succeeded in penetrating on the same day as far as St. Loup, and on the 22nd as far as Lure, and in opening communication with Colonel v. Willisent now advancing on Vesoul. After Vesoul was reached on the 23rd, the etappen line, which had now to serve not only to the XIVth Army Corps but to the whole of the South Army, could again be occupied as before. The protection of it, south of Fresnes St. Mamès, was entrusted at the beginning of February to parts of the South Army.

At this period only weak detachments of Kettler's Brigade were stationed on the railway Nuits-Dijon. On the 2nd the guard at the Buffon Bridge having been recalled to Montbard, a small party of Garibaldians succeeded in blowing up the bridge on the morning of the 3rd. But as the opening of the railway in question was contemplated by Army Headquarters, the latter pushed forward stronger forces for its protection.

Measures of protection in toar of the centre of the Germanarmy.

The protection of the communications in rear of the centre of the German Army was a much easier matter than in the south. The railway running from Weissenburg and Strassburg by way of Nancy and Châlons was guarded on both sides by strong detachments.

Capture of Pfalzburg.

Against attacks from the side of Pfalzburg the railway was secured by troops of the Government-General of Alsace.\*\*

On the night of the 13th—14th September the garrison of this fortress, the bombardment of which on the 31st August

occupied as follows:

In Xertigny: 2nd and 3rd 2nd Saxon Gar.

Ist 2st St. Loup: 5th Wirtt.

Garrison Battalion; in Plombières: 1st and 4th Saxon Gar.

† See ante, p. 11, note ||.

† See ante, p. 121.

| See ante, p. 121.

| See ante, p. 111, and Garnier, "Les Volontaires du Génie dans l'Est," p. 275

et seq.

¶ See ante, p. 83.

■ With respect to the occurrences before Pfalzburg up to 3rd September (see Part I. Vol. 1, pp. 263, 266, Vol. II, pp. 460-463, and sketch facing p. 461).

had produced no result, made a fresh sortie. A column of 500 men advanced upon Büchelberg, drove back the pickets, and penetrated into the village. The company posted here\* con-

centrated rapidly and forced the enemy to withdraw.

Bands of volunteers, who hung about the neighbourhood, were continually threatening the rear of the investing troops, whilst the fortress maintained a steady fire upon their front. In consequence of this, Major v. Giese caused the fortress to be bombarded on the evening of the 24th November by the three divisions of his field battery from three separate points, Les Baraques-des-trois-Maisons, Lesquatre-Vents and Vescheim. The enemy's artillery replied to the fire with rapidity and vigour, but caused little loss.

Meanwhile, the fortress began to fall short of food, and small-pox was extending its ravages. The commandant, Major Taillant, who had on the 30th November commenced to negotiate upon terms which could not be accepted, offered on the 12th December to surrender the place unconditionally. On the 14th the German troops made their entry. They found all the supplies of ammunition destroyed, and the greater part of

the arms rendered unserviceable by the garrison.

Fifty-two officers and 1,838 men became prisoners of war; 65 spiked guns were captured. The fortress was left to the occupation of two Landwehr companies.

During the month of November the protection towards the west of the Weissenburg—Paris railway between Avricourt and Epernay had been undertaken by the Governments-General of Lorraine and Rheims.

When the Inspector-General of Etappen of the IIIrd Army in the middle of December gave up five battalions to that of the IInd Army, the Government-General of Rheims took over in addition the occupation of Dormans and Château Thierry, while to the etappen troops of the IIIrd Army¶ was only left the protection of the short line of rail to Paris, that of the etappen road running to the south of the capital and that of the Versailles—Chartres railway.

<sup>1</sup>st Sondershausen † On the 30th October the 1st Light Res. was relieved by 2nd Light Res. VIII VIII 4th on 22nd the 3rd Res. Drag. by 6th Bay. Chev. The latter was replaced on 2nd November by the 6th Bay. Chev. On 4th December in addition 3 officers and 115 men of  $\frac{3rd}{Breslau\ II}$  and  $\frac{12th}{4th\ Buv}$ , joined the investing troops. App. CLXXVI gives a return of the German casualties at the fortresses of Pfalzburg, Bitsch, and Longwy.

<sup>See ante, p. 116, notes † and §.
See ante, p. 119.
They still numbered 11 bartalions, 9 squadrons, and 2 batteries.</sup> 

The extensive forests, stretching between the Marne and Seine in the neighbourhood of Epernay, Montmirail, and Nogent-sur-Seine, rendered the duties of reconnoitring and watching so difficult, that strong bands were able to carry on their raids in that country, and threaten the roads leading to Paris as well as the railway.

The Inspector-General of Etappen had in consequence formed a flying column under Colonel v. Seubert, which scoured the whole country from Coulommiers as far as

Sézanne and Provins.

The Government-General of Rheims also sent frequent expeditions into the forests. On 20th December a detachment advanced from Epernay and put to flight some franctireurs

who tried to hold their ground at Mareuil-en-Brie.

At the end of December the same district had been cleared from the side of Dormans by the 1st Company IInd Reserve Rifle Battalion. This company, while levying contributions on 2nd January between Marcilly and Conflans-sur-Seine, came into collision with large forces. After losing their Company-Commander, Captain v. Basedow, Lieutenant Schellwitz held his ground for some hours in and near Marcilly. the adversary received further reinforcements and surrounded the company on different sides, the latter cut its way through to St. Quentin-le-Berger, and marched to Vitry-le-Français, where it arrived next morning.

On hearing of this action, the etappen commandant at Troyes despatched on the 7th a detachment to Conflans. This detachment, however, only came across some small parties, which made no attempt at serious resistance. In order to make a complete clearance of that district, mixed detachments were despatched towards the end of the month from Epernay, Coulommiers, and Troyes, by order of the Government-General They united on the 27th at Nogent-sur-Seine, of Rheims.

without having seen the enemy.

In the district under the jurisdiction of the Government-General of Lorraine, a band of franctireurs, several hundred strong, starting from Lamarche, attacked on the morning of the 22nd the garrison of the Fontenoy railway station, who were unable to offer much resistance, and blew up the bridge over

<sup>\* 6</sup>th Württ. Regiment, 2nd Württ. Cuy, and 1st Wurtt. Depôt Battery.

<sup>🛊 4</sup>th

<sup>†</sup> Fifty men of the Potsdam Battalion and 1st Heavy Res. Cav.

† Captain v. Basedow, who was dying, had to be left on the field with two badly-wounded riflemen. He is said to have been carried off that evening by franc-

tireurs.


\$\frac{2\text{nd and 3rd}}{\text{Brandenburg}} \text{ and } \frac{12\text{th}}{\text{Torgau}}, \text{ with some cavalry.}

\$\| \text{The Chasseurs of the Vosges already mentioned, asts p. 124, note } \| \text{L. (See Rambaux, "Le Pont de Fontenoy," p. 20, et seq.)}

\$\text{Asian and 50 men} \text{ fith} \text{.}

<sup>¶ 1</sup> Vice-Sergeant-Major and 50 men Geldern

Proceedings at Bitsch.‡



the Moselle at that place.\* A landwehr man stopped the mailtrain from Nancy before any accident could happen. soldiers travellingt by the train were rapidly assembled, and advanced upon Fontenoy, but only came across a few stragglers. Some troops which had been despatched from Toul and Nancy stated that the adversary had withdrawn rapidly in the direction of Langues.

Since the Weissenburg-Nancy railway had been opened Proceedings for traffic, the fortress of Bitsch's was only of importance so far as it barred the railway from Hagenau to Saargemund, which otherwise might have served to connect the central and northern lines. On the 4th September the garrison made a sortie with 700 to 800 men against the line Reyerswiller-Schorbach. The sortie was repulsed by the 1st Battalion 8th Bavarian Regiment.

Two days later, two battalions and half a company of fortress engineers arrived from Germersheim to reinforce the investing detachment, so that its commander, Colonel Kohlermann, had now at his disposal 4 battalions, 2 fortress batteries, a company of fortress engineers, and 28 troopers. In order to compel the surrender of the fortress by an energetic bombardment, 20 more heavy guns\*\* had been brought up. On the heights surrounding the fortress on the west, six batteries were constructed. To protect these batteries, the bulk of the infantry took post on this side, whilst a flying column was in observation to the north and east of the fortress.

\* See ante, p. 109.

IIIrd IIIrd

and 5th, 7th. and 8th 4th Bay.

As reserve in Simser Farm: HIIrd Sth Bav.; Artillery and Engineer Park were at the brick-kiln east of Hottweiler; for holding and watching the roads leading to Zwei-6th brücken, Weissenburg and Reichshoffen: 4th Bav., and four troopers.

The two landwehr companies in observation at Lemberg (see Part I, Vol. II, p. 460) had meanwhile left.

The batteries were constructed at the following points:-

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<sup>†</sup> Forty men of various regiments, under Captain Rossel, 46th Regiment.

<sup>†</sup> See sketch.
§ With regard to the proceedings before Bitsch up to 3rd September, see Part I,
Vol. I, p. 259, and Vol. II, pp. 459-460.

|| See Pradal, "Relation historique du Siège de Bitche," p. 68.

<sup>¶ 4</sup>th Bav. 8th Bav., and 1 2nd Bavarian Fort. Engineer Company.

<sup>\*\*</sup> Four 12-cm. guns were already with the investing detachment. †† The investing troops were distributed as follows on 6th September :-

On the line Reversviller—Freudenberg Farm—Susel Farm: Sth Bav.; 4th Bav.; IIIrd

No. 1 Battery with 4 12-cm. guns, north-east of Reyerswiller.

No. 2 ,, with 4 60-pr. S.B. mortars on the Bitsch—Reyerswiller road.

Nos. 3, 4, and 5 Batteries, each with 4 12-cm. guns between this road and the road to Rohrbach.

The construction of the batteries, and the transport of ammunition, were rendered very difficult by the continuous rain. The bombardment was commenced on the forenoon of 11th September, and was at first directed against the citadel. At the outset the adversary answered vigorously, but already on the 12th his fire had slackened. From this time the town became the mark for the guns; it shortly took fire at several points. The field guns opened upon a camp visible between the town and citadel. On the 14th the line of investment was pushed nearer the fortress.\*

Although to all appearance the town had sustained considerable damage by the 17th,† comparatively slight effect had been produced on the works; moreover, as the siege guns had been seriously scored by heavy use, there was little prospect of achieving any success by continuing the fire. In consequence, Colonel Kohlermann gave orders on the 18th for the siege batteries to be dismantled, and this was accomplished by the 21st.

In view of the circumstance that the surrender of the place, of which the bulk of the inhabitants had fled, could not for the present be calculated upon on the ground of want of food, the Governor-General of Alsace, Lieutenant-General Count v. Bismarck Bohlen, caused the fort to be merely observed for the present. The two battalions of the 8th Regiment, under Colonel Schrott, appointed for the purpose, went into huts near Schwangerbach and behind the Pfaffenberg.‡ The north and west sides of Bitsch were watched by patrolling companies.

The garrison, after making some minor sorties on the 29th and 30th, which were easily repulsed, remained perfectly

quiescent until the last.

At the end of October the two battalions of the 8th Bavarian Regiment, previously mentioned, were relieved by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 4th Regiment. At the end of November and end of January, an exchange between the two regiments again took place, so that at the commencement of the armistice, Colonel Kohlermann was again in front of the fortress with his two battalions.

Four 6-pr. field-guns which arrived on the 13th were manned by the Sortie Battery from Germersheim.

No. 6 Battery, with 4 12-cm. guns north of the latter road.

To man these batteries there were present the men of the 4th Battery of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th, and after the 13th September those of the 3rd Battery of the 2nd Bavarian Fortress Artillery Regiment.

The command of the siege artillery was assumed on the 12th by Major Zeller.

<sup>•</sup> The flying column was further reinforced by the  $\frac{7 \text{th}}{4 \text{th Bav}}$ .

<sup>† 130</sup> houses were reduced to ashes, 100 half-destroyed (see Dalsème, " Le Siége de Bitche, p. 57).

I The cavalry detachment also remained before the fortress. The engineer

The raids of the franctireurs in the north of France were Measures of facilitated by the Ardennes fortresses, so long as they remained protection in uninvested, as well as by the forests of the Argonne and of the France.

Ardennes.\* The troops before Mézières undertook repeated expeditions against these bands,† but without entirely exterminating them.

the north of

On the 8th October, by order of the Government-General of Rheims, a small expedition was made from Laon against St. Quentin, but it failed, as the town was strongly occupied. When, on the 21st, larger forces advanced upon St. Quentin, the place was forced to surrender by a few rounds of shell.

In consequence of the advance of the 1st Army upon Amiens, the weak etappen troops of the Meuse Army sufficed to occupy the railways leading from Soissons to Clonesse and Mitry.

After the departure of the Ist Army for the Lower Seine, its Inspector-General of Etappen, who reached Amiens on the 3rd December, occupied, besides the Amiens-Rouen railway.

some places where hospitals had been established.\*\*

When, shortly after, the adversary, by his advance towards Ham and La Fère, threatened the communications of the Germans, ## a battalion, a battery, ## and some troopers were sent on 11th December by the Government-General of Rheims to These troops having become available at that place in consequence of the arrival of strong detachments of the field army, §§ and of the departure of the French to Amiens, Colonel v. Krohn received orders to use them for a raid upon Vervins before returning to Rheims. While carrying out these instructions, he was met by superior forces, and in consequence never reached the place.

company moved on the 16th October to Germersheim, in order to proceed subsequently to Paris. The two battalions of the 4th Bavarian Regiment and the Sortie Battery found other employment within the district of the Government-General of Alsace.

<sup>\*</sup> See Part II, Vol. I, p. 252, note §, and Vol. II, p. 29, note ‡.

† See Part II, Vol. II, p. 125, et seq.

‡ On the 15th December, a large band attacked, close to Vouziers, the 4th Company Kottbus Battalion marching from Sedan, but after a short fight was repulsed upon Chestres.

<sup>§</sup> Colonel v. Kahlden with 1st and 1 2nd and 2nd, 3rd, and 5th Kottbus and 17th Drag.

<sup>||</sup> Colonel v. Kahlden, with the Frankfurt, Küstrin, and Woldenberg Battalions, 2nd. 3rd, and 5th and 1st Light Reserve

<sup>¶</sup> See Appendix No. LXXII.

At the disposal of the Inspector-General of Etappen there were only the St. Wendel Bettalion and the 6th Res. Hus.

<sup>††</sup> See Part II, Vol. II, p. 25. The losses sustained on this occasion are shown in Appendix CLXXIV.

<sup>###</sup> Frankfurt-am-Oder Battalion and Heavy Reserve

<sup>§§</sup> See Part II, Vol. II, p. 110.

The headquarters of the 1st Army having, at the end of December, entrusted to field troops the duty of protecting the Rouen—Amiens railway,\* there only remained for the Inspector-General of Etappen, who had proceeded to Chantilly on the 2nd January, to occupy the railways leading from Creil to Amiens and Beauvais.

With the fall of Mézières, and after Rocroy had been taken, the traffic on that railway could only be threatened from Givet

and Longwy.

Although the small fortress of Givet undoubtedly served as a rallying point for the franctireurs of that neighbourhood, still an active service of patrols from the garrisons of Mézières and Rocroy sufficed to hold them in check. A strong band, which showed itself to the north-east of Mézières, was on the 15th January dispersed by a half companys after a short skirmish

near Gespunsart.

The security of the easternmost part of the line of communications of the 1st and Meuse Armies was ensured from the beginning of December by troops belonging to the Government of Metz. After the departure of those parts of the VIIth Corps still left at Metz, the Governor, Lieutenant-General v. Löwenfeld, had received instructions from the Royal Headquarters on the 27th November to occupy Metz, Thionville, and the Metz-Saarbrücken railway with 15 battalions, 4 squadrons, and 3 batteries, and to defeat the enterprises made by the enemy from Longwy.

Siege of Longwy.

The fortress of Longwy, although only eight miles distant from the Thionville-Mézières railway, required the more attention as its garrison was very active.

The fortress, numbering some 4,000 inhabitants, consists of an open lower town, situated at the confluence of the Côte

<sup>\*</sup> See Part II, Vol. II, p. 120, note §.
† See Part II, Vol. II, p. 233, note \*.
‡ Four of the landwehr battalions, recently assigned to the 1st Army, did not arrive until the second half of January, and had to be employed chiefly as garrisons for Peronne and Amicus (see Part II, Vol. II, p. 280, notes § and \*\*).

<sup>§ 1 8</sup>th Küstrin

<sup>||</sup> The following were at first placed under General v. Löwenfeld's orders : 72nd Regiment (of which two battalions were at Thionville, one at Saarlouis) besides the Görlitz, Posen, Neustudt-a-W., Schrimm, Neisse, Beuthen, Kosten, Neutomysl, Rawicz, O-trowo, Rosenberg, and Oppeln Battalions, the 2nd Heavy Re-erre Cavalry Regiment, and the combined Artillery Division XIth Army Corps (1st, 2nd, and 3rd Light Res. Batteries).

Besides these there were at Metz 9 Fortress Artillery and 1 Fortress Pioneer Companies; at Thionville, 1 Fortress Artillery, and 1 Fortress Pioneer Companies.

General v. Löwenfeld occupied Metz with 84 battalions, 2 squadrons and 2 battalions, Thionville with 2 battalions, and the Metz-Saarbrücken railway with

<sup>11</sup> battalions. Towards Longwy he pushed 3 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 1 battery.

At the end of December and beginning of January 8 depôt battalions were assigned to the Government, whilst the 72nd Regument passed to the VIIth Army Corps, and the Neisse, Beuthen, and Rosenberg Battalions to the Government-General of Lorraine (see Part II, Vol. II, p. 97, note ¶, and ante, p. 120, note ¶).

¶ See sketch.

1

Siege of Longwy.¶ Rouge brook with the Chiers, and the fortified upper town. This latter is built on the right bank of the river at the northeast extremity of a plateau, which falls in steep slopes to the valley some 300 or 400 feet below it. The other bank rises again quickly to the same height, and overlooks the town and fortress. The wooded nature of the country permits of an approach from several sides under cover. Besides the high roads coming from Luxemburg, Verdun, and Metz, which meet at the fortress, there are several other good approacher. In the valley itself runs the railway from Longuvon to Arlon.

The works of fortification were constructed towards the end of the 17th century by Vauban on his "First System," and form a hexagon with ravelins. Before the north-east front lies a hornwork with a lunette, whilst on the south there is but one advanced lunette. The bomb-proof buildings had been recently augmented and strengthened.\* The garrison numbered some 4,000 men,† including the Garde Nationale Sédentaire; among them were a number of line troops and fugitives from Sedan. The armament consisted of 131 guns. The fortress was adequately provisioned. Its Commandant, Lieutenant-Colonel Mussaroli, had expelled from the town all persons incapable of work, and declared his intention to defend the fortress to the last.

Since the end of August, several expeditions had been made by the garrison against part of the troops investing Metz and Thionville. On the morning of the 21st September, a detachment consisting of one company and a division of dragoons, which had marched to Arrancy for requisition purposes, was surprised by a hostile detachment of 450 men coming from Longwy. The company having rallied, it succeeded in repulsing the enemy.

After the middle of November, Longwy was observed by a mixed detachment of the 14th Division. which occupied the line Villers-la-Montagne-Tellancourt. In the middle of December, by orders from the Royal Headquarters, this detachment was relieved by troops of the Government of Metz.\*\*

After some slight collisions in the earlier days, the garrison, on the morning of the 27th December, made a sortic in force

<sup>\*</sup> See Massaroli, "La Défense de Longwy devant le Conseil d'Enquête et l'opinion publique." † Massaroli estimates the garrison exclusive of Garde Nationale at 1,800 men.

<sup>12</sup>th 35 and 12th Drag.

§ See also Part II, Vol. II, p. 27.

See Part II, Vol. II, p. 30, notes \* and 1.

<sup>¶</sup> See ante, p. 132. 1st and 2nd • Fus. Rosenberg and Oppeln Battalions, 2nd Heavy Res. Cav. and 3rd Light Res., under Major Count v. Schmettow.

against the left flank of the Prussian outpost position. Favoured by the darkness, the adversary penetrated into Tellancourt, but was again driven out by the two companies there present, after about an hour's fighting. A hostile detachment which had proceeded towards Frênois-la-Montague had been gallantly

repulsed at the entrance to the village.

A reconnaissance ordered by the Royal Headquarters having led to the belief that a bombardment would probably result in the early fall of the fortress, orders were issued on the 30th for the siege to be at once commenced. For this purpose, some more troops, with a siege park to be brought up from Montmedy and Thionville, were assigned to the Government of Metz. Upon the arrival of these reinforcements, the strength of the detachment before Longwy amounted to 10½ battalions, 2 squadrons, 2 batteries, 7 fortress artillery, and 4½ fortress pioneer companies.† The siege park numbered 86 guns.

His Majesty the King appointed Colonel v. Krenski, hitherto Chief of the General Staff of the XIIIth Corps to be commander of the troops before Longwy; this officer arrived at

Longuyon on 9th January.

After making a preliminary reconnaissance, he resolved to direct the main attack against Bastions V and VI, whilst they were to be taken in flank and reverse from the heights at Mexy and the Mont du Chat. The artillery siege park was formed at Cons Lagrandville, to which place the railway from Longuyon was restored on the 15th.‡ For the service of the right wing, there was also an auxiliary park at Villers-la-Montagne. Engineer depôts were formed at Villers-la-Chèvre and Villers-la-Montagne.

On 13th January the adversary, who had probably heard of the German preparations, made a sortic towards Villers-la-Chèvre, but was speedily repulsed by two companies posted there, and by a battery brought up from Tellancourt.

After the troops had been gradually pushed up nearer to the fortress, during which some slight collisions occurred with



the enemy on the 14th at Rehon and Mexy,\* the line of investment on the north was likewise closed on the 17th.‡

The batteries were commenced on the evening of the 16th under very unfavourable conditions of ground and weather. On the 17th the field batteries opened fire on the fortress, thereby distracting the adversary's attention. The outposts were pushed forward to within 1,000 paces of the works.

By the evening of the 24th twelve batteries and two mitrailleuse emplacements were constructed, of which, however, Batteries Nos. 10, 11, and 12 never opened fire.; No. 1 Battery commenced firing on the 19th; Batteries Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 followed by the 21st; No. 7 and 8 on the 22nd; No. 9 Battery early on the 24th.

On the afternoon of the 20th a shelter-trench was constructed in advance of the batteries of the left wing, and on the succeding nights was widened and extended so as to form the 1st parallel.

In consequence of a dense fog, only a weak cannonade had

```
The following took part: 1st, 2nd, and 3rd and 1st and 2nd
                                                             Ostrowo
                                       Schrimm
    † The position after the arrival of the last troops on 18th January was divided
into the three following sections:
1. Left Section (west of the Luxemburg—Longwy road and of the Lower Chiere): Köslin, Münster, and Oppeln Battalions, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th, 8rd and 4th Neutomys!
                                                              Glatz
2nd Hesv. Cav. Regt., and Srd Light Res.
   2. Central Section (from the Chiers to the Mets-Longwy road inclusive):
                                                                       lst
Schrimm, Stettin, Rawicz, and Ostrowo Battalions, 2nd Heav. Res. Cav., and
1st Light Res.
     XI
8. Right Section (from the Metz-Longwy road to the Luxemburg-Longwy road inclusive): Anklam and Schivelbein Battalions.
    The following places were occupied in first line: - Warnimont, Cosnes, Lexy,
Rehon, Mexy, Herserange, Longlaville, and Mont St. Martin. The headquarters of
the Investing Corps were at Cons Lagrandville.

‡ Right wing (flank) attack: Captain Weinberger.
      No. 1 Battery, with 8 15-cm. and 8 12-cm. guns north of Mexy.
   Left flank (main) attack: Major Hein.
      No. 8 Battery, with 4 15-cm. guns east of Les Maragoles.
                          " 412-cm. "
                         " 4
                                  "
        "
                         " 4
        ,,
                  "
                                  "
                                         32
                                              on the Romain heights.
        "
                          99
                                         "
                         " 4 15-cm. "
        "
                  27
                          ,, 4 22-cm. mortars—in the parallel south of Romain Farm.
        " 10
                  ,,
                                            north of Pulventeux Farm.
                          99
        ,, 11
                              4 27-cm. ,,
                          ,,
                  99
    ", 12 ", 4 12-cm. guns—on the Mont du Chat.
Two emplacements, each armed with 2 mitrailleuses, at first in the neighbour-
hood of Nos. 4 and 7 Batteries (M1 and M2), but after the 24th in the parallel (M8
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Batteries Nos. 9, 10, 11, and 12 were not commenced until later. The construction of the latter presented great difficulties, owing to their position in the dense

Major Wolf directed the artillery attack, Colonel Schott the engineer works.

wood, and the steepness of the hill side.

been maintained on the 20th, but next day the artillery struggle commenced. The enemy directed a heavy and successful fire at first against the batteries of the right flank, afterwards also against those of the main attack, but especially against Nos. 1 and 6 Batteries. On the 22nd, also, he directed his guns chiefly upon the batteries of the right flank which were doing him much damage, but his fire shortly relaxed under the increasing cross-fire of the attacking batteries. On the evening of the 23rd an extensive conflagration broke out in the fortress. The next day the enemy answered in a desultory fashion; towards evening he sent in a parlementaire and commenced negotiations.

In consequence, the firing ceased at 7.30, and that same evening a capitulation was concluded. The surrender of the fortress took place on the 25th, and next day the besieging

troops made their entry.

The town had suffered comparatively little; much more effective had been the cannonade from the heavy artillery upon the works of the fortress and the enemy's artillery. Part of the garrison having succeeded in escaping across the Belgian frontier, which was quite close, only 2,000 prisoners fell into the hands of the Germans. Of material captured, there were some 130 guns, mostly spiked, 2,600 stand of arms, as also large supplies of ammunition and food.

The losses of the siege detachment amounted to 3 officers

and 57 men.\*

Colonel v. Krenski left on the 27th January with the bulk of his troopst for Commercy, in order to be afterwards employed before Langres.<sup>‡</sup> The siege train of 67 guns followed to the same place, one battalion remained as garrison at Longwy; two battalions passed under the orders of the Government-General of Rheims,§ who was thereby enabled to occupy in greater strength the northern line of railway.

See Appendix CLXXVI. According to Massaroli the French losses amounted to 157 men.

<sup>†</sup> With 6 battalions, 2 squadrons, 2 batteries, 6 fortress artillery and 3 fortress pioneer companies.

1st and 2nd were replaced by 3rd and 4th 2nd Heav. Res. Cav.

See ante, p. 84. Colonel v. Krenski was for a time placed, on 30th January, under the Government-General of Lorraine.

<sup>§</sup> The Anklam and Glatz Battalions, which had been already assigned to the Government-General. The rest of the siege troops were otherwise employed by the Metz Government.

## ADMINISTRATION OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORY.

The onward march of the German armies during November and at the commencement of December had necessitated the creation of a fourth Government-General,\* and, in consequence, on the 16th of December, Lieutenant-General v. Fabrice, Saxon Minister of War, was appointed Governor-General at Versailles. The Departments of Somme, Seine Inférieure, Eure,† Oise, Seine and Oise,‡ Eure and Loir, Loir and Cher,§ and Loiret, were placed under his orders.

In accordance with the instructions¶ for carrying out the administration, the Governors-General had under their orders Civil Commissaries,\*\* who on their part were to make use of the administrative authorities of their districts. This led, however, to great difficulties, as the majority of the French Government officials refused to serve under German direction. The municipal officials were much more willing, and, rightly appreciating the true interests of the country, carried out their

duties, even under the most trying conditions.

In these circumstances a large number of German officials had to be summoned to France, who were employed partly as Préfets and Sous-préfets, and partly as assistants to the different heads of departments. The authority of these gentlemen, however, was not by any means recognised generally by the population, and, in most cases, their orders were only obeyed when there was a military force to back them. But in consequence of the few troops available for these purposes, this was frequently impossible. In many departments the difficulties were increased by the circumstance that the French officials endeavoured to continue their work without reference to German control. Hence the German administrative authorities were in many instances prevented from carrying their well-meaning intentions into effect with regard to the population.

The Governments-General made every effort to revive trade and industry. Where the troops had not already restored the

† So much of it as lies on the right bank of the Seine. ‡ It hitherto belonged to the Government-General of Rheims

So much of it as lies on the right bank of the Loire.

No troops were assigned to the Government-General of Versailles, but the field troops were instructed to comply with any requisitions which might be made.

Appendix CLXXVII contains the composition of the Staffs of the Governments-General at the end of January, 1871. As regards the first established Governments-General (see Part I, Vol. II, p. 468, and Part II, Vol. I, p. 59, and also Appendix LXVI). Map No. 38 shows the boundaries of the Governments-General.

The following were appointed Civil Commissaries: for the Government-General of Alsace, Government-President v. Kühlwetter; for the Government-General of Lorraine, Government-Vice-President Count v. Villers; for the Government-General of Rheims, Count v. Tauffkirchen, who was relieved at the beginning of January, 1871. and Landrath Prince Karl Hohenlohe; for the Government-General of Versailles, the Saxon Financial Councillor v. Nostitz-Wallwitz.

railways, canals, and roads, their repair was taken in hand, and their use, so far as military interests permitted, thrown open to the public. A postal service was established.\*

On the other hand, the occupied country had to be laid under contribution for the various necessities of the German

Armv.

As the want of officials often rendered it impossible to levy the indirect taxes, these were replaced, especially at an early period, by a capitation tax, the amount of which was fixed on the basis of the revenues of 1869. Each department had, moreover, to contribute 1,000,000 francs as compensation for the losses sustained by the capture of German merchantmen, and the expulsion of German subjects from France. It was frequently necessary to enforce these contributions by detachments of troops.

With a view to reverting to a state of order, a strict administration of justice and police was especially necessary; the more so as generally throughout the country the French judges had, at the instigation of the Government of National Defence,

closed their courts.

In the Government-General of Alsace, permanent military tribunals were established to adjudicate in the case of offences committed by the inhabitants against one another, and, in order that these tribunals might be regularly constituted, Government Procureurs were summoned from Germany. In the other Governments-General the judgments for such offences were given by the Préfets whenever application was made to them. For the Government-General of Lorraine a special court of justice was established at Nancy, upon which devolved the prosecution of the inhabitants for crimes, misdemeanours, and offences committed against the Germans.

Very active measures had to be adopted for the punishment of offences perpetrated against the German military operations, or upon individual members of the army. The accused were directed to be tried by military tribunals. More often than not these persons could not be discovered, and it then became unavoidable to throw the responsibility upon the communes in which the offences had been committed. This was the only way of preventing the population from taking an active part

in the war.

The conscription ordered by the French Government had to be resisted by preparing lists and keeping a sharp watch over those persons who were eligible as soldiers. This was especially necessary in the districts of Alsace bordering upon Switzerland

Sanitary police measures had to be adopted, particularly against small-pox and cattle disease.



<sup>•</sup> German post-offices had existed in the Government-General of Alsace since the beginning of September.

The numerous difficulties which the Governments-General encountered in carrying out their duties diminished directly the armistice was arranged. The population then returned to their ordinary work, and, moreover, a large number of troops were rendered available for enforcing the necessary obedience.

## OCCURRENCES IN THE LITTORAL PROVINCES AFTER THE MIDDLE OF NOVEMBER, 1870.\*

Although upon the approach of winter the coast provinces did not appear to be seriously threatened, General Vogel v. Falckenstein, in view of occasional cruises of the French fleet in the North Sea,† had ordered about the middle of November a brigade of all arms to hold itself in readiness for the protection of Hamburg, and another for the protection of Bremen. These brigades were so placed as to be concentrated if necessary in thirty-six hours. Measures for watching and protection were likewise resumed.

During December also a hostile fleet cruised in the North Sea, and as late as the 23rd of the same month some men-of-war

showed off the mouth of the Elbe.

The German ironclad squadron went for the winter into Wilhelmshaven, in order to undergo necessary repairs in dock.

Meanwhile the garrison and depôt troops, amid tempestuous weather, cold and snow, continued the difficult duties of watching the coast, and, in conjunction with the newly formed garrison battalions and depôt squadrons, guarded some 60,000 prisoners of war.\*\* In proportion, as the approach of winter lessened the danger of a landing, and the want of troops increased in the theatre of war, the force on the coasts was gradually reduced.

· See Sketch 7 in Part I.

‡ 6 battalions, 4 squadrons, 4 batteries and 1 pioneer company, under Lucut. General Wittich.

§ 6 battalions, 4 squadrons, 10 guns, and 1 pioneer company, under Lieut.-General v. Alvensleben.

|| On the abolition at the end of August of the commands of the field troops in the littoral districts, all the troops left in the districts of the Ist, IInd, IXth, and Xth Army Corps (see Part I, Vol. II, p. 425), passed under the direct orders of the Governor-General of the Littoral Provinces.

¶ See Part I, Vol. II, p. 117 et seq.

- . As regards the new formations and the guarding of the prisoners, see subsequent narrative.
- †† From the beginning of November until the commencement of the armistice, the following troops were transferred from the littoral provinces to France: -
  - 2 combined landwehr regiments (Nos. 22/62 and 23/63). 9 landwehr battalions (of the 13th, 41st, 42nd, 44th, and 49th Regiments).
  - 3 reserve landwehr battalions (Nos. 33, 34, and 35).

1 reserve cavalry regiment (1st Res. Hussars)

8 depôt battalions (3rd, 5th, 9th, 14th, 17th, 25th, 85th, and 92nd Regiments). 13 fortress artillery companies (9 of 1st Regt., 2 of 2nd, and 2 of 9th Regt.)

2 fortiess pioneer companies (1 of 1st, and 1 of 1Xth Army Corps).

- 1 torpedo detachment. In the middle of November, in addition to a considerable number of companies of fortress artillory and pioneers, there were further:

  8 field and 20 unmobilized landwehr battalions.
  - 38 depôt battalions and 5 depôt rifle companies.

30 depôt and reserve squadrons. 12 depôt batteries.

<sup>†</sup> See Part II, Vol 1, p. 285. A hostile flotilla of eleven vessels appeared between the 6th and 16th November between Heligo and and Borkum.

This led to numerous changes in the distribution of the troops left in the districts of the Ist, IInd, IXth, and Xth Army Corps.

The corvette "Augusta," which had been commissioned during the war, was despatched from Kiel by the Admiralty on the 14th December in order to prevent as much as possible

the shipment of arms from America to France.

The vessel cruised until the beginning of January off Brest, and then proceeded to the mouth of the Gironde, where Captain Weickhmann captured two merchantmen and a Government steam transport laden with provisions for the French Army. The "Augusta" afterwards, proceeded to Vigo harbour, and remained there until the armistice.1

Of the vessels abroad at the commencement of hostilities, the corvettes "Hertha" and "Medusa" remained in Eastern Asia waters, without coming into collision with the enemy, The corvette "Arcona" cruised until the beginning of January near the Azores, and afterwards proceeded for repairs to Lisbon, where she remained until the conclusion of peace.

The gunboat "Meteor," I in accordance with orders, lay until

the close of the war in Havana harbour.

The armistice brought temporary rest also to the littoral provinces and their garrisons.

With regard to the forces at disposal in the middle of February, see subsequent narrative.

<sup>\*</sup> See Appnedix IV, and Part II, Vol. I, p. 286.

<sup>†</sup> The two sailing ships were sent to Germany, the steamer was sunk.

† A French flotilla, consisting of two ironclad frigates and a despatch boat, lay off Vigo harbour, and prevented the German ship from putting to sea.

§ See Appendix IV.

The long time occupied in diplomatic negotiations in respect to neutralising the East Asian waters, prevented any operations in this theatre of war.

¶ See Part II, Vol. I, p. 286.

GENERAL RETROSPECT OF THE WAR FROM THE BEGINNING OF SEPTEMBER, 1870, TO THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES.\*

THE advance to Paris had been interrupted by the operations against Marshal MacMahon, but only for eight days. Immediately after the decisive action had been fought at Sedan on the 1st September, the march was resumed, and on the 19th of the month the French capital was invested on all

One half of the German forces had to be left before Metz, and only 150,000 men held at first the 50 miles of girdle round Paris and her immense resources. After the rapid and victorious course of events of the first months, the two fractions of the German army found themselves constrained to a long and troublesome detention before these two cities.

The French nation, with ardent patriotism, had resolved to fight to the bitter end. By command of the French Government, the officials refused to co-operate with the German authorities in regulating the supply of the troops. The population, urban and rural, fled from their homes or took up arms for irregular warfare. Railways and roads were broken up, and very costly works destroyed, often when there was no necessity to do so. On their arrival before Paris, the Germans found the whole of the immediate neighbourhood completely ruined and pillaged.

This undoubtedly rendered the invasion much more difficult,

but also entailed greater hardships on the country itself.

The armies of the Empire had disappeared from the theatre of war, but, under the pressure of a powerful and unscrupulous Dictator, fresh armies were forming in all the unoccupied districts of France. To keep them at a distance was the chief task of the supreme German authorities. The only means at first available for this purpose must come from the line of investment itself. Attempts at relief at one time threatened from the south, at another from the north, whilst, to meet sorties, first one part of the thin investing line, and then the other, had to be reinforced.

The tactics of the troops when again taking the field assumed a change of character. The rawness of the season forced the troops to be placed under shelter, at all events at night. Hence, we find both sides occupying wider cantonments and attacking on a broad front, while the difficulty of exercising unity of command and the more independent action of the subordinate commanders tell in favour of the better trained and hitherto victorious army. The superiority of the German artillery became daily more manifest. On the other hand, the action of the cavalry was much circumscribed by the character of the ground and the bad weather. The shortness of the days required that the engagement be pressed to a speedy decision. Most of the actions were decided by a turning movement, whilst the danger of seeing the weakened centre pierced was removed, owing to the absence of skill of the adversary and the little intrinsic value of his hastily gathered forces. It was almost only in positions prepared for defence that they were capable of a serious and generally lasting resistance.

By the beginning of October the Republic had succeeded in assembling 60,000 men on the Loire. Meanwhile, however, the army before Paris had also been reinforced by two army corps, which had hitherto been employed in guarding and transporting the numerous prisoners captured at Sedan. With the troops that could be best spared from Paris, General v. d. Tann hastened to meet the advancing enemy, defeated him on the 10th October at Artenay, threw him back beyond the Loire,

and occupied Orléans.

But before the month had expired, he found himself again opposed by a French army far superior to his own. Weakened by having to detach part of his troops to watch hostile forces on the Eure and Lower Seine, General v. d. Tann was forced at Coulmiers on the 9th November to retire upon St. Péravy. The French, however, refrained from any further attack, and contented themselves with occupying an extensive position covering Orléans.

On the eastern theatre of war, General v. Werder, after the fall of Strassburg on 27th September, moved towards the Saône valley, threw back on Besançon the troops under General Cambriels which opposed his march, and occupied Dijon. In Alsace, Schlettstadt and Neu-Breisach were captured, while Belfort was

provisionally invested.

Meantime the final blow had been struck at Metz, where Marshal Bazaine had awaited the outcome of political events in France. The attempt at relief by a whole army from without had been as abortive of result as the efforts from within to pierce the girdle of investment. On 29th October Prince Frederic Charles planted his colours on the ramparts of the fortress, which for seventy days had kept immovable before it a considerable part of the German forces. It only now became possible to employ the 1st Army to secure the investment of Paris on the north, and the IInd Army for the same purpose on the south.

The duties of guarding 173,000 prisoners, and the various expeditions against smaller fortresses, occupied so many men, that General v. Manteuffel had at first but a small force at his disposal. Nevertheless, he defeated General Farre at Amiens on the 27th November, entered Rouen eight days later, and drove

back General Briand to the sea coast.

Meanwhile, Prince Frederic Charles appeared before Orléans. He was subsequently joined also by the detachment of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg, which had dispersed some hostile bodies showing in the west.

On the French side, Gambetta, Minister of War, assumed the conduct of the military operations. He desired to advance with the assembled numbers upon Paris by way of Fontainebleau, give the hand to a sortic made at the same time by the garrison of the place, and thereby restore the connection between the capital and the provinces. The movement commenced on the 28th November from the right wing, but the Xth Corps, which was reinforced in good time, repulsed at Beaune-la-Rolande all the attacks of the far superior forces of the enemy.

On 2nd December a fresh attempt was made to press forward with the French left wing, but this also was defeated by the troops on the line Loigny—Poupry. On the 3rd, Prince Frederic Charles moved forward with all his forces concentrically to the attack. After two days' fighting the French army was driven from all its positions with a loss of 20,000 men, and was separated into two fractions. Orléans was once more

occupied.

In order to establish connection with the army of the Loire, General Ducrot had simultaneously with its advance made a well-planned but timely observed sortic against the east side of the line of investment. But this attempt failed before the resistance of the Germans at Villiers on the 2nd December.

So many successes of the German arms occurring within the space of a few days could not fail to lessen considerably the adversary's hope of relieving the capital. But, in consequence of the abundant resources, of the country, the undaunted Dictator succeeded in a short time in forming a fresh army out of each of the fractions beaten at Orléans. With the western army General Chanzy, supported on the Forest of Marchenoir, at once passed to the attack. For four days the Grand Duke held his own unsupported. When the IInd Army afterwards moved up from Orléans, the enemy was thrown back across the Loir, and the Government Delegation fled from Tours to Bordeaux. The other army, under General Bourbaki, remained for the time motionless at Bourges.

The German supreme authorities now deemed it necessary to grant some repose to the field troops extending from the Moselle to the Loire and even to the sea. The commanders were instructed to allow any fresh offensive movements made for the relief of Paris to approach their lines and then to take the

offensive against them.

But General Faidherbe had already led forward the North Army, which had been meanwhile reinforced. General v. Manteuffel, hastening forward with reinforcements from Rouen, succeeded, however, on the 23rd December in wresting from the adversary on the Hallue the villages occupied in front line. Next day the French commenced to retreat. On the 3rd January the French General made an attack on Bapaume, but was unable to prevent the fall of the fortress of Péronne, which had been meanwhile invested.

The Paris Army had, during this period, with the expenditure

of considerable forces, made a fruitless sortie with the object of capturing the German position at Le Bourget, which was causing them much annoyance. Ultimately, by pushing forward earthworks and arming them with heavy artillery, they endeavoured to break gradually the enemy's chain of outposts. Mount Avron, more particularly, formed a wedge driven into the line of investment.

The Germans, on their part, had the greatest difficulty in bringing up from home territory not only the daily supplies for hundreds of thousands of men, but the immense stores of material necessary for the attack of a fortress like Paris. The means held in readiness up to that time were, however, sufficient to force the adversary after two days' bombardment to evacuate the Avron on the 29th.

A week later, on the 5th January, the bombardment of the south front was commenced, and the outlying forts reduced to silence.

Before these events, the concentration of very considerable forces on the Sarthe had not escaped the German supreme authorities. This and the restlessness of the adversary on the Upper Loire led to the belief that General Chanzy and General Bourbaki contemplated advancing simultaneously upon Paris by way of Chartres and Montargis respectively; as was in fact originally the intention. It was, therefore, resolved to take the offensive against the former with the IInd Army, and to ward off the latter for the moment with the IInd and VIIth Corps.

The time of year and the nature of the ground offered the greatest difficulties to the advance upon Le Mans. The neighbourhood of this place was, however, reached on the 10th January after continuous fighting; and, after a three days' battle, the enemy's army was driven behind the Mayenne.

Meanwhile the French authorities, after failing so often in their enterprises, had resolved to move against the communications of the German Army.

Ere long the hostile forces gathered together in greater numbers in front of General v. Werder, but it was not until the 5th January, in an action near Vesoul, that prisoners had been made from the various corps of the 1st Army of the Loire, showing for certain that this latter force had been moved by rail from Bourges to the Doubs. The two Corps which had been concentrated for observation in the neighbourhood of Montargis and Auxerre, under General v. Manteuffel, were ordered at once to march in that direction, but General v. Werder had at first to rely on his own strength to protect the siege of Belfort against upwards of 100,000 men. For three whole days he fought in the position on the Lisaine against the greatly superior force of the enemy, until the latter, on the 17th, abandoned all hope of victory and retired upon Besancon. Not only were the German communications secured, but General v. Manteuffel had now arrived and severed those of the enemy.

During the whole of this period the population of Paris, whose only means of communication with the outer world had been by balloon, had resolutely borne the evils of an investment, in the hope of seeing themselves speedily relieved by the numerous armies of the provinces. To their privations, which increased daily, were now to be added the terrors of a bombardment.

Against their better judgment the military commanders, on the 19th January, were forced to undertake a final great sortie, but the Vth Army Corps, on the German side, held its position against all the masses advancing from Mont Valérien. On the same day, at St. Quentin, a renewed attempt by General Faidherbe ended in failure. On the 21st January the bombardment of the north front of Paris also commenced with extreme activity.

Under the pressure of such circumstances the Government in Paris found itself ultimately compelled, on the 23rd January, to enter into negotiations. A provisional armistice was granted to it, but the south-east departments were excluded from its

provisions.

In this region General v. Manteuffel had already reduced the 1st Army of the Loire to the most critical condition. A third French army disappeared from the theatre of war on the 1st February, by passing over into neutral territory; a fourth had laid down its arms only a few days before in Paris, but remained interned in the capital until the conclusion of peace. Belfort, pressed by sorest need, opened its gates by order of the French Government.

THE ARMISTICE AND THE PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE.

THE EXECUTION OF THE ARMISTICE, AND THE RESULTING DISPOSITIONS OF THE OPPOSED ARMIES.\*

The Convention of the 28th January, 1871,† had been concluded with the members of the Government of the National Defence present at Paris; the Delegation sitting at Bordeaux, charged hitherto with conducting the war in the provinces, had at first been no party to that agreement.

However much the bulk of the French people were inclined for peace, and were convinced of the uselessness of any further resistance, it was still questionable whether the war party would acknowledge the armistice and whether the national representatives, to be subsequently elected, would ratify the conditions

of peace imposed by the conqueror.

The military part of the agreement was carried out in a comparatively short space of time. The line of demarcation fixed therein between the opposed forces ran from the mouth of the Scine southward to the Sarthe, which river it reached between Angers and Le Mans. From this point, turning towards the Loire, it crossed this river close above Saumur, passed round that part of the Indre-et-Loir Department situated south of the river, and then led, chiefly in an easterly direction, by way of Vierzon, as far as the frontier of the Côte d'Or Department. The two northernmost departments of France, as also the peninsula of Le Hâvre, had special lines of demarcation. The belligerents on both sides had to withdraw their troops, inclusive of the outposts, to a distance of ten kilomètres from the line of demarcation. The fortresses still remaining in French hands—Paris, Givet and Langres—were also surrounded with a neutral zone of corresponding breadth.

At Paris, the occupation of the territory and forts assigned by the convention to the Germans was carried out without any

special difficulties.

On 29th January the troops advanced to the neutral zone. To the HIrd Army was assigned the ground on the left banks of the Marne and Seine, including the bridges at Charenton and Neuilly, as well as the road leading from the latter place to Bezons; to the Meuse Army were appropriated the right banks of the Marne and Seine, and the north part of the Gennevilliers peninsula.

The surrender of the fortresses was arranged as follows:--

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1t Paris.

<sup>\*</sup> See Plan No. 39.

† See Part II, Vol. II, p. 390, and the text of the Convention in Appendix CLVI.

The Vth Army Corps occupied Mont Valérien; the XIth, Fort d'Issy; the Hnd Bavarian, Forts de Vanves and de Montrouge; the VIth, the redoubt Les Hautes Bruyères and Forts de Bicêtre and d'Ivry; the 1st Bavarian, Fort de Charenton; the Württemberg Field Division, the de Gravelle and de la Faisanderie redoubts; the XIIth, the Forts de Nogent, de Rosny, de Noisy, and de Romainville; the Guard Corps, the Forts d'Aubervilliers and de l'Est; the IVth, the town of St. Denis with the Double Couronne du Nord, Fort de la Briche, and the north part of the Gennevilliers peninsula; lastly, the Guard Landwehr Division, the Neuilly bridge.\* The arming of the forts against the city enceinte was at once commenced.

The outposts advanced as far as the line of demarcation. For the purpose of controlling the traffic, examining detachments were posted on the roads opened to the public by virtue of the Convention.

In order to prevent a famine in the city and to satisfy the most pressing wants of the population until the arrival of French convoys of provisions, the supplies which could be spared from the German magazines were placed at the disposal of the Paris authorities.‡ In order to permit of the capital being provisioned with the least possible delay, all the Commanders-in-Chief, the Governors-General, and the Inspectors-General of Etappen received instructions to put no impediment in the way of repairing the railways and other communications, and to cause the torpedoes to be removed from the rivers.

A special Convention concluded on the 30th January permitted to the French the joint use with the Germans of the lines Dieppe-Rouen-Amiens-Creil-Paris. Vierzon-Orléans -Paris, and Nevers-Montargis-Moret-Paris. \ Telegraphic communication was also regulated by an agreement on the 2nd February; lastly, permission was given to the inhabitants to bring in fuel from the neighbourhood, and to repair the aqueducts which had been much damaged during the siege.

In spite of these measures, it was not until the middle of February that the distress prevailing in the capital was entirely

The German prisoners in Paris were handed over to the 1st Bavarian Army Corps on the 31st January; the French arms and material of war in Forts d'Ivry, de Bicêtre, d'Aubervilliers, and de Romainville on and after the 6th February. This latter operation was a very slow one, and was not terminated in the main until the 18th February. The unserviceable iron guns

See Part II, Vol. II, p. 390.

<sup>\*</sup> A change took place the next day, in that the Württemberg Field Division also took over the occupation of Fort de Nogent.

See sketch, and Appendix CLVI. Passage was only permitted to those who were provided with a pass furnished by the French authorities and countersigned by the Gorman.

<sup>†</sup> They were only used to a very small extent. (See subsequent narrative.) On the 3rd February the first French couvey of provisions reached Paris. Leter on some other lines were added. (See subsequent narrative.)

were destroyed; all the rest, except some of the bronze guns mounted in the forts,\* were sent to Germany.

The payment of the war contribution of 200,000,000 francs imposed on Paris took place on 12th February. A mixed commission was appointed to regulate all matters of detail. French gendarmes were to perform the police duties in the neutral zone. No serious disputes occurred between the people and the German troops, nor did anything happen to disturb the peace during the whole duration of the armistice.

On the other hand, numerous obstacles interfered with the

carrying out of the Convention in the Departments.

On the 29th January General v. Goeben had, on receipt of the news of the impending armistice, ordered the troops of the Ist Army in the Somme district to advance closer up to the line of French fortresses, and also to occupy Dieppe. Meanwhile, the text of the Convention reached Amiens, and had been communicated to General Faidherbe, with inquiry at the same time if he was disposed to submit to the conditions; if so, the prospect was held out that the German troops on the further side of the line of demarcation would be at once withdrawn. The French officers sent to negotiate recognised the armistice generally, but were without instructions in regard to the evacuation of Abbeville and some other places. TIn consequence, those places in regard to which doubt prevailed, were not for the present occupied, where they happened to be in French hands. It was not until the 1st February that the Germans entered Dieppe, and on the 6th Abbeville.

The carrying out of the armistice met with greater difficul-

ties on the Lower Scine.

The Ist

On the left bank of the river, the occupation of the district assigned to the German troops was on the whole completed without incident. Only the pickets posted on the Seine at Aizier, and, on the right bank, the garrison of Caudebec were fired at by French war vessels on the 30th. A small detachment advancing against Lillebonne was fired upon from the place. That same day Generals Dargent and Loysels proposed a meeting of plenipotentiaries in order to determine a line of demarcation. But as it appeared that both generals were without sufficient instructions, and that they were endeavouring to protract the pourparlers, the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin informed them that the negotiations on the basis of the Convention must commence at once, and, if it were not

\* Abbeville paid no special indemnity. The State property there was allowed to be removed.

<sup>\*</sup> At the commencement, 502; after evacuation of the south and west fronts, 46 guns.

<sup>†</sup> Gambetta had, it is true, accepted the armistice, but, not yet knowing the conditions in detail, he had merely forbidden the continuance of operations, without providing the Generals with more precise orders. (See ante, page , and Appendix CLXVIII.)

<sup>§</sup> See Part II, Vol. II, p. 282, et seq.

recognised, hostilities would be at once resumed. In these circumstances, he deferred the disbandment of the XIIIth Corps, ordered by the Royal Headquarters, and also the return

of the 22nd Division to the XIth Army Corps.\*

A resumption of hostilities was, however, no longer necessary, as Jules Favre, at the request of the Chancellor of the Empire, had already provided the French commanders with definite instructions on the 2nd February. That same day General Dargent recognised the Versailles Convention and the line of demarcation claimed by the Germans. General Loysel, in spite of his refusal at the outset, signed on the 4th a special convention concluded on the basis of the Versailles Convention. The armistice having thus been carried out on the Seine, the disbandment of the XIIIth Army Corps could now take place.

In order to reform the units, General v. Goeben had, on 1st February, ordered the return to the Seine of the troops of the Ist Army Corpst posted on the Somme. At the same time, the 17th Infantry Division, the 3rd Guard Cavalry Brigade, and the 5th Cavalry Division, were placed under the orders of the Ist Army Corps, the 3rd Reserve Division, with the combined Guard Cavalry Brigade and the 3rd Cavalry Division, under the orders of the VIIIth Army Corps; the 12th Cavalry Division passed under the orders of the XIIth Army Corps at Compiègne

on the 5th February.

The movements ordered in consequence by the respective Corps headquarters were completed by the middle of Feb-

The following were the positions:—On the Somme, on the right wing the 16th Division, on the left the 15th, in the centre the 3rd Reserve Division and the Corps Artillery round Amiens; in rear, as far as Beauvais, the 3rd Cavalry Division. On the Seine, on the right bank along the line of demarcation and on the coast, the 2nd Infantry Division, and Corps Artillery from the 1st Army Corps, and the 3rd Guard Cavalry Brigade; in rear, at Rouen, the 1st Infantry Division. On the left bank the 17th Division had relieved the 22nd, and had extended as far as the line Evreux-Orbec-Bellou, whilst south of it as far as Gacé remained the 5th Cavalry Division.

Opposed to these, the French troops were distributed as follows:-North of the Somme district the army of General Faidherbe, numbering some 25,000 men and 16 batteries, had taken post in the quadrilateral Lille—Arras—Cambrai—Valenciennes, for the purpose of reforming there; in addition to these, some 55,000 garrison troops were occupying the fortresses. the Seine, as extreme left wing of the 2nd Army of the Loire. was posted Saussier's Division; and a number of franctireurs on

The 17th Infantry and 5th Cavalry Division were, until further notice, to page to the 1st Army.

† See Part II, Vol. II, p. 279, and Appendix CXXV.

† Of the 19th Corps, General Dargent.

the left bank; on the right bank of the river, in and near Le Havre, stood Loysel's Corps, consisting of some 30,000 gardes

mobiles, badly armed and little drilled.

In the zone occupied by the Hnd Army, the carrying into effect of the convention met with no hindrances of importance. The Army Headquarters had received a copy of the Convention on the 29th January, and communicated its provisions to the French generals, asking the latter at the same time if they were disposed to recognize them. It then appeared that these officers had merely received orders to stay hostilities. Notwithstanding this, General Chanzy and, after some negotiations, General Pourcet, declared themselves ready to retire behind the line fixed by the Convention; so that on the 5th February the armistice had completely come into force in this region.

On the French side, General Chanzy had moved his army to the left on the 28th January, as a preliminary to taking the offensive later from the neighbourhood of Caen. This movement, however, speedily ceased, and the army, the total strength of which was some 156,000 men and 54 batteries, remained for the present in their extensive positions between the mouth of the Seine and the Loire at Angers. In the neighbourhood of Vierzon stood General Pourcet's 25th Corps, some

**30,000** men strong.

The IInd Army.

> In consequence of the satisfactory declarations of the French generals, Prince Frederic Charles was able to withdraw on the 31st January the troops still standing in the neutral

The armistice quarters were regulated in such wise that the 4th Cavalry Division was to take post between Sees and Alencon, the IIIrd Army Corps and the 2nd Cavalry Division between the last-named place and Le Mans, the Xth Corps, with the 1st and 6th Cavalry Divisions, thence to Montrichard, the IXth Army Corps in the neighbourhood of Orléans, and

lastly, General v. Rantzau's Detachment at Auxerre.

On 3rd February all the troops had reached their destina-Only the last-named detachment, after leaving advanced troops at Bléneau and Gien, was brought up to Châtillon-sur-Loing on the 9th February. This removal was due to the circumstance that the mixed brigade of the VIth Army Corps. under General v. Fabeck, with which it had advanced against Auxerre, had occupied this town on the 2nd February after its evacuation by the French troops.

In this way the armistice was carried out on the 6th February along the entire line of demarcation fixed by the Convention. It was only before the fortresses of Bitsch and Langres that there were any difficulties.

\* The Gardes Mobiles south of Tours would not at first evacuate the neutral zone, until General v. Hartmann had threatened to re-commence hostilities.

<sup>†</sup> This consisted of the 16th, 17th, 19th, and 21st Corps, Cleret's Division, and several corps of franctireurs under Lipowski, Cathelineau, and others.

† See Part II, Vol. II, p. 226, and Vol. III, p. 122.

The commander of the troops investing Bitsch,\* Colonel Kohlermann, had informed the commandant of the fortress on the 1st February of the conclusion of the armistice. commandant, however, refused to acknowledge the Convention without express orders from his Government. The outpost duties had therefore to be continued with all the circumstances of war until the end of February, without, however, leading to any collisions. It was not until protracted negotiations had taken place, and the investing troops, reinforced for the purpose, had threatened to attack, that the French evacuated the fortress on the 24th and 25th March.

The garrison of Langres, the commandant of which had for similar reasons at first raised difficulties, retired on the 7th

February to the line of the forts.†

On the 13th February, the armistice was also extended to the Côte d'Or, Jura, and Doubs departments, and also to the fortress of Belfort.‡ At two places only was any opposition offered to its execution. The commandant of Auxonne, owing to insufficient instructions, did not free the railway leading past the fortress until the 5th March; General Rolland, who was in command at Besançon, claimed for the supply of the fortress and the removal of the wounded the whole country situated to the south and east of the town as far as the Swiss Not until the 19th February did he consent to withdraw his troops to a distance of 10 kilometres from the forts. On the complaint of the French, and after a decision thereon by the Royal Headquarters, the Germans evacuated, on the 21st February, the town of Beaune, situated in the neutral zone.

Opposite the South Army were the remains of the French East Army, which had escaped to the south of France, had been assembled by General Cremer at Chambery, and had been again formed as the 24th Corps. It shortly attained an effective

of some 23,000 men.

The Army of the Vosges, which, after Garibaldi's withdrawal on the 12th February, was commanded by Admiral Penhoat, stood with some 40,000 men in the neighbourhood of Châlonsur-Saône. Between it and the 15th Corps were gardes mobiles and franctireurs in a strength of 15,000 to 20,000 men, under Generals de Pointe de Gévigny and Du Temple east of the Upper Loire, in the Nièvre and Yonne departments.

In consequence of the winter campaign and the defeats they had suffered, these troops, almost without exception, were

little fit for fighting.

§ See Part II, Vol. II, p. 222, note +, and Vol. III, pp. 76, 121, 123.

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The South

See Part II, Vol. III, p. 130.
 See Part II, Vol. III, pp. 81, 123, et seq. With regard to the position of the South Army, see Part II, Vol. III, pp. 84, 102, and Appendix CLXX.

THE GENERAL SITUATION, MOVEMENTS AND NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE ARMISTICE. POSITION AND STRENGTH OF THE CONTENDING ARMIES AT THE END OF THE ARMISTICE.\*

After the conclusion of the armistice the divergence of opinion between the Paris Government and the Delegation in Bordeaux had given rise to serious difficulties in respect to

carrying out the elections.

In the endeavour to exclude from the National Assembly those who were inclined for peace, Minister Gambetta issued, on the 31st January, special orders, in which, contrary to the liberty of choice stipulated in the Armistice Convention, he excluded from the Chamber all those who since the 2nd December. 1851, had stood in any official relation whatsoever to the Imperial Government. In spite of the protest of the German Chancellor, Count v. Bismarck, against these electoral decrees, the Dictator maintained his previous decision. Only after the Paris Government had sent several of its members to Bordeaux, in order to secure a majority in the councils there; the did Gambetta abandon all further resistance, and on the 6th February sent in his resignation. The elections then went on with speed and order.

Although these promised a result favourable to peace, the necessary preparations were made on both sides for a resumption,

if necessary, of hostilities.

The French commanders perfectly well knew that the scattering of their forces would be very unfavourable for further operations. By the advice, therefore, of General Faidherbe, the North Army, which was inadequate to cope with the force opposed to it, was disbanded. The 22nd Corps, consisting of 18,000 men and 10 batteries, was despatched by sea to Cherbourg, whence, on the 26th February, it reached the neighbourhood of St. Lô and Bayeux; the 23rd Corps remained in the northern fortresses.

General Chanzy requested permission to transfer the bulk of his forces to the left bank of the Loire, in order to secure the connection with Southern France; the protection of Brittany was to be entrusted to a special corps. Accordingly, in a council of war held at Paris on the 9th—10th February, it was resolved to form an Army of Brittany, 100,000 to 150,000 strong, under General Colomb; its duty consisted in protecting the district west of the Mayenne hitherto held by General Chanzy's troops. It touched near Angers the Army of the Loire, now

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French
preparations
to continue
the war.

<sup>\*</sup> See Plan No. 40.

<sup>†</sup> On the 1st February a member of the Paris Government, Jules Simon, had arrived at Bordeaux, in order to regulate the elections, but was unable to overcome the opposition of M. Gambetta.

consisting of some 160,000 men, whose position extended as far as Châteauroux, along an arc of a circle open towards the north.\*

Whilst before the capitulation of Paris, the main tasks of the armies formed in the provinces had been the relief of the capital and the severance of the enemy's communications, it was now contemplated, in the event of a renewal of hostilities, to remain at first on the defensive in south-east France. For this purpose, there were scarcely 251,900 effectives available.†

The German supreme authorities also made the necessary German preparations during the armistice for a resumption of hostilities. The first step was to take measures for restoring the hostilities.

effective to the war strength and to complete the equipment of

In order to be free to act against the French armics still in the field, it was necessary at once to nip in the bud by threat of the most serious reprisals any renewal of the resistance at Paris.

On the heights from Romainville to Aubervilliers, 158 guns, 62 of which French, were placed in battery; at Mont Valerien and in the south forts, besides 367 guns destined to cope with an assault, there were 83 more French gunst facing the city. Moreover, 72 Prussian guns were established along the line Ivry-Bicêtre, so that Paris could, after the 19th February, be cannonaded at close range by 680 guns.

At an earlier period it had been considered that two or three army corps could be dispensed with before Paris. A reinforcement of the 1st and South Armies did not appear necessary; on the other hand, the IInd, which was opposed to the most numerous and redoubtable army of the enemy, required an increased

• The 26th Corps, under General Billot, formed in Guéret, had been brought up to the army at Châteauroux.

Appendix CLXXVIII shows the effective of the French troops behind the Mayenne on the 8th February, 1871.

† These details are based on the "Rapport sur la Situation de l'Effectif de l'Armée Française présent sous les Drapeaux le 5 Fevrier, 1871," prepared by the Committee of Enquiry of the National Assembly.

According to it, the total of the field troops present under arms amounted to 534,452 men and 1,242 guns. The National Guards were reported as being at present "incapables de rendre aucun service à la guerre." The franctireurs, originally over 1,500 officers and 36,000 men, had been disband d, except the most trustworthy membere.

In the depots, camps of instruction, and in Algiers, there were 354,000 reserve troops, with 57 departmental batteries.

The 132,000 recruits inscribed for the year 1871 had not yet been levied.

The French fleet had given up a large number of men and guns to the field army, and had dismantled most of their fighting ships. It was therefore not in a condition to undertake an enterprise on a large scale. Only two flotillas, which were alternately stationed in the North Sea or at Cherbourg and Dunkirk, a division of despatch-vessels and gunboats at Le Havre, and two ironclad batteries on the Rhône remained in commission. The Loire flotilla had fallen into the hands of the Germans. (See Chevalier, "La Marine Française et la Marine Allemande pendant la Guerre, 1870-71;" Rollin, "La Guerre dans l'Ouest," p. 361, and Part II, Vol. I, p. 364.)

1 In Forts d'Ivry and de Bicetre, 8 guns each; in Fort de Montrouge, 10; on Mont Valérien, 14; and in Forts de Charenton, de Vanres, and d'Issy, 43 guns. The forts received ammunition for a twenty days' heavy canonnade.

effective. In consequence, the Vth Army Corps was moved on the 9th February to the Loire, in order to relieve the IXth Corps there, while, on the 10th, the IVth Corps followed to Chartres.\*

All arrangements were made so that on the resumption of hostilities, the offensive might be taken at all points with

vigour and energy.

In consequence of a communication from the Federal Chancellor, according to which a prolongation of the armistice might be expected in view of the result of the elections, the Royal Headquarters instructed the Army Commanders, on the 13th February, to stop temporarily any movements which might already have been commenced in view of the resumption of hostilities.

In pursuance thereof, in the IInd Army the IVth Corps was quartered in the neighbourhood of Nogent-le-Rotrou, the IXth, on relief by the Vth Army Corps,† between Vendôme, Vouvray, and Blois, whilst the rest of the Corps remained generally in

their previous positions.‡

Meanwhile, the National Assembly had met at Bordeaux on the 12th February, and the armistice was extended on the 15th until noon on the 24th. M. Thiers, who had been chosen as chief of the Executive Power, declared to the Chambers on the 19th February that he was resolved with all his might to terminate this hopeless war, and that same day, in company with Jules Favre, he proceeded to Paris, in order to commence negotiations for peace at Versailles.

As in spite of these favourable signs there could be no absolute certainty of the armistice being prolonged beyond the 24th, General Count v. Moltke on the 20th instructed the commanders of armies to complete at once all the movements necessary for their security, but not to commence hostilities

without express orders.

Meanwhile, on the 21st February the armistice was again

extended until midnight of the 26th.

Orders were therefore given by the Hnd Army for the IVth Corps with the 4th Cavalry Division to form the right wing of the army at Fresnay-sur-Sarthe and Bonnétable, the HIrd with the 2nd Cavalry Division remained at Le Mans, and the IXth was to move up between the HIrd and Xth Corps.

The South Army had been instructed by the Royal Headquarters to turn to account on the resumption of hostilities its superiority and take a rapid offensive against the enemy's forces, which would probably still be found at Autun and Châlon-sur-Saône, and to drive them back upon Lyons. In doing so, they were however, in order to avoid the strong fortress, the siege of



<sup>•</sup> The Vth Army Corps remained under the orders of the HIrd Army. The gaps created in the line of investment were filled by changes of quarters of the neighbouring corps.

<sup>†</sup> Its march had not been interrupted; it occupied Orléans, Blois, and Gien.

† The troops only concentrated, in order to make room for the IXth and IVth Army Corps.

which was not contemplated, in no case to proceed beyond Mâcon. In lieu of this the main forces of the South Army, after leaving the XIVth Corps at Châlon-sur-Saône, would then take the offensive towards Bourges by way of Nevers or Moulins. Moreover, preparations were to be made for the immediate

investment and siege of Langres.

Accordingly, the Hnd Army Corps at Poligny and Lons-le-Saunier, the VIIth at Dijon and Nuits, with a flank detachment on the Sombernon-Bligny-sur-Ouche road, were to hold themselves in readiness for an advance upon Bourg, as well as upon Chagny and Autun. The XIVth Corps was, after drawing in the 1st and 4th Reserve Divisions, intended to invest Besançon and Auxonne, secure the communications, and with the remaining available troops\* advance against Châlon-sur-Saône.

General v. d. Goltz was entrusted with the expedition against Langres, and Krenski's Detachment as well as ten landwehr battalions of the Government-General of Lorraine were assigned to him. For the same purpose there were also placed at his disposal eight fortress artillery companies and three fortress pioneer companies, which, with the available material of the Belfort siege park, were to be brought up from the fortress, as also siege material already sent from Longwy to Chaumont.

Of the Ist Army, the Ist Corps had been on the Seine since the 19th February, the VIIIth with the 3rd Reserve Division and 3rd Cavalry Division on the Somme, the 17th Infantry Division as general reserve in Dieppe. As protection against a hostile attack the forces in the Somme district were as early as the 23rd collected in three groups between Péronne and St. Quentin, at Amiens, and at Abbeville respectively. On the same day the order arrived from the Royal Headquarters to concentrate the army on the left wing, after leaving a sufficient force on the Somme. The execution of this order, which had been occasioned by the news of the transfer of the 22nd Corps to Cherbourg, could, however, be countermanded on the 24th February in consequence of the favourable course of the peace negotiations.

For the same reason the intelligence which reached Versailles on the same day of an assembly of the Loire Army at Poitiers, and of the transfer of the command of the Vosges Army caused no further measures on the part of the Royal Headquarters, so that the changes in position of the Hnd and South Armies already commenced were brought to a termination; in the next

few days.

The German field army in France numbered on the 1st March, 1871, 464,221 infantry, 55,562 horses, and 1,674 guns, whilst the garrison troops mustered 105,272 infantry, 5,681

The Baden Division and some Landwehr battalions.

<sup>†</sup> See Part II, Vol. III, p. 84. ‡ See Plan No. 40.

Appendix CLXXX shows the effective of the German Army in France on 1st March, 1871.

The line of communication during the armistice. horses, and 68 guns, so that the total strength of all the German troops in France amounted to 569,493 infantry, 61,243 horses, and 1,742 guns. Besides these there were numerous depôt troops available in Germany.\*

We have still to speak briefly of the line of communications

of the German army during the armistice.

The extent and carrying power of the railways at disposal had considerably increased since the conclusion of the Convention of the 30th January, as the repair of the damaged lines was actively proceeded with on the part both of the French and the Germans. But the railways had now to endeavour to meet far greater demands upon them. Besides provisions for Paris, arrangements had to be made for forwarding the reserves of men and material which were needed in order that hostilities, if necessary, might be resumed with full force. Nevertheless, the different lines were not strained beyond what they could bear, as the German authorities exercised exclusive supervision over the traffic. This supervision extended also to those lines used in common with the French, to which were shortly added the lines Laval—Le Mans—Paris, Argentan— Dreux—Paris, Orléans—Tours, and Rouen—Poissy—Paris. The trains laden by the French ran only as through trains.

It was of no little importance that the French Government provided, on payment, 200 locomotives and 5,000 carriages, by which measure the previous scarcity of rolling stock could be

more quickly supplemented.

The 1st Army received as a new means of communication the line Rouen-Dieppe, whilst a regular traffic was opened on the line Versailles-Iloudan-Dreux, and was extended towards the west. The lines Amiens-Abbeville and Tergnier-St. Quentin, which had been repaired by the French, could now

be jointly used by the Germans.

As regards the IIIrd and Meuse Armies the terminal stations could be pushed closer to Paris. On and after the 11th February the Paris circular railway ran goods and hospital trains, a matter of importance both for the troops west of Paris belonging to the IIIrd Army and also for the IInd Army. The latter, after the restoration of the Yonne bridge at La Roche on 11th February, was able to send its trains not only along the central line through Paris, but also on the southern line through Juvisy and Paris to the heart of its cantonments. These communications were further supplemented by opening the lines Orléans— Tours and Le Mans—Beaumont-sur-Sarthe.

In the rayon of the South Army, the line Vesoul—Belfort was put in working order after the fall of the fortress.

<sup>\*</sup> Appendix CXC shows the effective of the German depôt troops at the beginning of March, 1871.

† See General Map No. 10.

<sup>†</sup> See ante, p. 149. § See Part II, Vol. III, p. 108. See Part II, Vol. III, p. 109.

viaduct of Xertigny\* having been restored, the entire line from Blainville to Gray was opened to traffic on 24th February.

No further interruption of these communications took place, notwithstanding the circumstance that the franctireurs scattered over the country only submitted by degrees to the armistice, and that the German garrison troops had to be

occasionally employed to entirely disperse them.

On the German coasts, as well, all measures of security neces- Proceedings sary in the event of a resumption of hostilities were taken during in the littoral the armistice. Besides the mixed brigadest intended for Hamburg and Bremen, 28 battalions, 3 squadrons, and 3 batteries were available for the immediate protection of the remaining points on the coast † 131 battalions, 5 rifle companies, 14 squadrons, and 1 battery, the employment of which was reserved by General Vogel v. Falckenstein, were held in readiness in the rearward garrisons. Consequently, for more extensive operations, a total force of 52½ battalions, 25 squadrons, and 6 batteries could be reckoned upon, while 22 garrison battalions and 22 depôt squadrons were employed to guard the prisoners of

The armament of the Emden batteries with heavy guns from Minden, as also an extension of the batteries at Cuxhaven and Hohen-Wieschendorf were in contemplation; at the same time, preparations were made for increasing the number of sunken ships and torpedoes, and for removing the buoys and landmarks at an opportune moment.

The greater part of the iron-clad fleet, together with four gunboats, was intended to protect Wilhelmshaven. The embouchure of the Ems was to be defended by the gunboats "Comet" and "Natter," that of the Weser by the gunboats "Jäger," "Hay," and "Wolf," that of the Elbe by the ironclad "Prinz Adalbert," and the gunboats "Cyclop," "Fuchs," "Hyäne," and "Habicht."

provinces.

<sup>\*</sup> See Part II, Vol. III, p. 110.

<sup>†</sup> At this time the brigade appointed to protect Bremen numbered only five battalions. See Part II, Vol. III, p. 189.

<sup>1</sup> The following could also be employed for coast defence :- 24 fortress artillery companies, 9 reserve marine artillery companies, 1 depôt pioneer company, 4 fortress pioneer companies.

<sup>§</sup> Besides these troops intended for use as a combined force, the Governor-General had reserved the following: - Parts of the depôt divisions of Nos. 9 and 10 field artillery regiments, 6 fortress artillery companies, 2 pioneer depôt divisions, 4 train depôt divisions.

<sup>||</sup> Including 14 Landwehr battalions, which the War Ministry had appointed to act as a reinforcement, if required, as also the marine and reserve marine battalions.

¶ The corvette "Augusta" was also ordered home during the armistice.

#### THE PEACE PRELIMINARIES.

Whilst the contending armies were making their preparations in case of a resumption of hostilities, the peace negotiations, commenced on the 21st February, continued their course.

After M. Thiers had left no stone unturned to obtain milder conditions, and the Germans had made some concessions, the preliminaries of peace were signed on the afternoon of the 26th February by the German Chancellor, as well as by repre-

sentatives of the South German States.

France bound herself by this Convention\* to renounce infavour of the German Empire, Alsace, excepting the fortress of Belfort, and part of Lorraine, and to pay a war indemnity of five milliards of francs, of which one milliard at least was to be paid in 1871, the rest in the course of the next three years.

The evacuation of the territory occupied by the German armies was to commence immediately after the ratification of the Convention, and to be carried out gradually in proportion

to the payment of the war indemnity.

The troops were not to make requisitions, but were to be fed at the expense of the French Government. Concurrently with the first evacuation, the French forces, with the exception of a garrison of 40,000 men for Paris and the necessary fortress garrisons, were to retire behind the Loire, and not to recross the river until the final signature of the Treaty of Peace. The opening of the necessary negotiations was to commence at Brussels immediately after the ratification of the preliminaries, as also the surrender of the French prisoners of war.

By two supplementary conventions, the armistice was prolonged until the 12th of March, with the reservation that it might be terminated by either party on and after the 3rd of March, with a delay of three days for the re-commencement of hostilities. Lastly, it was further agreed that on the 1st of March a force of 30,000 Germans should enter Paris, and until the ratification of the Convention† should occupy the part of the town bounded by the Seine, by the enceinte between Point du Jour and the Porte des Ternes, the Rue du Faubourg St. Honoré and the Jardin des Tuileries.‡

The dethronement of the Napoleonic dynasty having been decreed, the Chief of the Executive Power succeeded, on the 1st of March, in inducing the National Assembly at Bordeaux to ratify the Convention. The arrangements for the occupation of the French capital were, in consequence, only carried out to a

+ According to Article III of the Preliminary Convention.

1 See Sketch No. 8.

<sup>\*</sup> Appendix CLXXIX contains the Preliminary Convention and its Supplement.

limited extent. Nevertheless, the entry of part of the German army into Paris possessed great importance, as it thereby showed the complete submission of the adversary.

The troops were to enter the city on the 1st, 3rd, and 5th of March in three echelous, which relieved each other in

succession.\*

On the morning of 1st March, His Majesty the Emperor and King passed in review the first echelon on the Longchamps. After its termination, the German forces entered the enemy's capital, colours flying, to the strains of the Triumphal March

into Paris which had been played in the year 1814.

Meanwhile, on the afternoon of the 2nd March, the ratifications were exchanged, and in consequence thereof the Royal Headquarters gave orders for the occupied parts of the city to be evacuated. The first echelon left in the forenoon of the 3rd, whilst, at the same time, His Majesty the Emperor and King held a parade of the second echelon on the Longchamps. On the previous day, His Majesty, the Commander-in-Chief, communicated to Her Majesty the Empress and Queen Augusta the final glorious result obtained by the German army, in the following terms:—

"I have just ratified the Treaty of Peace, which was accepted yesterday by the National Assembly at Bordeaux. After seven months of glorious struggle, thanks to the bravery, devotion, and endurance of all ranks of the incomparable army, and the ready self-sacrifice of the Fatherland, the great work is now terminated. The God of Armies has everywhere visibly blest our enterprise, and has by His grace permitted this honourable peace. Glory be to Him! My heartfelt thanks to the Army and to the Fatherland.

(Signed) "WILLIAM."

s 2

Ist Echelon:—11,000 men of VIth Army Corps.

11,000 , of Had Bavarian Corps.

8,000 , of XIth , of Guard Corps and Guard Landwehr Division.

2,200 , of Fortress Artillery and Fortress Pioneers.

1Hrd Echelon:—15,000 , of XIIth Army Corps.

7,200 , of Württemberg Field Division.

RETURN OF THE ARMY, AND THE PEACE OF FRANKFORT.

### DISPOSITIONS FOR THE MARCH.

In accordance with Article III of the peace preliminaries,\* the surrender of the forts situated on the left bank of the Seine was to be simultaneous with the evacuation of the capital; in the next place, the district between the Seine and Loire was to

be quitted as soon as possible by the opposed armies.†

The departments on the right bank of the Seine were not retroceded to France until after the conclusion of the definite peace, and in proportion to the payments made to Germany. The departments of the Ardennes, Marne, Haute Marne, Meuse, Vosges, and Meurthe, as also the fortress of Belfort, were appointed as a special security for the three last milliards, but the number of German troops to be left in them was not to exceed 50,000 men. Germany, at the same time, declared herself ready to accept sufficient financial guarantees in lieu of the security agreed upon.

The Royal Headquarters issued general instructions; as to the mode of carrying out the evacuation of the territory west of the Seine, as also with regard to the changes necessary in the distribution of the army. In arranging the new positions regard was had to restoring the original order of battle, to comfortable quarters for the troops and the preparations for their return march, as also to the possibility of assembling rapidly in the event of a resumption of hostilities. Moreover, the troops selected for the permanent occupation of the newly acquired districts were now appointed, and moved off for their future garrisons. The reserve and Landwehr troops stationed in these parts or in French territory could be dismissed to their homes, whilst in place of them the VIIth and XIIth Army Corps, as also the Württemberg Division, were to take over the duty in rear of the army, and for this purpose were to be detached from their present commands.§

In consequence of these arrangements, the headquarters Ist Army moved the 1st Infantry Division from its position on the Rille to the right bank of the Seine at Rouen, which place it reached on 12th March. It relieved the detachments of the Guard Corps and XIIth Army Corps, which had been engaged

<sup>\*</sup> See ante, p. 160, and Appendix CLXXIX.

<sup>†</sup> The details were regulated by a special military Convention, concluded on 4th March.

<sup>‡</sup> Appendix CLXXXI gives the directions with regard to the execution of the preliminary Convention and the armistice Convention of 26th February, 1871.

§ They at the same time passed under the orders of the Royal Headquarters.

<sup>5</sup> They at the same time passed under the orders of the Royal Headquarters. By an Imperial Cabinet Order of 5th March, the Governments-General of Lorraine, Rheims, and Versailles, were abolished, and their functions transferred to the Commanders-in-Chief of the respective armies.

in these districts, and ordered the return march of the 17th Division in accordance with instructions meanwhile received

from the Royal Headquarters.

The remaining troops continued to occupy the Departments of the Somme, Seine Inférieure, and Eure,\* and that part of the Department of the Oise which lies west of the Gisors—Beauvais—Breteuil road.†

The 5th Cavalry Division had been transferred to the Meuse

Army.‡

Greater changes became necessary with the Hnd Army, which had, up to that time, been posted with its main forces on the Sarthe and in the Touraine. It had first to send away the IVth Army Corps and the 4th Cavalry Division. Both were in the neighbourhood of Alençon. The former returned by way of Mantes to the Meuse Army, the latter by way of Chartres and Melun to the HIrd Army. The bulk of the Hnd Army moved to the Upper Seine in three columns. The HIrd Corps and the 2nd Cavalry Division crossed the river at Nogent, the IXth Corps and the 6th Cavalry Division at Troyes, the Xth Corps and the 1st Cavalry Division at Chatillon. The Xth Army Corps had the longest distance to march, and consequently could not reach the right bank of the Seine until the 31st March.

The army now occupied the whole of the country newly assigned to it. This included the Department of Haute Marne, and also those parts of the Aube and Côte d'Or Departments situated on the right bank of the Seine, the last-named Department being separated on the south-east from the district assigned to the South Army by a line drawn from the sources of the Seine to Grancey-le-Château. As it turned out that the troops had not all been able to find the wished for good quarters, the Hand Army, together with the Württemberg Division, were assigned in addition the Departments of the Marne and Vosges, so that they could spread out more widely

and enjoy greater comfort.

The Army Hendquarters, which, during the march to the Seine, had remained for some time at Fontainebleau, were established in Chaumont from the 19th March. As the Commander-in-Chief had meanwhile received leave of absence,\*\*

† See Map No. 41.

<sup>\*</sup> Except those parts of the two last-named departments lying on the left bank of the Seine.

It had crossed the Seine at Mantes, where, however, it was detained for two days by the presence of 12,000 French troops, who were waiting to be conveyed by train to Paris.

<sup>§</sup> Some parts of this column followed the IXth Corps through Troyes.

|| The Convention of the 4th March had fixed the 28th as the limit for the evacuation. It was, however, extended by agreement to the 1st April, in consequence of the position of the Xth Corps.

<sup>¶</sup> See Map No. 41.

\*\* Prince Frederic Charles proceeded by Royal command from Fontainebleau to
Berlin for the opening of the first German Reichstag.

General v. Voigts-Rhetz had been appointed to succeed him

temporarily.\*

The South Army, which had been much weakened by the departure of the VIIth Corps, as likewise of the landwehr and reserve troops, sustained a further diminution by the return home of the Baden Division.† It was, therefore, reinforced by the Vth Army Corps coming from Blois and Orléans, and by the 1st Cavalry Division, which was detached from the Hnd Army after the passage of the Seine. The South Army retained in general the former positions in the Haute Saône and Doubs Departments, which were assigned to it, and also occupied those parts of the Jura and Côte d'Or Departments; lest to the Germans by the Armistice Convention of 15th February.§

The South Army was broken up by an Imperial Cabinet Order of the 31st March. Its troops were incorporated in the IInd Army, and the chief command of the whole was entrusted to General v. Manteuffel, who established his head-

nuarters at Dijon.

In front of Paris the Meuse Army occupied the Seine et Oise Department, or as much of it as lies on the right bank of the Seine and north of the Ourcq Canal, as also that part of the Oise Department left free by the 1st Army. The 1st Guard Infantry Division, posted in front line towards the capital, occupied St. Denis as well as Forts de l'Est and d'Auber- ${f villiers. T}$ 

The IIIrd Army was placed in more difficult circumstances, The forts on the left bank of the Seine and the Gennevilliers peninsula, which were included in their rayon, were, it is true, handed over to the French authorities on the 7th March, but all the troops which were still south of the Seine could not be at once withdrawn. Moreover, it was first necessary to remove the siege park and the captured war material, and on the few available roads the movement which had been ordered could only be gradually carried out. On the 10th March the evacuation was commenced, and was then terminated without further interruption. On the 19th, Versailles was also to be given back to the French. But meanwhile the French Government had expressed a wish that the sittings of the National Assembly

From the 18th March.

<sup>†</sup> It was still to remain mobilised for the present in Germany. For a time the South Army had only the Hud Army Corps to maintain peace and order in the district assigned to it, as General v. d. Goltz's detachment had also been disbanded.

<sup>†</sup> Part of the last-named department had been given up to the Hnd Army. Towards the south-west this department was bounded by a line drawn from the sources of the Scine to Chagny. The arrondissement of Beaune was, however, evacuated on the 24th March. (See Map No. 41.)

§ See Part II, Vol. III, p. 84, and Appendix CLXX.

[With the evacuation of Paris, the control over the right of entry ceased, and the traffic for passengers and goods was thrown open.

The arrondissement of 4th March, a new line of

T By a Convention supplementing the Agreement of 4th March, a new line of demarcation had been agreed upon for the troops on the north of Paris after the surrender of Mont Valerien. It commenced on the right bank of the Seine above St. Denis, and ran to the east of St. Ouen as far as the enceinte.

should be transferred thither with the least possible delay. The Royal Headquarters moved on the 7th to Ferrières, after declaring its readiness in the convention concluded on the previous day to evacuate Versailles and its immediate vicinity on the 11th March. In exchange for this, the IIIrd Army was allowed to march through the Gennevilliers peninsula,\* to occupy provisionally Clanart and Vitry-sur-Seine,† and to use the Ivry bridge; for removing the war material. Versailles could not, however, be given up on the 11th March, as differences of opinion had meanwhile arisen between the plenipotentiaries of the two Governments as to carrying out

certain provisions of the Convention.

The French commander, who presented himself this day at the German outposts, had offered to await on the right bank of the Seine near Paris the further decision. The difficulties which had arisen were quickly removed by negotiations at Ferrières. On the 12th, Versailles was given up. The Germans marched off, part by the north and part by the south of Paris, to the district assigned in future to the IIIrd Army, namely, the Seine and Oise Department south of the Ourcq Canal, and the Seine and Marne Department on the right bank of the Seine. The 22nd Division proceeded to occupy the Forts de Romainville, de Noisy, de Rosny, and de Nogent; it touched on the south the 2nd Bavarian Division, which was in first line. The head-quarters had proceeded to Meaux. On the 21st March there were no longer any German troops in this direction on the south bank of the Seine.

From the 14th March the Meuse Army was disbanded, and all the troops remaining before Paris, placed under the orders

of the Crown Prince of Saxony as IIIrd Army.

As for the future the German armies had only to watch the execution of the Convention, His Majesty the Emperor and King, accompanied by the Crown Prince of Germany, left Nancy, where the Royal Headquarters had been since the 13th March, and proceeded by way of Frankfort-on-the-Maine to Berlin.

The last movements had afforded several opportunities of assembling large bodies of troops for a review. On the 7th March the Ist Bavarian Corps, the XIIth Army Corps,

† Both places were hitherto considered neutral. The Germans had, however, the right to guard the siege and captured material until it could be removed.

|| See Map No. 41.

<sup>\*</sup> For the 10th and 11th March. Marching quarters might also be occupied there.

I Up to 19th March.
§ In the Convention of 4th March, a line of demarcation south of Paris had been agreed upon which ran from Bougival through Buzmval to St. Cloud, and from Bas Meudon to the Upper Seine, and which was to hold good during the interval between the surrender of the south forts and the complete withdrawal of the German troops. This line of demarcation was now extended round Versailles, so that it was indicated by the villages of Bougival, Louveciennes, Bailly, Noisy, Rennemoulin, Bois d'Arcis, Bouvier, then along the Bièvre to Petit Jouy, and further on by way of L'Hotel Dien, Vélizy, Villebon, Meudon.

and the Württemberg Division were inspected by the Emperor on the plateau of Noisy-le-Grand and Villiers-sur-Marne near Paris; on the 12th March the 1st Army Corps and 17th Division were reviewed at Rouen; on the 13th, the VIIIth Army Corps, the 3rd Cavalry Division, and the 3rd Reserve Division were reviewed at Amiens, by H.I. & R.H. the Crown Prince by special order of His Majesty.

On the day of his departure for Germany His Majesty the Emperor and King addressed the following army order to the

whole Army: -

"Soldiers of the German Army!

"I leave this day French territory, upon which the German name has acquired so much fresh military honour, but upon

which so much precious blood has been shed.

"An honourable peace is now assured, and the troops have already commenced to return to their homes. I bid you farewell, and I thank you once more from the bottom of my heart for all that you have achieved in this war by your bravery and endurance. You return home with the proud consciousness of having fought victoriously in one of the greatest wars the world has ever seen, of having preserved the Fatherland from being trodden by hostile foot, and of having reconquered for the German Empire countries which it had long lost. May the army of the now united Germany ever remember that only by constantly striving after perfection can it maintain its high position; then can we look forward to the future with confidence.

" Nancy, 15th March, 1871.

(Signed) "WILLIAM,"

## INSURRECTION OF THE COMMUNE AT PARIS.

### THE PEACE OF FRANKFORT.

The Emperor's words of thanks had hardly died away, the army was preparing to celebrate with festivities the birthday of its Commander-in-Chief, when, in striking contrast, civil war broke out in Paris.

The revolutionary movement\* which had commenced in the capital during the siege had made more and more progress, so that the garrison of 40,000 men, allowed by the preliminary peace, proved to be quite inadequate for the maintenance of tranquillity. The masses, strengthened by National and Mobile Guards, gained possession of a large number of guns and quantities of stores, and, under the direction of a "Central Committee," offered open resistance to the Government. The latter sought in vain to repress the disorder. On the 18th March, M. Thiers moved the regiments that were still trustworthy to Versailles, partly for the protection of the Government established in the town, and partly to withdraw them from the corrupting influence of the Paris intriguers, so that the capital was now entirely given up to the revolutionary party.

The Germans, in view of their own security, were ready to afford every possible aid to the authorities, although they did not feel themselves called upon to intervene actively in foreign

disorders without they were forced to do so.

In this sense, the Army Commanders-in-Chief were instructed to prevent any revolutionary movements in their own districts, as well as any departures for Paris likely to add fuel to the flame; but, so far as possible, to comply with any wishes of the French Government.

The troops of the IIIrd Army further in rear were brought up nearer the forts, the outposts again posted along the line of demarcation, and the process of disarming suspended. On the 23rd March the necessary movements were completed. The troops received instructions to resist with all the means in their power any sortics from Paris; the men in power there were also informed that any attempt to arm the fronts facing the Germans would at once entail an immediate bombardment of the city.† The insurgents were well aware that an attack

Eleven fortress artillery companies were distributed among the forts, 9 more in

<sup>\*</sup> See Part II, Vol. II, p. 389.
† Of heavy guns, there were 9 in Fort de la Briche, 11 in St. Denis, 14 in
Fort de l'Est, 25 in d'Aubervilliers, 28 in de Romainville, 14 in de Noisy,, 14 in
de Rosny, 14 in de Nogent, 18 in Charenton, 7 in the Redoute de la Faisanderie, and
10 in Fort de Gravelle. The disarming of the latter work was already carried out.
Until the arrival of those 18 heavy guns a Bavarian 6-pounder battery was placed

on the German positions could be only prejudicial to the object at which they were aiming, and consequently directed their efforts solely to securing their predominance in the capital, and to preparing a sortic against Versailles. Accordingly, the troops in front of Paris could on the 2nd April be once more distributed in more scattered quarters, which were, however, so arranged that a rapid concentration could be again easily effected.

Although these events had hitherto produced no influence on the positions of the 1st, 11nd, and South Armies, any diminution of the German troops in France did not appear advisable. For this reason the 17th Division, which in its return march had reached the south of Mézières, was detained by orders to remain temporarily in that neighbourhood.

The French Government, which required an increased body of troops in order to suppress the insurrection, applied to the

German authorities for the necessary authorization.

On the 28th March a Convention was accordingly concluded at Rouen,\* by virtue of which the French Government bound itself to employ its troops at Versailles only against Paris and for the protection of the National Assembly. For these purposes alone they were allowed to raise their force to 80,000 men, including 10,000 National and Mobile Guards; they were further permitted to collect the required number of men at Besançon, Auxerre, and Cambrai, while their transport to Versailles, so far as the districts occupied by the Germans were affected was to be furthered by every possible means

affected, was to be furthered by every possible means.

To supply the deficiencies, the French Government calculated chiefly upon the homeward bound prisoners of war, the transport of which along the lines Metz—Charleville, Strassburg-Lunéville, Mülhausen-Vesoul, had been regulated by a special Convention on the 11th March. Its execution, however, met with difficulties, as neither the rolling-stock to be furnished by the French, nor the Commissaries to be sent to the terminal stations for the reception of the troops, arrived at the proper time. Later on, after the outbreak of the revolution in the capital, the increasing insecurity necessitated great caution in setting at liberty these mostly well-drilled troops, for it was not beyond the range of possibility that part of them might side with the On the basis of the Rouen Convention only insurgents. 20,000 line troops, besides National and Mobile Guards, were at first allowed to return.

This augmentation of the Versailles army gave no cause for anxiety, inasmuch as the HIrd Army could within two days assemble 200,000 men before the capital.

the parks at Brou, Sévran, and Villiers-le-Bel. In the latter, 51 heavy guns were still left. Those fortress artillery and pioneer companies which were of no further service in France were sent home.

<sup>\*</sup> Lieutenant-General v. Fabricc, hitherto Governor-General at Versailles, was charged with the negotiations. He was to represent the Federal Chancellor in settling all questions which might arise, whether legal, administrative, or diplomatic.

On the 2nd April the insurgents proceeded to attack Versailles, but were repulsed on this as well as on the following day. On the 4th April, the Government troops occupied the Châtillon plateau and the left bank of the Seine from Sevres to near Courbevoie. This movement not only served to protect their own positions, but at the same time to prepare for the further advance against the fortifications of the city.

It was not until the 25th April that Marshal MacMahon, to whom had been entrusted the chief command of the troops assembled at Versailles, undertook the attack of Forts d'Issy and de Vanves. The former was found by the troops evacuated

on the 10th May; the latter was captured on the 13th.

During these engagements the peace negotiations, commenced on the 28th March at Brussels and continued in the beginning of May at Frankfort-on-the-Maine, under the personal direction of the Imperial German Chancellor, had proceeded so rapidly that the definitive peace on the basis of the preliminaries, and with the condition that the ratification should be made within ten days, could be signed on the 10th May."

The ratification having been effected by the Germans on the 16th, the French National Assembly accepted the peace on the

18th by 440 against 98 votes.

In view of the continuance of the bitter struggle between the troops of the Government and the insurgents, a fresh concentration of the HIrd Army in front of the capital appeared necessary. On the 17th this was completed.

On the 20th May Marshal MacMahon opened fire with such effect from the Bois de Boulogne upon the city fortifications, that on the following day the ramparts, abandoned by the

insurgents, could be escaladed at the Porte de St. Cloud.

On the news of the entry of Government troops into Paris, the traffic through all the gates in front of the German positions was suspended during the night of the 21st-22nd May. The outposts advanced in part to the positions they had held during the armistice, in part still nearer to the ramparts, as Article 7 of the ratified Convention gave the Germans, in the interest of their own safety, power over the neutral zone in front of the capital. Behind the front line supports were placed in

the Oise.

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Appendix CLXXXII contains the text of the Treaty of 10th May, 1871, with its supplementry conditions, and the final protocol of the same day.

† The IVth Army Corps assembled the 8th Division in the neighbourhood of Pontoise; the 7th, after crossing the Oise, moved into a district bounded by this river, the Seine, and the line St. Gratien—Beaumont. Next to this came the close cantonments of the Guard Corps, which stretched southward as far as the Ourcq Canal, eastward as far as the railway Mitry—Crépy-en-Valois. The XIth Army Corps brought up to Livry those parts of the 22nd Division which were unemployed as garrisons (see ante, p. 165); the 21st Division concentrated at Chelles on both banks of the Marne. The 1st Bavarian Army Corps brought up its troops in rear nearer to the forts, in order to make room for the VIth Army Corps. The army headquarters were established at Margency.

The 1st Army had pushed forward the 1st Division in the direction of Oreil on the Oise.

readiness, in order to defeat any attempt to break through the

The further advance of the Government troops in the interior of Paris was apparent to the Germans by the flight of the insurgents and the crashing of the shells.\* The masses who congregated before the gates were not allowed to pass. In order to prevent their departure from the city, the outposts were pushed forward close up to the barriers.

After a terrible struggle, lasting for eight days, in the streets and at the barricades, Paris again passed into the hands of the recognised Government.‡ The restrictive measures of precaution taken by the Germans could now be removed. On the 30th the troops in general returned to their old canton-

ments.

## CONTINUATION OF THE RETURN MARCH AND THE DEMOBILISATION.

The German conditions having been fully complied with, and the French Government having re-established its authority in Paris, there was no longer any impediment to the withdrawal of those German forces which were not to be employed in the subsequent occupation. The arrangements to this end had been long since drawn up in a detailed manner.

After determining the main features of the plan, the Executive Commission, in concert with the Ruilway Direction, determined the amount of work to be done by the different

lines, and the time-tables for the trains.

Further, in order to ensure the supplies while marching to the entraining stations, numerous magazines had been established on the great roads leading to the Rhine, which in case of need could be refilled within three to five days. The troops received orders to march in successive echelons at a day's march apart; these echelons, composed of all arms, were to have a total depth of three or four days' march. The opportune publication of the new peace distribution allowed of the exchange which had become necessary in certain units to take

Appendix CLXXXIII contains a return of casualties of the German troops in

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Lieutenant Egler, 11th Bavarian Regiment, and three men were wounded; also three men of the 94th.

France from 1st February to the beginning of the occupation.

† In consequence of the threatening attitude of the masses who demanded to pass through, two battalions of the 2nd Foot Guards were called up. Château Vincennes was surrounded by a chain of posts until the arrival of the troops from Versailles.

<sup>†</sup> On 28th May. The occupation of the neutral zone opposite Fort de Romainville in contravention to the Treaty led later on to a complaint. But the explanations tendered by the French military authorities quickly brought about an understanding. See Appendix V, and Part II, Vol. III, p. 111.

place before the movement commenced. The regiments also of the Cavalry Divisions which had been broken up could mostly rejoin their corps while still on French soil. The return march was executed in four great echelons, the succession of which was so regulated that the march to the frontier could be carried out without any crossing of the columns, and thence their transport by rail could be at once commenced.\*

Only the Guard and the IVth Army Corps were entrained at the nearest stations of the line Mitry-Soissons and Meaux --- Epernay. The VIIIth, as also the bulk of the XIth Corps, and the Württemberg Field Division continued the march home

by road.

The transport proceeded according to the preconcerted plan. By the middle of July all the troops had reached their garrisons.

In order to restore to the country with the least possible delay the working power of which it had so long been deprived, it had been decided on the 4th March to disband the garrison battalions and the unmounted landwehr depôt squadrons according as they could be dispensed with, and also to

† Ist Echelon-

Vth Army Corps, entrained at Belfort and Mülhausen from 27th May.

VIIth Army Corps, entrained at Searlouis from 1st June.

17th Infantry Division, entrained at Mainz from 9th June, marching thither via Thionville and Saarlouis.

Had Echelon-

Guard Corps entrained from 2nd June, on the lines Mitry -- Soissons and Meaux-Epernay.

IXth Army Corps: 18th Division, by road viá Luneville - Kaiserslautern to Mainz, then entrained from 17th June.

25th Division by road viii Saverne, Weissenburg, Manuheim to Darmstadt. XIIth Corps (exclusive 24th Division) by road vid Verdun-Metz to Mainz and Frankfort, then entrained from 26th June.

IInd Bararian Army Corps, by road vid Sezanne, Vitry—Nancy to Meaux.
then entrained from 28th June.

Württemberg Field Division, by road vid Neufchâteau, St. Dié, and Strassburg.

IIIrd Echelon-

HIrd Army Corps (exclusive 6th Division), by road vid St. Menchould and Metz-one part to Saargemund, the other to Mosbach. Then both by rail, commencing respectively on the 21st and 26th June.

Vith Army Corps (exclusive 11th Division), by road to Nancy and Blain-ville-la-Grande, then entrained from 2nd July.

VIIIth Army Corps, by road.

XIth Army Corps (exclusive 22nd Division), by road, except the Cassel troops, which proceeded by rail from Mainz.

Ist Bavarian Army Corps (exclusive 2nd Division), by road rid Nancy to Strassburg and Maxau, thence entrained from 8th and 9th July respectively.

IVth Echelon-

IInd Army Corps (exclusive 4th Division), entrained at Gray, Vesoul, and Belfort from 18th June.

IVth Army Corps, entrained on 12th June.

Xth Army Corps (exclusive 19th Division) entrained at Vitry, Bar-le-Duc, Blainville-la-Grande, and Nancy, from 21st June.

<sup>\*</sup> Part of these troops were not entrained until after they had crossed the Rhine.

demobilise and dismiss all the garrison troops left at, or returning, home.

At the same time the dismantling of the fortresses and coast fortifications had been commenced, but the latter were to retain for the time being a certain power of resistance. Moreover, the speedy removal of all the submarine defences which might impede navigation was commenced. A Cabinet Order of 4th April, 1871, ordered the complete disarming of the coast works, except so much as was necessary to retain for future purposes, as also the disbandment or return to their homes of the troops employed in the littoral provinces.\* On the 9th March the command-in-chief of the forces in the Baltic and North Sea was abolished, and orders given for the reduction of the navy to the peace effective.† The state of siege for the districts of the Ist, IInd, VIIIth, IXth, Xth, and XIth Army Corps was raised on the 27th March, and on 8th April the order followed for the demobilisation of the five Governments General which had administered the districts of the North German Confederation.

The demobilisation of the whole of the Prussian field army, in accordance with the Royal Cabinet Order of the 1st June, 1871, commenced with the Vth and VIIth Army Corps, which were the first to return home,‡ and with the Guard Corps. This order was applied to the other Corps according to the date that they returned to their districts.

The return of the South German troops to the peace footing took place on reaching their peace garrisons.

On the news of the long wished for return of the troops, preparations were made at all points to receive them.

Besides the triumphal entries which the respective sovereigns and the free towns contrived for the warriors returning to their homes, the whole nation prepared for them a splendid reception. The 16th June had been fixed to greet the German Army and Navy in the newly constituted capital of the German Empire, which were a holiday aspect on the occasion.

After reviewing in front of the gates of the city the Guard Corps and those detachments deputed to represent the whole

¢

In the territory of the North German Confederation the advanced works of Saarlouis, Mainz, and Coblenz, were alone armed, as well as the works on the coast and the river mouths (see subsequent narrative). Orders were at the same time sent for the disarming, and for the raising of the state of siege, of the South German fortresses.

<sup>+</sup> The Volunteer Seewehr was also disbanded.

The Landwehr troops necessary for guarding the prisoners of war were not dismissed until the arrival of these troops. Since the conclusion of the definitive peace the return of all the prisoners of war still in Germany proceeded without hindrance, and was assisted to a great extent by the circumstance that the rollingstock, which had to be sent to France for the return of the German armies, could be utilised.

army, His Majesty the Emperor and King, surrounded by the German princes and his generals, made his entry into Berlin at

the head of his troops.

After defiling past the statue of Frederick the Great, the Emperor proceeded to unveil the monument, which the filial piety of the Sovereign and the gratitude of the Fatherland had erected to the memory of Frederick William III, the Conqueror in the War of Liberation. This celebration formed a worthy close to a war which had been brought to a successful issue by following in the footsteps of our fathers.

# THE OCCUPATION.

On the 27th May, 1871, the disbandment of the 1st Army had been ordered; on the 4th June, a similar order had been given for that of the IInd and IIIrd.\* For the occupation of the territory serving as guarantee for the payment of the war indemnity, his Majesty had appointed the following:-From the Ist Army, the 1st Corps; from the Hnd, the 4th, 6th, 19th, and 24th† Divisions; from the IIIrd, the 11th, 22nd, and 2nd Bavarian Divisions. For the last period, after the payment of two milliards, the 4th, 6th, 19th, and 2nd Bavarian Divisions had been appointed. All the German troops on French soil were combined into the Army of Occupation in France, to the command of which his Majesty the Emperor and King appointed, on the 20th June, General von Manteuffel. In virtue of full powers conferred upon him by the supreme authorities, the General agreed with M. Thiers with regard to the details of the quartering and feeding of the German troops, as well as with regard to their relations with the inhabitants of the occupied districts.

In consequence of the foresight of the Commander-in-Chief, all these circumstances were arranged for the Army of Occupation in the most satisfactory manner. To facilitate further communication, the Chief of the Executive Power had delegated the Count de St. Vallier and the Intendant Blondeau to the head-

quarters of General v. Manteuffel.

The troops of the Army of Occupation established themselves in the quarters first proposed for them, at the same time that the bulk of the German forces returned to their homes. The 11th, 22nd, and 2nd Bavarian Divisions occupied the positions of the Guard, XIth and Ist Bavarian Corps; the Ist Army Corps occupied the district previously held by the Ist Army, including the Aisne Department; the 6th Division, the Marne Department; the 4th received the Vosges, Haute Saône, and Doubs Departments as well as those parts of the Jura and Côte d'Or Departments belonging to the occupation territory; to the 19th were assigned the Aube Department east of the Seine, the Haute Marne, Meurthe and Meuse as far as the Ste. Menehould— Verdun-Metz road; to the 24th was given that part of the Meuse Department situated to the north of that road, the part of the Moselle Department left to the French and the Ardenmes Department.

Army.

<sup>\*</sup> The Crown Prince of Saxony, having relinquished the command of the IIIrd Army in consequence of the Royal Cabinet Order of the 3rd June, the Chief of the General Staff, General v. Schlotheim, carried on the work temporarily. At the same time, the Ist Army Corps was attached to this Army.

+ The 24th Division had been for some time under the orders of the IInd

In distributing these troops, the numbers of which were limited to the least possible, over this extensive territory, the main point kept in view was the permanent occupation of the fortresses and of the chief towns of the departments. The troops in excess of these requirements were to form reserves for unfore-

seen contingencies.

In respect to the exceptional task of this army and the dangerous position in which it might be placed should war break out, not only was it maintained in a condition for the field, but detailed arrangements were made for the employment of the different parts in the event of a concentration becoming necessary. The forts in front of Paris remained fully armed ‡ their ten days' supply of food was raised to three weeks.§

Belfort acquired enhanced importance in consequence of the gradual evacuation of the adjoining departments and the resulting separation from the rest of the territory of occupation. For this reason, not only was the strength of its garrison raised to the war footing, but the heavy artillery necessary for its defence together with the proper ammunition was placed there.

After the breaking up of the existing Inspections-General of Etappen, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Occupation took upon himself the duties connected with the communications. The place of the Line Commissions at Rheims and Nancy was taken by the Railway Commission at Nancy, upon which devolved, besides its own duties, all arrangements with the French railway administrations.

Meanwhile the time was approaching for the payment of the first half milliard, which, according to the Frankfort agreement, was to take place thirty days after the re-establishment of the Government in Paris. In modification of the Preliminary Peace, it had been determined by the Treaty of Frankfort that, for this period, the Departments of the Somme, Seine

The numbers drawing rations amounted on 1st July, 1871, to 119,337 men and 30,375 horses.

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<sup>\*</sup> The infantry and cavalry of these divisions were organised according to the peace distribution; the battalion had a total strength of 802. Besides these, there was with each Division a division of artillery, a pioneer company with entrenching tool column or field bridge train, an infantry and an artillery annumition column, two commissariat columns, a sanitary detachment, two or three field hospitals, and half a field bakery column. To this must be added 13 fortress artillery companies omployed before Paris, and 4 in Belfort. The Army of Occupation had, in consequence, a total strength of 106 battalions, 61 squadrons, 204 guns, 9 pioneer companies, and 17 fortress artillery companies.

<sup>†</sup> See Map No. 42. ‡ See aute, p. 167.

<sup>§</sup> As soon as the railway was available, room was made by the removal of 62 heavy guns, which were left in the siege park of Villiers-le-Bel, and did not belong to the armament proper of the forts.

Belfort was armed against an assault, and was provided with the fortress artillery material to resist a siege. Of the 316 heavy guns necessary for this purpose, part were derived from the stores found in the place and from the siege park employed before the fortress, and the remainder were brought up from Germany.

Inférieure, and Eure, \* should alone be left in French hands, and not also those parts of the district nearest to the capital.

After the payment had been made, orders were given on the 20th July to evacuate the territory in question. Of the troops posted there the headquarters Ist Army Corps and the 1st Division commenced their march homewards, whilst the 2nd Division was transferred to the Oise and Aisne Departments.

For the remainder of the Army of Occupation no changes in

position became necessary.

The unexpectedly favourable results of the loan, which the French Minister of Finance had been at once empowered to raise, was a convincing proof of the amount of wealth still existing in the country, in spite of the immense losses that had been sustained. The country generally, and Paris in particular, lent a ready hand to the Government to pay off the war indemnity before it was due, and thereby liberate themselves the sooner of the German troops.

The withdrawal of the Germans from the Oise, Scine and Oise, Seine, and Seine and Marne Departments, and the evacuation of all the forts still occupied had, in accordance with the Treaty, to be preceded by the payment of another milliard. This sum having been for the most part paid by the 8th September, 1871, the dismantling; was at once commenced, so that the outer works could be handed over to the Paris.

military authorities on the 20th.

Meanwhile the 2nd and 22nd Divisions were already on their way home. The 11th, the return of which was likewise in the near future, soccupied in anticipation thereof the district situated south of the Paris-Strassburg railway, and bounded by the line Nancy-Mirécourt-Chermont--Vitry-le-Français, from which the 19th removed, whilst the 4th, 6th, and 24th remained in their previous quarters. The 2nd Bavarian Division, to which fell the Aisne Department, received instructions to occupy also the Oise Department until the third half milliard was paid.

The Army Headquarters had been at Compiègne since the commencement of the occupation and were transferred on the

14th September to Nancy.

With the object of bringing about the last period of occupation¶--during which only 50,000 men were to garrison six departments--further negociations were entered into by the



<sup>\*</sup> Of the Eure Department, only that part situated on the right bank of the Seine was still occupied (see aute, p. 163).

<sup>†</sup> On 11th August, the strength of the Army of Occupation amounted to 101,834 men and 26,610 horses.

<sup>†</sup> The French fortress artillery material was sent to Toul and Mézières. § The negociations, which led to the Convention of 12th October, 1871 (see subsequent narrative), were at this time so far advanced that an agreement appeared no longer doubtful.

<sup>||</sup> Up to the 8th October, 1871, 3 battalions, 1 squadron, and 1 battery were-moved to the Oise Department. The numbers drawing rations in the Army of Occupation on 1st October, 1871, were 72,316 men and 19,066 horses.

¶ See ante. p. 162.

French. As the result, an agreement was concluded on the 12th October, 1871, by virtue of which France bound herself to concede certain abatements of custom dues to the territory coded to Germany, and to pay the deficient 500 millions of the second milliard by the 1st May, 1872. In exchange for this, Germany had offered to withdraw her troops at once from the Aisne. Aube, Côte d'Or, Jura, Doubs and Haute Saône Departments. which were to be considered neutral in a military sense until payment was made. Accordingly, the troops moved away on the 22nd October; the 11th and 24th Divisions were conveyed to Germany, and the 2nd Bavarian to the Ardennes Department, the Montmedy and Briey arrondissements, as also to the The 6th Division remained in the Marne Châlons Camp. Department; the 19th moved to the Meuse Department. exclusive of the Montmédy arrondissement, to the Meurthe Department and the French part of the Moselle Department. exclusive of the Briev arrondissement; the 4th to the Haute Marne and Vosges Departments, and to the Belfort arrondissement.t

In arranging these positions, in which the troops had to remain until the probable end of the occupation, 2nd March, 1874, special attention was directed to carrying on the duties scrupulously on the peace footing. The training of the men could therefore be proceeded with in proper form. The regimental drills were followed by brigade drills, and afterwards by autumn maneouvres.

On the 29th June, 1872, a further convention was concluded. By virtue of this, France bound herself to pay the three milliards of debt as follows: namely, half a milliard two months after the exchange of ratifications; half a milliard on 1st February, 1873; one milliard on 1st March, 1874; one, and the last, milliard on 1st March, 1875.

After payment of the first-mentioned half milliard, the Marne and Haute Marne Departments were to be evacuated, and when the fourth milliard was liquidated, the Vosges and Ardennes Departments.

Although 500 millions were paid on 7th September, 1872,‡ the corresponding evacuation could not be entirely carried out before the 4th November, as the erection of hut barracks, which the French Administration were constructing wherever permanent buildings were not available, had occupied more time than was anticipated.

On and after the 18th November, 1872, the troops were distributed as follows:—The 4th Division was in the Vosges Department, exclusive of the Neufchâteau and Coussey cantons, and in the Belfort arrondissement; the 19th in the Meurthe

1 The exchange of ratified documents took place on 7th July.

<sup>\*</sup> In the rayon of the 19th Division there were, in addition, 7 squadrons and 1 battery of the 4th quartered at Luneville, and 7 squadrons of the 6th at Commercy.

† By sending back the 11th and 24th Divisions, and by causing the infantry battalions to revert to the peace effective of the Old Guard battalions, the strength agreed upon was arranged.

Department, and in the French part of the Moselle Department, exclusive of the Briey arrondissement; the 6th in the Meuse Department, exclusive of the Montmédy arrondissement, and in the Neufchâteau and Coussey cantons; the 2nd Bavarian in the Ardennes Department and in the Montmédy and Briey arrondissements.

At the beginning of December, 1872, the third milliard was paid. At the commencement of the year 1873, large payments towards the sum due on 1st March, 1874, were reported. The expectation that France would relieve herself of the remaining part of her debt at an early date found its justification. The final convention, concluded on 15th March, 1873, bound France to pay the fourth milliard by the 5th May, 1873, and to extinguish the fifth by successive instalments of 250 millions each on the 5th June, 5th July, 5th August, and 5th September, 1873. In exchange for this Germany agreed to evacuate the whole of the occupation territory after the second instalment. Only the fortress of Verdun, with the garrison increased by 1,000 men, and a line of communication leading to the frontier, was to remain in German hands as a last guarantee for the final payment.

After dismantling the fortresses of Belfort, Toul, and Mézières, the Army of Occupation returned home on the 2nd August. The garrison of Verdun,\* which had been previously reinforced, followed on the 13th September, 1873. Three days later General v. Manteuffel quitted French territory with the last

German troops.

<sup>\*</sup> The detailed arrangements with regard to the occupation of this fortress were agreed to between the Communder-in-Chief and the French authorities. Besides the headquarters, there were to remain in the place—the 12th Infantry Brigade, the 1st Squadron 11th Lancers, the Staff as well as the 5th and 6th Heary Batteries of 3rd Foot Division, 3rd Field Artillery Regiment, the 3rd Field Pioncer Company 3rd Pioneer Battalion, the 2nd and 4th Companies 10th Foot Artillery Battalion, the 6th Company 3rd Foot Artillery Regiment, and No. 3 Commissariat Column IIIrd Army Corps.

THE FIELD TELEGRAPH, FIELD POST, SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION, COMMISSARIAT, HOSPITAL, DIVINE SERVICE, AND MILITARY LAW DEPARTMENTS.—THE RECRUITING OF THE GERMAN ARMY.—EVENTS IN GERMANY.—RESULTS OF THE WAR.

The services in war of the combatant part of an army are to a great extent dependent on the mode in which the communications are regulated, so as to bring to the field troops their various requirements in food and ammunition, to tend their sick and wounded, and to replenish their losses in men, horses, and material. It is only by a careful direction of these important branches of the service and the fullest devotion of the persons employed, that the troops are able, amid the changing circumstances of war, to maintain the necessary strength for battle.

Besides, therefore, describing the operations and the battles, the history of the war of 1870-71 must give a picture of those services, so vital to the maintenance and support of that army, which were rendered by the army departments and by the

home population during that period.

The organisation of the communications leading to, and in, the theatre of war, so far as the railways are concerned, has already been described in detail.\* To complete the description it is desirable to glance in the first place at those departments which were charged with the transmission of intelligence and orders.

<sup>•</sup> See Part I, Vol. I, pp. 58-59, II, 456-458; and Part II, Vol. I, pp. 135, 170, and Vol. III, p. 103-112, 158-9.

## THE FIELD TELEGRAPH.

The function of the field telegraph is to organise as rapid a means of communication as possible between the different parts of the field army, and also between this latter and home territory, thereby facilitating unity of command over the im-mense masses composing an army. This service thus became of great importance in respect to the progress of military operations.

Preparation and organization.

The telegraph service in the field was divided into field telegraph divisions and etappen telegraph divisions, of which the former had to connect the headquarters of Armies with their Corps, the latter to connect the headquarters with the permanent lines of the country. By the joint action of both services the inter-communication of the headquarters of Armics was to be maintained, as also between these and the Royal Headquarters.

A third service, the State telegraph, which also furnished the officials necessary for the field stations, had to establish in a more solid manner the lines of etappen telegraph, and

keep them in working order.

In order that these different services might work in unison. the Director-General of the State Telegraph, Major-General v. Chauvin, had at the Royal Headquarters a representative, the chief of the military telegraph, Colonel Meydam, with whom he was in constant communication. Colonel Moydam was specially charged with the direction of the telegraph of the Royal Headquarters and of that of the lines of communication, but was also in constant relation with the field telegraph divisions. He exercised his influence over their working through the Quarter-master-General, Lieutenant-General v. Podbielski, who had to regulate the general transaction of business, especially the communication between the Commanders-in-Chief of Armics and between these and the Royal Headquarters. In other respects the Commanders-in-Chief of Armies had free disposal of the telegraph divisions attached to them for whatever special objects and requirements might seem best.

At the outset five field and three etappen telegraph divisions were mobilised in Prussia and attached to the field army.† In

Inspection. (This division only formed on 11th August.)

See General Map No. 10. † The difference between these numbers and those given in Part I, Vol. I, p. 40, is explained by the subsequent narrative. The detachments were distributed

Royal Headquarters-4th Field Telegraph Division, 1st Lioutenant Friedheim,

<sup>3</sup>rd Engineer Inspection.

Ist Army—1st Field Telegraph Division, Captain May, 4th Engineer Inspection: later, 1st Lieutenant Witte, 1st Engineer Inspection.

IInd Army—2nd Field Telegraph Division, Captain Hearfahrdt, 2nd Engineer Inspection; 5th Field Telegraph Division, Captain Liddecke, 1st Engineer

addition to these, Bavaria had mobilised one etappen and two field telegraph divisions,\* one for each army corps, and Württemberg had also mobilised one field telegraph division.† The effective strength of these divisions in personnel and material

was smaller than those of North Germany.

To replace the officials detailed for duty with the field telegraph, the State telegraph received non-commissioned officers and men of the army who had been already trained to these duties. In order to be able to extend the telegraphic network immediately after the commencement of operations. working parties and material were placed in readiness at the French frontier, and supplementary lines were creeted in the area of strategical concentration of the German Army and on the coasts of the North Sea and Bultic. The right of sending

telegrams was regulated by the Quartermaster-General.

After the entry of the German Army into France the Royal Operations of Headquarters and the headquarters of the 1st and 1Ind the field Armies were restricted in the first instance for their telegraph until the graphic communication to the line Saarbrücken—Kreuznach, investment of the IIIrd Army to the line Landau-Ludwigshafen. As the Metz and army gradually advanced, these permanent lines were con- Paris. nected with those of the field telegraph, which were laid by way of Remilly to Pont-a-Mousson for the Royal Head-quarters and the Hnd Army, by way of Boucheporn to Varize for the Ist, and by way of Hagenau, Ober-Modern, and Luneville to Nancy for the IIIrd Army. To connect these lines together, there were the transverse lines St. Avold-Boucheporn, Lützelstein-Saargemünd-Bening, and, later on, Nancy—Pont-à-Mousson. Besides certain shorter branches, the line Hagenau-Vendenheim-Steinburg was prepared for communication with the Baden Division despatched against Strassburg.

During the engagements round Metz, the telegraphic net-

IIIrd Army—3rd Field Telegraph Division, Captain Kauffmann, 1st Engineer Inspection; later, 1st Lieutenant Fischer, 1st Engineer Inspection. Etappen Inspection, 1st Army-3rd Etappen Telegraph Division.

The effective of a field telegraph division consisted of—1 Captain as Commander, & Lieutenants (inclusive of 1 from the train), 1 surgeon, 7 telegraph officials, 90 pioneers, 45 train soldiers, 15 riding and 58 draught horses and 13 carriages.

<sup>90</sup> pioneers, 45 train soldiers, 15 riding and 58 draught horses and 13 carriages.

The effective of an etappen telegraph division of two sections consisted of—
1 Director in charge. The first section—2 Lieutenants (1 from train), 7 telegraph
officials, 35 pioneers, 37 train soldiers, 8 riding and 52 draught horses, 11 carriages.

The second section—5 telegraph officials, 15 train soldiers, 4 telegraph foremen,
20 telegraphiets, 8 riding and 18 draught horses, 5 carriages.

\* 1st Field Telegraph Division, 1st Lieutenant Ritter v. Renauld, Bavarian
Engineers; 2nd Field Telegraph Division, 1st Lieutenant Ruchs, Bavarian Engineers;
† Lieutenant Bausenberger, Württemberg Field Pioneer Corps. The command
obanged hands frequently.

obanged hands frequently. In the littoral districts, 1,288 miles of wire and 44 new stations were opened.

work was extended to the vicinity of the battlefield, to Courcelles, Gorze, and Thiaucourt. During the investment of the fortress the headquarters of the Army Corps and of the different Divisions were connected together and with their Army Headquarters.\* In order to establish communication with the Meuse Army, and later on with the Royal Headquarters, the State telegraph constructed in August another line, running from Pont-à-Mousson round Metz, and thence,

avoiding Verdun, to Clermont-en-Argonne.

During the forward movement upon Châlons, the Royal Headquarters used the line Bar-le-Duc-Commercy, which here bifurcated on the one side to Thiaucourt for the Meuse Army, and to Frouardt and Vaucouleurs for the HIrd Army. As at this period rapid communication between the various parts of the field armies was particularly necessary, every effort was directed between the 21st and 25th August to connect the different army corps headquarters of the IIIrd Army with the headquarters of that army, and with the Royal Headquarters. † The telegraph lines subsequently followed the army in its movement to the right as far as Varennes and Cernay-en-Dormois, whence, all the material having been expended, the despatches had to be conveyed by relays of orderlies. Immediately after the battle of Sédan this fortress was connected with the line Clermont-Metz by way of Montmedy and Consenvoye.

During the subsequent march to Paris, the Royal Head-quarters and the Meuse Army connected themselves with the line Nancy—Paris, which later on was extended from Lagny as far as Ferrières and Versailles. In this way the Royal Head-quarters remained in constant connection both with the troops investing Metz and Strassburg and with the advancing armies. Meanwhile, the Meuse Army, after the surrender of Laon, had connected this fortress with Rheinis, and on its arrival before Paris, had, by the 20th September, placed the line Lagny—Roissy—St. Brice in working order. The HIrd Army which, during its advance, had extended its communications from Epernay through Montmirail to Coulommiers, and from here had established connection with the great line at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, continued the lines from Coulommiers onward by way of Villeneuve St. Georges and Longjuneau to Palaiseau.

During these events, it had been evident that the resources of the field telegraph did not always suffice for the objects which were contemplated. Up to the present, the idea

<sup>†</sup> Avoiding Toul.

† The following lines were repaired:—Void—Ménil-la-Horgne, Vaucouleurs—Gondrecourt, Gondrecourt—Tréveray, Vaucouleurs—Pagny, Ligny—Nangois-le-Petit, Ligny—Trony-lle, Bar-le-Duc—Blesme—St. Dizier—Varsy.



<sup>\*</sup> See Part I, Vol. II, p. 476. No telegraph was laid down between the outposts and their headquarters for want of material. Mounted orderlies and optical signals had to be employed instead. The line Maizières—Uckange was restored, in order to communicate with the troops investing Thionville.

of connecting the Army Headquarters with the daily halting places of the Corps headquarters had to be abandoned. On the other hand, the field and ctappen telegraphs made every effort to secure telegraphic communication between the Army Headquarters and the permanent network in rear.

The field telegraph divisions worked usually in the front, their material being replaced later by that of the etappen telegraph divisions. The latter again gradually removed their material, as soon as the more permanent lines of the State

telegraph were ready to replace it.

At the commencement of the war, more particularly, it was not always possible to prevent our own troops from thoroughly destroying the French lines which had been slightly interrupted, thereby rendering difficult the rapid repair of the lines. The German field lines were also occasionally damaged by carelessness. Furthermore, the pioneer detachments detailed to the telegraph divisions had neither any practice at the outset in repairing the French lines, nor had they the requisite material.\* Although all these evils were overcome in course of time, yet at the end of August it became urgently necessary to increase the field telegraph.

In consequence of this, two more field and two more etappen telegraph divisions were formed in September; they reached

the theatre of war at the beginning of October.

In order to facilitate the administration of the State telegraph, which had replaced the etappen telegraph in the work between the field army and home territory, and was only able to carry out this service with difficulty, three war telegraph directions were formed at Nancy, Epernay. | and

In this manner the telegraph gradually succeeded in completely mastering the extensive field of its action, although the enormous extension of the theatre of war and the rapid

tion, according to the circumstances of the moment.

It was extremely difficult to augment the staff of officials. Later at Rheims.

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<sup>\*</sup> Only the 2nd section of the ctappen telegraph divisions was provided with the material and tools requisite to repair the permanent lines.

† The following were formed:—By 5th Pioneer Battalion in Glogau, the 6th Field Telegraph Division, Captain Bliesener, 3rd Engineer Inspection; later, Lieutenant Fleck, 4th Engineer Inspection; by the 10th Pioneer Battalion at Minden, the 7th Field Telegraph Division, Captain v. Woyna, 3rd Engineer Inspection; by the 2nd Pioneer Battalion at Stettin, the 4th Etappen Telegraph Division; by the

the 2nd Pioneer Battalion at Stettin, the 4th Etappen Telegraph Division; by the 4th Pioneer Battalion at Magdeburg, the 5th Etappen Telegraph Division.

1 After the addition of these divisions to the armies, the following were at disposal:—Royal Headquarters, 4th Field Telegraph Division and 2nd Etappen Telegraph Division; Ist Army, 1st Field Telegraph Division and 8rd Etappen Telegraph Division; IInd Army, 5th Field Telegraph Division; IIIrd Army, 3rd and 6th Field Telegraph Divisions, 1st and 4th Etappen Telegraph Divisions, 1st and 2nd Bavarian Field Telegraph Divisions, Bavarian Etappen Telegraph Division, and Württemberg Field Telegraph Division; Meuso Army, 2nd Field Telegraph Division; XIIIth Army Corps, 7th Field Telegraph Division; XIVth Army Corps, 5th Etappen Telegraph Division.

During the further course of the war, several changes took place in this distribution, according to the circumstances of the moment.

movements of the troops frequently gave rise to very serious difficulties. It not infrequently happened that the lines which had been completed with much trouble had to be again removed, because some headquarter, in consequence of a change in the military situation, had altered its assigned destination, and the counter-order arrived too late. The construction was the most quickly effected when the telegraph divisions were attached to the advanced guards, and carried out the work at the same rate as the latter progressed. Often also they hastened forward to the vanguards under special escort. In such cases, it happened frequently that telegraph stations had to hold their ground under fire, or had to give way before the sudden advance of the enemy.

The unfavourable weather was also not without its influence, as it both delayed construction,\* and frequently destroyed the lines which had been made ready. Lastly, the constant and premeditated damage done to the lines by the inhabitants and franctireurs gave much trouble. In consequence of the length of the lines and the small effective of garrison troops, it was frequently impossible, in spite of the greatest vigilance,

to prevent this damage.

During the siege of Paris Versailles became the permanent centre of the telegraphic network which was daily undergoing

extension.

The telegraphic lines established at the commencement of the investment having gradually become formed into a continuous girdle, the capital was surrounded by two parallel wires which, starting from Versailles, touched Longjumeau, Villeneuve St. Georges, Lagny, Gonesse, Margency, and St. Germain-en-Laye. One of these wires, with which those leading to the provinces were connected, served more particularly for communication between the Royal Headquarters and the Army Headquarters and the Inspectors-General of Etappen; the other, with its numerous branches, for communication between the different parts of the Army of Investment. It not only connected all the Corps headquarters and the distant Divisional and Brigade staffs, but also brought within reach important points of the outpost line, the observatories, and, later on, the groups of siege batteries. Communication with Germany was maintained by two main lines, which led from Lagny past Bar-le-Duc and Nancy to Landau, and by way of Rheims and Metz to Saarbrücken. After the conclusion of the armistice, the forts were brought into communication with the wire running round the city and

‡ Foreign apparatus was frequently found attached, especially to the etappen lines. French despatches were seldom intercepted.

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From the investment of Metz to the end of the eampaign.

<sup>\*</sup> For instance, on 4th January, the 3rd Field Telegraph Division took 9½ hours in frosty weather to construct 5½ miles of line between Villacoubley and Saclay, near Paris: on the other hand, on 9th November, the 2nd Etappen Telegraph Division, in fine weather, only took 7½ hours to put up 15½ miles of wire between Juzanvigny and Fincy (cast of Troyes) by way of Brienne-le-Château.

with one another; during the occupation of Paris, three stations

were pushed forward into the city itself.

In order to establish connection with the armies intended to cover the investment of Paris, the following lines were created from Versailles during the course of the campaign: namely, to Amiens, Rouen, Dreux, Chartres, Orléans, Montargis: to Dijon, by way of Melun and Montbard, and to Chaumont-en-Bassigny, by way of Troyes. These were connected afterwards with the wires leading to the armies and detachments fighting in the

provinces.

When the 1st Army advanced towards the Oise after the fall of Metz, the field telegraph continued its operations in rear of the army, utilising the existing lines through Rheims and Soissons. Before the battle of Amiens, wires were laid from the previous terminal station at Montdidier to Breteuil and Moreuil, for the purpose of facilitating communication with the wings of the army. As soon as the wires were continued to Amiens after the occupation of that city, direct connection could be established with Versailles through Creil. In the further advance of the army upon Rouen, the two sections from Amiens, by way of Poix—Buchy and Poix—Gournay to Rouen, could be repaired.

After the victory on the Hallue, every effort was made to preserve the connection between the separated parts of the army. Lines were creeted from Amiens, by way of Corbie, to Albert and to the neighbourhood of Péronne, and were continued from this latter point to Combles and Ham. After the battle of Bapaume and the fall of Péronne, these lines were prolonged further, and Amiens was connected with La Fère by way of Ham. By this means, the forces united on the Somme obtained all the advantages accruing from a rapid transmission of reports and orders, which were of much value also in the operations before the battle of St. Quentin. During the pursuit, the line Ham—St. Quentin—Bantouzelle was established.

When at the commencement of October, the Ist Bavarian Corps and the 22nd Division were dispatched to Orleans and Chartres, both places were quickly placed in telegraphic union with the line round Paris. The first of these lines had, however, to be partially abandoned after the engagement at Coulmiers, so that Toury now formed the terminal station for the recently-formed detachment under the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg. As soon as this detachment, on the approach of the IInd Army, took post between Chartres and Rambouillet. Epernon came into telegraphic connection with Nogent-le-Roi. When the Grand Duke advanced, in the middle of November, in the direction of Le Mans, communication was kept up through Nogent-le-Rotrou, whilst, at the same time, the rearward telegraphic network was extended by the two branches Versailles—Dreux and Chartres—Bonneval--Arpajon. In the subsequent movements of the detachment upon Beaugency and later upon Toury, not only was the connection with

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CALIFORNIA.

Chartres maintained, but an immediate connection with the lines of the IInd Army from Bonneval through Viabon to

Toury was established.

The IInd Army, on leaving Metz for the Middle Loire, had at first established two lines, which led from Blesme by way of Montierender, and by way of Chaumont-en-Bassigny to Troyes. During the forced march of the army from the vicinity of Troyes—Chaumont to the westward, the telegraphic connection was continued from Troyes by way of Sens to Nemours. Later on, communication was opened with Versailles from Pithiviers, by way of Corbeil, after restoring the French lines, and also by way of Angerville.

Up to the engagements at Orléans, the lines in the territory occupied by the IInd Army could be completed; during the days of the battle they were carried forward, and, on the 5th December, continued into the occupied city. In order to maintain connection with the corps pushed in advance, the branches from Orléans to Châteauneuf, Beaugency and La

Ferté St. Aubin, were at once completed.

On the advance towards Tours of the Duke of Mecklenburg's detachment, supported by the IIIrd and Xth Army Corps, the line Orléans—Beaugency was extended through Blois to Vendôme. When, in the latter half of December, the IInd Army concentrated in the neighbourhood of Orléans, and the detachment took post at Chartres, the telegraphic network was extended by the branches Vendôme—Châteaudun—Bonneval, Châteaudun—Orléans, Chartres—Courville, and Châteauneuf—Montargis—Gien; this last branch was continued to Briare on 31st December.

The movements of the troops upon Le Mans, which commenced at the beginning of January,\* were followed by lines of telegraph, both from Chartres through Nogent-le-Rotrou,† and from Vendôme through St. Calais. After the occupation of Le Mans, the connection of the latter town with Alençon, Conlie, Château Courville, La Fontaine and by way of Tours with Châteaurenault and Bois was at once completed. The XIIIth Army Corps, moving from Alençon to Rouen, opened the section Chartres—Evreux—Rouen on 24th January; another line through Buchy to Dieppe was afterwards established.

On the south-eastern theatre of war, during the siege of Strassburg, telegraphic lines had been constructed from the headquarters at Mundolsheim to Vendenheim, to Kronenburg near the scene of attack, to the Baden Division at Oberschäffelsheim and through Rastatt to the detachment posted at

Kehl.

When after the fall of the fortress, the XIVth Army Corps moved to the southward, the line Blainville-la-Grande—Epinal

<sup>\*</sup> See Part II, Vol. II, p. 84.
† The connection between Chartres and Brou by way of Illiers was first established

was restored, in connection with the main line Landau—Nancy -Paris. All further extensions had to be provisionally deferred for want of material. It was only after the capture of Dijon that the section Epinal-Vesoul could be placed in working order.

When the Corps occupied very extended positions at the beginning of November, the necessity of more rapid communication became manifest. Although only one etappen telegraph division, and but little material were available, Vesoul was connected by way of Lure with La Chapelle, and by way of Gray with Dijon.\* This connection contributed to a large extent in enabling the concentration of the Corps at Vesoul, ordered on 26th December, to be carried into effect in two days. The stations Dijon, Mirebeau-sur-Bèze, and Gray were evacuated; on the other hand, a fresh line was made for the 4th Reserve Division from Vesoul to Villersexel.

When, however, at the commencement of January the Corps again moved northward, the sections situated south of the line Vesoul-La Chapelle, and, during the final concentration behind the Lisaine the stations west of Lure, had to be abandoned, so that communication with the Royal Headquarters could only take place by way of Mülhausen. Within twenty-four hours the most important posts of the Lisaine position were connected together and with the headquarters. By this means, during the subsequent battle, reports and orders were transmitted by telegraph; this arrangement was of considerable importance for the conduct of the action. In the further movements after the battle, and in the joint operations with the other parts of the recently formed South Army,† the lines Lure -Villersexel-Rougement and, as the movement progressed, Lure-Vesoul-Gray-La Barre-Byans were brought into use.

After the passage of the French East Army into Switzerland, the lines from La Barre through Dôle to Lons-le-Saunier and Dijon, and from Gray to Fontaine Française, Auxonne. and through Dijon to Beaune and Montbard, were placed in working order.

In spite of their want of experience at first, these new telegraph corps were able to comply with the manifold demands made upon them, and have shown that they are not only an effective but an indispensable means for facilitating military and political action.

The amount of line worked by the field telegraph corps during the war was 6,729 milest with 407 stations; by the State telegraph, 7,765 miles with 118 stations.

On 17th December another line was constructed from Gray through Dam-

pierre to Port-sur-Saône.

† The 7th Field Telegraph Division had been assigned to it in January.

‡ Of these, 5,127 miles of repaired French lines, 496 provisional, and 1106 miles field telegraph. No detailed mention is made in this work of the telegraphic petwork laid down during the progress of operations, but all lines of the field and State telegraph used during the war are shown on General Map No. 10.

## FIELD POST.

The organisation of the field post had for its primary object the rapid and safe transmission of military correspondence and other consignments for service purposes. In the second place it was intended to form a means of transmitting private letters, newspapers, and small private remittances.

Although for these purposes no special formations existed in time of peace, the German postal administration succeeded, in the shortest possible time, in providing a service which satisfied

the requirements of the campaign.

This consisted of field post offices and etappen post directions. The former were charged with the postal service of the troops: the latter had to organise and maintain the communication to the rear and the connection with the Home postal department. The functions of the etappen post commenced at a distance of one day's march in rear of the headquarters of Army Corps, and included also the postal work at the stations on the line of communications. Both departments were, in a military point of view, subject to the military authorities, and, for technical matters, to the German postal authorities.

To facilitate the service, all consignments for the field army were sent to collecting depôts in Germany, where the letters were sorted by corps and forwarded to the first station on the line of the etappen post. From this point they were conveyed to the field-post offices, and there taken over by the troops. Correspondence intended for troops not on the move were sent to their fixed destinations without going to the collecting

depôts.

Organisation and duties.

> At the commencement of the war the following field-post offices were established for the troops of the North German

Confederation:

One chief post office, under Chief Field Postmaster Zschüschner for the Royal Headquarters, 3 army post offices\* for the three armies, and for the army corps 13 field-post offices, each having 3 subsidiary agencies for the two infantry divisions and the corps artillery.

Besides these, three etappen post directions were organised

for the Inspectors-General of Etappen.

These arrangements, however, proved inadequate during the course of the campaign. In consequence, the means still

1 With the Inspector-General Ist Army, Etappen Post Director Wittmann; Hand Army, Schliewen; HInd Army, Lietz.

With the etappen post-directions only the Directors and the two Inspectors were mobilised.

<sup>\*</sup> With the 1st Army under Army Postmaster Krause, with the 1Ind under Army

Postmaster Bock, and with the IIIrd Army under Army Postmaster Lambrecht.

† With the IXth Corps there was an additional field-post agency for the 25th Division. Originally each field-post office had an "agency for the advanced guard," but this was soon abolished, and the agencies were employed for new formations.

available of the field and State post were employed later to form a subsidiary agency for each of the eight cavalry and five landwehr or reserve divisions, for the Governments-General of Alsace and Lorraine, and for the headquarters of the Meuse and South Armies, while a field-post office was organised for the XIIIth

and for the XIVth Army Corps respectively.\*

The technical direction of the entire service was centered in the General Post Office at Berlin, under the General Post Director Stephan, so that a close connection was established between the field-post and the home arrangements, while unity of direction and rapid communication of the necessary orders were secured. In order to organise the postal service, a fieldpost department was created at the General Post Office on the first day of mobilisation.

The South German Field Post was organised on similar lines. For the Bavarian Army Corps two field-post offices, with two field agencies each, and an etappen post office,† were organised; for the Württemberg Field Division one field-post office and three brigade field-post agencies, and a field etappen post : for the Baden Field Division a field-post agency.

Even at the commencement of the war the postal service Work of the had to contend with many difficulties, as the railways were field-post

almost entirely taken up with the troops.

It was not until the 7th-10th August that the ctappen Paris, post offices could open at Saarlouis, Homburg, and Landau, after which, about the iniddle of August, the postal communication to the rear could be regularly organised. The 1st Army now received its letters by way of Saarlouis and Corny, the Hind by way of Homburg, Saargemund, and Pont-a-Mousson, and the IIIrd, using partly the railways, by way of Landau, Hagenau, and Nancy. The necessary cross-communication between these postal routes was carried on by mounted messengers.

During the movements which now followed in quick succession, and the direction of which was frequently changed, it became necessary to abstain from laying down fixed itineraries for the post. It was not until the advance commenced from Sedan to Paris, that a courier post with fixed stations could be organised for the Royal Headquarters. This post, keeping pace with the

† A total of 101 officials, exclusive of the Landwehr called out for postal duties.

22 carriages and 60 horses, were available.

‡ Besides 18 field post divisions charged with collection and delivery to the troops. Besides postilions and train soldiers, there were 46 officials, who were drawn from post officials liable to military service. The material consisted of

8 waggons and 18 horses.

§ With 25 officials, 4 carriages, and 10 horses; postilions and drivers were taken from the army. An Etappen Post Inspector was appointed for the etappen post organised later by the postal authorities.



until the investment of

<sup>&</sup>quot; In all, 77 field post offices with 788 officials, 869 horses, and 188 waggons were formed during the war. Inclusive of etappen and home territory posts, 411 terman post offices, with 2,140 officials, were organised in France. Besides these, 3,761 officials were withdrawn from the post-office to serve in the ranks, so that altogether 5,001 persons belonging to the post office in peace time were employed. The total length of the postal communication was 3,318 miles.

military operations, ran from the railway station at Remilly through Pont-à-Mousson, Bar-le-Duc, Châlons-sur-Marne, Meaux and Lagny to Versailles. Very shortly after, the line was also utilised for a carriage postal service, and then formed the main artery of communication of the occupied district, into which flowed many of the branch lines and the circular post organised for the army investing Paris. North and south of this line lay the postal roads of the Meuse; and HIrd Armies; the former ran from Pont-à-Mousson, through St. Mihiel, Vouziers, Rethel and Dammartin, the latter from Nancy, round Toul, by way of Bar-le-Duc, Châlons, Epernay, Coulommiers and Villeneuve St. Georges or Corbeil to the circular post round Paris.

These postal lines with their numerous transversal connections and branches were at first confined to the roads, and could only use by degrees the railways as they became open to traffic, and upon which travelling post offices were

established.

On and after the 15th October the transmission of parcels in the same way as letters was commenced, and in spite of the immense number that were posted, this arrangement continued with short interruptions until the end of the war. The principal depôts for parcels intended for France, were in the first instance at Remilly for the 1st and 1Ind Armies, at Nanteuil-sur-Marne, later on at Lagny, for the IIIrd and Meuse Armies, with subsidiary depôts at Corbeil and Dammartin.

The difficulties and impediments in the way of the field-post service increased during the course of the war, and became more accentuated during the war against the Republic. The great distances entailed by the diversity of the operations, the rapid and frequently changing movements of the armies, the masses of correspondence to be despatched, and at times the insecurity of the roads, demanded immense efforts on the part

of the personnel.

Matters of great importance and difficulty were regulated on the spot by the General Post Director, or by the officials of

† The relays for the circular post were stationed at Lagny, Villeneuve St. Georges, Versailles, Argenteuil (later, St. German-en-Laye), and Gonesse.

If For instance, the arrangement of the main courier line, the circular post at Paris, the field railway post offices, the conclusion of a Convention with Belgium, and the installation of Chief Post Directions at Strassburg and Metz.

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The couriers completed the journey by road from Remilly to Versuilles in 42 hours. From 9th November till the return of the Royal Headquarters, they were forwarded by rail through Strassburg as far as Lagny.

<sup>†</sup> For the etappen post road of the Meuse Army the General Post Office sent a civilian—first Postdirector Hutscheureuter, afterwards in his place Postcouncillor Lehmann. After three weeks the personnel of the etappen post included 81 officials, 56 postilions, with 19 carriages and 144 horses. The carriage of correspondence from Pont a Mousson to the army of investment eccupied on an average 21 days.

<sup>§</sup> During the first 55 days 1,219,533 parcels were received, for the despatch of which 81,922 bags, 560 railway wagons, and many hundred carriages were requisite. The Baden and Württemberg Field Post had previously forwarded private parcels. The transmission of Baden private parcels was undertaken on the 1st September by a military agency in connection with the Baden War Ministry.

the German Postal Administrations. To facilitate the service special field-post tables were prepared and distributed by the Postal Department in Berlin. In these tables was shown the distribution of the whole of the troops with the post offices upon which they were dependent, and any changes were inserted from day to day. Notwithstanding these precautions, it was impossible to avoid occasional delays, when in spite of enquiries the field-post was unable to find out in time the positions of corps, or when these latter on account of the distance were not in a position to send for their letter-bags. It happened at times, also, that the mails were attacked and captured by the inhabitants or by franctireurs.\* Morcover, the horses speedily succumbed from heavy work in wet weather, from insufficient food and indifferent stabling, and were difficult to replace.

The temporary interruption of the railways, which were used to the utmost extent possible, did not cause any serious impediment to postul communication, as when necessary the mails

were carried by road.

When the 1st and IInd Armies continued their march after Services of the fall of Metz, the field post following in their wake placed the field post until the and the lines of advance in connection with the existing regular of the war. lines, and in a short time instituted a regular postal service in the permanently occupied districts. The 1st Army obtained a great advantage from the circumstance that by a treaty with Belgium the mails from Cologne were brought through Belgian territory by way of Sedan. It was not until after the fall of Montmedy and the opening of the railway from Metz to Sedan that the Belgian route was abandoned.

In the middle of January the field-post communications extended in the north of France to St. Quentin, Péronne, Abbeville, Eu, Dieppe, and Yvetôt, in the west and south of Paris to Alençon, Le Mans, Tours, Orléans, and Montargis.

On the south-eastern theatre of war, an etappen post road was instituted from Blainville through Epinal, Vesoul, and Gray to Dijon.† In consequence of the rapid change of operations, the service on these lines had to be temporarily stopped, so that in January the mails could only be sent for some weeks by way of Strassburg, Mülhausen, and Dammerkirch. It was only after the battle on the Lisaine that those branches were again given over to traffic, and afterwards used by the entire South Army tas the Hand and VIIth Army Corps had aban-

until the end

On 14th November, Post Conductor Bodensohn, who had reached with a parcel post the town of Sens, not yet occupied by the Germans, was attacked by a raging mob. After a gallant resistance, and after receiving a severe wound, he was made prisoner, but was released next day on the arrival of German troops. Most of the bags were recovered. On 28rd December, Postillions Dickenbrock and Beckschäfer repulsed a hostile attack with their side-arms in a ravine between Chablis and Auxerre

In the middle of November the XIVth Corps had available, besides the Baden field-post agency, the field-post office organised at Coblenz, and the field-post agency of the 4th Reserve Division. Up to that time the Baden field-post had done the work single-handed.

I The ctappen postal service of the South Army was arranged by the General Post Office.

doned their communications by way of Châtillon-sur-Seine. After the passage of the French East Army into Switzerland the regularity of the postal service, which now extended to Dijon, Poligny, La Barre, and Baume-les-Dames, met with no further interruption.

Administration of the post in · occupied French

territory.

The administration of the local post in the occupied French territory was taken over by the Germans. On 24th August, 1870, a German "Post Administration," under direction of the General Post Office, was established at Nancy. During the course of the campaign it opened forty post offices, which carried on the communication between the different villages in the district, and also between these and Germany and thence with foreign countries. At the same time they had as much as possible to help the field-post offices, especially in opening up new lines and arranging the service on railways. Further, a Chief Post Direction was established at the beginning of October for Alsace and Lorraine at Strassburg and Nancy respectively;† through its agency 158 German post offices were opened by the end of March, 1871.

On the 24th of this month the French authorities once more took over the postal administration in the districts which had been occupied by German troops. In order to ensure unity of direction a Chief Post Direction for the Army of Occupation was

established at Rheims.

The activity and perseverance of the field and home postal services had succeeded, in spite of circumstances of great difficulty, in fulfilling the duties imposed on them, and rendered eminent services not only to the army but to Germany. To show the extent of the interchange between the army and the mother country, it will suffice to state that up to the 31st March the following were despatched through the North German field-post from and to the Army:—

89,695,000 letters and post-cards. 2,354,310 newspapers. 6,453,520*l.* Government money. 2,526,370*l.* private remittances. 125,916 service parecls.

1,853,686 private
Through the Bavarian post:--

about 3,240,000 letters.

72,000 registered letters and money orders. 90,000 parcels.

<sup>\*</sup> From October, at Rheims.

<sup>†</sup> Later at Metz.

† Under Postrath Wittmann, formerly with the Inspection-General of Etappen,

\*\*The root administration at Rheims was at the same time broken up.

Ist Army. The post administration at Rheims was at the same time broken up.
§ Further, the German post undertook the very extensive correspondence
between the French prisoners in Germany, and allowed such to pass post-free when
sent through the military authorities. Upwards of 200,000? was paid to the
prisoners in small sun's upon jost office orders from France.

Through the Württemberg post, from the commencement until the return home of the troops:—

6.898,000 letters, post-cards and newspapers.
454,233 parcels and money orders to the value of
483,4987.

Through the Baden post:-

1,470,500 post-cards, ordinary and registered letters.
114,400 newspapers.
190,810l. Government money.
102,310l. private remittances.
63,067 parcels.

## SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION.

The control of all measures respecting the reserves of ammunition had been entrusted to the officers commanding the artillery of the different armies by virtue of an order from the

War Ministry on 25th July, 1870.

At the commencement of the war 143 horsed ammunition columns were mobilised, of which 76 were exclusively for the artillery and 60 for the infantry, whilst 4 Bavarian and 3 Württemberg columns conveyed partly artillery and partly small-arm ammunition. The uniformity of armament which prevailed almost throughout the German Army facilitated in a high degree the replenishment of ammunition.

The Bavarian Army Corps alone were in a less favourable position, as not only were their foot soldiers armed with rifles of two different systems, but their artillery possessed, in addition to 4 and 6 prs., some 12 prs., and later on some mitrailleurs, and consequently the ammunition for four different

calibres had to be carried.

The supply of ammunition was throughout abundant. The German infantry soldier carried, it is true, ten rounds less than the French, and the regimental transport conveyed a smaller number of rounds for each man; on the other hand, the ammunition columns carried larger supplies.†

The replenishment of ammunition during an action became a matter of the first importance even at the earliest collisions

of the campaign.

In order to place themselves on equal terms with the heavy

The functions of the ammunition columns of an army corps.

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* See Appendix V.

† See Part I, Vol. I, p. 13. In all, the supply carried by the troops and

columns of an army corps, exclusive of the two Bavarian, with a total strength of

25 battalions and 15 batteries, or 24,525 rifles and 90 guns, amounted to:—
```

161 rounds per rifle.
287 shell
21 canister
220 shell
11 canister
For a Bavarian Army Corps these numbers amounted to :—
312 shell
10 canister
} for each 4-pounder gun

10 canister } for each 4-pounder gun 212 shell 11 canister } for each 6-pounder gun.

The Bavarian 12-pounder batteries had in their limbers, wagons, and ammunition columns, 175 rounds per gun.

For all the cavalry, the supplies present furnished, according to the varied composition of the armies, from 62 to 100 rounds for the needle carbines, 34 to 56 for pistols.

The number of rounds for each arm in the reserve ammunition depôts (see subsequent narrative) likewise varied in different armies. The Prussian reserve ammunition columns conveyed in round numbers—

3 to 15 rounds per rifle.
7 to 11 ,, per carbine.
4 to 13 ,, per pistol.
42 to 69 ,, per light and heavy gun.

and long-range fire of the enemy, the German infantry found it necessary to fire more rapidly and at greater ranges than they had intended. The control of the firing became frequently very difficult in consequence of the great losses in leaders. expenditure of ammunition soon reached in consequence a very high figure, so that the supplies with each individual man in the foremost fighting line were fully expended. Thus it was that cases frequently occurred when the infantry were hindered in their fighting from want of ammunition. There are no precise data available in respect to the number of cartridges expended by a given body of troops, whether in separate engagements, or during operations extending over a certain country or a certain period of time; neither would the number of rounds drawn from the ammunition columns to replace losses afford a just criterion.

Want of ammunition in action was first apparent to a considerable extent in the battle of Mars-la-Tour in the case of the infantry of the IlIrd Army Corps.† It was also experienced on the 18th August by the troops of the 1st Army engaged to the east of the Gravelotte defile; on the 28th November by the detachments of the Xth Army Corps employed to garrison Beaune-la-Rolande, and in several other battles. Similar inconvenience occurred very frequently to the Ist Bavarian Corps during its engagements in the Eure district and on the Loire. In almost every one of the numerous actions fought there, battalions had to limit their action for want of ammunition, or had to be withdrawn in order to replenish.

Such an expenditure of ammunition, however, only happened to certain parts of the troops in front line, whilst the total consumption of the infantry was less than had been expected. The cause of the deficiency was in all cases that the connection of the fighting battalions with their ammunition wagons and the

The expenditure of the Württemberg and Baden Divisions (not shown there)-

Württemberg,	5,125	Baden	9,197 sl		4.	pounder guns.
,,	8	,,	80 c	anister <u> </u>	, -	Louiser, Prince
,,,	2,904	,,	7,062 s		l s.	pounder guns.
91	-	19		anister	ľ	Lounat L Bane.
"	1,063,291	"		eedle-gun	1	
· ,•	82,000	**	(F) c	arbino	} C8	ırtridges.
. ,,	40,000	,,	18,290 p	istol	J	-

In the Württemberg Division the artillery small-arm cartridges are included in

In the wurttemberg Division the artillery small-arm cartridges are included in the carbine; in the Baden, they are counted in the distribution of ammunition made by No. 14 Prussian Reserve Ammunition Column.

The total expenditure of the German Army is estimated at 362,662 rounds of field gan ammunition, and approximately 30,000,000 cartridges.

† The total expenditure of the corps this day was 720,436 cartridges; therefore, for each of the 25 battalions which bore about an equal hand in the fight, 28,819 rounds.

Appendix CI-XXXIV shows the ammunition issued to replenish the columns. from the three Prussian reserve ammunition depôts and two Bavarian chief ammunition columns during the war.

<sup>2.</sup> The total expenditure of the corps between the 10th October and 16th December, however, amounted to 21 cartridges only per man per fighting day, taking into account the number of men engaged in each of the ceparate fights.

ammunition columns was severed, and it then became impossible to bring in good time the ammunition, which was in plenty

turther in rear, to those points where it was most needed.

The experience of previous wars with regard to the measures to be taken was insufficient to act as a guide; it was only, therefore, by degrees that the arrangements became perfected. As a general rule the infantry, in order to replenish their ammunition during an engagement, brought up their own cartridge wagons, but cases also occurred where the infantry ammunition columns issued ammunition on the battle-field under heavy fire.\* The German infantry, nearly always acting on the offensive, was hardly ever able to accumulate a reserve of ammunition beforehand for use at decisive moments. When engagements followed in rapid succession, as during the operations at Orleans and Le Mans, it was even very difficult to bring the troops under fire at all times with their complete supply of ammunition. Lastly, some of the cartridges were probably lost by the general habit of casting off the knapsack before going into action.

The supplies of ammunition for the artillery were requisitioned to a greater extent even than in the case of the infantry.

This circumstance was manifest in the first engagements of the HIrd Army. The expenditure of the batteries of the Vth Army Corps in the battle of Worth was so great that it exceeded the reserve of the only two available ammunition columns, and in consequence the whole of the expended ammunition could not be replenished on the morning of the 7th August. The artillery of the XIth Army Corps fired fewer rounds than that of the Vth, and as it had all its ammunition columns present, it could not only replace its own expenditure without difficulty, but was able to help the Vth Corps. The want of ammunition which temporarily occurred on the battle-field was solely due to the circumstance that the second echelons of battery wagons could only ascend the Elsasshausen heights with the greatest difficulty.

In the battles of the 16th and 18th August, the replenishment of ammunition gave more trouble than at Wörth, for, in consequence of their great losses, many batteries were unable to send their wagons to bring up the urgently required ammuni-

tion.

columns.

On the 16th the first cohelon of columns of the HIrd Army Corps moved close up to the batteries in action, whilst those of the Xth on account of crossing with other troops, could not reach the battle-field until night. On the 18th also, all available ammunition wagons of the IXth Army Corpst were

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<sup>\*</sup> For instance, with the IIIrd Corps on the 16th, and with the VIIIth Corps on the 18th August.

<sup>†</sup> The ammunition columns of the second echelon did not leave Posen until the 2nd August, and reached the Army Corps on the 8th.

‡ In the 1st eshelon of the column there were only 1½ artiflery ammunition

brought forward to the firing line, and were sent separately as required to the batteries. In order to avoid unnecessary losses, the teams were sent to the rear, and they were again brought up later to fetch away the empty wagons. Both in the case of the Prussian and Hessian artillery of the IXth Corps, the echelons of wagons were not always able to follow, so that there was frequently a lack of ammunition, particularly with the guns engaged to the south of the Bois-de-la-Cusse. On the other hand, the batteries of the Guard in some cases kept their first echelons close up to them during the battle, and took out the ammunition direct from the wagons, in order to keep the limbers filled as long as possible.

How large the expenditure of artillery ammunition was in the two battles will be seen from the following figures:—

The 15 batteries of the HIrd Army Corps\* fired on the 16th August an average of 768 rounds, and 2 of them expended 1,164 and 1,148 respectively. On the 18th the 10 batteries which were engaged fired on an average 274 rounds, whilst the highest number of rounds fired in any one battery was The Xth Army Corps, on both days, fired about 524 rounds per battery; the maximum was 1,048 rounds, namely, on the 16th August. Two Hessian batteries expended on the 18th August a total number of 1,880, two of the 18th Division 1,930 rounds. The average expenditure of the IXth Army Corps was 526. In such circumstances, it is plain why the HIrd Army Corps on the 20th August emptied its own five and two ammunition columns assigned to it from other corps. Only the heavy batteries and the light of the 6th Division were again completely provided with ammunition; the others were each short of 305 rounds. The Guard Corps had at its disposal on this day only \( \frac{1}{2} \), the VIIIth 1\( \frac{1}{2} \), the Xth one incomplete artillery ammunition column, whilst the IXth had issued all its supplies. Their replenishment was the more difficult, as the columns had also given up a large part of their men and horsest to the batteries which had lost heavily, and consequently the trying marches to Saarlouis and Forbach, the quarters of the reserve ammunition columns, had to be done with reduced teams.

The operations of the IIIrd Army on Sedan gave rise to very serious difficulties for the columns, which had proceeded as far as Weissenburg and Hagenau to replenish their supplies. In order not to impede the troops in their sudden movement to the right, these columns could not in all cases follow, and afterwards had to make forced marches, during which the already weak teams suffered severely. In spite of this, there were only wanting, when the serious struggles commenced, 11 artillery ammunition columns to the VIth Army Corps, and 1 of the main ammunition column to the Ist Bavarian Corps.

1 See subsequent narrative.

<sup>\*</sup> A Prussian light battery carried in limber and wagon 864, a heavy battery 702, an artillery ammunition column about 1,750 shell.

<sup>†</sup> For instance, 225 horses in the IIIrd Army Corps.

The expenditure of ammunition in the battles of Beaumont and Sedan reached almost the same amount as before Metz. For instance, with the batteries of the Vth Army Corps it reached an average of 390, in those of the XIth 500, the maximum being 731 rounds; whilst one Bavarian battery\* fired 939 rounds. On the field of battle, a real want of ammunition was alone experienced about midday by the batteries of the XIth Army Corps, in action to the east of St. Menges, as their second echelon of wagons had to give way to other troops, and could not immediately follow. In the course of the afternoon two other ammunition columns arrived simultaneously with them, so that the firing had only to be diminished in force a few hours.

In the case of the Army of the Meuse, the replacement of ammunition bore a different character to that of the other armies, as a special commander of artillery had not been nominated, and no separate reserve ammunition supplies had been assigned. In these matters the Corps were immediately dependent on the headquarters of the IInd Army. In consequence, the columns of the Guard Corps, after the battle of St. Privat, replenished their supplies at Saarbrücken, Faulquemont, and Forbach,† whence they rejoined the Corps with great difficulty. On the other hand, the XIIth Corps did not draw from its reserve ammunition columns,† although these were the first to arrive at Herny, until after the battle of Sedan. The expenditure of ammunition with the Saxon artillery in the numerous successive fights was, it is true, comparatively small.‡

The batteries of the Guard fired in the battle of Sedan an average of only 400 rounds, the maximum being 724, whilst of the IVth Army Corps only ten batteries generally took part in the fight, and altogether fired 780 rounds. In spite of the considerable expenditure in the recent battle of Beaumont, the

replenishment in this case could be easily effected.

The replenishment of the columns exhausted by the battle of Sedan was done at Nancy for the HIIrd Army; the columns of the Meuse Army had to go back to Faulquemont and Herny, and arrived before Paris between the 22nd and 27th September.

The expenditure of ammunition in the actions which took place during the investment of Metz was very considerable, in consequence of the necessity of an obstinate resistance. For instance, in the Ist Army Corps, after the battle of Noisseville, all the columns were emptied, as they had also to provide for

tember. On this day 7,415 projectiles in all were fired.

§ In the Guard Corps all five, in the IVth Corps three, in the XIIth four

artillery ammunition columns.

<sup>\*</sup> Each Bavarian 4-pounder battery had in its limber and wagon 1,100, each 6-pounder 798 rounds.

<sup>†</sup> See subsequent narrative.

1 It amounted in all, from 18th to 31st August, 2,059 4-pounder and 3.016
6-pounder projectiles, while the equipment of the five columns was 4,080 and 4,980
respectively; consequently, besides the ammunition for the batteries, there were
2,021 4-pounder and 1,974 6-pounder projectiles available as reserve on 1st September. On this day 7,415 projectiles in all were fired.

the troops of Kummer's Division. The replenishment had to be done for the 1st Army at Saarlouis, for the 1Ind Army at Faulquemont. In consequence, the columns were in part forced to make very considerable marches, but they succeeded in providing what was wanted. The army before Metz was even able, without risk of running short itself, to send away two large convoys of ammunition. Ten artillery ammunition columns sent on the 13th September to Pont-a-Mousson, for the purpose of replenishing the supplies of the Meuse Army, were not utilised by the latter. On the 23rd September, again, thirteenartillery ammunition columns proceeded to Rheims, where they formed a reserve for the Meuse Army, and also supplied the

troops besieging Verdun.\*

During the engagements of the 1st Army in Northern France the reserve ammunition columnst could not be in all cases brought up to the front, but, as a principle, the headquarters of the army endeavoured as far as possible to push forward supplies along the railway, as might be required, thereby shortening the laborious marches of the horsed columns. In this way intermediate depôts were gradually created at Breteuil, Long-eau, Creil, and Nesle. At the commencement of the year 1871 the difficulties of replacing the ammunition increased, as the continued bombardment of Péronne with field guns entailed an exceptionally large expenditure of ammunition. The greatest expenditure took place with the VIIIth Army Corps, which at the end of December had but half a column remaining at its disposal, and on the 19th January had again entirely exhausted its supplies. The artillery also of the combined division of the Ist Army Corps had at times to limit its fire during the battle of St. Quentin, because its columns had not yet arrived.

In the troops belonging to the IInd Army and to the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg's Detachment, the services of the ammunition columns during the engagements in the south and west of Paris had been so taxed, that extraordinary measures had to

be adopted in order to keep the batteries supplied.

After the engagements in October great difficulties were already experienced. Besides the great expenditure there was also the awkward circumstance that the Reserve Ammunition Depôt could not be brought near enough to the 1st Bavarian Corps,‡ while the 17th and 22nd Divisions had actually no reserve ammunition columns of their own. These troops consequently found themselves mainly dependent upon the assistance of the rest of the IIIrd Army.

The rapid advance of the IInd Army from Metz to the Loire did not allow of the reserve ammunition columns keeping pace

<sup>. •</sup> Most of these columns returned to their corps towards the end of October, part not until the end of November.

<sup>†</sup> See subsequent narrative. ‡ See subsequent narrative.

with it. In consequence of a demand made on the 19th of November, the Royal Headquarters allowed the Reserve Ammunition Depôt to be pushed forward by rail as far as Vitry-le-Français, and the ammunition columns to replenish temporarily from the supplies of the IIIrd Army.

This latter despatched a number of its columns to the south, namely, some from the VIth for the 17th Division, some of the XIth for the 22nd Division, and some of the IInd Bayarian

Army Corps for the 1st Bavarian Corps.

Later on, the Hnd and Vth Army Corps were also requisitioned upon, and an intermediate depôt was formed at Orléans out of six artillery and three infantry ammunition columns.

This depôt, however, never became permanent; on the contrary, all the columns of the IInd Army, and of the Grand Duke's Detachment, as well as many of the IIIrd Army, were, up to the 30th January, in constant movement, in order to replace the great expenditure from the reserve ammunition depôts in rear. The delivery from the columns of the IIIrd Army ensued first at Montgeron and Montlhéry; later on, chiefly at Etampes, Toury, and Orléans. The columns which took part in this service had an extremely difficult duty to perform, in consequence of the unfavourable weather, the bad roads, and the attacks of a hostile population. The four ammunition columns of the Vth Army Corps accomplished the distance to Angerville—41½ miles—in the night of the 3rd December, whilst two of the XIth Corps advanced still further, and completed 60 miles without a halt.

The columns of the Hnd Bavarian Army Corps, from their quarters at Palaiseau to the supply depôt at La Ferté-sur-Jouarre, and to Orléans, had in each case to march about sixty-two miles. Altogether, the main ammunition column of this Corps, during this period made, with its 386 carriages, 24 convoys, which delivered to the Ist Bavarian Army Corps 21,000 artillery projectiles, and 1,700,480 small-arm cartridges.

In such circumstances, it is intelligible that in spite of all efforts the service of replenishing the supplies might give rise to serious misgiving, while the effect of artillery fire gained in importance against the badly-trained levies of the Republic. In the Grand Duke's Detachment, between the 1st and 15th December, for every twenty small-arm cartridges, one artillery projectile was fired. In the first half of January, at which time the employment of artillery was much restricted by the character of the ground, the relative proportions were 134 to 1. The artillery of the HIrd Army Corps in the Battle of Orléans expended hardly less projectiles than on 18th August; in the IXth Corps, also, four artillery ammunition columns were almost entirely emptied by the issues made on the 3rd and 4th December. In the 1st Bavarian Army Corps, ammunition had to be issued daily from the 2nd to the 11th December, so that ultimately there was a deficiency of 6-pr. projectiles, whilst some of the 4-pr. batteries, on account of the leading of the guns, were

obliged to cease firing. On 11th December, according to a return furnished from Army Headquarters, the HIrd Army Corps had still 24 artillery ammunition columns at its disposal, the IXth, Xth, and the 17th and 22nd Divisions, had only the limber ammunition of the batteries.

During the engagements round Le Mans, the expenditure was somewhat less than that in the month of December. Yet this period was the most trying for the columns of the IInd Army; often sent in directions which were subsequently changed, they had to make a series of very severe night marches along mountain roads slippery with ice, or deep in snow.

For the Army Corps lying in front of Paris, the replenishment of ammunition presented no difficulties. The men and horses of the columns could therefore be partly employed for

transport duties in the siege parks.

The troops which proceeded to South-east France, after the fall of Strassburg, were well provided with ammunition columns, and completed their supplies without difficulty at Lunéville. It was not until the middle of January that difficulties arose, when the XIVth Army Corps moved away to the Lisaine, whilst the columns had for the most part to make the wide détour from Epinal by way of Lunéville, and thence by railway through Strassburg and Mülhausen. Consequently, on the 15th January, there were but two artillery and two infantry ammunition columns at disposal for the defence of the extensive Lisaine front. On the Lisaine, even on the first day, there occurred in places a want of ammunition, and several batteries were obliged in consequence to husband their fire. But owing to the gradual arrival of the remaining columns,‡ and with some assistance from the siege artillery, serious embarrassments were avoided. In the subsequent advance of the Army Corps, the replenishing of ammunition met with no impediment. The troops of the VIIth Army Corps which first reached the southern theatre of war were at times compelled to observe great caution in their expenditure of ammunition, as the 13th Division had only four columns with it, and for its replenishment was restricted to the reserve ammunition columns of the IInd Army at Vitry-le-Français, or to the convoys pushed forward thence to Chatillon-sur-Scine. The remainder of the columns could not leave Rethel until towards the end of January, and rejoined the Army Corps on the 14th February.

In consequence of the enormous burdens thrown upon the Reserve railways, the transport of the reserve ammunition columns smmunition

columns.

The corps of the Meuse Army were in this respect placed under the orders of the Commander of Artillery of the HIIrd Army.

† On the 28th October, two newly formed columns of the 4th Reserve Division joined those commerciated in Part II, Appendices LXXXI and CXXXI.

† The column of Colonel Debeckits's Detachment marched by night from the detraining station to the battle-field.

† Ruch Presian reserve superturition column consisted of 32 wagens without horses. Of show left available after the mobilisation was completed, the 18th was

met with great difficulties from the very commencement of the

campaign.

Although the columns of the Ist Army\* arrived at Saarlouis on the 23rd and 24th August, they could not be brought up to Metz until the middle of November, and at the end of the month to Laon. Three of them were moved thence with teams to Soissons with great difficulty, and remained there until the end of the war. In January, one of these columns proceeded to join the newly-formed South Army.

No. 1 Reserve Ammunition Depôt† reached Saarlouis on the 1st September, and Soissons on the 5th December. No. 13 Reserve Ammunition Column, which had become available on the disbandment of the 3rd Reserve Division, brought up from Rheims, and later from La Fère, ammunition for the troops in

front of Mézières and Péronne.

The reserve ammunition columns of the Hnd Army! reached the neighbourhood of Forbach between the 24th and 26th August. By the 18th September, eleven of them were assembled at Faulquemont, whilst a Saxon column had been able to reach Herny by the 22nd August. During the advance of the army after the fall of Metz, they were for the most part confined to the ordinary roads, so that they could only be gradually brought up to Commercy and Vitry-le-Français, and did not reach Pithiviers until January, 1871. On the other hand, No. 2 Reserve Ammunition Depôt, which was organized at Forbach on 29th August, and transferred in part shortly after to Faulquemont, was moved after the fall of Metz to Pont-à-Mousson, and at the beginning of December to Vitry-le-Français, and here placed under the orders of the commander of artillery of the IIIrd Army. The duties of this depôt exceeded, in consequence, very much what was contemplated beforehand, as it had to supply ultimately twelve army corps, the Guard, IInd, IVth, Vth, VIth, XIth, and XIIth Army Corps before Paris, the IIIrd, IXth, Xth, and XIIIth on the Loire, lastly the VIIth on its march to the south-east. In order to supply these corps more easily with ammunition, the supplies were stored at five different points-Lagny, Nanteuil, Epernay, Vitry-le-

2nd Division field ammunition reserve park, consisting of reserve ammunition Columns Nos. 9 to 12.

Saxon reserve ammunition Columns Nos. 1 and 2.

assigned later on to the 3rd, and the 14th to the 1st Reserve Division, both without horses; Columns No. 15 and 16 were turned into field ammunition columns, and assigned to the XIIIth Corps.

<sup>†</sup> This reptenished from the artillery depôts at Coblenz, Cologne, Minden, and Saarlouis.

<sup>† 1</sup>st Division field ammunition reserve park, consisting of reserve ammunition columns Nos. 1 to 8.

Besides, two Hessian ammunition columns, which were detach d on the 6th August at Kaiserlautern from those following the field army, and became reserve columns.

<sup>§</sup> This depôt was to replenish from the artillery depôts at Wesel, Küstrin, Posen, and Glogau; later also from those at Dresdon, Königsberg, Spandau, Stettin Darmstadt, Saarlouis, Cologne, and Minden.

Français and Rheims -in proportion as the railway lines

became available,

With the IIIrd Army, the control of the ammunition supply at the commencement of the war was the more difficult as the organization of the South German Columns was not identical, and the line of railway at disposal was ere long much occupied with the transport of siego material to Strassburg. The Prussian columns,† however, succeeded by the 14th August in pushing forward to Weissenburg, and thence to Hagenau and Nancy. On the 4th October, they reached this last-named town complete, although six of them had meanwhile again made the march to Erfurt, in order to replenish from No. 3 Reserve Ammunition Depôt, which remained there throughout the war. After the full of Toul, the division proceeded with six columns to Epernay, whilst the two left at first in Nancy supplied the XIIIth Army Corps and the other troops stationed in rear of the field army. In November these columns, with two others, were pushed forward to Nanteuil, and towards the end of the year the four others to Lagny, and from these two points supplied the IInd and IIIrd Armies.

Supplies of ammunition for the South German troops were pushed forward from the rear in a similar manner. The Württemberg Ammunition Reserve, without teams, proceeded from I'lm to Nancy on 2nd September; the reserve ammunition depôt of the IInd Bavarian Corps reached Nancy on the 1st September, that of the 1st Bavarian Corps, Lunéville on 26th August. Later on, the two last moved forward first to Vitryle-Français, then to La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, whilst in their place two supplementary depôts arrived at Nancy, and a newly formed third depôt was opened at Ingolstadt. The Wirttemberg Ammunition Reserve was partly brought up to Paris, but was afterwards established permanently at Nanteuil, later

on at Lagny.

The reserve ammunition columns of the XIVth Army Corps¶ proceeded in October to Lunéville and, while drawing their own requirements from Rastatt, supplied the Army Corps, as well as the 1st and 4th Reserve Divisions. Although the Baden supplies were in this way placed under requisition in a manner which could not have been foreseen, they were never allowed to be completely exhausted. Later on, the newly created Prussian artillery depôt at Strassburg bore a hand in pushing

The Saxon reserve ammunition columns were left here.

<sup>† 3</sup>rd Division of the field ammunition reserve park, consisting of reserve ammunition Columns Nos. 17 to 24.

<sup>†</sup> This depôt drew the supplies from the artillery depôts at Erfurt, Neisse, Dansig, and Magdeburg.

§ Two divisions of the ammunition depôt company, the third formed the convoy

from Ulm and Inddwigsburg.

|| Each Bavarian reserve ammunition depôt consisted of 75 ammunition wagons

without teams.

T No. 14 Prussian Reserve Ammunition Column (originally assigned to 4th Reserve Division) and a newly formed Baden column.

forward ammunition, and, from the 20th January, sent a considerable part of its stores to form a reserve ammunition

depôt at Epinal.

The experiences of the campaign showed that the expenditure of artillery, compared with infantry ammunition, was quite different to the proportion borne by the supplies of the two kinds carried in the ammunition columns of an army corps. The artillery projectiles were expended in a greater degree, the infantry cartridges in a less degree than had been expected.\* This serves to explain why at different parts of the theatre of war the firing of the German batteries, when opposed to the enemy, had to be limited, and that also the reserve ammunition services were not always able to supply the requirements of the artillery, while for the small arms there was always a superfluity of cartridges. A comparison of the returns of issue made by those services shows that for one round of artillery ammunition an average of 45 small arm cartridges reached the field army, whilst the field ammunition columns carried with them 188 cartridges for one round of gun ammunition.

That, in spite of the obstacles already mentioned, the army has been spared from any serious misadventure, affords a brilliant proof of the great care which all the officers in command, the men, and the authorities have devoted to their

difficult duties.

There were no special columns set apart for replenishing the expended ammunition of the siege artillery. The artillery siege train, however, included, besides the guns, a definite quantity of ammunition for each, and the necessary supplies for its replenishment had to be drawn immediately from the artillery depôts assigned to it.

For the siege of Strassburg, orders were at first given to bring up half the regulated allowance of ammunition for the siego train. The weight of the entire artillery material amounted to some 92,400 cwts. Its transport by rail presented no difficulty, but this was not the case as regards its removal from the railway station to the artillery park, as the wagons obtained

† About 45 in the case of the 1st Reserve Ammunition Depôt, 39 in the case of the 2nd, and 53 in the case of the 3rd.

artillery ammunition.

Replenish-

ment of siege

<sup>\*</sup> In the Guard Corps, the supplies of 10 columns of 9-centimetre projectiles were used, and of 14 columns of 8-centimetre projectiles, during the campaign, while of small-arm cartridges only the supplies of 14 infantry ammunition columns. The HIIrd Army Corps expended in the battle of Mars-la-Tour for its heavy guns the ammunition of nearly 7, for its light guns the ammunition of over 7 columns, but only the contents of 6 small-arm ammunition wagons; during the whole war, the supplies of 12 artillery and 2 infantry ammunition columns. In the Vth Army Corps the corresponding number of emptied columns was about 9 and 3, and in the entire 1st Army 21 and 3.

<sup>†</sup> The infantry received also the ammunition sent with the draughts from the depôts; for instance the infantry of the VIIth Army Corps, 1,473,875 cartwidges that of the IXth, 989,560.

ridges, that of the IXth, 989,560.

§ See Part I, Vol. II, p. 437. This would be some 100,000 shell and 10,000 shrapnel for rifled guns, 29,000 shell for smooth-bore mortars, 10,000 wall-piece, and 1,000,000 needle-gun cartridges.

for the troops and those requisitioned in the district were insufficient.\* The expenditure was so considerable, that even by the 30th August the second half of the ammunition had to be despatched, and this in turn was followed by supplies from Spandau, Magdeburg, and Mainz. In addition, besides the ammunition for the Baden siege guns,† further assistance was given from Rastatt, and ultimately the supplies from Ulm were made available for the attack on the right bank of the Rhine. At the beginning of September the enormous flow of wagons caused some embarrassment, as they could not be unloaded in time, and the railways became blocked. Consequently, several trains had to be shunted to neighbouring stations until the necessary sheds were erected at the park to receive the contents. Generally, the administration of the park had to contend with great difficulties, the more so as the preparatory works had suffered interruptions owing to the early commencement of the bombardment. The productive power of the laboratory was so augmented by the utmost exertion that the daily turn-out was 6,650 shell and 4,500 cartridges; nevertheless, no reserve of ammunition could be accumulated, and all that could be done was to meet the daily requirements. The preparation of ammunition for high-angle fire presented especial difficulty, as this nature of fire was largely employed in the later phases of the siege. The expenditure also of wall-piece cartridges far exceeded the amount fixed for the equipment of the siege train, so that in the first half of September 50,000 rounds had to be furnished from the Prussian, and 20,000 rounds from the Baden arsenals.

Nevertheless, at the time of the surrender, the siege artillery was perfectly able to continue the struggle without

abatement of energy.

The transport of ammunition to the batteries in action, or to those newly erected, had been regulated in such manner that the requisitioned country wagons only did duty within the parks, while on the ground occupied by the siege works the teams and columns of the troops were alone employed. Later on, the wagon train had to be largely augmented by requisitions made over a large area of country.

The siege artillery expended before Strassburg a total of 202,099 shell, weighing upwards of 4,000 tons, whilst the weight of all the projectiles fired by the field artillery of the North German Confederation during the whole campaign only

amounted to some 1.375 tons.

The comprehensive measures which had to be taken in order to bring up the ammunition for the artillery intended for

<sup>.</sup> The simultament than sport of the entire material by road would have required 438 (means; (3,750 desches) and 3,560 country wagons and herebs.

Are Fact All Vels: Lyp. 25, and Appendix LXVIII:

3 44 this period, among nothers, over 74,000 rounds of 7- and 25-pounder shells were on the way from Coblenz and Cologne.



the siege of Paris, have been already described, but the

following may be added:-

The headquarters of the Meuse Army undertook the provision of the number of wagons requisite for the attack on Mont Avron. The Guard Corps formed a special park of 50 wagons, and the Saxon Cavalry Division collected by the 22nd December some 600 country wagons, whilst the IVth and XIIth Army Corps and the Württemberg Division with their own teams took over a quantity of transport work. As soon as the artillery attack on the north front was decided upon, the Army Headquarters fixed the strength of the wagon park at 700 wagons, and instructed the Army Corps to comply with all requisitions on the part of the siege artillery for working parties, teams, and material. It was of no slight advantage that all requisitions could be sent by railway as far as Villiersle-Bel, consequently, to the immediate vicinity of the park.

The orderst given on the 7th December for the transport service on the south front could not naturally come into immediate effect; because the bringing up of the newly created wagon park column required a considerable time, the traffic along the line of relays, formed of teams from the ammunition columns, was interrupted by the temporary breaking down of the bridges over the Seine, and the number of country wagons collected was rapidly diminished by desertions and sickness. On 16th December orders were given in consequence for all the draught. horses of the pontoon columns, light, field bridge trains, and entrenching tool columns to be brought up, and for six infantry ammunition columns to be handed over for employment on the work. These latter were employed on and after the 2nd January.

In this way not only could the supply be properly kept up, but at the time of the capitulation there was so much ammunition on hand that the bombardment could have been maintained still more actively than had before been the case.

Provision had also been made in Germany for further supplies. The despatch of the second portion of the ammunition for all the guns on the south and east attack was com-menced on the 6th January, and was to be so organised that a train was to reach Esbly every second day. On the 20th January a third portion was ordered to be forwarded.

In the siege of Belfort the German artillery had from the outset to contend with difficulties, as the material of the park brought up from Neu Breisach had already been heavily drawn upon. It arrived with only 100 rounds per gun. The



<sup>\*</sup> See Part II, Vol. II, p. 128.
† See Part II, Vol. II, p. 128.
On 26th January, the following were working: at each of the 7 stations of the line of relay, Esbly—Villacoublay, 3 wagon-park and 1 infantry ammunition column; running through along the whole line, 2 columns of French country wagons; in the purk itself, 3 wagon-park columns, 2 columns French country wagons, and 3 columns provided by a contractor. and 8 columns provided by a contractor.

Bavarian guns had each 200 rounds. During the course of the siege, applications for supplies had always been complied with by the authorities with the greatest willingness;\* but the firing batteries had not the less to be careful in husbanding their ammunition. At Belfort, as elsewhere, the main difficulty lay in bringing up the material from the terminal stations; first, Colmar, later Mülhausen and Danmerkirch. The available means of transport; were always too weak to satisfy the claims made upon them; the distances were long, and the roads, at first sodden, afterwards became like ice or were buried deep in snow.

Consequently, at the commencement of the siege, only some 1,000 rounds could be fired daily. The circumstances did not

improve even later.

The supply of ammunition in those sieges, for which French material was either exclusively or mainly used, was effected in

different ways according to circumstances.

Thus in the bombardment of Verdun, which commenced on the 13th October,‡ with French artillery, difficulties cropped up from the first, as the wagons available for transporting the ammunition from Sedan were insufficient. The bringing up of the Prussian siege material was also a slow process, as it could only be transported by rail from Vendenheim as far as Commercy. Of the convoys of country wagons despatched thither, each could carry about one-fifth part of the contents of a railway train. Although the distance was only 35 miles, only four trains could be emptied by the 8th November. The bringing-up of French ammunition by road was considerably facilitated later on, so that when the fortress was unexpectedly surrendered there was a supply for each gun for many days.

In the other sieges considerable difficulties had to be frequently overcome when transferring the siege park from one fortress to another, and in sending forward the material brought

up from Germany.

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## THE COMMISSARIAT.

From the very commencement of a campaign a very great strain falls upon the authorities entrusted with the food supply of an army. The strategical concentration brings together large masses in a small area, whilst the railways are fully taken up-

with the transport of the troops and their trains.

The districts in which the German armies were concentrated possessed for the most part abundant resources. In spite of that, the Rhine provinces could not be expected to furnish more than two days' food for all the troops which were about to arrive. This expectation was the less hopeful, as the not over-abundant harvest of the current year still lay in part on the ground, and the prevailing drought both limited the power of the mills and the use of the communications by water.

The first general measures for ensuring the supplies have already been mentioned.\* With the various armies, however, there were differences in the mode of procedure, due to the varying nature of the districts in which they were concentrated.

For the 1st Army, which had to advance through the unfertile Eifel country, Coblenz and Cöln served as collecting stations for all supplies. The supplies stored at Trier had been at first removed to the rear by order of the headquarters of the VIIth Army Corps, in view of the dangers that might arise from a hostile irruption. But owing to the energetic help of the civil authorities and inhabitants, and with the aid of a requisitioned wagon-park, any serious embarrassments were avoided. By the 30th July a considerable magazine was again established at Trier. After the railway became free, supplies could be pushed forward to Fraulautern, and, on the 8th August, the bakery columns of the Army Corps were in active operation at that place.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Hand Army had on the 22nd July authorised his troops to bring with them by rail an independent supply of five days' food. On the 29th he ordered the food, within the limits of six days' supply, available in the district of strategical concentration to be purchased at any price, and, in order to facilitate the provision, allowed variations in the composition of the ration of food and fodder. Of special importance was the use of preserved provisions, which this army was the first to employ on a large scale. The experiments previously made; had not been sufficiently conclusive to

† Prince Frederic Charles, as early as the 16th July, forwarded a proposal on this subject to the War Ministry.

‡ Made chiefly by the HIrd Army Corps at the instance of the War Ministry.

<sup>\*</sup> See Part I, Vol. I, pp. 75-76. Besides the measures there mentioned, the purchase of 3,000,000 lbs. of each of the following stores—Preserved meat, biscuit, oats, and compressed hay, were ordered in England, at the instance of the Intendant-General, Lieutenant-General v. Stosch. The articles were to be delivered at Collandon and the control of the Intendant Collandon and the collandon and the collandon and the collandon and the collandon articles.

lead to a change in the authorised composition of the ration; but, at this time, a preserved food prepared from pea-meal, fat, and bacon had proved so excellent that, immediately after the mobilization, an extensive factory for making it was set up at Berlin, under Army Intendant Engelhard. factory commenced work on the 8th August, and after a few days furnished the first 100,000 pea-sausages, which, under the name of Erbswurst, became afterwards so widely known.\*

The provisions purchased in the Hanse Towns and in Holland, and transported up the Rhine in hired steamboats, the bakeries established with the columns and the regiments, lastly, the removal to Bingen of the extensive stores of the fortresses of Cöln and Wesel, not only furnished sufficient food during the concentration, but rendered possible the creation of a reserve

store of provisions.

During the concentration of the IIIrd Army, the food question presented much greater difficulties, as the supplies provided by contract could not arrive in time on account of delays in the railway transport. Even with this drawback no embarrassments occurred, as the food furnished in billets by the inhabitants exceeded all expectation, the South German Governments most willingly handed over their supplies, and, lastly, the Inspector-General of Etappen, who arrived at Mannheim on the 26th of July, at once set to work to create a large army magazine at that place, and collected a wagon-park of 1,000 wagons.

At the commencement of the operations, the following magazines were at the disposal of the German troops in the

district of strategical concentration:-

The Ist Army had those at Fraulautern and Trier; the IInd Army had those at Kreuznach, Alzey and Worms, as also the reserve magazines at Bingen and Mainz; the IIIrd Army had the magazines of the South German States already mentioned and the army magazine in process of formation at Mannheim.

During the advance of the 1st and 1Ind Armies to the Moselle, the former was dependent at first on supplies forwarded from Saarlouis to an intermediate magazine at Boulay. The supplies captured at Forbach and other places formed a welcome addition; as did also the supplies obtained by requisition, and the quantity of bread baked by the troops themselves. The 1st Army received assistance also from the IInd,

This article of food met with such general approval, that for a long period the factory had to supply the whole army with it. The factory ultimately extended its tuniness to making other kinds of meat preserves, and altogether sent some 40,000,000 sations to the field army.

† As base of supply, the line Bingen—Mains—Worms served at first, but after the 29th July the line Krousnish—Alsey! Worms!

21137 Of these, 400 were handed over to the Guard Corps as a provisional wagon-pairs.

† See Part I, Vol. I. p. 75.

\*\*J. After taking several days' supplies, large quantities were transported from Forbach to Saardonis.

Forbach to Searlouis.

as the Royal Headquarters, by an order of 12th August, allowed it temporarily to receive supplies at Forbach, St. Avold and Faulquemont. Later on considerable quantities of provisions were given up to this army, in order to form a

magazine at Courcelles-sur-Nied.

In consequence of the rapidity of the movements, the supplies of the Hnd Army had to be rapidly pushed forward to the line Neunkirchen—Homburg; for this purpose the Royal Headquarters, from the 4th August, allowed three provision trains each day on the line Bingen—Neunkirchen. In order to forward as quickly as possible all the stores collected on the Rhine to that line and beyond, the Army Headquarters paid especial attention to utilizing every kind of carriage that was available. Magazines and bakeries were thus created in succession at Saarbrücken, Saargemünd and Saar-Union, later on at Forbach, St. Avold, Faulquemont, and on the 13th August at Remilly. In this neighbourhood considerable masses of food were collected, in order, as far as possible, to guard against any difficulties after the passage of the Moselle.

During the engagements before Metz it was only on rare occasions possible, as for example with parts of the 1st Army on the 14th August, to provide the troops with food on fighting days, but at any rate during the course of the next day

sufficient food was supplied throughout the army.

With the HIrd Army, there were no difficulties up to the first collisions with the enemy, the provision columns of the army corps being brought up within reach and replenished successively from the stores pushed forward on the 5th August from Landau, Homburg, Mannheim, and Würzburg to Weissenburg; and on the 6th to Sulz. During the advance through the thinlypopulated mountainous country, where the columns had to remain in rear, the regimental supply wagons and wide-ranging requisitioning proved of great service, so that with most of the army corps there was no deficiency. The circumstances took a more favourable turn during the advance to the Marne, as in these rich districts the troops could be billeted on the inhabitunts; moreover, the magazine formed by the Hnd Army in Saar-Union was available, and at several points French supplies fell into the hands of the troops. After the railway to Nancy had been opened to traffic on the 21st August, the Inspector-General of Etappen of the IIIrd Army formed magazines at this town and at Lunéville.

For the Army of the Meuse, Pont-à-Mousson was first appointed as the advanced depôt and stationary magazine. This magazine was quickly filled from the stores at Nancy and Remilly, and with supplies received from home. On the other hand, the bringing up of food to the troops was very difficult, as the Hnd Army, being already overworked with the transport of the wounded, was unable to comply with the demands made upon it for carriage for the wagon-park columns. The XIIth Army Corps, with the aid of its own

wagon-park which arrived on the 24th August, was alone able to arrange for pushing forward supplies by stages. rest, until the end of the month, the troops were in general adequately supplied, either by food in billets, or by requisition or purchase. The stores in the smaller magazines established at St. Mihiel and Commercy also rendered assistance.

The movement to the right of the IIIrd and Meuse Armies, which commenced on the 26th August, very materially increased the difficulties of feeding the large masses concentrated in a The commissariat wagons and the live cattle could not follow immediately after the troops, it was very seldom possible to bring up the trains, and neither requisition

nor purchase furnished what was required."

In general, the troops were at this time obliged to consume their iron-ration, and, if possible, to replenish it by bringing up some of the wagons of the commissariat train. A very welcome addition came to hand in the French supplies captured at various points, as, for instance, at La Besace, Carignan, Donchery, and Bazeilles.† At that time the troops were undoubtedly experiencing no inconsiderable privations. After the 2nd September, the commissariat and wagon-park columns could be again brought up within reach, while at the same time the unforeseen obligations of feeding the numerous prisoners of war devolved upon the army administration.

During this period the baking of bread at home was diligently proceeded with, in order to satisfy the wants of the Army. But as at first no commissariat railway trains could be sent forward to the army, the food ran great risk of spoiling, in consequence of the great heat, an evil which it was attempted to meet as far as possible by preparing desiccated bread. When subsequently, the railways could also be used for provisions, the transport of goods of every kind assumed immense pro-The commissariat authorities in the field and the home authorities made equal efforts to furnish the army with Some merchants also, who were not engaged by contract, succeeded to a large extent in bringing up their In this way, supplies of all kinds shortly flowed in, and to convey these neither the railways nor the means for unloading at the places of destination sufficed. In the result, the lines became blocked. These inconveniences frequently recurred during the war, and might have entailed disastrous consequences for the supply of the army, had not the adminis-



<sup>\*</sup> The convoys for the IIIrd Army could not all be informed in time of the changes in the direction of march. In consequence, No. 2 Commissariat Column of the XIth Army Corps was seized by the enemy when proceeding from Vitry-le-Français to Rheims.

After the 29th August, the army in front of Metz placed at Etain 100 wagons every day to help the Meuse Army.

† On the 31st August a provision train containing seven days' supply for an Army Corps fell into the hands of the Guard Corps at Carignan. 1 See Part I, Vol. II, p. 408.

trative authorities by their increased energy succeeded in clearing the lines,\* and had not the bountiful resources of the occupied districts essentially contributed, with few exceptions,

to provide what was needed.

Immediate relief could only be obtained by discharging with the least possible delay all trains that were blocked, even though large quantities of food were thereby exposed without protection to the weather, and, consequently, to rapid deterio-The Chief Commissariat Officer of the Hand Army succeeded in bringing up to the army investing Metz, a large quantity of such supplies, which were blocking the station, and were intended chiefly for the army corps before Paris.

'The army investing Metz shortly experienced serious difficulties in consequence of a deficiency of transport. The wagon-parks were so greatly diminished by having to give up curriages for railway construction, for the transport of wounded, and by sickness that, for instance, on the 17th October, the 1st Army had but some 20 wagons remaining of its original

number of 2,000.

The scarcity of water which prevailed at Metz't was constantly felt, but by a regular issue from the ample atores of wine found on the spot, and, later, by increasing the coffee ration, and by sending brandy and mulled wine to the outposts, all disadvantageous consequences were avoided. The Army of Investment was, as a general rule, not only sufficiently provided during the whole period, but was even able to help the Meuse Army and the prisoners coming from Sedan, and those made at the capitulation of Metz. It even provided for the inhabitants of the fortress.

During the advance of the IIIrd and Meuse Armies from Sedan to Paris, as the troops were widely distributed at the night-halts, the supplies furnished by the inhabitants on requisitions, and, when necessary, by the commissariat columns, sufficed for the purpose. Even the daily rations of bread were so adequately provided by requisition and by the troops baking for themselves, that tenders by contract could be cancelled. All the troops found themselves in possession of their iron rations, and, in addition, carried with them several days' supplies in their wagons. In order to keep up these advantageous conditions as long as possible, the Commissariat Department of the IIIrd Army caused main magazines to be formed at Rheims and Châlons-sur-Marne, and also put in

despatch of provision trains from Germany was not to take place unless it was expressly ordered by him or by the Inspectors-General of Etappen.

† The so-called American or Abyssinian wells, which had been provided in large quantities, were of little use in the generally stony subsoil of Northern and Central France.

By order of the Intendant-General of the Army, dated 11th August, the

See Part I, Vol. II, p. 478, and Part II, Vol. I, p. 179.
By the Royal Cabinet Order of 12th September, the number of provision wagons had been fixed at two per battalion-one for each squadron, battery, or column.

working order by means of the columns of the Vth and VIth

Army Corps the large bakeries found at Mourmelon.

The appearance of the rinderpest seriously compromised the certainty of the supply. In order to prevent the spread of this epidemic among the transport cattle, the Senior Commissariat Officer of the Army had adopted most comprehensive measures. Every horned beast now proceeding to the front along the line Landau—Nancy was to be killed, the good meat to be salted and the bad destroyed. The import from countries in rear was limited to France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. At times, it was wholly forbidden. Notwithstanding this, cases of the disease recurred later, in consequence of which it was exceedingly difficult to obtain meat, and still more so to get that change which is so desirable. The despatch of salt meat and other preserves, for the preparation of which a special factory had been opened at Mainz, did not suffice, even with a liberal supply of mutton, to prevent the inconvenience which the want occasioned.

In order to supply the army investing Paris, the Cavalry Divisions, immediately on arriving before the capital, were ordered to undertake requisitions over a large area. The produce of these requisitions were to be formed into magazines for the IIIrd Army at Versailles and Corbeil, for the Meuse

Army at Chantilly.

For the former, the supplies could only be forwarded by rail as far as Nogent l'Artaud, for the latter as far as Château Thierry, so that the columns for the transport of the food were nine to ten days on the road. In consequence the available wagons, in spite of every effort, fell far short of bringing up what was wanted.\* The Inspector-General of Etappen of the IIIrd Army, who had, by the order of 25th September, been charged with the supply of the whole of the investing force, could not effect the supply by means of his park,† as part of it had been obliged to remain at depôts in rear, and part was required for the transport of the siege artillery. The Meuse Army, in consequence of the favourable results of its requisitions, was able to form a sufficient reserve in its depôt at Chantilly. Those made by the IIIrd Army produced little, so that the rations were not up to the regulation. In these circumstances, the Royal Headquarters ordered that requisitions should only be made in general by more extended movements, or in districts which had been abandoned by the inhabitants, or in those where no agreement could be come to with them; in all

his own.

<sup>\*</sup> The Versailles magazine, for instance, had at its disposal 1,386 wagons of the commissariat and wagon-park columns, which, with only a seven days' march, could only convey 8,000 to 8,600 cwts. (200 wagon-loads) daily; consequently not the half of the 8,000 required daily. The blocks on the railway recurred, for reasons already stated; and consequently the conclusion of contracts, which necessitated the use of the railway, was reserved exclusively to the Inspector-General of Etappen.

† The Inspector-General of Etappenof the Meuse Army had no wagon-park of

other cases purchases for each were made the rule. The independent action of the troops was relied on to cover in this manner the consumption, and to turn to account uniformly the abundant resources of the district occupied. The harvest throughout the region occupied gave such a large yield of potatoes and vegetables, that some corps had an ample supply to last the whole winter.

Thrashing machines, mills, and bakeries were worked, and by ready money payments, opening markets, and by keeping open the communications as much as possible, such an impulse was given to contracts that from the end of October the current supply, so far as it was not brought by rail or delivered by the contractors into the magazines direct, could be regarded as secured. The supply also of the army with fresh meat, in spite of the reappearance of the rinderpest, was also arranged, as the purchases by the Commissariat, especially in the neighbourhood of Meaux and Epernay, were attended with success. Moreover, the issue of preserved rations, for which a new factory had been established at Frankfurt-on-the-Main in addition to those at Berlin and Mainz, was materially increased. description of food had the advantage for the Commissariat in being lighter for transport, and for the troops, especially those on outpost duty, that it was more easily prepared for consumption. The unavoidable sameness of the ration was successfully compensated for by the large stores of wine found in the neighbourhood of Paris, and by the occasional issue of an extra ration of brandy.

Supply was considerably facilitated by the opening towards the end of November of the traffic by rail to Gonesse, Mitry,† and Lagny. The relief thereby given to the wagon-park chiefly served the purposes of the siege artillery, but it was not until the end of the year that the constant blocks on the railways could be prevented and the traffic carried on with the

regularity desirable.

The Commissariat Department also made arrangements to help, after the surrender of Paris, in the alleviation of the misery which prevailed in the capital. For this purpose considerable supplies were available on 28th January, but the French authorities only made use of them to a limited extent. On 30th January they, it is true, requested supplies on payment, but gave up next day the receipt of cattle. A single train of provisions belonging to the Meuse Army reached Paris; on the other hand, immediately after the capitulation, 15,000 rations were handed over to the town of St. Denis gratuitously.

1 In all, at the various points, some 35,000 cwts. flour, 2,050,000 rations of meat preserved—smoked, salted, and tinned—and as much bacon.

<sup>\*</sup> In the middle of November some 100,000 head of slicep, among others,

<sup>†</sup> Since the fall of Soissons the Meuse Army had its own line of rail, but the transfer of loads (see Part II, Vol. I, p. 137, note §) at Soissons and Villers-Cotterêts, and the transport by land between those places necessitated considerable working parties and a large number of wagons.

The troops despatched to the south for the purpose of covering the investment of Paris received orders in the first instance to live upon the country, which had at present not suffered from requisitions. It became shortly very difficult to provide oats for the numerous cavalry, but the Commissariat Department of the IIIrd Army succeeded in pushing forward convoys in good time to Rambouillet and Chartres. In the latter town large purchases were also made for ready money.

The conditions proved less favourable for the Had Army in its march to the Loire. From the 24th October the Army Headquarters had made most detailed arrangements, that the country west of the Loing, which had been nearly exhausted of supplies, might be reached with the commissariat wagons filled. Up to that point, the supplies furnished in billets were in general to suffice.\* Besides, there were still the magazines at Bar-le-Duc, Commercy, and Toul, and then, further in front, at St. Dizier, Joinville, and Neufchâteau. Further, the Commissariat Department authorised a provision railway train to be despatched daily to Blesme for the Hand Army. The columns would thus be able, from the line Blesme—Chaumont, to follow the army with full loads.

On the other hand, the Royal Headquarters had charged the IIIrd Army to despatch for the use of the IInd Army 300,000 rations of food and 60,000 rations of forage to each of the towns of Etampes and Malesherbes. In spite of all exertions, very few supplies could be sent thither for want of transport. Of much greater importance for the Hnd Army was the permission given on the 29th November for it to uso the line Blesme-Lagny; to this latter town were sent to receive fresh supplies the wagons of the columns, which in all the army corps had been rapidly emptied after the passage of the Loing. Notwithstanding this, comprehensive measures were required on the part of the Commissariat to protect the troops from real want, especially as the requisitions yielded little, and at first also purchase for cash was by no means successful.

The capture of Orléans yielded but poor booty in respect of food, and the movement of the wagons sent after the troops by the Inspector-General of Etappen was greatly returded. It was only by degrees, and by giving to the troops themselves considerable sums of money that an impulse was given to

<sup>\*</sup> See Part II, Vol. I, pp. 258-259. At the same time, the wagon-park of each army corps was reinforced by 100 wagons, and 2,700 carriages were ordered in Germany by the Inspector-General of Etappen.

† For the IXth Corps and 1st Cavalry Division.

‡ For the IIIrd Corps.

For the Xth Corps.

The supplies were to be conveyed in wagons from Lagny to Juvisy or Corbeil, as the case might be, and from thence by rail to the depôts. For the transport by road there were but 50 wagons available. The railway Corbeil—Malesherbes was not open to traffic at all; that from Juvisy to Etampes was only open to light traffic (see Part II, Vol. III, p. 106).

trade, and the people were induced to bring the produce of the harvest to the markets which had been established at Orléans, Etampes, Joury, and Chartres, thereby saving themselves in the surest way from requisitions. The prices paid were in all cases very high. By the joint efforts of the intendance and the troops, it became possible to overcome the difficulties generally, so that the efforts demanded at this period could be borne by man and horse without overtaxing their

strength.

In the latter half of December matters improved to such an extent that at the commencement of the advance on Le Mans the army was again adequately fed and its train was still filled with provisions. From the 3rd to the 6th January the latter could supply the rations which could not be provided in quarters, but in the subsequent days of fighting the supply of food was attended with almost insuperable difficulties. part of the commissariat train which was full could not follow along the slippery and snowed-up roads; the exhausted country could furnish nothing more. The troops were therefore chiefly dependent on their iron rations. Thence it resulted that the men's food became shortly out of all proportion to the amount of increasing work required of them. After the capture of Le Mans the supplies captured there, and the system of purchase at once introduced, satisfied the most pressing requirements. The supplies forwarded from Orléans and Chartres, as also from Germany, were now coming freely, and by distributing the troops more widely in their cantonments, the inhabitants could furnish the rations.

The first troops of the 1st Army, which left after the fall of Metz, could only be furnished with four days' rations, as the supply of food for the prisoners necessitated great efforts, and the wagons demanded from Germany to complete the wagonparks had not yet arrived. The troops which followed were more favourably placed in this respect, the transfer of the magazine from its original position at Courcelles-sur-Nied to Herny facilitating considerably the forwarding and distribu-tion of supplies. As a general rule, provisioning in quarters was adopted during the march, and recourse was only to be had to the commissariat train when urgently necessary. In order to keep the latter filled, officials sent in advance organized magazines at Laon, Rethel, Rheims, and Soissons, the Intendant of the Army of the Meuse giving great help.\* The supplies also captured at Sedan and Verdun were utilized, and for the rest purchases in the country were allowed. The arrangements proved adequate, and the army, provided with sufficient supplies, continued its march to North-West France. By the 7th December, the most advanced magazine was at Soissons, but the supplies of the Mease Army already stored at Beauvais could be used in common.

<sup>\*</sup> He placed at disposal 8,000 to 9,000 cwts, of oats at Clermont-en-Argonne,

After the communication by rail between Amiens and Rouen had been re-established,\* the magazines formed at Rosières, Amiens, and Rouen could be filled by provisiontrains from Germany, supplemented by requisitions and pur-The supplies captured at La Fère and Péronne were stored in those magazines, while the contents of some commissariat wagons captured on 26th December from the French were distributed directly to the troops.

In the last period of the war, the 1st Army had not to

contend with any serious difficulties.

During the siege of Strassburg the magazine at Lampertheim† was chiefly used; this was replenished daily from Rastatt. After the capture of the fortress the newly-formed XIVth Corps was able to leave this neighbourhood with its commissariat train filled with supplies.‡ The expended stores were first replenished at Lunéville: § a magazine could now be formed at Epinal, and the bakery column commenced work. At the beginning of November the intendance created a magazine at Vesoul, in the middle of the month at Gray, and towards the end at Dijon, which were filled partly by convoys from Lunéville and later from Charmes, and partly by requisition. results of the requisitions were however small, as the retreating French troops had either used or destroyed all supplies. There was so little oats that on some days not more than half a ration could be distributed.

When, after the formation of the South Army, in the month of January, the Hnd and VIIth Army Corps proceeded to the southern theatre of war, the difficulties greatly increased. The Hnd Army Corps had left Paris at first sufficiently provided with supplies. In the XIVth Corps the trains on account of bad weather and roads were not always able to follow. The 14th Division had not been able to bring up its trains from the north, so that the VIIth Army Corps up to the middle of January had but three commissariat columns and 270 auxiliary wagons at its disposal. During the fighting on the Lisaine, more particularly, it was not always possible to avoid actual want, as in consequence of the sudden transfer of the communications to Dammerkirch and Sentheim the magazines there could not at once provide sufficient supplies. The XIVth Army Corps, in this respect, remained dependent on its own resources, while for the other two corps the Intendant of the VIIth Army Corps took over the supply; a commissariat depôt was at the same time created at Châtillon-But as an etappen line could not be organized at sur-Seine.

<sup>\*</sup> See Part II, Vol. III, p. 101.
† See Part II, Vol. II, p. 444.
‡ Of the columns mentioned in Part II, Appendix LXXXI, p. 63 ‡, two wagon-park columns did not arrive until the end of November and beginning of December; the corps also received a Prussian field bakery column and two Prussian wagon-park columns. There were with the corps during its advance only three Baden commissariat columns and three wagon-park columns.

<sup>§</sup> See Part II, Vol. I, p. 204. See Part II, Vol. II, pp. 310, 323, and Vol. III, p. 110.

first to that place,\* the supplies from the line Nancy—Chatillon were brought to Epinal and, with those still remaining to the XIVth Corps, united here to form an army magazine. The communications between this point and the troops could only be carried on by the very difficult land road. The trains required at least ten days to replenish. In consequence General v. Manteuffel found himself obliged on the 14th January to indicate to the Generals Commanding the IInd and VIIth Corps the necessity of combining supply from magazines with a careful system of requisitions; they were allowed perfect freedom of action in arranging the details. The food provided from the district found a welcome addition in the French military supplies which frequently fell into the hands of the troops during the course of the operations.†

In order to regulate the transport from the rear, the intendance with the assistance of the Prefecture in Epinal provided a number of wagons for the transport from this place to the army. When on the 22nd January a new magazine was formed at Dôle, the bakery columns also commenced operations at this point.

The Intendant-General had further instructed the Intendant of the IInd Army to secure a ten days' supply for the South Army on the line Blesme—Nuits-sur-Armaçon—Joigny, but this measure could not come into force at first. The transfer ordered on the 2nd February of the magazine from Epinal to Vesoul met with insuperable difficulties owing to the want of wagons, and it was only with the aid of all the regimental and departmental carriages that a regular communication could be maintained between Epinal and Dôle. Immediately after the reoccupation of Dijon a magazine was formed at that place.

The XIVth Corps was specially dependent for supplies on transports from the rear, as the district to be traversed during the advance had been already exhausted. The halting day on the 22nd January was employed to regulate the details of the situation. Notwithstanding this, the rations between the 25th and 29th were very sparing. It was not until sufficient supplies could be sent from Dôle, and all the columns of the Army Corps had reached Dampierre on the 30th, that the state of affairs improved again.

Towards the end of the operations the supply of oats and forage was difficult, especially with the troops of the South Army. The opening to traffic of the line Blesme—Dijon, however, which took place on the 11th February, enabled serious embarrassments to be avoided.

During the armistice it was a principle for all parts of the theatre of war to utilise in the first instance the resources of the country for the supply of the army. Rationing by the inhabitants was consequently employed as much as possible.

<sup>•</sup> See Part II, Vol. III, p. 110.

<sup>†</sup> On 21st January considerable supplies were found at the Dôle railway station; later on, a provision train was stopped on the railway at St. Vit, and a number of provision wagons captured at Pontarlier.

and the distribution of the troops regulated accordingly. All officers, surgeons, and superior officials received a money allowance in lieu.\* Even after the signature of the peace preliminaries France had to maintain the German troops. In consequence of an agreement concluded on 11th March, the latter abandoned the systems of requisitions, and of rations provided in quarters. Supplies on the Prussian scale were to

be drawn direct from the magazines.

The French Government paid for each man's ration 13 francs, and for each forage ration 21 francs. In order to supply herewith the food of the troops on a sufficient scale, means had first to be found to reduce the very high prices to a proper standard. By the conclusion of contracts with a trading company, which made the necessary purchase in the cheapest markets in districts as remote as possible, this object was attained, and gradually economies were made which partly benefitted the Army of Occupation and partly the Treasury.

Owing to the foresight and loyalty of all the intendance and supply officials, and of the officers and men employed in the train, and the never-failing initiative of the troops, those periods of difficulties of supply were tided over without endangering the health of man and horse in a way that had never been attained in any previous great campaign. If in isolated cases, as, for instance, on the days of battle, the food was deficient, or the rations could not be issued in the regulated proportions, this was due to circumstances which can never be entirely under control in time of war. The German troops have, however, shown that they are able to bear the hardest privations without detriment to their soldier-like qualities.

Lastly, we must not fail to mention in praise the very welcome help given to the field armies by the quantities of clothing and food of every kind sent as gifts from societies and

private persons in all parts of Germany.

‡ See subsequent narrative.

By this means it was intended to give the officers, &c., the possibility of obtaining a sufficient ration in spite of the rise of prices, due to the opening of communication with Paris. The money allowance was 15 france a day; the necessary sums had to be supplied by those parts of France which were in German occu-

<sup>†</sup> The Agreement was based on Articles IV and VIII of the Preliminary Peace Convention. The officers and officials received the allowance until the end of March. All non-commissioned officers and men in France, exclusive of those in hospital, those under arrest, and those on leave, received after the 21st March a daily allowance, which for soldiers was 3d., and for non-commissioned officers was the same as the field allowance of their rank.

## THE HOSPITAL SERVICE OF THE GERMAN ARMY.

Jomposition
of the
Medical
Department.

The hospital service of the German army demanded so large a medical staff that the available military surgeons of the active and furlough lists were quite insufficient to meet the requirements, and it was therefore necessary to bring into the army a large number of civilians, many of whom voluntarily offered their services.\*

As a principle the military surgeons of the active list were attached chiefly to the newly created sanitary units,† and in these cases and in the regiments were supplemented by surgeons belonging to the furlough list. Eminent professors in the universities, and operators were attached to each of the field armies as consulting surgeons with the rank of surgeons-general, or to the army at home in the same capacity but without military rank, while part of the civil surgeons were attached to the field troops. The majority of these gentlemen were, however, attached to the field and reserve hospitals, more especially those foreigners who had entered into a contract with the German military authorities. To complete further the establishments, medical students who had not received their diploma, but who were sufficiently trained, were posted as sub-surgeons.

Civilians with the requisite qualifications were also appointed to fill the administrative posts in the hospitals. On the other hand, the situations of hospital assistants, hospitals orderlies, sick bearers, and field apothecaries were filled from the fur-

lough lists and, later, from the depôt troops.

Very soon after the commencement of the campaign the

Medical
Service with
The troops.

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* Upwards of 2,000.

† Sanitary detachments, field hospitals, and reserve hospital staff (see Appendix V). Part of the vacancies for assistant-surgeons in regiments remained unfilled. The following new units were formed in the course of the war—
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For XIIIth Army Corps, 1 sanitary detachment, 3 field hospitule, 2 divisions of

reserve hospital staff.

For XIVth Army Corps, including 4th Reserve Division, 2 sanitary detachments, 5 field hospitals, 3 divisions reserve hospital staff.

In Bavaria, 2 field hospitals.

Including the new formations, there existed in the field army the following—52 sanitary detachments or sanitary companies respectively and sanitary divisions.

197 field hospitals.

45 divisions of reservo hospital staff.

17 reserve hospital depôts.

‡ The following medical personnel were employed with the German Army and the reserve hospitals during the war—

7,022 surgeons. 8,836 hospital assistants.' 12,707 hospital orderlies.

7,800 sick-bearers, including the auxiliary sick-bearers with regiments.

606 apothecaries. 254 dispensers.

1,809 hospital officials. Besides

523 officers.

8,398 train soldiers.

Total 46,955 persons.

regimental surgeons had plenty of work to do in attending to men not seriously ill and the footsore, the numbers of which shortly attained a considerable figure. In order to avoid causing inconvenience to the marching troops by conveying these men immediately in rear of the column, special detachments were formed of these men in most of the Divisions. They marched with the trains under the care of a surgeon, or were brought up to their Division in carriages after a three days' rest.\* Those men who were incapable of marching after the lapse of this time passed to the field or etappen hospitals. If there were none of these in the vicinity, the men, so long as they were on German soil, were handed over to civil hospitals or religious institutions.

In the case of large bodies of troops remaining stationary, as during investments and sieges, the organisation of sick depôts, consulting rooms, and cantonment hospitals proved very practical, especially at the commencement of winter when

the number of cases of catarrh increased.

It was particularly difficult to preserve the health of the army investing Metz. Its sanitary condition was very unfavourable owing to the strain of the outpost duties, the months of bivouac passed in ground infected with dead bodies and saturated with refuse, and the defective protection against the inclemencies of the autumn season.

Although some ninety hospitals were gradually established here, this number scarcely sufficed for the sick and wounded; the less so as a large number of the wounded from the battles before Metz were incapable of travelling, and had to be tended

on the spot.

Between the 20th August and 31st October 135,636 sick and wounded were treated by the army of investment; of these 82,025 were attended to by the regimental surgeons. Of the sick 22,090 suffered from gastric fever and typhus, 27,959 from dysentery. During September and October 1,328 men died of typhus, 829 of dysentery.

In the fortress also malignant disease had also prevailed. In order to protect the troops from fresh contagion, not only were all places used as barracks and hospitals carefully disinfected,† but comprehensive measures were adopted to clear

the neighbouring battle-fields.

The condition of things in and near Sedan was equally unfavourable, the town being full of sick and wounded. Typhus and dysentery did their ghastly work among the German troops who remained there. The Belgium Government under-

Some of these detachments were temporarily employed on etappen duties.

+ Soon after the mobilisation was ordered, an instruction was issued as to the
measures to be adopted for disinfection in the field army, and a depôt of material
mas formed at Nancy in November, 1870.

was formed at Nancy in November, 1870.

1 According to official calculation, there were some 10,000 corpses interred on the battle-field of 16th August alone; on all the battle-fields round Metz, some 25,000 to 30,000.

took in the early part of 1871 the disinfection of the field of battle.

The army investing Paris, being better housed, enjoyed, generally speaking, a more favourable sanitary condition than that investing Metz, but was not entirely free from the diseases above mentioned. Small-pox having been spread by fugitives from Paris, all the men were re-vaccinated with success, so that, notwithstanding the spread of the disease among the country people, it did not seriously affect the troops. In February jaundice appeared, and was probably due, like dysentery, to the presence of sulphate of lime in the water; on the whole, however, the mortality before Paris did not greatly exceed the average death-rate in time of peace.

In the case of those troops which had to undertake severe active operations in winter, especially in the Hnd Army and the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg's Detachment, the effective speedily diminished through sickness even more than through losses in action. It was also very difficult to provide the necessary carriage to convey the sick after the army and to the

hospitals.

In general the months of September and October were the most unfavourable for the entire German army in respect of health.\* In the former month dysentery reached the highest point with a mortality of 34.09 per cent. of those affected, in the latter month typhus with 27.9 per cent. of deaths; towards the end of the campaign the number and virulence of the cases of these two diseases considerably decreased.

In the battles and engagements the sanitary detachments displayed an activity as great as it was beneficial. Naturally, where enormous losses occurred in a brief interval of time, help could not be always brought at once; at times also the positions of bandaging stations had to be shifted in consequence of their being reached by the enemy's fire. Generally speaking, these stations were, however, quickly established, and at well

selected spots.

In the greater battles single sanitary detachments have often treated upwards of 400 wounded, so that, like the regimental surgeons, they had to continue their work almost without interruption the whole day long. In such circumstances, the transfer of the wounded from the bandaging stations to the hospitals caused no little difficulty, as the wagons of the detachment were not sufficient, and auxiliary transport was, generally speaking, difficult to obtain.

The service was much more simple in the sieges; the sanitary detachments and the regimental surgeons could then do their work in permanent localities in rear, and at bandaging



<sup>•</sup> Appendix CLXXXVI shows the highest sick rate in the field army during the war and the number of sick on 19th February, 1871, in percentage of effective. In January the number of deaths by dysentery was only 2.74 per cent. of those sick, typhus 658 per cent.; but in February the rate rose to 8 per cent. for the former and 15 per cent. for the latter.

stations established in the trenches. Before Paris field hospitals were also frequently pushed forward close up to the outposts, and, later on, surgeons and sick bearers were permanently told off to most of the siege batteries.

The sanitary detachments are also frequently employed to

form hospitals, and to remove the sick from hospitals.

Immediately in rear of the sanitary detachments the field hospitals were established.\* This was generally done with great rapidity, and in a manner suited to their special functions. Country houses, churches, and other public buildings generally offered the requisite accommodation, but in some cases the resources of a peasant's cottage or a barn had to suffice. During this war hospital hut barracks were for the first time erected on a large scale on the battle-field, as, for instance, at Spicheren, Wörth, and Sedan. The result was in all cases very favourable. Similar buildings were employed on a larger scale to increase the accommodation of stationary field, and etappen hospitals.†

Besides the field hospitals, the personnel of the reserve hospitalst became, at an early stage, an important part of the sanitary service. Although intended simply to relieve the field hospitals, and to convert these latter into stationary hospitals, they were also employed to form field and etappen

hospitals.

In all, at nearly 500 places, stationary hospitals were formed from the field hospitals and the *personnel* of the reserve hospitals. The number of sick and wounded treated in all the

field hospitals was 295,644.

The etappen hospitals were intended not only for the requirements in rear of the field army, but at the same time formed a network of organization for the forwarding of sick to the rear. In this respect, its work was most difficult where there was no regular railway communication, as the convoys of sick moving by land had for the most part to pass the night in the etappen stations.

At the commencement of the preliminary peace the existing hospitals of the IInd and IIIrd Armies were for the most part evacuated, and could be removed at the end of March. In the

† The largest German barrack (field) hospital was that at Notre Dame de Bonsecours near Nancy.

Württemberg no reserve hospital personnel was organised.

For instance, the personnel of the hospital reserve of the Army of the Meuse had treated 37,366 sick and wounded, including 28,836 in passage, and 9,192 more in

the clearing stations at Mitry and Gonesse.

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Each field hospital was arranged for 200 sick, but, if necessary, could receive
considerably more. A Bavarian main field hospital was calculated for 500 to 800
sick.

<sup>†</sup> The personnel of the reserve hospitals of each Prussian and Saxon Army Corps consisted at first of 3 staff and 9 assistant-surgeons, with the necessary officials and orderlies, but was afterwards strengthened by the addition of civil surgeons. It could be employed in three independent sections, and was placed under the orders of the Inspector-General of Etappen. The personnel of the hospital reserve of the 25th and of the Baden Division was correspondingly weaker. For the Bavarian Army Corps the main field hospitals served as reserve hospitals. For Württemberg no reserve hospital personnel was organized.

course of this month the sick and wounded, capable of being removed, who were still left in the hospitals of the Ist, Meuse, and South Armies, were conveyed to Germany in six hospital trains. The further evacuation and removal of the hospitals kept pace with the return of the troops; the last large transports of sick were sent to Germany in November, 1872.

The reissue of medicines, bandaging materials, and other necessaries, was furnished to all hospitals by the reserve hospital depôts following the army, by the reserve hospital magazines, and by central reserve hospital depôts formed by the military administrative authorities as also by the depôts of volunteer

ambulances.

Transport

sick.

and distribution of Previous experience had shown that, as a principle, the sick and wounded should be distributed over as large an area as possible. This principle was observed so far as the means allowed. After the first great battles it was, however, very difficult to provide the surgeons, orderlies, and carriages necessary for the purpose.

All sick and wounded, who could bear movement, were assembled at suitable points, placed in wagons, and brought along etappen roads to the nearest working railway stations, in order to be thence forwarded to their homes. The railway trains proceeded to Germany by way of Weissenburg or Forbach, and from the commencement of September were worked by special evacuation committees at Weissenburg and Saarbrücken. Later on, another one was added at Epernay. These distributed the arriving convoys in corresponding groups, and sent them to hospitals in Germany, which were placed at their disposal for this purpose.\*

Nancy and Lagny gained in importance during the war as points of assembly of sick and wounded. At the former town the entire sick transport of the German Army in France was at times collected; so that occasionally as many as 1,500 to 1,700

men assembled and passed the night there.

Lagny formed from the 24th November the chief point of assembly for the army investing Paris, and temporarily for the wounded of the Hnd Army coming from the neighbourhood of Orléans and Le Mans.‡

The sick and wounded, which chiefly arrived in the wagons

The Evacuation Committee at Saarbrücken had to be removed to Forbach on 10th October, in consequence of the unfavourable circumstances of the station.

<sup>\*</sup> The Evacuation Committees were informed by a regular system of returns of the number of beds vacant in the hospitals. 6,500 wounded from the battles of Beaumont and Sedan were by special agreement sent home through Belgium. These transports were directed by an Evacuation Committee at Aix-la-Chapelle, which was, however, broken up on the 10th October.

<sup>†</sup> The total number of the sick and wounded which proceeded in this way through Nancy between 23rd August, 1870, and 5th May, 1871, amounted to 144,940; of these 70,282 men were treated in a barrack etappen hospital at the railway station.

‡ The principal line of evacuation of the 1Ind Army lay through Orleans....

Montargis—Moret—Chaumont—Blesme to Nancy and Weissenburg.

Between 27th November, 1870, and 11th April, 1871, 48,243 sick and wounded were received at Lagny.

of the commissariat columns filling at Lagny, were, as a rule, conveyed next day to Epernay, whence they were either distributed to the field, and stationary field, hospitals in the Champagne and in Alsace-Lorraine, or were taken to Germany. The sick of the 1st and Meuse Armies were forwarded by way of Rheims—Mézières—Metz, later by way of Frouard, to Forbach; those of the IIIrd Army all proceeded by way of Nancy to Weissenburg.\*

For the transport of the slightly wounded and sick, special sick trains were set apart; they were made up of covered goods wagons, provided with straw or mattrasses, in winter with woollen blankets, and were under the charge of surgeons. On the other hand, all badly wounded were as far as possible placed in hospital trains, the introduction of which may be regarded as one of the most important advances in military

hospital work.

The necessary wagons were provided by the German Railway Companies, whilst their equipment was carried out partly by the State and partly through the society for volunteer ambulances. Their internal arrangement was calculated to afford a number of comfortable cots, which were not immediately exposed to jolts, so that even badly-wounded men could bear without danger long railway journeys, while the surgeons and attendants could carry on their work without interruption.†

The Prussians and Saxons entrusted the care of the hospital trains to the hands of surgeons, while the South German States gave them to officers, officials, or private The trains equipped by volunteer associations were under the control of delegated and directing surgeons. The non-medical personnel of all the hospital trains was furnished

by the volunteer ambulance.

The first trains of this kind left Munich on the 7th, 8th, and 11th August. On the 16th of the same month the Württemburg hospital train commenced their transport; in September the North German, and in November the Baden hospital train.

The total of sick and wounded brought by railway to Germany amounted to 240,426, of whom 36,426 men were

forwarded by hospital trains in 164 journeys.

The organisation of reserve hospitals for the reception of Reserve sick and wounded from the theatre of war had been prepared hospital in all German States in time of peace, so that before the arrival of the wounded from Weissenburg, Spicheren, and

Between 8th November, 1870, and 23rd March, 1871, 84,827 sick and wounded passed through Epernay, of whom some 19,000 were brought thither in hospital trains.

<sup>†</sup> All the carriages had the means of heating, and were so connected with the kitchen carriage and surgeon's carriage, which also contained the dispensary, that there was through communication during the journey. Each train contained on an average 200 beds.

Wörth, a more than sufficient number of beds for the first requirements were available. The reserve hospitals were arranged by the provincial authorities, but were under military direction and superintendence. All peace garrison hospitals became reserve hospitals, but served primarily to receive the sick of the depôt and garrison troops. At the time of greatest need there were in all 111,932 beds available in 368 places; of these 7,268 were in hospital hut barracks, the construction of which had shortly to be commenced in view of the increasing number of sick and wounded.\*

The number of civil surgeons employed in the reserve hospitals increased considerably, as many military surgeons provisionally left behind at home had to be withdrawn from the reserve hospitals, in order to accompany troops proceeding to the theatre of war, in consequence of new formations, or to take

the place of others.

The care of the sick prisoners of war was also undertaken as well by the existing reserve hospitals. But when the numbers became excessive, separate hospitals were organized for them. With them the services of the French surgeons, who had followed their troops into captivity, were also utilised. Prisoners of war who were thoroughly unfit for service were dismissed to their homes.

Altogether in the State reserve hospitals, including the prisoners' hospitals, 812,021 sick and wounded were treated, in 17,613,397 working days.

The gradual closing of reserve hospitals commenced at the

end of March, 1871.

In consequence of the experience gained in the year 1866 special attention had been paid in Germany to voluntary medical aid. A convention concluded on 21st April, 1869, had paved the way for a uniform working of the societies existing in all parts of the country, under the direction of the Central Committee of the German Association for Medical Aid in the Field for Sick and Wounded Soldiers.

At the invitation of Her Majesty, Queen Augusta of Prussia, the duties of the volunteer medical societies had at the same time been determined. The relations between them and the military administration, to which they must be unconditionally subordinate in the general interest, had been precisely regulated. In order to turn to account the resources and the spirit of self-sacrifice of the whole nation, the Central Committee issued on the 19th July, 1870, an appeal inviting every one to share in the charitable work.

To organize the *personnel*, who volunteered their services from all classes of society, to direct them in the proper groove,

Voluntary medical aid.

<sup>\*</sup> The largest of these establishments was that built in the Tempelhof Plain, by the Prussian War Ministry, the Municipality, and the Help Committee at Berlin. It consisted of 15 State 20 city, and 15 committee barracks, which in all contained 2,500 beds.

and to prevent them from acting without concert, was the task of the "King's Commissary and Military Inspector of the Volunteer Ambulances." The post, which had existed in the Prussian Army since 1866, was entrusted on 20th July, 1870, to Prince Hans Heinrich XI of Pless, his authority being extended to the army of the North German Confederation. The Prince called to his aid a number of delegates,\* and distributed them in such wise to the field army and the interior, that each State of the North German Confederation had a State delegate, each Prussian province and some of the Government districts had each a provincial or district delegate. To each army was attached an army delegate, a general etappen delegate, and a column director; to each army corps, an army corps delegate. The South German States also appointed similar delegates, who in Bavaria were under the Central Committee of the National Society of that country, and in Württemberg under Prince Hermann of Saxe Weimar, appointed Royal Commissary. The Grand Duchies of Baden and Hesse had entrusted the formation of these auxiliary institutions to Prince Pless. delegates present with the South German States placed themselves most willingly at his disposal for all general concerns.;

In order to fulfil the first and most important duties of voluntary help, namely, to furnish attendants for the convoys of wounded and to help in the field hospitals, an appeal was made on the 22nd July, and in answer thereto a large number of patriotic gentlemen and ladies reported themselves for personal service. The well-trained personnel placed at disposal by several religious and lay societies was especially of great value. The societies charged themselves with training a reserve of attendants in order to form the necessary reserve. Numerous larger and smaller detachments were organized, and these, like the columns of attendants of the etappen delegates, rendered service partly on the battle-fields, but more particularly in the

stationary hospitals and with the convoys.

At all the principal points of the railways used for the transport of troops and wounded in France, and at all the larger and many of the smaller stations of Germany, refreshment stations and dressing stations were established, which were of the greatest value.

In Germany, voluntary help was principally active in opening hospitals, partly independently and partly with the help of

† The delegates of the etappen had at their disposal a column of some 200 volunteer sick attendants. To them were attached sub-delegates, who, as the communications extended, were left behind at important points.

The delegates appointed by the Prince Pless for the interior were at the same time representatives of the Central Committee.

<sup>†</sup> The total number of delegates under the Military Inspector in the theatre of war amounted to 363, of whom the majority belonged to the Orders of St. John and Malta. In addition to these, there were a number of other persons as representatives of various societies both in the theatre of war and in Germany, and in the latter case, particularly in the reserve hospitals.

the military administration. The numerous societies,\* especially the Aid Societies of Women, under the direction of Her Majesty the Queen of Prussia and the other German Princesses. participated in the work in the most active manner, and showed a spirit of self-abnegation. At the end of the war there existed upwards of 1,500 of such hospitals; a large number of wounded and of convalescents were likewise received into private estab-

lishments and into private families.

In order to give information to relatives of the whereabouts of the sick and wounded, a central intelligence office was established in Berlin on 19th July, which was supplemented later on by similar establishments in almost all the principal towns of the country. Through the instrumentality of the Geneva International Committee, relations were maintained with the office of the Société du Secours aux Blessés Miltitaires in Paris. In all, the Berlin office, from 11,963 lists furnished by the hospitals, brought on its books and maps upwards of

509,837 men, including 60,000 Frenchmen.

The immense success of the volunteer ambulances was in great measure due to the spirit of self-sacrifice shown by the entire German nation in providing the necessary resources. From the earliest days of the war the free gifts streamed in by large quantities. Their collection, disposal, and despatch to the army formed an important branch of the duties of the Central Committee and its representatives. To receive these objects three principal depôts were in the first instance formed at Coblenz, Mainz, and Mannheim, and eleven reserve depôts were established as chief collecting depôts for the larger districts, When the German armies entered France, seventy-six branch depôtst were formed in the course of time, which were filled from the main depôts and distributed stores to the troops, to the hospitals, and to the dressing stations.

The total value of the gifts in money made from Germany to the army in this way amounted to eleven million thalers (1,650,000l.), and the value of the other gifts may be estimated

at five million thalers (750,000l.).

Foreign countries, and especially the Germans living there, have borne their share in the most generous manner, and have sent to the Central Committee and the societies affiliated to it valuable gifts of every kind, and upwards of 21 millions of thalers (375,000*l*.).

In consequence of these valuable resources, the societies were also in a position after the war, to place health resorts within the reach of soldiers broken down by sickness, and to

I Numerous consignments of gifts were, in addition, sent direct to regiments and corps.



By the end of the war, 25 county, 25 provincial, and 1,987 branch societies, including the societies of women, with some 255,000 members, were at the disposal of the Central Committee.

<sup>†</sup> Four depôts or refreshment and dressing stations were formed at Libramont, Liege, Bouillon, and Aix-la-Chapelle, for the purpose of administering to the wounded sent back through Belgium.

give help to invalided soldiers and to the families of soldiers killed in action.

During the war, the volunteer ambulances and the assistance of the entire nation have aided to an enormous extent the military institutions which, in keeping with the circumstances of the army, must meet the first necessities, and, for that help, have carned the warmest thanks of the German Army. This feeling was nobly expressed in a letter addressed by the Royal Commander to Her Majesty the Empress and Queen, on his return from France, in recognition of the work of the Central Committee.

In examining the results of the medical service during the Results of the war, they may be considered on the whole as exceedingly sanitary favourable. More especially is the circumstance worthy of service. notice that the number of men who succumbed to disease was far below the number who died by external force. the campaign of 1866, 59·1 per cent. of the deaths in the Prussian Army were due to disease, this number in the Franco-German War was only 28.95 per cent. Taking into comparison the duration of the campaigns and the forces employed, the number of deaths by disease and epidemics in 1870-71 was only one-half of the number in 1866.

The small difference, which on the other hand tells to the disadvantage of the war of 1870-71, in the average number of recoveries from wounds, is to be attributed chiefly to the longer duration of the campaign and the greater extent of the theatre

Cholera, which in the war of 1866 was the chief element in the death-rate, and exanthematic typhus, did not on this occasion attack the German Army, but it was not so with abdominal typhus and dysentery.

The number of deaths in the German Army, inclusive of the navy and civilians attached to the army, amounts to 40,881; of these 70.03 per cent. died by external force, viz:—

Killed in action  Died of wounds  Accidental death  Suicide	17,572 10,710 316 30
Total	28,628

By acute internal disease, the deaths were 25.45 per cent., viz. :--

Typhus	6,965
Dysentery	2,000 261
Gastric fever	159 500
Other acute internal disease	521
Total	10,406

## By other maladies:-

Internal chronic complaints	778
Sudden death	94
Undetermined disease	556
Unknown causes	419
Total	1 847

For the army, excluding navy and civilians, the numbers were as follows:—

By external violence	28,596	deaths
" internal acute disease		••
., , chronic ,	767	91
" sudden death	93	"
" unknown diseases	553	27
,, other diseases	415	**
Total	40,743	•

The sanitary condition of Germany did not suffer any serious deterioration in consequence of the war.

During this campaign the German military medical service has proved its excellence in the most varied ways, while the careful and ready help of the surgeons have contributed in a marked degree to maintaining the efficiency, and thereby indirectly to the success of the German arms. In all circles of the army the self-sacrificing devotion of the entire medical personnel has been the theme of universal acknowledgment. Not a few of those men have fallen victims to the enemy's fire and to epidemics while carrying out their duty, but, on the other hand, thousands of sick and wounded Frenchmen and Germans owe their lives to their ever-ready devotion.

## DIVINE SERVICE AND MILITARY JUSTICE.

For carrying on the divine service in the field army, the peace Divine establishment of military chaplains was augmented from the large number of clergymen who voluntarily offered their services. A number were appointed, so that, generally speaking, each infantry, landwehr, and reserve Division had at least two, frequently three, divisional chaplains. According to the religion of the majority in the respective corps, the number of Evangelical or Catholic chaplains preponderated. Further, in most of the Army Corps, the corps artillery, and frequently the Cavalry Divisions, had their own chaplains. Besides the regular establishment, two extra were appointed to each army corps, the appointments being made, according to the requirements, by the Senior Protestant chaplain, or the Catholic representative.

Although at the opening of the campaign, the rapid movements of the whole army, and the subsequent operations of the Ist, IInd, and South Armies did not always allow of divine service being held, yet before going into action the chaplains lost no opportunity by a short address of reminding the troops of their duty, and to be seech the Divine help in the impending struggle. It was at the dressing stations and in the hospitals, however, that the chaplains showed more particularly their zeal and devotion. Indefatigable in their calling to administer to the dying the consolation of religion and the comfort of the Holy Sacrament, they endeavoured, while ministering to their souls, to assist also the surgeons in nursing their bodies.† After the numerous glorious victories and actions, the serious duty devolved upon them of expressing the feelings of the troops by thanks to the Almighty, of consecrating the graves of the dead, and of reminding the troops of the sublime and consoling thought that their fallen comrades had sacrificed their lives by the faithful accomplishment of the highest duty towards their king and country.

For the troops who were forced to remain a long time in one and the same neighbourhood, as before fortresses, especially before Metz and Paris, a more regularly arranged divine service was possible than with the field army. The churches in the villages occupied were used for the service of both religions, mostly with the willing assistance of the French clergymen. Sometimes also large bodies of troops were assembled for divine service in the open air.

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<sup>\*</sup> The majority of the 1st class chaplains and many garrison chaplains, who, according to the regulations, were destined to remain at home in case of mobilization, were called in 1870 to take the field as chaplains.

<sup>†</sup> While hastening to the assistance of the surgeons at the bandaging stations, Divisional Chaplain Schwabe, of the 22nd Division, fell on the 18th October before Châteaudun. In the action at Ladon, on the 24th November, Divisional Chaplain Dietz, of the 19th, and in the battle on the Hallue, Divisional Chaplain Gross, were wounded.

In the hospitals, similar duties to those on the battle-field devolved, only to a greater extent, upon the chaplains. Special hospital chaplains were appointed to this duty, and for their assistance were added a considerable number of volunteer hospital chaplains of both creeds, Protestant field deacons and catholic priests despatched by religious associations\* to the hospital establishments in the theatre of war and in Germany. Their distribution, and the ministration in the hospitals, devolved upon three field-hospital chaplains, who were at first attached to the Inspectors-General of Etappen of the three armies, but to whom, later on, were apportioned the duties by districts: all the hospitals in the districts falling to their charge, without regard to the armies to which they belonged.

The relations with the sick, wounded, and dying opened to those having the care of souls a wide and thankful sphere of duty. Besides this, these chaplains had the special task of ministering directly to the spiritual well-being of the soldiers, by acting as intermediaries between the soldiers in their charge and their relatives, and also by providing suitable reading for those who were able to take advantage of it. Lastly, the chaplains were never absent from the side of the surgeons in the hospitals, and shared with them the cares and dangers of

their calling, to which also many chaplains fell victims.

The work of the chaplains of both creeds, in the field as well as in the hospitals, was of the more value for the army, as these men, besides fulfilling their special duties in the care of souls, considered it their special task to maintain and develop the

patriotic and moral sense of the army.

The administration of military law was carried out in the

field on essentially the same principles as in peace.

By a Royal Decree, prepared in 1867, but not promulgated until 20th July, 1870, the procedure of military tribunals was, however, simplified in some points, and thereby the administration of justice was made more speedy-a matter of special importance in time of war. By a second decree issued at the same time the relations between the army and the inhabitants of the enemy's country were also regulated. In this the principle had to be observed of securing absolute powers to the military authorities under all circumstances, and of dealing promptly and severely with any French subjects who did acts prejudicial in any way to the German On the other hand, the complete co-operation of the authorities in the enemy's country had been calculated upon, in order, as far as possible, to lighten the inevitable

\* From the Rhenish-Westphalian Association of Malta, the Order of St. John of Malta, and others.

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Military law.

<sup>†</sup> In all, there were employed in France during the war, 92 Protestant hospital chaplains, besides 30 chaplains and candidates in theology, who were temporarily or permanently posted to the reserve hospitals in Germany. All hespital chaplains and supernumerary field chaplains had refused any fixed remuneration during the term of their employment.

burdens of the war by distributing them in a just manner. This supposition was not always realised, and as the officials of the French administration, police and law, refused in most cases their co-operation, great difficulties occurred in carrying out these branches of the administration.

In spite of this, the German officials of military justice rendered possible throughout a rapid and vigorous action of the courts-martial, thereby contributing both to maintaining discipline in the German Army, and to deciding the legal questions arising with the French population. This latter duty was considerably facilitated by the circumstance that the German Judge Advocates very successfully fulfilled at times the duties of the prefects in the occupied departments.

The field gendarmerie, formed only at the moment of Field mobilization, was charged with the police duties of the army, gendarmerie. especially in respect to men temporarily detached from their corps and to civilians following the army, and also with the local police duties in the occupied districts of the enemy's

country.

For the first of these services it was above all things important to keep the roads used by the army open and practicable for traffic. The great length of the trains, the drivers of which were not as a rule accustomed to military discipline, caused the field gendarmes a considerable amount of work. In the local police administration they had to share, in so far as seeing to the maintenance of the roads and bridges, and forcing the local authorities to make the necessary repairs.

The field gendarmerie had another important task—that of preventing unauthorised requisition. In this respect the strictest supervision had to be maintained over many of the civilian followers, like sutlers and purveyors, who easily found opportunities for unlawful acts, and whose crimes were then mostly laid to the charge of the troops. On the fields of battle the field gendarmerie had as much as possible to share in seeking out and protecting the wounded, and, later on, to perform important duties in clearing the battle-fields and

carrying out measures of sanitary police.

The carrying out of the local police duties in the occupied districts soon proved extremely difficult, as, in consequence of the extent of territory the number of available men was far from adequate, while the difference of language and the apathy of the French authorities greatly increased the difficulty of co-operation with these latter. But even when the French police authorities could be employed in a regular manner, they had to be always supported by the German field gendarmerie, as the former could not be allowed to deal independently with any crimes that might be committed by German soldiers. Thus, for instance, a mixed duty was arranged in Rouen in such wise that patrols consisting of two Prussian field gendarmes and two sergeants de ville were charged with maintaining order in the streets.



As a general rule, in spite of its weak effective,\* and of the difficulties, to which allusion has been made, the field gendarmerie succeeded in satisfactorily discharging its numerous duties, and has contributed in no slight degree to maintaining in this war as well the discipline for which the German Army has ever been renowned.

Independently of the field gendarmerie the Royal Headquarters had a special field police, which, in addition to its protective functions in the enemy's country, had also to share in certain administrative duties. In the difficulties already described the duties of the director of police were very varied and onerous, so that other trained officials had to be appointed for his assistance. The field police had an important task at Versailles, where the protection of the Royal Headquarters and the observation of strangers demanded special attention. By increasing the personnel, the employment of French police officials and military aid, tit became possible to maintain tranquillity and security during the whole period that Versailles was occupied.

<sup>\*</sup> With each of the three original Army Headquarters—1 detachment commander, 1 second officer, and 1 sergeant-major with a corresponding number of gendarmes detached from the army corps; with each army corps (including the two Bavarian)—1 officer, 1 sergeant-major, 40 gendarmes,; with each Inspector-General of Etappen, a detachment of field gendarmerie under its own commander, formed of 1 sergeant-major and 20 gendarmes from each corps of the army. The Royal Hendquarters, and, later on, the headquarters of the corps besieging Belfort received each 1 sergeant-major and 5 gendarmes. With the Württemberg Division, the duties were performed by the squadron of mounted messengers (Feldjäger) already existing in peace time, consisting of 3 officers and 82 men.

† Originally composed of a Director, Dr. Stieber, and 4 officials.

‡ 4 officers, 185 non-commissioned officers and men, of the Ist Reserve Rifle Battalion were ordered to Versailles to reinforce the field police.

THE RECRUITMENT AND OTHER SERVICES IN GERMANY.

At the mobilization of the army, the depôt troops in the Recruitment. districts of the North German Corps were formed partly of men of the reserve, the youngest classes of the 1st class Ereatz Reserve, and the first class of the Landwehr. Morcover, the general desire to take part in the war had brought hosts of volunteers to the colours.

It was necessary to train these recruits as soon as possible for service in the field. In order to ensure that the depôt troops might be in a position in this respect to fulfil the duties required of them, it was held as a principle during the whole course of the war that those charged with the training should

be sufficient in numbers and equal to their task.

For the North German field troops, the rule for the filling up of vacancies was that every corps which had lost 10 per cent. of its effective by death, wounds, capture, or sickness, was to apply, either directly or through the headquarters in the field, for a corresponding draft to its depôt, or to the temporary corps commander. As a rule, the drafts, by arrangement of the Inspector-General of Etappen, reached the terminal etappen station by train, and thence joined their corps by road. But the railways were unable in all cases to meet the demands. After heavy engagements, more particularly, they were so much taken up by the transport of wounded and prisoners that delays occurred in bringing up the drafts. It not infrequently happened that weeks elapsed before the drafts reached their corps, especially when the latter had advanced in the interval.

The vacancies, which occurred by the despatch of the drafts, were first filled by new levies. At the commencement of

The depôts of the cavalry, horse artillery, Guard artillery, rifles, fusiliers, and Guard infantry, raised no recruits for the Ereats Reserve.

After the 9th September men of the older classes of the Landwehr were

called up to the depôts.

became 5 per cent., as the previous mode of procedure did not render it possible to

received 147 officers and 9,480 men.

In the artillery the losses were, in the first instance, replaced by men and horses from the ammunition columns.

<sup>\*</sup> For the strength of the North German depôt troops, see Part I, Vol. I. pp. 41-42.

In the district of the XIIth Army Corps and the Grand Ducal Hesse Division the same principles obtained as with the Prussian corps (see Part I, Vol. I, p. 36).

+ After the 30th December this requisition had to be made when the loss

maintain the troops permanently at the war establishment.

‡ For this reason, after heavy losses had injuriously affected the fighting powers of certain corps, as, for instance, after the battles round Metz, it not infrequently happened that two or more corps had to be combined into one. In order to equalise matters, an exchange often took place between very weak detachments and those which had suffered less (see Part I, Vol. I, pp. 388, 438; Vol. II, pp. 162, 473, note †; Part II, Vol. I, pp. 176, 197, note †; p. 256, note †; Vol. II, p. 145, note ‡.

Certain corps could not at first obtain the necessary numbers to replace casualties. The IIIrd Army Corps, for instance, required 382 officers and 13,064 men, to replace its losses on the 6th and 16th August, but by the end of September had only residual 147 officers and 9.480 men.

September the recruits for 1870-71 were called up. When these did not suffice, recourse was had to the 1st Class of the Eratz Reserve and the older classes of men who had already merved.\*

In this way, the men intended to replace casualties in the infantry could be drawn from three originally different groups. In the first place, there were the available number of men who had already served, estimated in each battalion at some 500, or a total of 60,000 men. This number was sufficient to cover the losses sustained in August and September. A second group, which comprised the recruits and volunteers enrolled on mobilisation, was assigned to the field troops, generally speaking, from the beginning of October, yielding a further increment of some 50,000 men. Lastly, at the commencement of 1871, the whole of the recruits of the year 1870-71 were available to the extent of some 70,000 men. Moreover, the depôts were considerably increased by men discharged from the hospitals as fit for duty. The condition of the other arms of the servce was no less favourable.

The field landwehr troops did not at first receive any men to replace their casualties, but the unmobilised landwehr battalions,† and the garrison battalions, and the dismounted landwehr squadrons; were charged with training men for this

purpose.

In order to cover the increasing want of officers, landwehr officers, whose services could not hitherto be spared, were drafted to the field regiments. Convalescent officers and officers on the reserve list also did duty with the depôts, so that

others whom they relieved might join the field army.

To replace casualties in the field troops of the Bavarian Army Corps and their depôts, were used in the first place, as in North Germany, the trained men of the reserve and The further reserves were ensured by calling out landwehr. on the 4th October the whole of the contingent of 1870-71 -16,000 in number-and also 2,520 of the 1st Class Ersatz Reserve, some of whom joined the field troops in December. In order to be able to satisfy the very large demands at this time, the period of training of new recruits had from the middle of this month to be shortened to six weeks. Hand in hand with these arrangements, the depôt troops were further augmented. For instance, after the 17th December, the establishment of each depôt battalion was increased by 200



<sup>•</sup> On the formation of the depôts, and also in the subsequent course of the campaign, the prescribed effectives were often exceeded.

At the commencement of February, 1871, each of these received 300 recruits

from the 1st Class Ersatz Reserve, with orders to hasten the training, so that drafts might be ready for the field battalions in May.

See subsoquent narrative. See Part I, Vol. I, p. 37-38 and 42-13.

The cavalry recruits were not sent into the field until after eix months' training, those of the artillery as they became ready.

men, each depôt rifle company by 50 men.\* The fourth company of the battalions was appointed to furnish the men for the corresponding landwehr battalions.

In the artillery, in consequence of the new formation of a field artillery division,† the eight depôt batteries were reduced

to four.1

The drafts from the depôts of the Württemberg Field Division were replaced by calling up trained ersatz reservists of the years 1859-1866, and untrained recruits and ersatz

reservists of 1870, lastly, by volunteers.

In Baden the arrangements for depôts followed in their main features the North German regulations. At the beginning of September the infantry depôts sent reinforcements of 240 men each to the regiments in the field.\*\* Large drafts proceeded to the theatre of war in November, at the end of December, end of January, and middle of February. Meanwhile, the recruits levied in 1870 had been gradually incorporated. Lastly, all men belonging to the classes of 1860 and upwards who were fit for active service and had not yet been incorporated, were ordered to join their respective landwehr battalions, the fortress artillery battalion, and the depôts on the 31st January, 1871.

By these measures, not only were the requisite numbers in all the German corps secured to the fullest extent, but also, in spite of the numerous new formations, the depôt troops were in almost every case maintained at their establishment, without being forced to have recourse to any other steps than those

recognised by regulation.

By the beginning of March, 1871, the depôts of the German Army had sent in all to France a reinforcement of upwards of 2,000 officers and some 220,000 men,†† thereby again bringing the field troops at that date to their full war establishment. On that same date the German depôt troops amounted to 3,288 officers, 204,684 men, and 26,603 horses.##

The men proceeding to the army were fully equipped, armed, and provided with ammunition; those of the cavalry, artillery, and train took with them the necessary drafts of

† See later narrative.

Some 1,400 men.

If Appendix OXC shows the strength of the German depôts at the beginning of March, 1871.

<sup>\*</sup> The total depôt troops were increased by this measure some 3,700 men.

<sup>1</sup> By this arrangement, the effective of each of the batteries was increased by 86 non-commissioned officers and 278 men.

<sup>§</sup> As regards the depôt arrangements in Württemberg, see Part I, Vol. I, pp. 38-39 and 43-14. Also see subsequent narrative as regards recruits for the depôt

See Part I, Vol. I, pp. 39 and 44-45.

\*\* The field battalions were originally only 900 strong (see Part I, Vol. I, p. 45, note \*). The augmentation of the 5th Infantry Regiment did not take place until

<sup>††</sup> Appendix CLXXXIX gives a summary of the drafts despatched to the German Army between the commencement of the war and the beginning of March,

horses. The renewal of the clothing and equipment of all

troops in the field was completed from home territory.\*

In the case of the cavalry, artillery and train,† the requisite number of horses was applied for to the depôts, but in the case of the infantry, rifles, pioneers, and administrative services, to the horse depôts in the field. These horse depôts in urgent cases, however, rendered assistance to the other arms; in regard to this, there was the less hesitation, as they usually had a greater number of saddle and draught horses than their proper establishment. They formed their reserves by means of requisition, by captures, by the receipt of temporarily unfit horses, and by drafts from the depôts in Germany. The most difficult matter was to satisfy the demands for officers' horses. In order to provide sufficient numbers of these, the horses of killed and wounded officers were purchased.

For the North German troops, a central horse depôt was organised at Berlin, which was at first to receive 300 horses, viz., 100 saddle and 200 draught, but, generally speaking, had later on a larger establishment. Altogether it sent 3,585 horses to the field depôts, replacing its drafts by purchase in

the open market.

In Bavaria, besides the depôts, the military studs and the riding school furnished the necessary horses. From home territory, 3,005 saddle and draught horses were sent to the Bavarian troops, 938 to the Württemberg, and 325 to the Baden troops.

In all, the German Army received from home a supply of about 22,000 horses. To these must be added those taken from the enemy's country, of which some 16,000 horses were partly requisitioned and partly captured. The total supply for the German Army amounted during the war to upwards of 38,000 horses.

The artillery regiments of North Germany received 92 field guns in replacement of others. The demands were sent by the troops through the artillery commanders of the different armies to the War Ministry, which ordered the necessary issue from the artillery depôts; 23 guns were despatched to the Bavarian, and a similar number to the Württemberg field artillery § The total expenditure of field guns in the German Army amounted to 116 pieces.

During the war, the losses and replacement of rifles and side-arms and of field equipment was not very large, as the



These drafts were formed into detachments by corps, and proceeded with a small escort to the advanced depôt of their army, where they were taken in charge and forwarded. As the equipment could not always be received in time, the troops had recourse to the private industry of the enemy's country in urgent cases.

† At the mobilisation, the remounts of 1870 were posted to the depôts.

Their casualties in horses were reclaimed by purchases in the open market.

† See Appendix LXXXIX.

§ Generally the guns only han to be replaced (see also Appendix CLXXXIX).

|| For instance, 33 needle-guns, 39 breech-loading carbines, 146 sabres of different patterns, 179 side-arms, and 44 lances, were sent to the XIIth Army Corps to replace others.

German troops in the majority of cases remained masters of the battle-field.

During the armistice the whole of the losses in men, horses, and material had been replaced in such manner that at the time of the peace negotiations the German Army was in readiness to resume the struggle, with its full complement of

men and equipment.

While the field troops were gaining decisive successes on the Home staffs, other side of the frontier, the home staff on this side of it were steadily pursuing their less prominent, but extremely important new formaduties. In the first place, the War Ministry, the staff and tions. the "provisional staff" in the army corps districts strove, as circumstances required, to render available for the manifold purposes of war those resources of the country which had been by no means exhausted at the close of the mobilisation. In their endeavours they were most energetically supported by their subordinates and the other authorities.

The longer the war lasted, the more the theatre of operations extended and the more the losses increased, so much greater became the demands which the home authorities had to meet.\* In North Germany, at the end of August, two reserve army corps had been assembled at Berlin and Glogau, each composed of six landwehr regiments, a reserve cavalry regiment, one heavy and two light reserve batteries.† The first-named of these corps was despatched to Freiburg in Baden at the end of September, and afterwards employed to form the 4th Reserve Division. It was augmented by the cavalry regiment and the batteries of the other reserve corps, whilst the twelve infantry battalions of this Corps were handed over to the Government-General of Alsace at the end of October.1

At the same time that these reserve corps were formed, the augmentation of the landwehr troops intended for home fortresses and etappen duties had been taken into consideration. The garrison battalions in the North German fortresses accordingly received, to the extent required, an establishment of 1,002 men after the end of August. In the depôt squadrons, detachments of sixty horses were told off for duty in the fortresses after the departure of the reserve cavalry regiments.

1st Reserve Lancers.

Heavy, 1st and 2nd Light, Reserve Butteries, 1Vth Corps.

The reserve corps at Gloguu consisted of-

Landwehr Regiments Nos. 7, 10, 47, 50, 81, and 85. 3rd Reserve Lancers.

Heavy, 1st and 2nd Light, Reserve Batteries, VIth Corps. Licutenant-General v. Löwenfeld, hitherto Governor-General of the Vth and Vith Army Corps districts, was appointed Inspector of these two re erre corps. 

‡ See Appendix CLXXV.

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tions, and

<sup>\*</sup> Appendix CLXXXVII shows the average total effective strength of the German troops during the War of 1870-71 in the various months; Appendix CLXXXVIII the total strength during the war.

<sup>†</sup> The reserve corps at Berlin consisted of-Landwehr Regiments Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5, 43, 45.

Further, in the districts of the VIIth and VIIIth Army Corps the supernumerary men of the garrison troops, when not required to reinforce the battalions in the fortresses, were formed into companies of 200 men each, and assigned to the etappen troops of the 1st Army.\* Supplementary to this measure, all the landwehr battalions intended for etappen duties were augmented later on from the supernumeraries of the depôt and garrison battalions.† Hand-in-hand with these, six squadrons intended for etappen purposes were formed from the supernumeraries of the different depôt squadrons.

At the end of November, 1870, the effective of all landwehr battalions in the field and of those stationed on the coast was ordered to be raised from 802 to 1,002 men, a measure which might be extended by the provisional corps commanders, if required, to the other landwehr battalions left in the home

districts.

As regards new formations, these were limited in North Germany at first to two reserve rifle battalions, which were formed of the dep6t companies of the Guard Rifles, Guard Sharpshooters, and the 1st to the 8th Rifle Battalions, each on an effective of 802 men.‡ The progress of events in the theatre of war, and above all the increasing number of prisoners, however, rendered necessary further steps in this direction.§ The cavalry having still a considerable surplus of trained men of the younger classes, who had as yet been unemployed, "dismounted landwehr depôt squadrons" were created at the end of November; by the end of the war sixty of them, in all some 15,000 men, had been formed.

Shortly after, "garrison battalions" were formed of men on the furlough lists of all arms, of volunteers who had served and were no longer liable to military service, and lastly of Ersatz reservists. For service with them, officers on the unattached lists of all arms were called out, besides landwehr officers and officers formerly of the line but now on the retired list. By the end of January, 1871, 23 garrison battalions were formed, and 39 were in process of formation. By April the number had risen to 72, a total

1 As to their subsequent employment, see Appendix CIXXV.

§ The more so, as the number of garrison and reserve troops left at home diminished more and more as the war progressed.

|| To fill the officers' vacancies, officers of the retired list were called out whom those on the furlough list were insufficient.

¶ 180 men from the 1st Class Ersatz Reserve and the same number from the youngest of the Hnd Class.

<sup>\*</sup> See Part 1, Vol. II, p. 458, note \*, and Appendix CLXXV.

<sup>†</sup> These Landwehr battalions were to be thereby raised to an establishment of six companies of 200 men each.

In the North German corps districts there were at the commencement of September, 1870. 81 Landwehr battalions, 4½ reserve cavalry regiments, 19 reserve batteries. About the middle of November, on the other hand, there were only 57 Landwehr battalions, 6 squadrum reserve cavalry, and 8 reserve batteries. In Pebruary, the number of North German garrison battalions was only 33, of which 17 were not on the war footing.

torce of 60,000 men.\* Both the garrison battalions and the dismounted depôt squadrons passed under the orders of the

infantry brigade provisional staffs.

Simultaneously with these augmentations and new formations taking place, the mobilisation of the troops which were despatched during the course of operations to the theatre of war was carried out. Besides the bulk of the landwebr battalions, this applied chiefly to a large number of fortress artillery and pioncer companies, various trains and columnst necessary for the siege parks and to those ammunition columns. trains, and administrative services necessary for the newly

created army corps and reserve divisions.

In Saxony, during the continuance of the campaign, all the troops loft at home were placed immediately under the Government-General established in that country. In consequence of the battles round Metz, the four garrison battalions after their mobilisation and formation into a brigade, followed on the 24th August to the theatre of war. As this left of infantry only the depôt battalions and companies at home, every two brigade staffs were combined into one. In the middle of December two fortress artillery companies proceeded to France, whither by the 1st January the three reserve batteries were following.

The total troops mobilised in Saxony amounted to 1,102 officers, surgeons, and officials, 56,272 men; those not on the war footing numbered 382 officers, surgeons, and officials, The landwehr district staffs had during the war 15,863 men.

called in from the furlough list a total of 47,500 men.

The Grand Duchy of Hesse formed no landwehr troops, but towards the end of January created a garrison battalion of 480 men, which was mainly employed to guard prisoners.

In Bavaria, of the eight line battalions left originally as garrison troops, there remained at the middle of September on this side of the frontier only the 1st battalion of the 4th and the 2nd of the 8th. These also joined the field army in December.

I The XIIIth and XIVth Army Corps were first of all provided with these

<sup>\*</sup> The battalions, originally 602 strong, were raised later to upwards of 800 men. † See Part I, Vol. II, p. 456, and Appendix CLXXV, and also the narrative of the sieges of the French fortresses passim.

<sup>§ (</sup>a.) Depôt troops:—9 depôt battalions, 2 rifle depôt companies, 6 depôt (b.) Garrison troops—4 Landwehr (garrison) buttalions, 3 rane depot companies, 6 depot equadrons, 8 depot batteries, 1 pioneer depot company, 1 train depot divisior.

(b.) Garrison troops—4 Landwehr (garrison) buttalions, 3 reserve foot batteries, 4 fortress artillery companies. The 4th Company 72nd Landwehr Regiment at Königstein also belonged to the garrison troops.

[Bach battalion had an establishment of 802 men (see Part I, Vol. II, p. 464,

<sup>\*</sup>nd Appendix CLXXV).

¶ See Appendix CLIII.

• See Appendix CLXXV. †† They joined the Ist Bavarian Corps. The rest had already proceeded to France, vis: \_\_\_\_IInd and IIIrd and \_\_\_\_\_ to the detachment investing Bitsca; IIIrd and IIIrd to the 1st Bavarian Corps; IInd and IIIrd were

Of the 16 landwehr battalions,\* eight were despatched for etappen duties in the theatre of war. After the augmentation of the depôt troops; and of the landwehr battalions, there were still at disposal 10,000 trained and 24,000 untrained landwehr. No new formation of infantry took place in Bavaria. In the cavalry an etappen squadron of 5 officers and 164 men was formed of the depôt squadrons of the six chevaux-legers regiments. The field artillery formed at the beginning of September from its depôt batteries one division, which at the end of the month proceeded to the theatre of war. Of the Bavarian fortress batteries left at home, parks were formed for the sieges of Strassburg, Paris, Bitsch, and Belfort.\*\* The two reserve ammunition depôts to formed at the commencement of the mobilisation were augmented by the 1st September by three auxiliary depôts.##

The Bavarian engineers formed at the end of August, two new bridge trains, which left Ingolstadt to join the field

army.§§

The total of the Bavarian troops which did not proceed to the theatre of war numbered-

> 39,261 mcn and 3,840 horses in September, 1870. 3,929 45,123 January, 1871. 24,120 2,919 April, 1871.

The new armament of the infantry had so far progressed during the course of the war that towards the end of the year, besides the four rifle battalions II provided at the outbreak of hostilities with the rifle M. 69, the eight line battalions originally intended for garrison duties were armed with that weapon.

\* By an order of 10th August, all 16 Landwehr battalions were reinforced by 40 men per company (see Part I, Vol. I, p. 43, note †).

† See Appendix CLXXV, especially with reference to the parts of the 31st

temporarily at home in January to receive their new armament, and Ist and IIIrd in February, 1871.

I andwehr Battalion sent temporarily to France.

† As regards depot troops, see aule, p. 236.

§ The squadron was employed on etappen duties (see Appendix CLXXV).

|| The detachment consisted of: Staff, 2 rifled 6-pounder and 2 rifled 12-pounder batteries of 6 guns each, 1 mitrailleuse battery of 4 (after 24th October of 6 pieces), and 1 ammunition column. Its strength was 866 men, 807 horses, 28 (later, 30) pieces, 86 carriages.

pieces, 86 carriages.

A second mitrailleuse battery proceeded, on 24th October, to the field army (see Appendices V, XCII, XCV.

¶ See Part I, Vol. I, p. 43.

\*\* See Part II, Vol. 11I, p. 129, and Appendices LII, CXXIX, and CXLVI.

†† See Part I, Vol. I, p. 42.

†† See ante, p. 203.

§§ Each of 2 officers, 66 men, 106 horses, 15 six-horse trestle wagons (see Appendices V, XCII, and XCV).

||| See Part I, Vol. I, p. 43.

¶¶ See Part I, Vol. I, p. 37.

In Württemberg, the command of all troops left at home during the campaign, including the Ulm garrison, was entrusted to the Governor-General, under whom there was a provisional Corps Staff. Of the troops left originally at Ulm,† the 1st Battalion 4th Regiment proceeded in the middle of August to Alsace on etappen duties. At the beginning of September the 2nd battalion of the same regiment, and the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 6th followed for the same purpose.‡ In September also the 3rd and 4th squadrons 3rd Cavalry Regiments were brought to Paris, the 1st and 4th batteries of the Fortress Artillery Battalion to Strassburg. In the middle of October the 1st and 2nd depôt batteries, and at the end of the month the 2nd and 3rd squadrons 2nd Cavalry Regiment\*\* were employed on active service.

When only two of the six cavalry squadrons left originally in the country remained, three reserve squadronst were newly formed in Württemberg. From the middle of February the levies of recruits were placed in special companies, which served to form "depôt battalions" in the garrisons of Stuttgart, Ulm, Ludswigsburg.##

The total force of the troops in Württemberg amounted at

the beginning of March to 164 officers and 12,814 men.

In Baden, all the line battalions originally left at home followed by degrees the field army III the last of all being the 2nd Battalion 6th Regiment, II which had, till then, belonged to the garrison of Rustatt. Further, eight fortress artillery companies and a fortress pioneer company were brought up to the siege corps before Strassburg\*\*\* and Belfort. † † Of the six landwehr battalions formed on mobiliza-

<sup>\*</sup> With regard to the Württemberg troops left originally at home, see Part I, Vol. I, pp. 43-44. Towards the end of the campaign there were still in Württemberg, 4 Landwehr depôt battalions, 1 depôt cavalry regiment, 2 depôt batteries, 1 fortress artillery division, 1 pioneer depôt division, 1 engineer company, 1 train depôt division, besides the depôts of the field troops.

† See Part I, Vol. I, p. 43.

† See Appendix CLXXV.

These two squadrons joined the Division before Paris on 15th September.

See Appendix LII. See Appendix CLXXV.

<sup>\*\*</sup> See Appendix CLXXV.

\*\* See Appendix CLXXV.

†† On 16th January, 1871.

‡‡ At this time the depots of the infantry and rifles were employed to train recruits, a duty which up to that period had been wholly performed by the Landwehr depôt battalions (see Part I, Vol. I, p. 43).

§§ Exclusive of the personnel of the garrison and reserve hospitals.

|||| See Appendices V, LII, LXXXI, and CLVII.

¶¶ This battalion had been temporarily employed between the 6th and 17th Angust 1870. at Lanterburg. to guard the chappen: between the 31st August and

August, 1870, at Lauterburg, to guard the etappen; between the 31st August and 29th September, together with 300 men of the 5th Depôt Detachment and 4 guns, under Colonel Bauer, to protect Baden territory on the Upper Rhine. From here two companies took part in the siege of Strassburg. On 29th September the whole battalion was again assembled at Rastatt, whence on 24th December it proceeded to

the seat of war. ††† See Appendix CXXXI.

tion, the 1st was employed throughout the campaign, the 4th and 6th, and parts of the 2nd, 3nd, and 5th at different times. on etappen duties.\* The 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th battalions, belonged, until the end of the war, to the garrison of Rastatt.

The total strength of the Baden troops not placed on the war footing, inclusive of the depot troops, amounted in-

> September, 1870 ... 2,148 men. January, 1871 .. 10,951 March, 1871... .. 13,604 ,

All these were placed under the orders of the "Commander-

in-Chief of the troops left in home territory."

Armed

fortresses.

After the arming of a certain number of fortresses was ordered on mobilization, the measures of the military authorities consequent thereon had been ably seconded by the civil authorities; more particularly by the Prussian Ministries of Finance and Trade. Zealously aided by all parties, the work proceeded with expedition and certainty.

Of the forces of the North German Confederation the following had been appointed at the commoncement of the

war as garrisons of the fortresses :---

Rhine front 87,500 men. North Sea and Baltic Coasts ... 50,000 South front 55**,3**00 Other fortresses. 47,000 .. 239,800¶

These figures were, however, considerably modified by the withdrawal of numerous garrison troops to the theatre of war and for new formations. After the successes of the field army, all the armed fortresses\*\* with the exception of those on the coast or at river mouths and of the advanced works of Saarlouis, Mainz, and Coblenz, could be ordered for disarmament towards the end of November.

|| The former furnished the necessary timber from the State forcets, the latter the rails from the surplus stores of the State railways.

¶ In this number are included the depot troops quartered in the fortress.

•• Landau and Germersheim were not of importance after the end of the concentration. Rastatt retained its importance for the protection of the Beden Rhineland until after the fall of Strassburg and New Breisach (as regards the arming of the South German Fortresses see Part I, Vol. I, pp. 42 and 45).

<sup>\*</sup> See Appendix CLXXV.

† See Part I, Vol. I, p. 45.

1 As regards the depot troops, see Part I, Vol. I, p. 45, and cale, p. 237.

§ See Part I, Vol. I, p. 40. The fortresses of Neissa and Glatz, the littoral fortresses of Friedrichsort, Geestemunde, Wilhelmshaven, Stralaund, Swinemunde, Colburg, Danzig, Pillan, and Memel, were at that time armed (see Part I, Vol. II, pp. 421-422).

Shortly after the commencement of the war when the first Treatment trains of French prisoners of war reached Germany, efforts were made to house them in a manner similar in all respects to that prisoners of prescribed by regulation for the barrack accommodation of the war. German soldier. At first the prisoners were only interned in fortresses. When the available accommodation there did not suffice, steps were taken for forming large camps of tents or huts.\* The number of prisoners increasing more and more during the course of the campaign, it was decided to place them in open towns whonever suitable troops were available to guard them, or could be temporarily housed there.

Each depôt formed in this way was placed under the orders of a German officer and divided into companies of 200 to 300 men.! The commandant of the depôt exercised the higher disciplinary powers. In other respects the military legal code of the State in which they were interned was applied to all prisoners. The sick were sent to the hospitals. Regard

was also paid to providing divine service.

The officer prisoners were permitted to occupy private quarters at their own expense, provided they gave their word of honour not to escape, and to pass their correspondence through the hands of the military authorities. If they did not agree to this, they were kept under military supervision in a manner suited to their rank. When the word of honour was withdrawn or broken, more vigorous measures were put in force.

The officer prisoners received a special pay according to rank, to which later on was added by the French Government

a special allowance paid through the English Embassy.

The non-commissioned officers and mon received their rations and the necessary clothing, in payment of which part

of their prison-pay had to be deducted.

From the commencement it was considered desirable to employ the men as much as possible in regular and suitable work, the more so as this was the surest means to prevent disorders and escapes. The order originally adopted throughout the territory of the North German Confederation, that the privates should work gratuitously for five hours a day in aid of the military treasury, whilst all overtime should be properly

† In the middle of February the prisoners were distributed as follows:-Officers.

152	Depôta	in	North Germany			10.718	805.287
26			TO	••	• •	547	39,536
7	**		337	• •	• •	119	12.839
8	**	**	Baden	• •	••	333	11,750
2	22	**	Hesso Darmstad	t	••	1 13	2,569

<sup>‡</sup> Later on, the companies were increased to 500 mcn. § Quarters in barracks suitable for officers were given to those who had no private means.

<sup>\*</sup> On the approach of winter the tent camps were abandoned and the huts were provided with means for heating.

remunerated, could not be maintained on account of the gradual overfilling of the depôts. Voluntary work for payment was encouraged, and private persons were allowed to employ the prisoners; the majority, however, were utilized for building barracks, forming or altering drill grounds and ranges, in the workshops or in some other suitable manner.

If in consequence of the enormous influx of prisoners it was not always entirely possible, at times on convoy, to avoid certain inconveniences, the majority of the Frenchmen quartered in Germany during the war could have no just cause for com-

plaint with regard to their food and treatment.

## RESULTS OF THE WAR.

The total losses\* of the German Army amounted to :--

6,247 officers, surgeous and officials. 123,453 men.

14,595 horses.

1 colour.

6 guns.t

On the other hand, up to the middle of February, 1871, this army had sent into captivity 11,860 French officers and 371,981 men. Besides these, 7,456 officers and 241,686 men had laid down their arms in Paris. 2,192 officers and 88,381 men of the French East Army with 285 guns passed into Switzerland.

The trophies of the German troops comprised :-

107 eagles and colours.

1,915 field guns and mitrailleuses.

5,526 fortress guns.

The great struggle of the two nations had come to an end

after a seven months' struggle.

Like their fathers half a century before, the sons had fought and bled for the independence of the German Fatherland. The latter could be restored in its integrity and untouched by foreign foot to the blessings of a peace honourably won.

However great the sacrifices entailed by the war, no people could have borne them more cheerfully. Every man, in a spirit of enthusiasm, had done his best from the very commencement of the war, and the sorrowful losses had been borne in silence and with the consciousness of duty.

But what the victorious army had won on the battle-fields of France counterbalanced those sacrifices.

					Officers.	Men.
Line	••	••	••	••	4,542	125,178
Navy	• •		••	••	866	18,665
Garde 1	Mobile	••		••	2,548	102,843

<sup>\*</sup> Appendix CXCII shows the total loss of the German Army in the war.
† Including two reserve guns (see Part II, Vol. I, p. 280). Two guns, which, however, fell again into the hands of the Germans at the capitulation of Metz, were also lost on 18th August (see Part I, Vol. II, p. 30).
‡ These belonged to the following troops—

<sup>(</sup>See Vinoy, "L'Armistice et la Commune," p. 383; and as regards the National Guards; Appendix 186, Art. VII.)

§ See "Les Troupes Erançaises internées en Suisse en 1871" (rapport officiel).

[Appendix CXOI gives a list of the trophies captured by the Germans during the war.

With Metz and Strassburg, those lands which had been torn from Germany in the time of her weakness, were again restored to her, and the nation is indebted to the bravery and perseverance of her sons for the long looked for union. At the unanimous call of the sovereigns and free towns, the victorious King of Prussia assumed the dignity of German Emperor.

## APPENDIX CLVII.

# ORDER OF BATTLE

Of the South Army.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF: GENERAL BARON V. MANTEUFFEL.

Chief of the Staff: Colonel Count v. Wartensleben. Quartermaster-in-Chief: Major v. Lewinski Ist.

Commanding Artillery: Lieut.-General v. Decker.

General Staff: (1.) Major v. Holleben or Normann, Saxon Staff; (2.) Captain v. Rauchhaupt, 79th Regt.;

(3.) 1st Lieutenant Baron v. Collas, 37th Fusiliers.

Adjutants: (1.) Captain v. Schütz, 8th Hussars; (2.) Captain

Baron v. Reiswitz u. Kadersin, 15th Hussars;

(3.) 1st Lieutenant v. Gaede, 4th Dragoons.

Army Intendent: Intendent Igel.

Army Surgeon-General: Surgeon-General Dr. Westphal.

Commandant of Headquarters: Major v. Strantz, à la suite,

10th Lancers.

Inspector-General of Etappen: Colonel Jancke.\*

### SUMMARY OF FORCES.

								Battalions.	Squadrons.	Batteries.	Guns.
Hnd Army Corps			•		•	•	-	25	8	14	84
VIIth ,	•	•	•	•	•	-	-	81	12	14	84
XIVth "	•	•	•	•	•	•	-	24	20	18	78
4th Reserve Divisio	n	•	-	•	•	-	٠.	15	8	6	86
Siege Corps before temporarily deta sion, and also exc	ched	l fron	n the	4th	Reser	rve D		23	6	6	84
To	tal	•	•	•	•	•	-	118	54	58	816

Did not enter upon his functions until the armistice, owing to his not receiving the order until 6th March, 1871.

	<del></del>			
	Bettalions.	Squadrons.	Grans.	Pioneer Companies.
IIwd ARMY CORPS. (11th January, 1871.)				
General Commanding: General v. Fransecky. Chief of General Staff: Colonel v. Wichmann. Commanding Artillery: Major-General v. Kleist. Commanding Engrs. and Pionrs,: Major Sandkuhl.				
8RD INPANTRY DIVISION.			ł	
Commander: Major-General v. Hartmann. Officer of General Staff: Major Stockmarr.				
5th Infantry Brigade, Major-General v. Koblinski.				
2nd Grenadiers, Colonel v. Ziemietzky 42nd Regiment, Colonel v. d. Knesebeck	8 8	=	=	=
6th Infantry Brigade, Colonel v. Wedell.			İ	
14th Regiment, Major v. Schorlemmer 54th Regiment, Major Liebe	8 8	=	=	=
2nd Rifle Battalion, Captain Schulz	1 -	4	=	=
Baron v. Eynatten  1st Field Pioneer Company with Light Field Bridge Train, Captain v. Wissmann Sanitary Detachment No. 1.	_ _	_	24	1
Total of 1st Infantry Division	13	4	24	1
4TH INFANTEY DIVISION.				
Commander: LieutGeneral Hann v. Weyhern. Officer of General Staff: Captain Boie.				
7th Infantry Brigade, Major-General du Trossel.				
9th Grenadicrs, Colonel v. Ferentheil und Gruppen- berg - 49th Regiment, Lieut. Colonel Laurin	8	_		_
8th Infantry Brigade, Major-General v. Kettler.				
21st Regiment, LieutColonel v. Lobenthal	3	_	_	_
61st Regiment, LieutColonel v. Weyrach 11th Dragoons, LieutColonel v. Guretsky-Cornitz 3rd Foot Division 2nd Field Artillery Regiment (5th	8	4	_	=
and 6th Heavy, 5th and 6th Light Battery), Lieu Colonel Bauer	_	_	24	_
2nd Field Pioneer Company with Entrenching-tool Column, Captain Grethen 3rd Field Pioneer Company, 1st Lieutenant Mündel	_	  - 	_	1
Sanitary Detachment No. 2.				
Total of 4th Infantry Division	12	4	24	2.

				<del></del> -
·	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Gune.	Pioneer Companies.
Corps Artillery, Colonel Petzel.				
Horse Artillery Division 2nd Field Artillery Regiment (2nd and 3rd Horse Artillery Batteries), Lieut Colonel Maschke	1	1	12	_
2nd Foot Division 2nd Field Artillery Regiment (3rd and 4th Heavy, 3rd and 4th Light Batteries), Major Hübner	_	_	24	_
Total of Corps Artillery		_	86	_
Columns Division 2nd Field Artillery Regiment, Major Leo. Artillery Ammunition Columns Nos. 1-5. Infantry Ammunition Columns Nos. 1-4. Pontoon Column. 2nd Train Battalion, Colonel Schmelzer: Hoepital Reserve Depôt. Horse Depôt. Field Bakery Column. Commissariat Column Nos. 1-5. Field Hospitals Nos. 1-12. Train Escort Squadron.				
VIITH ARMY CORPS. (11th January, 1871.)				
General Commanding: General v. Zastrow. Chief of General Staff: Colonel v. Salviati. Commanding Artillery: MajGen. v. Zimmermann. Commanding Engrs. and Pionrs.: Major Treumann.				
18TH INPARTEY DIVISION.				
Commander: LieutGeneral v. Bothmer. Officer of General Staff: Major v. Werder.				
25th Infantry Brigade, Major-General Baron v. d. Osten Sacken.				
13th Regiment, Colonel Baron v. d. Busche-Haddenhausen	8 8	=	=	=
26th Infantry Brigade, Colonel v. Barby.			}	
15th Regiment, Colonel v. Delits 55th Regiment, LieutColonel v. Bischofshausen	<b>8</b> 8	=	=	=
7th Rifle Battalion, Major v. Kamecke 8th Hussars, LieutColonel Arent 8rd Foot Division 7th Field Artillery Regiment (5th	1 -	-	=	=
and 6th Heavy, 5th and 6th Light Batteries), Major Wilhelmi  1st Field Pioneer Company with Light Field Bridge	-	_	24	-
Train, Captain Junker	_	_	_	1
Total of 18th Infantry Division -	18	4	24 L	1

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Pioneer Companies.
14th Infantry Division.				
Commander: Major-General Baron Schuler v. Senden. Officer of General Staff: Major Baron v. Hilgers.				
27th Infantry Brigade, Colonel v. Pannewitz.				
39th Fusiliers, Major Hermann	8	-	=	=
28th Infantry Brigade: Major-General v. Woyna IInd.				
53rd Regiment, LieutColonel v. Grabow	8 <b>8</b>	=	_	_
15th Hussars, Colonel v. Cosel - 1st Foot Division 7th Field Artillery Regiment (1st and 2nd Heavy, 1st and 2nd Light Batteries),	-	4	_	-
Major Baron v. Eynatten 2nd Field Pioneer Company with Entrenching-tool	-	_	24	_
Column, Captain Goetze  8rd Field Pioneer Company with Entrenching-tool	_	_	_	1
Column, Captain Cleinow	_		_	l ı
Sanitary Detachment No. 2.				
	18	4	24	2
Sanitary Detachment No. 2.	19	4	24	
Sanitary Detachment No. 2.  Total 14th Infantry Division  Corps Artillery, LieutColonel Minameyer.  Horse Artillery Division 7th Field Artillery Regiment (2nd and 3rd Horse Artillery Batteries), Captain Hasse  2nd Foot Division 7th Field Artillery Regiment (3rd and 4th Heavy, 3rd and 4th Light Batteries).	18	4	24	
Sanitary Detachment No. 2.  Total 14th Infantry Division  Corps Artillery, LieutColonel Minameyer.  Horse Artillery Division 7th Field Artillery Regiment (2nd and 3rd Horse Artillery Batteries), Captain Hasse  2nd Foot Division 7th Field Artillery Regiment (3rd and 4th Heavy, 3rd and 4th Light Batteries), Major Matthiass	18	-		
Total 14th Infantry Division  Corps Artillery, LieutColonel Minameyer.  Horse Artillery Division 7th Field Artillery Regiment (2nd and 3rd Horse Artillery Batteries), Captain Hasse  2nd Foot Division 7th Field Artillery Regiment (3rd and 4th Heavy, 3rd and 4th Light Batteries), Major Matthiass  Total of Corps Artillery Regiment, Major Gasch. Artillery Ammunition Columns Nos. 1-5. Infantry Ammunition Columns, Nos. 1-4. Pontoon			12	
Sanitary Detachment No. 2.  Total 14th Infantry Division  Corps Artillery, LieutColonel Minameyer.  Horse Artillery Division 7th Field Artillery Regiment (2nd and 3rd Horse Artillery Batteries), Captain Hasse  2nd Foot Division 7th Field Artillery Regiment (3rd and 4th Heavy, 3rd and 4th Light Batteries), Major Matthiass  Total of Corps Artillery  Columns Division 7th Field Artillery Regiment, Major Gasch. Artillery Ammunition Columns Nos. 1-5.			1 <b>3</b>	
Total 14th Infantry Division  Corps Artillery, LieutColonel Minameyer.  Horse Artillery Division 7th Field Artillery Regiment (2nd and 3rd Horse Artillery Batteries), Captain Hasse  2nd Foot Division 7th Field Artillery Regiment (3rd and 4th Heavy, 3rd and 4th Light Batteries), Major Matthiass  Total of Corps Artillery Regiment, Major Gasch. Artillery Ammunition Columns Nos. 1-5. Infantry Ammunition Columns, Nos. 1-4. Pontoon Column. 7th Train Battalion, Major Baron v. Bothmer.  Hospital Reserve Depôt; Horse Depôt; Field Bakery Columns Commissariat Columns Nos. 1-5.			1 <b>3</b>	
Total 14th Infantry Division  Corps Artillery, LieutColonel Minameyer.  Horse Artillery Division 7th Field Artillery Regiment (2nd and 3rd Horse Artillery Batteries), Captain Hasse  2nd Foot Division 7th Field Artillery Regiment (3rd and 4th Heavy, 3rd and 4th Light Batteries), Major Matthiass  Total of Corps Artillery Regiment, Major Gasch. Artillery Ammunition Columns Nos. 1-5. Infantry Ammunition Columns, Nos. 1-4. Pontoon Column.  7th Train Battalion, Major Baron v. Bothmer.  Hospital Reserve Depôt; Horse Depôt; Field Bakery Column; Commissariat Columns Nos. 1-5; Field Hospitals Nos. 1-10; Train Escort Squadron.  Attached to the Corps.  60th Regiment, Colonel v. Dannenberg 72nd Regiment, LieutColonel Löwenberger v. Schön-		-	1 <b>3</b>	
Total 14th Infantry Division  Corps Artillery, LieutColonel Minameyer.  Horse Artillery Division 7th Field Artillery Regiment (2nd and 3rd Horse Artillery Batteries), Captain Hasse  2nd Foot Division 7th Field Artillery Regiment (3rd and 4th Heavy, 3rd and 4th Light Batteries), Major Matthiass  Total of Corps Artillery Regiment, Major Gasch. Artillery Ammunition Columns Nos. 1-5. Infantry Ammunition Columns, Nos. 1-4. Pontoon Column.  7th Train Battalion, Major Baron v. Bothmer.  Hospital Reserve Depôt; Horse Depôt; Field Bakery Column; Commissariat Columns Nos. 1-5; Field Hospitals Nos. 1-10; Train Escort Squadron.  Attached to the Corps.			1 <b>3</b>	
Total 14th Infantry Division  Corps Artillery, LieutColonel Minameyer.  Horse Artillery Division 7th Field Artillery Regiment (2nd and 3rd Horse Artillery Batteries), Captain Hasse  2nd Foot Division 7th Field Artillery Regiment (3rd and 4th Heavy, 3rd and 4th Light Batteries), Major Matthiass  Total of Corps Artillery Regiment, Major Gasch. Artillery Ammunition Columns Nos. 1-5. Infantry Ammunition Columns, Nos. 1-4. Pontoon Column.  7th Train Battalion, Major Baron v. Bothmer.  Hospital Reserve Depôt; Horse Depôt; Field Bakery Column; Commissariat Columns Nos. 1-5; Field Hospitals Nos. 1-10; Train Escort Squadron.  Attached to the Corps.  60th Regiment, Colonel v. Dannenberg 72nd Regiment, LieutColonel Löwenberger v. Schönholtz  5th Reserve Lancers,* Colonel v. Bode			1 <b>3</b>	

<sup>•</sup> The Regiment was attached to the 13th Division.

				<del></del>
	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Pioneer Companies.
XIVTH ARMY CORPS. (19th January, 1871.)  General Commanding: General v. Werder.				
Chief of General Staff: LieutColonel Leszczynski, Baden General Staff. Commanding Artillery: General Count v. Sponeck. Comding. Engrs. and Pionrs.: Major Albrecht, 2nd EngInsp.				
PRUSSIAN TROOPS.			l	1
Cmmander: Major-General Baron v. d. Golts.				
Mixed Infantry Brigade, Colonel Wahlert.		İ		
80th Regiment, Colonel Nachtigall	<b>8</b> 3	=	=	=
Mixed Cavalry Brigado.		İ		
2nd Reserve Dragoons, LieutColonel v. Walther - 2nd Reserve Hussars, LieutColonel Count v. Dohna	=	4	=	=
Combined Artillery Division, (Heavy Reserve Battery 1st A.C., 1st and 2nd Light Reserve Battery IIIrd A.C.), Major Ulrich	_	_	18	_
Total Prussian troops	6	8	18	
Baden Division.				
Commander: LicutGeneral v. Glümer. Chief of General Staff: Major Baron Taets v. Amerongen.				
Commander of Baden Artillery : Colonel v. Freydorf.				
1st Infantry Brigade, Colonel Baron v. Wechmar.				
B.G. Grenadier Regiment, LieutCol. Hoffmann - 2nd Grenadiers, LieutColonel Stölzel	8 3	=	_	_
2nd Infantry Brigade, Major-General Baron v. Degenfeld.				
8rd Regiment, LieutColonel Kraus 4th Regiment, Colonel Bayer	3 8	=	=	_
3rd Infantry Brigade, Major-General Keller.			İ	
5th Regiment, Colonel Sachs	8	=	=	=
3rd Dragoons, LieutColonel Baron v. Gemmingen -	-	4	_	_
Divisional Artillery (1st, 2nd, an 5th Heavy, 1st and 2nd Light Batteries), LieutColonel Theobald-	_	-	30 L 2	_

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Pioneer Companiee.
Pontoon Company with Light Field Bridge Train, Captain Lichtenauer	-	_	_	1
Cavalry Brigade, Colonel Baron v. Willisen.				
Body Guard Dragoon Regiment, Major v. Merhart - 2nd Dragoons, Colonel Wirth Horse Artillery Battery, Captain Baron v. Stetten -	=	4		_ 
Total of Baden Division	18	12	36	_
Corps Artillery, Major Kochlitz.				
Grand Duchy of Baden 3rd and 4th Heavy, 3rd and 4th Light Batteries	_	_	24	_
Prussian Columns Division, Major Groschke.				
Artillery Ammunition Columns Nos. 1-4. Infantry Ammunition Columns Nos. 1-3.				
Baden Columns Division, Major Engler.		ł		
Artillery Ammunition Columns, Nos. 1-3, Infantry Ammunition Columns Nos. 1 and 2. Pontoon Column.				
Train, Major v. Chelius.				
Prussian Sanitary Detachment. Baden Sanitary Detachment. Prussian Horse Depôts Nos. 1 and 2. Baden Horse Depôt. Field Bakery Column. Prussian Provision Columns Nos. 1 and 2. Baden Provision Columns Nos. 1-3. Five Prussian Field Hospitals. Five Baden Field Hospitals. Train Escort Detachment.				
5th Field Railway Detachment.				Ì
Chief: Chief Engineer Krohn. Company Commander: Captain Kactelhodt, 45th Landwehr Regiment.				
5th Etappen Telegraph Division.	1			
Director: Telegraph Director Böhnke.			1	
4TH RESERVE DIVISION. (On 19th January, 1871.)				
Commander: Major-General v. Schmeling. Officer of General Staff: Major Kretschman.				
Combined Infantry Brigade, Colonel Knappe v. Knappetadt.				
25th Regiment, Colonel v. Loos	. 8	-	_	-

<del></del>				
——	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Pioneer Companies.
2nd Combined East Prussian Landwehr (Nos. 4 and 5), Colonel v. Krane (Osterode, Ortelsburg, Graudenz, and Thorn Battalions).	4	-		-
East Prussian Landwehr Brigade, Colonel v Zimmermann.				į
Combined East Prussian Landwehr Regiments (Nos. 1-3), LieutColonel v. Scheurmann - (Tilsit, Wehlau, Insterburg, and Gumbinnen Battalions) Combined East Prussian Landwehr Regiments	4	_		_
(Nos. 43-45), Colonel v. Usedom - (Loetzen, Goldap, Danzig, and Marienburg Battalions)	4	_	_	-
4th Reserve Cavalry Brigade, Major-General v. Tresckow II.				
1st Reserve Lancers, LieutColonel v. Wulffen - 3rd Reserve Lancers, Colonel v. Schmidt - Combined Artillery Division (1st and 2nd Heavy, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Light Batteries), Major v.	=	4	=	=
Schaper 2nd Fortress Pioneer Company VIIth A.C., Captain	-	-	36	-
Jacob · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	_		-	1 ,
Total of 4th Reserve Division	15	8	36	1
SIEGE CORPS BEFORE BELFORT.† (See the Ordre de Bataille in App. CXXXI.)				
4th Field Railway Division.				ŀ
Chief: Railway Engineer Vieregge. Company Commander: Captain v. Seidlitz- Kurzbach-Ludwigedorff, of the 23rd Landwehr Regiment.				
7th Field Telegraph Division.				
Commander: Captain Friedheim, 3rd Engineer Inspection.				

<sup>\*</sup> The Combined Artillery Division was formed of the Reserve Batteries of the 4th and 6th Army Corps.
† Under the Orders of the XIVth Army Corps.

## APPENDIX CLVIII.

Headquarters, Versailles, 8th January, 1871.

Composition of the Army under the chief command of General Baron v. Manteuffel.

# 1. VIIth Army Corps :-

	_	_						Battalions.	Squadrons.	Batteries.
13th Infantry Division	•	•					-	13	4	4
14th ,, ,,	•	•	-				-	12	4	4
Corps Artillery Attached .	-	•	•	•	•	٠	-	-	-	6
60th and 72nd Regiment		-	-		-		-	6	_	_
5th Reserve Lancers -		-		-	-			_	4	_
1st Reserve Hussars -	•	•	•				-	_	4	_
Tota	1 -	•			•		-	81	16	14

On the 8th January their disposition is as follows:-

Headquarters, 13th Division, and Corps Artillery on the march from Auxerre to Châtillon sur-Seine, which point will probably be reached on the 11th instant.

14th Division moving by rail from Boulzicourt to Châtillon-sur-Seine. The first echelons reached this point on the 7th; the Division will be assembled there on the 12th.

Colonel v. Dannenberg, with 60th and 72nd Regiments, 3 squadrons, and 2 batteries, south of Châtillon-sur-Seine, covering the concentration of the Corps and observing Dijon and Langres.

centration of the Corps and observing Dijon and Langres.

Towards the last-named place, Lieutenant-Colonel Hensel, stationed with Government troops at Chaumont, has thrown forward 8 companies, ½ squadron, and ½ battery by way of Luzy and Foulain.

The 1st Reserve Hussars is meanwhile attached to the Inspector-General of Etappen of the IInd Army, and should be left behind at Nuits when the VIIth Corps commences its operations. The Corps, therefore, comprises 31 battalions, 12 squadrons, and 14 batteries.

2. IInd Army Corps:—25 battalions, 8 squadrons, 14 batteries. The Corps is on the march from Montargis to Nuits, where the leading Division will arrive on the 12th.

# 3. XIVth Army Corps :--

						Battalions.	Squadrons.	Batteries.
Major-General v. d. Goltz's Detach	ment	•	•			6	8	8
Baden Field Division	•	•		•	-	18	12	9*
1st Reserve Division	•	•		•	-	15	4	8*
4th Reserve Division	•	-	•	•	-	15	8	6 2
General v. Debechita's Detachment	, •	•	•	•	-	8	2	2
Total - :	•	•	•	•	•	62	34	28

The Corps on the morning of 8th is posted as follows:—1st Reserve Division and about \( \frac{1}{2} \) 4th Reserve Division is besieging Belfort, Debschitz's Detachment is at Delle, remainder of Corps and Headquarters at Vesoul.

Total strength of the army (exclusive of 1st Reserve Hussars):—118 battalions, 54 squadrons, 51 batteries.

# EXPLANATION OF THE SITUATION.

Up to the middle of last month the XIVth Army Corps, which occupied a position commanding the line Châtillon-sur-Seine—Dijon—Gray—Vesoul—Monbéliard, was only opposed to hostile detachments of weak numerical strength; namely, Garibaldi with 12,000 men at Autun, Crémer with 20,000 at Beaune and Dôle. Since that time considerable bodies of hostile troops, brought up from the south, have concentrated at Besançon.

In order to cover the siege of Belfort, General v. Werder abandoned Dijon, and after recalling General v. d. Goltz, who was detached for

the purpose of investing Langres, concentrated at Vesoul.

A direct support was afforded to him by General v. Debschitz's Detachment, which was formed in Southern Alsace, and was pushed forward to Delle. Further, on the news that a large part of the enemy's forces, in process of reorganisation at Bourges and Nevers (Bourbaki: 15th, 18th, and 20th Corps), had proceeded by rail to Châlons-sur-Saône, General v. Zastrow, who was with the 13th Division and Corps Artillery, VIIth Corps, at Auxerre, received orders to move to Nuits and Montbard. The 60th and 72nd Regiments, from Metz and Chaumont, were at the same time set in movement in that direction. A few days afterwards, however, the march of stronger hostile forces from Cosne to Briare, coupled with other intelligence, rendered it probable that General Bourbaki was still posted with his main body at Nevers and Bourges, and was preparing to take the offensive in the direction of Paris.

The hostile troops which had reached Besançon maintained at all points a defensive attitude, and even blew up the remaining bridges over the Doubs.

The 5th Baden Heavy Battery and the Bavarian Sortie Battery which reached the Baden Division and the troops besieging Belfort respectively, early in January, are not included.

General v. Zastrow, in consequence, received orders to return to Auxerre, while at the same time the Hud Army Corps was relieved before Paris, and directed on Montargis; the two Corps united were then to oppose the expected march of Bourbaki's army, while the

IInd Army took the offensive against Chanzy's army.

During the execution of these movements, General v. Werder announced in a positive manner that he had in his front troops of the 18th and 20th Army Corps. General Röder telegraphed from Berne that Bourbaki himself had reached Dijon, and was advancing with an army of 60,000 men and 80 guns. A detailed report, of which the data in other respects proved trustworthy, showed that, in accordance with the new French plan of operations, Bourbaki (under whose orders were the 15th, 18th, and 20th Corps, and probably the 19th, at Bourges, &c.) would take the offensive against the XIVth Corps, relieve Belfort, reoccupy Alsaco, and permanently sever the German lines of communication. For this purpose, leaving one Corps at Vierzon, his army was to be reinforced by the 24th Corps, newly formed at Besançon under General Bresolles, by Crémer's troops and by Garibaldi's volunteers.

These operations have already been initiated. For the last three days the outposts of the 18th, 20th, and 24th Corps to the south and west of Vesoul and to the south of Belfort, have been directly opposed to General v. Werder's troops; yesterday a concentration was evident towards the road Besançon—Vesoul. Whether the whole of the 18th and 20th Corps are assembled, it is impossible to say; it may be doubted for the present. It is said also that on the 31st December Bourbaki held a review at Bourges of the 15th and 18th Army Corps. This intelligence is not, however, confirmed. The position of the 15th and 19th Corps has not yet been established. Of the 19th Corps, it is not known for certain whether it is with Bourbaki or with Chanzy, or whether it was not disbanded after the action at the beginning of December. If both belong to Bourbaki's army he will have at his disposal for the intended operation one of them in the east, while the other will be at Vierzon. Should the 19th Corps, on the other hand, belong to Chanzy's army or have been disbanded, the 15th Corps probably remains at Vierzon. Bourbaki will then have at his disposal in the east only the 18th, 20th, and 24th Corps, and Garibaldi's bands.

The army thus constituted is deficient in cavalry, but adequately provided with artillery. Commissariat and ammunition trains will be almost entirely wanting, and cannot be altogether replaced by using the railway. The infantry is well armed, but defectively organised. The numerical strength of the different Army Corps may be some 30,000 men, so that, exclusive of the bands of Garibaldi, estimated at 12,000, the total force may be taken at 90,000 to 120,000 men.

General v. Werder has received orders provisionally, before everything else, to cover the siege of Belfort, and to base himself on Southern Alsace. He should not oppose directly a hostile advance west of the Vosges, but, in conjunction with the troops of the Government of Lorraine, observe it. When he finds only weak forces in his front, he should at once take the offensive, and move against the enemy's communications. The advance of the IInd and VIIth Corps will suffice to defeat the enemy's projects.

The Hnd Army, employed for the moment in offensive operations against Chanzy's army advancing from Le Mans, has left a Division

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at Orléans, which has posted a detachment at Briare.

### APPENDIX CLIX.

TELEGRAMS EXCHANGED BETWEEN GENERALS V. MANTEUFFEL AND V. WERDER.

(12th - 20th January, 1871.)

No. 1.

Received at H. Q., South Army, 12.1.71. Despatched Frahier; 6.15 p.m., 12.1.71.

To General v. Manteuffel, Châtillon-sur-Seine.
(Arrived there 12th.)

Position Delle, Montbéliard, Héricourt, Lure, completely occupied this day by my Corps, Schmeling's Division and Debschitz's Detachment. At Delle, Montbeliard, with its casemated castle free from escalade, and at Héricourt, the position is strengthened with fortress artillery. Colonel Willisen with 2 battalions, 3 cavalry regiments, and 2 batteries, is posted at Lure, watching Vesoul and the line of the Ognon, and is covering as far as possible the old etappen line Lure—Epinal. My advanced guard is pushed forward to Arcey; the enemy's outposts are facing ours. The march of hostile columns from the Ognon to the east is watched by Colonel Willisen's cavalry. 1st Reserve Division is posted before Belfort to prosecute the siege and protect the siege artillery against sorties.

(Signed) v. WERDER.

No. 2.

Received H. Q., South Army, 13.1.71.
Despatched Frahier 10.40 p.m., 12.1.71.

To General v. Manteuffel, Châtillon.

Enemy quiet. According to report from Colonel Willisen, enemy appears to be completing his concentration between the Ognon and the Doubs. Bourbaki reported to be last night at Villersexel, which was strongly occupied. Colonel Willisen retiring before strong hostile forces upon Ronchamp, and I can therefore do nothing for protection of Epinal.

(Signed) v. WERDER.

No. 3.

Received H. Q., South Army, 13.1.71. Despatched Frahier, 1.43 a.m., 13.1.71.

To General v. Manteuffel, Châtillon.

Colonel Willisen, pressed from Vesoul and Moffens, is withdrawn to Ronchamp.\* A regiment of cavalry is moving to Luxeuil in order to observe the enemy's flank.

> (Signed) v. WERDER.

#### No. 4.

Received H. Q., XIVth Army Corps, Despatched Châtillon, 9.10 p.m., 13.1.71.

To General v. Werder, Brévilliers, near Belfort.

I commence to-morrow with the IInd and VIIth Army Corps the advance in the main direction of Vesoul. Send telegrams as hitherto viá Chatillon.

> (Signed) v. MANTEUFFEL.

No. 5.

Received H. Q., South Army, 13.1.71. Despatched Bréviliers, 6 p.m., 13.1.71.

To General v. Manteuffel, Châtillon.

Enemy is attacking this day my outposts at Arcey and Chavanne with very superior forces and strong in artillery. Outposts have retired as far as Tavey and Couthenans. According to statements of prisoners, the 18th Corps is on the left wing at Chavanne, the 15th in the centre, the 20th on the right wing, and the 25th in reserve. Besides these troops there is a considerable force on the Doubs, probably the 24th+ Corps. I expect my position to be attacked tomorrow. I beg that I may be informed of your Excellency's intentions. (Signed) v. WERDER.

No. 6.

Received H. Q., XIVth Army Corps, 14.1.71. Despatched Chatillon, 9.30 a.m., 14.1.71.

To General Werder, Brévilliers, Belfort.

Telegram of 13th, evening, received. I march from here to-day

January. (See Part II, Vol. II, p. 328.)

† With regard to the real circumstances, see Part II, Vol. II, p. 324 et seq., and p. 328.

As a matter of fact Colonel v. Willisen did not evacuate Lure until 14th

with the army in the direction of Vesoul, in order to join forces with your Excellency as soon as possible. The advanced guards have been already pushed forward into the Côte d'Or since yesterday.

(Signed) v. MANTEUFFEL.

### No. 7.

Received H. Q., South Army, 9 P.M., 14.1.71. Despatched Brévilliers, 12.30 p.m., 14.1.71.

To General v. Manteuffel, Châtillon.

Up to noon, enemy quiet along the whole front, outposts everywhere in close proximity to each other. A reconnaissance made by the enemy on 13th towards Dasle and Croix was repulsed by General v. Debschitz.

(Signed) v. WERDER.

On the 15th January General v. Manteuffel received information of the telegram from General v. Werder to General Count v. Moltke (see Appendix CXL, p. 1765). The Commander-in-Chief of the South Army hereupon reported to Versailles that he would not interfere with General v. Werder's dispositions, and that his debouch from the mountains would make itself felt by the advanced guards at noon on the 16th. General v. Werder was informed of this by a cypher telegram.

# No. 8.

Received H. Q., South Army, 16.1.71.
Despatched Brévillers, 10.58 p.m., 15.1.71.

To General v. Manteuffel, Châtillon.

The enemy is attacking me vigorously from Chagey to Montbéliard with apparently four Corps, particularly with artillery. The attack has been repulsed at all points, and my position is intact everywhere.

Our losses between three and four hundred men. The struggle lasted from 8.30 a.m. to 5.30 p.m. Cypher despatch received.

No. 9.

Received H. Q., XIVth Army Corps, 17.1.71. Despatched Châtillon, 9.30 p.m., 17.1.71.

(Signed)

To General v. Werder, Brévilliers.

The army reached the east side of the Côte d'Or, between Dijon and Langres, to-day with the entire main body; the advanced troops have been since yesterday abreast of Champlitte. Direction of further advance depends on the information as to the situation of your Excellency, of which the latest news only extends to the evening of the

v. WERDER.

15th. Desirable that communication be speedily established by the cavalry between my left and your right wing, somewhere about Luxeuil, or perhaps to the southward. This will now have my attention.

(Signed) v. MANTEUFFEL.

H. Q., Prauthoy, 8 a.m.

#### No. 10.

Received H. Q., South Army, 17.1.71.

Despatched Brévilliers, 9 p.m., 16.1.71.

To General v. Manteuffel, Châtillon. To be forwarded.

Enemy to-day attacked my position at all points with varying force and energy, and was repulsed everywhere. General Degenfeld alone evacuated his position at Chenebier before superior forces, and retired to the position in front of Chalonvillars. I am doing everything to regain the Chenebier position. So far as known at present, our losses insignificant.

v. WERDER.

# No. 11.

Received H. Q., South Army, 18.1.71. Despatched Brévilliers, 9.55 p.m., 17.1.71.

To General v. Manteuffel, Châtillon.

General Keller with eight battalions despatched to Frahier on the night of the 16th-17th. Enemy, surprised at Chenebier before daybreak, lost his baggage and four hundred prisoners. Chagey was attacked in the morning repeatedly and vigorously but in vain; Bethoncourt the same at noon; at Montbéliard and west of Luze, brisk cannonade; but the fighting generally was weak and bears the character of a rear-guard action. At 1 c'clock General Keller was attacked by very superior forces, but held his ground in a strong position at Frahier; should the retreat of the enemy be confirmed, I shall at once take the offensive. Our losses in the engagements of the last three days about 1,200 men, of which the majority belong to 2nd and 3rd Baden Brigades. The 15th Corps were engaged at Montbéliard, next on the left came the 20th Corps, then the 24th, including Crémer's Division, and the 18th Corps at Chenebier.\* The enemy opposed to General Debschitz is not herein included. I beg your Excellency to tell me where I may expect you. Colonel Willisen will endeavour to communicate with you by way of Luxeuil and St. Loup.

(Signed) v. WERDER.

<sup>\*</sup> With regard to the actual distribution of the French Corps in front of the German position on the Lisaine, see Part II, Vol. II, p. 328, and App. CXXXIX, p 173§, et seq.

#### No. 12.

Received H. Q. XIVth Army Corps, 19.1.71. Despatched Châtillon, 12.40 a.m., 19.1.71.

To General v. Werder, Brévilliers.

Your Excellency's telegram on the proceedings of yesterday received, and I congratulate you and your brave troops on the three days' glorious struggle. My advanced troops will reach to-morrow the Saône on the line Gray—Scey-sur-Saône, the main body Fontaine Française and Dampierre, ready to advance from those points on the 20th. The direction of advance will depend on the reports I receive from your Excellency in the morning. The VIIth Corps will seek to-morrow connection with Colonel Willisen in the direction of Luxenil and St. Loup. Telegrams will reach me to-morrow by messenger-posts from Châtillon.

(Signed) v. MANTEUFFEL. H. Q., Prauthoy, 3.30 p.m., 18.1.71.

# No. 13.

Received H. Q., South Army, 18.1.71. Despatched Brévilliers, 9.3 a.m., 18.1.71.

To General v. Manteuffel, Châtillon. To be forwarded.

The retirement of the enemy suspected yesterday was confirmed last night. Supposed that his main body moved away on the 17th. Three Divisions, in my opinion, are in front of me, and have established themselves on the heights for defence. Baden Division will concentrate to-day at Frahier and Chenchier, and will attack, on the 19th, Athesans and Villersexel. With a second Division I will advance either through Béverne or Saulnot. Telegram of 7 a.m., 17th, not received this day until 2 a.m.\*

(Signed) v. WERDER.

### No. 14.

Received H. Q., XIVth Army Corps, 19.1.71.
Despatched Chatillon, 10.5 a.m., 19.1.71.

To General v. Werder, Brévilliers.

Telegram of 18th, 9 a.m., received.

I shall be on the 20th with my main forces at Gray and in front, ready to advance against the flank of the retreating enemy, or to intercept his retreat. I beg your Excellency to take the offensive with all available forces, and only to leave sufficient behind to besiege Belfort, so that decisive results may be secured. Telegrams reach me as before through Châtillon.

General Decker will be instructed to provide for the pushing for-

ward of reserve ammunition.\* Railway Nuits—Dijon undergoing repair, and is already open to Nuits.

(Signed) v. MANTEUFFEL. H. Q., Prauthoy, 11.45 p.m., 18.1.71.

#### No. 15.

Received H. Q., XIVth Army Corps, 19.1.71. Despatched Châtillon, 9 p.m., 19.1.71.

To General v. Werder, Brévilliers.

General v. Moltke has communicated to me his telegram of yesterday to your Excellency, from which it appears that Belfort is besieged by the 1st Reserve Division and Debschitz's Detachment, whilst the XIVth Corps and the 4th Reserve Division are following the retreating foe, and that I am accordingly to provide your Excellency with instructions. This has been already done yesterday. I would only add that it would be well for your Excellency to hold the retreating enemy to the spot as much as possible, so as to give me sufficient time for my flank movement; also, I beg your Excellency to inform me as soon as possible, by telegram or by the shortest way, on which bank of the Doubs, in your judgment, the enemy is retiring with his main force. My headquarters probably to-morrow at Gray.

(Signed)

V. MANTEUFFEL.

H. Q., Prauthoy, 9.30 a.m., 19.1.71.

#### No. 16.

Received H. Q., South Army, 19.1.17.
Despatched Brévilliers, 10.5 p.m., 18.1.71.

To General v. Manteuffel, Châtillon. To be forwarded.

Retreat of the enemy along the whole line; only rear-guards in

front of us this evening.

My advanced guards follow the enemy's rear-guards on the 19th, the main body on the 20th:—Upon Arcey, Schmeling's Division: 7 buttalions, 5 butteries, 3 squadrons; upon Saulnot, General Goltz: 6 buttalions, 3 butteries, 4 squadrons; upon Béverne, Athesans, and Villersexel, Baden Division: 18 buttalions, 9 butteries, 8 squadrons; upon Lure, Colonel Willisen: 2 buttalions, 3 butteries, 12 squadrons, of which the infantry and 2 butteries are etappen troops.

For the siege and covering body there remain Tresckow's Division, Debschitz's Detachment, Zimmermann's Brigade of Schmeling's

Division: total, 31 battalions, 7 batteries.

(Signed) ▼. WERDER.

General v. Decker had been appointed to the command of the artillery in the South Army by Cabinet Order of 11th January. He was at the time in Strassburg, from which place he reached the headquarters of the South Army on 27th January.

#### No. 17.

Received H. Q., South Army, 20.1.71. Despatched Brévilliers, 8.30 p.m., 19.1.71.

To General v. Manteuffel, Châtillon.

Enemy's loss in the three days' fight about 1,500 killed, 3,000 to 4,000 wounded. Prisoners at present upwards of 1,600. The retreat of considerable forces to L'Isle-sur-le-Doubs is reported. My advanced guards are in contact with the enemy at Arcey, at Saulnot, and Lyoffans; 4th Reserve Division reaches Ornans on 20th. General Goltz, St. Ferjeux; 2 Baden Brigades, Athesans, possibly Villersexel; 1 Baden Brigade, Vy-les-Lure. Colonel Willisen, Frotoy and Noroy. Corps headquarters on 20th, Saulnot; 21st, Villersexel. Despatches find me on the 20th vid Brévilliers, on the 21st vid Lure. I intend transferring my line of communications from the 23rd by way of Epinal, as that by Sentheim and Dannemarie is unfavourable on account of the bad roads. I beg to know if this falls in with your arrangements. From Zimmermann's Brigade I am taking, in addition, four battalions, a battery, and a squadron.\*

(Signed) v. WERDER.

## No. 18.

Received H. Q., XIVth Army Corps, 21.1.71. Despatched Châtillon, 3.15 p.m., 20.1.71.

To General v. Werder, Brévilliers. To be forwarded.

Gray has been occupied on 19th without resistance. IInd and VIIth Corps advance to-day, the 20th, on the left bank of the Saône to, and to the east of Gray; advanced guards pushed forward to the south. Head-quarters to-day at Gray. Propose to continue advance to-morrow, direction will be determined by reports that may meanwhile come in.

For the Commander-in-Chief, (Signed) COUNT v. WARTENSLEBEN.

Quartermaster-in-Chief.

Fontaine Française, 20.1.71.

Generals Baron v. Manteuffel and v. Werder received in addition from Versailles a number of communications regarding the intended and the completed movements.

As regards the actual state of affairs with the XIVth Army Corps, see Part II,
 Vol. II, p. 328-361.

### APPENDIX CLX.

Commander-in-Chief, South Army, H. Q., Châtillon, 5 p.m., 13.1.71.

# ARMY ORDER.

The IInd and VIIth Army Corps will commence to-morrow the advance through the Côte d'Or, in order to debouch with the least delay with their main forces on the line Sclongey—Longeau.

To this end, the IInd Corps is assigned the road Montbard—Chanceaux—Is-sur-Tille; the VIIth, those roads to the north of it.

Unless modifications are necessitated by events, the marches will be made according to the appended table, in which the destinations assigned are those of the main body. The advanced guards, especially in the case of the VIIth Army Corps, are to be pushed forward in order to reach and secure the debouch from the mountains as early as possible. This measure will also secure the debouch of the IInd Army Corps in the event of hostile attacks from Dijon.

To ensure these results, the troops on issuing from the mountains

will take all military precautions.

The Army Headquarters march with the right wing column of the VIIth Army Corps. The VIIth Corps will secure the march of

its troops and trains against the fortress of Langres.

For the security of the army, its communications and magazines, and of the railway Châtillon—Nuits against the south, a detachment will remain behind under Major-General v. Kettler, consisting of the 8th Infantry Brigade, 2 batteries, and 2 squadrons IInd Army Corps (6 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 12 guns). It will, in the first instance, concentrate in the neighbourhood of Montbard, and shape its proceedings in pursuance of the attached instructions. In so doing, it will remain in communication with the 1st Reserve Hussars, which will be placed by the VIIth Corps at the disposal of the Inspector-General of Etappen of the IInd Army, and for this purpose will be sent provisionally to Nuits.

(Signed) BARON v. MANTEUFFEL.

### MARCHING TABLE.

		Destination.							
Corps.	14th January.	15th January.	16th January.	17th January.					
VIITH ARMY CORPS (with the main- body).									
14th Division - 18th ,, -	Arc-en-Barrois Recey	Chameroi - Auberive -	Longeau. Prauthoy.						
IIND ARMY CORPS (with the Heads).	Lucenay-	Chanceaux -	Courtivron -	Selongey.					
Headquarters -	Leuglay* -	Germaine -	Prauthoy.						

Commander-in-Chief South Army, H. Q., Châtillon, 13.1.71.

INSTRUCTION FOR MAJOR-GENERAL V. KETTLER'S DETACHMENT.

Whilst the army executes its march through the Côte d'Or, or even after its termination, it is not impossible that the enemy may from the south strike a blow at our right flank and communications. These enterprises may be made either by Garibaldi's Corps raiding from Autun, upon which place according to present information it is pivoted, or by the enemy's troops in the neighbourhood of Dijon.

Major-General v. Kettler's duty will be to repulse such attacks to the extent possible with the force at his disposal; he is not debarred from making short offensive movements, which in certain cases may be advisable. His principal duty will be to keep watch upon Garibaldi's Corps, and by means of reconnaissances discover as far as

possible its position, strength, and movements.

The army, moreover, will take care to select its line of communications across the Côte d'Or in such wise that it may be protected both on the side of Langres and towards the south; on the other hand, the magazine at Châtillon and the railway Châtillon—Nuits will be considered as objects of special care for General v. Kettler's detachment. With this object he will open communication with the 1st Reserve Hussars, now at the disposal of the Inspector-General of Etappen of the IInd Army at Nuits, and will, if necessary, co-operate with it.

If, contrary to expectation, the detachment is pressed by very superior forces, it will first hold Chatillon as long as possible; and, if

<sup>•</sup> As a matter of fact the headquarters proceeded to Boulaine on 14th January.

necessary, retire along the Châtillon—Blesme Railway in order, together with the Government and etappen troops posted on the railway, to protect it. Reinforced by these troops, it will resume the offensive, or re-establish connection with the army through the country north of Langres.

(Signed) BARON v. MANTEUFFEL,

Commander-in-Chief.

### APPENDIX CLXI.

Commander-in-Chief South Army, H. Q., Fontaine Française, 6 p.m., 19.1.71.

General v. Werder having in a three days' struggle on the 15th, 16th, and 17th instant, repulsed all attacks directed against his position in front of Belfort by the army of Bourbaki, consisting of the 15th, 18th, 20th, 24th (and probably the 25th) Army Corps, the retreat of the enemy, suspected on the evening of the 17th, has been meanwhile confirmed. Apparently the main bodies of the enemy have already moved off in marching columns on the 17th, whilst in front of General v. Werder there still remained on the 18th about three Divisions as rear guards in defensive positions. No information has been received whether the enemy's retreat has taken place entirely in the district between the Saone and Doubs, or if he has also utilised the ground between the Doubs and the Swiss frontier. General v. Werder reports that he will this day assume the offensive with his advanced guards, and on the 20th will follow with his main body in the main direction of Villersexel, and I have requested him to employ for this operation all the forces available without raising the siege of Belfort.

With the part of the army under my immediate orders I will either advance against the flank of the retreating enemy or meet him directly in front. To this end the following movements will be carried out.

The IInd Corps will concentrate its main body at Gray, chiefly on the left flank of the Saône, and reconnoitre along the roads leading to Besançon; its advanced guard pushed forward to Pesmes. The portion of the Corps remaining at Thil Châtel will be called in by it by way of Mirebeau. A post of suitable strength will be left at Thil Chatel for the purpose of watching Dijon, and for the transmission of orders to General v. Kettler.

The VIIth Corps will, with its left wing, connect itself by way of Vesoul with General v. Werder's troops advancing between the Saône and Ognon. It will cross the Saône in the neighbourhood of Autet and Savoyeux, for which purpose at least one additional means of passage will be constructed; it will move its main body to the district about Sauvigney-Citey, &c., the advanced guard being pushed towards Besançon, thereby guarding and reconnoitring in the direction of Rioz. In order that the movement of the troops may not be impeded, the trains, so far as they can be dispensed with, will remain to-morrow on the right bank of the Saône. The directions of Langres and Dijon will continue to be watched, the former by the VIIth, the latter by the IInd Corps. The road from Gray by way of Choye to Besancon will serve as a line of demarcation between the Hnd and VIIth Corps; in the event of the Corps coming here into contact, the villages situated on it will belong to the VIIth Corps. My headquarters will be transferred to-morrow to Gray. (Signed)

BARON v. MANTEUFFEL, Commander-in-Chief.

## APPENDIX CLXII.

Commander-in-Chief South Army, H. Q., Gray, 5 p.m., 20.1.71.

### ARMY ORDER.

The army will continue the march to-morrow towards the Doubs, the IInd Army Corps in the general direction of Dôle, the VIIth

upon Dampierre.

The IInd Army Corps will concentrate its main body on the Ognon in the neighbourhood of Pesmes and Montmirey. The advanced guard which should be pushed forward upon Dôle will make an attempt upon the railway there, if possible at the junction, and upon the telegraph line, in order to sever the enemy's communications with Lyons, and at the same time secure the debouch across the Doubs for their own troops. General v. Hann's detachment\* is to be called in; it will then be charged with the duty, if necessary, of watching towards the fortress of Auxonne. The corps will further keep in view the observation of Dijon, as well as the maintenance of the connection with General v. Kettler, who has been instructed to move to-morrow upon Dijon.

Gray will remain occupied, so as to secure the passage of the

Saône at that point.

The VIIth Army Corps will proceed to the neighbourhood of Marnay—Audeux, guard itself towards Besançon, push an advanced guard towards Dampierre, with the van if possible to the Doubs, in order to reconnoitre it more particularly in respect to the bridges, and where possible to secure them. A rear guard will remain facing Bioz, opening communication with General v. Werder.

The railway Gray—Dampierre will form the line of demarcation between the IInd and VIIth Corps. The disposition of the trains is

left to the Corps.

My headquarters proceed to-morrow to Pesmes.

(Signed) BARON v. MANTEUFFEL,

Commander-in-Chief.

Commander-in-Chief South Army, H. Q., Gray, 21.1.71.

DESPATCH FROM GENERAL BARON V. MANTEUFFEL TO GENERAL V. WEBDER.

Your Excellency will have observed from the copy you have received of my orders to the Generals commanding the IInd and VIIth Corps, that I purpose, with the troops here, to cut off the suspected retreat of the enemy in the direction of Besançou on Lyons, and sever as soon as possible the communications with the last-named

\* See text, ante, pp. 12 and 16.

fortress, whilst the offensive movement of your Excellency already commenced will at the same time detain the hostile rear guards, and retard thereby the retreat of the main body. It is not at present clear whether the enemy's main forces are to be expected on the right or on the left bank of the Doubs; but I am inclined to think the left, as no report of a collision has at present reached me from my left wing (VIIth Corps), while in a southerly direction the advanced guard of the IInd Corps has, during its march yesterday, fought an action with some gardes mobiles and franctireurs at Pesmes, who wished to dispute there the passage of the Ognon. This view is confirmed by your Excellency's telegram of the morning of the 20th.

I am not sufficiently acquainted with the circumstances of your Excellency's position to be able to give, you direct orders. I count upon your Excellency remaining at the heels of the enemy, following him wherever his main forces retire, seeking and maintaining with your right wing connection with me, as I am similarly doing with my left wing as regards you, and sending me frequent reports. Your Excellency will be good enough, so soon as circumstances permit, to send me Colonel v. Willisen's detachment, or, at any rate, his cavalry and artillery, by forced marches through Pesmes, as, in consequence here of the deficiency of available cavalry, I am in urgent need of it in order to operate against the enemy's communications.

From the position Pesmes—Marnay—Dampierre—Dôle occupied on the 21st, and which secures the passages of the Ognon and Doubs, I shall make reconnaissances towards the Lons-le-Saunier road, the shortest line of march between Belfort and Lyons; the result of these may influence my further dispositions.

(Signed) BARON v. MANTEUFFEL, Commander-in-Chief.

### APPENDIX CLXIII.

# ORDER OF BATTLE

Of the French Army of the Vosges (some 20,000 men)

(Middle of January, 1871).

Commander: General Garibaldi.

Chief of General Staff: General Bordone.

1st Brigade: General Bossack-Hanke.

Eclaireurs de Gray. Chasseurs Egyptiens. Franctireurs du Midi. Franctireurs du Rhône. 1st Garde-Mobile Battalion:

1st Garde-Mobile Battalion: Alpes Maritimes. 42nd Garde Mobile Regiment: Aveyron.

2nd Brigade: Colonel Lobbia.

1st Battalion Egalité de Marseilles. 2nd Battalion Egalité de Marseilles. Guerrilla Marseillaise. Guerrilla Française d'Orient. One Garde Mobile Battalion. Eclaireurs à Cheval.

3RD BRIGADE: General Menotti Garibaldi.

2nd Battalion Garde Mobile Alpes Maritimes.
One Battalion Garde Mobile Basses Alpes.
One Battalion Garde Mobile Basses Pyrénees.
Légion de Volontaires Italiens.
Légion de Chasseurs des Alpes.
Bataillon des Franctireurs réunis.
Compagnie d'Oran.
Compagnie Franctireurs Francs-comtois.
Compagnie de Vaucluse.
Compagnie d'Alger.

4TH BRIGADE: Colonel Ricciotti Garibaldi.

Chasseurs des Alpes.

2 Companies Chasseurs Dauphinois.
Franctireurs des Vosges.
Franctireurs du Dôle.
Eclaireurs du Doubs.
Chasseurs du Havre.
Bataillon Nicolaï.
Franctireurs Toulousains.
Franctireurs de l'Aveyron.

Chasseurs du Montblanc. Chasseurs Republicains de la Loire. Compagnie des Eclaireurs de l'Allier. Compagnie du Gers. Compagnie de la Croix de Nice. Volontaires de Loir et Cher. Eclaireurs de Caprera. Franctireurs du Croissant. Les Enfants perdus de la Montagne. Compagnie des petites Mitrailleuses. Franctireurs de la Côte d'Or.

5TH BRIGADE (in formation): Colonel Canzio.

Carabiniers Génois. Légion Italienne, dite de Marsalla. Compagnie Espagnole. Compagnie Franco-Espagnole.

Separate corps.

Franctireurs de la Mort. Compagnie de la Revanche. Bataillon des Enfants perdus de Paris. Pontoniers du Rhône. Alsaciens de Paris. Compagnie de Colmar. Recruiting depôt.

# Beside these :-

The Garde Nationale Mobile of the Isère (see Pelissier's Division):

Artillery: 7 batteries with 42 guns.

Cavalry: Detachment of mounted Chasseurs (7th Chasseurs).

Hussar squadron. Guides squadron. Eclaireurs de Rhône. Guides de Châtillon.

and, later, 4 squadrons 11th Regiment de marche.

STRENGTH OF GENERAL PELISSIER'S DIVISION AT DIJON.\* (17th January, 1871.)

Garde Nationale Mobile:	Jura	7,188 men.
	Saône	8,900 ,,
	Loiret	1,100 ,
	Ain	2,100 ,,
	Haute Savoie	1,144 ,
	Isère‡	2,300 ,,

Total of Garibaldi's Force in the latter half of January, 48,000 (See Bordone, "Garibaldi et l'Armée des Vosges," p. 412.)

Total

22,732

<sup>\*</sup> See Enquête Parlementaire, Rapports, Versailles, 1874. Vol. II, pp. 689, 690, 694, and 754.

<sup>†</sup> At Auxonne. ‡ Attached to the Vosges Army.

### APPENDIX CLXIV

Ordre Général de Mouvement pour le 18 et le 19 Janvier.

Aibre, le 17 Janvier, 1871.

1re Armée.

Au Grand Quartier-Général.

Le 18º Corps d'Armée et la Division Crémer qui jusqu'à nouvel ordre est sous la direction du Général Billot viendront occuper les villages de Coisevaux et de Champey, la droite dans les bois communaux entre Coisevaux et Verlans, et la gauche dans les bois de Saulnot que le Général Billot fera surveiller avec beaucoup de soin.

Le 18° Corps s'appuiera ainsi par la droite sur le 20° Corps.

Le 20° Corps rappellera la Division Polignac qui est à Coisevaux et s'établira à Trémoins et sur le plateau de Tavey, ayant sa droite dans les bois du Chanois. Il est bien entendu que la Division Polignac ne devra exécuter son mouvement que lorsqu'elle aura été relevée par une division du 18° Corps.

Le 24° Corps conservera sa position en avant de Laire, sa gauche au bois du Chanois et sa droite occupant fortement le bois de Monté-

villars.

Le 15° Corps occupera fortement sur sa gauche, en se reliant avec le 24°, le Bois Bourgeois, le Mont Chevis, repliera sa droite qui est devant Montbéliard et occupera militairement toute l'arête qui est devant le Mont Chevis du côté de Bart et que traverse la route de Dung à Montbéliard.

Il fera exécuter sur toute cette position des travaux défensifs, do

manière à pouvoir garantir au moins son artillerie.

Le commandant du 15° Corps fora en outre reconnaître avec soin, pour l'occuper au besoin, la position défensive qui se trouve sur la rive droite du ruisseau le Rupt, s'appuyant à droite sur le Mont Bart et à gauche sur les hauteurs qui dominent Allondans. Le gauche sur cette position serait sur la rive gauche du Rupt, sur le plateau qui est entre Allondans et Issans, lequel s'appuie lui-même sur le bois dit de Dessus. Cette gauche par laquelle on se relie avec le 24° Corps devra être défendue à tout prix, en cas d'attaque de l'ennemi.

La réserve générale de l'armée, sous les ordres du Général Pallu,

viendra s'établir à Semondans, Désandans, et Echenans.

Demain, dans la journée ou pendant la nuit, si c'est nécessaire, après avoir fait les distributions de vivres et renouvelé antant que possible les munitions, on mettra en route tous les convois et les parcs, les corps d'armée ne gardant avec eux que l'artillerie de combat.

Les convois et les parcs devront toujours être tenus à une journée de marche en arrière. Les commandants des corps d'armée donneront à leurs intendants les instructions nécessaires pour laisser sur des points désignés à l'avance le nombre de voitures suffisant pour faire les distributions de la journée ; dès que ces distributions seront faites, ces voitures iront rejoindre le reste du convoi.

Après demain, 19, l'armée ira occuper les positions suivantes:—

Le 15° Corps suivant la route qui longe le Doubs s'établira sur les hauteurs en avant de Beutal, sa droite au Doubs et sa gauche au lieu dit le Compas, c'est-à-dire jusqu'à la lisière du bois du Bouloy.

Le 24° Corps passant par Rainans, St. Julien, Ste. Marie et Montonois, viendra s'établir à Bretigney, Faimbe et la Guinguette, le Mont Tuchot et les bois du Cédrier, du Clochet et du Combollet.

Le 20° Corps, suivant la grande route jusqu'au delà de Arcey, occupera Onans et Marvelise, c'est-à-dire les positions qui sont à l'est de ces points jusques et y compris les bois communaux qui sont entre Marvelise et Gonvillars.

Le 18º Corps, passant par Saulnot d'un côté et le Vernois et Chavanne de l'autre, ira s'établir à Crevans, Secenans, et Velle-

chevreux.

La réserve générale de l'armée ira à Geney.

Il est bien entendu que lorsqu'un village est indiqué pour l'emplacement des troupes d'un corps d'armée, ce n'est pas le village qui doit être occupé, mais la position militaire qui le commande.

Pendant ce mouvement de retraite, le génie militaire marchera

aux arrière-gardes pour exécuter les travaux nécessaires.

Le génie civil sera en avant d'une journée de marche pour préparer et pour réunir les ressources des habitants et exécuter des travaux des défense et préparer si c'est nécessaire, les moyens de destruction des ouvrages d'art.

Les commandants des corps d'armée donneront au génie civil et militaire toutes les instructions qu'ils jugeront convenables pour

l'accomplissement de leur mission.

Dans les ordres de marche des corps d'armée, on devra indiquer le nombre et la nature des troupes qui seront chargées de faire l'arrière-garde, et le départ des troupes devra être calculé de manière à ce que ces arrière-gardes puissent se mettre en route toute en même temps à 8 heures du matin. Ces arrière-gardes devront chercher à se relier le plus possible et à se soutenir mutuellement. Les commandants de ces arrière-gardes auront avec eux, au moins un peloton de cavalerie, de façon à pouvoir correspondre rapidement avec leur voisin et à s'éclairer sur leurs derrières. Si ces arrière-gardes sont obligées de s'arrêter pour attendre celles des corps voisins, elles devront s'établir dans de bonnes positions militaires.

Afin d'éviter la longueur des colonnes, on profitera de tous les chemins parallèles que présente le pays, et toutes les fois que cela sera possible, on fera marcher l'infanterie sur les flancs de la route.

laissant cette dernière à la disposition de l'artillerie.

Les commandants de corps d'armée feront commencer dès cette nuit le mouvement de leurs convois et des parcs; ils profiteront des voitures vides pour l'évacuation des blessés et ne conserveront que ce qui est nécessaire pour les distributions de semaine.

Les prévôts de divers corps d'armée partiront avec les convois dont ils sont chargés de régler l'ordre et la régularité, service qui a laissé

beaucoup à désirer jusqu'à présent.

Par ordre: le Général Chef d'État-Major Général, (Signé) BOREL. P.S.—Le Général Commandant-en-Chef recommande de la manière la plus formelle d'exécuter tous les jours sur les positions que les troupes occuperont des travaux de défense sévères.

Par ordre:

(Signé) BOREL.

A counter-order again changed the arrangements made for the 19th. The Army retired that day further to the rear. The order, however, shows in what manner the retreat was devised.

### APPENDIX CLXV.

Commander-in-Chief South Army. H. Q., La Barre, 24.1.71.

According to the reports received, the situation to-day is as follows:-

The XIVth Army Corps (including 11 battalions of the 4th Reserve Division) ought to have reached yesterday the line Montbozon—Glainans, and, according to the intentions communicated, may be expected to-day on both banks of the Doubs abreast of Baume-les-Dames. The Baden Division, advancing on the right wing, is endeavouring to open communication by way of Rioz with the VIIth Corps.

Before Belfort and in that neighbourhood are posted the 1st Reserve Division, Debschitz's detachment, and part of the 4th Beserve Division; the approaches against Fort La Perche are opened

along the line Danjoutin—Pérouse.

The VIIth Army Corps, after a brief engagement, captured yesterday the cross-roads at Quingey, and will secure the possession of this point by defensive works, the front of which will be towards Besançon. The Corps is established on the line Quingey—Dampierre; on the right bank of the Doubs its line of outposts Dannemarie—Routelle faces Besançon. A detachment on the Ognon watches the road from Besançon to Gray, and assures the connection with the XIVth Corps.

The IInd Army Corps is marching with three brigades from Dôle to Villers Farlay, and will this day stand echelonned between the latter town and Nevy-les-Dôle. A fourth brigade (Colonel Knesebeck) secures towards Auxonne and Besançon the line Dôle—Gray,

on which it stands echelonned.

Willisen's Cavalry Brigade, detached from the XIVth Army Corps, advances also into this neighbourhood; it is this day on the march from Frasne by way of Bonboillon to Pesmes.

Further in rear stands Major-General v. Kettler's mixed brigade; it has an independent mission to guard the communications between

Montbard and Dijon.

Bourbaki's army (15th, 18th, 20th, 24th, and probably the 25th Corps), the losses of which in three days' fighting before Belfort and subsequently are estimated at 10,000 men, has directed its main line of retreat upon Besancon, and has almost entirely passed to the left bank of the Doubs. It still occupied, the day before yesterday, Baume-les-Dames and Clerval in force; comparatively strong bodies of troops have also been left in the neighbourhood of Blamont, and to the north of it (towards Delle and Montbéliard); bodies of stragglers were met with yesterday at Vesoul. It is not yet known how far the heads of the enemy's main army have progressed along the roads between the Doubs and the Swiss frontier.

The actions fought by the IInd and VIIth Army Corps on the

21st, 22nd and 23rd, appear at present to have been chiefly against the Besançon garrison, gardes mobiles and franctireurs. In these engagements considerable quantities of stores have been captured, and, by the occupation of Dôle and Quingey, the nearest line of retreat through Lons-le-Saunier to Lyons is barred, while traffic has been stopped by blowing up the bridges along both railways leading from Besançon to Lyons. General v. Kettler's reconnaissance towards Dijon on the 21st has, during a sanguinary contest, in which we captured 500 prisoners, showed the strength of Garibaldi's Corps at not less than 25,000 men, and a position armed with twenty heavy guns.

In the supposition that the XIVth Army Corps will to-morrow (the 25th), after leaving Baume-les-Dames, gain by a short day's march some ground towards Besançon, the following are the main

hypotheses that would have to be considered:-

(1.) The enemy continues his retreat to the southward, and, as the road by Villers Farlay is barred, by the roads leading between Villers Farlay and Pontarlier. The IInd and VIIth Corps will then be ready to strike him in the flank with advanced guards, or bar his road with flying columns.

(2.) The enemy endeavours to break through by way of Quingey and Dampierre. The VIIth Corps will in that case stand with a Division on each bank of the Doubs ready to resist the first attack, whilst the IInd on both banks of the Doubs would be able to take part from the rear, according to circumstances.

In both eventualities, (1) and (2), the XIVth Corps would press vigorously from the north upon the enemy's rearguards.

(3.) The enemy debouches from, or by way of, Besançon upon Pesmes and Gray, in order probably to extend a hand to Garibaldi's Corps at Dijon. For this purpose the enemy has at his disposal the three main roads leading from Besançon, through Audeux, Pin, and Etuz. In this case all the nearest troops, 14th Division, Knesebeck's Brigade would advance against the left, the Baden Division against the right flank of the marching columns and hold them fast, whilst the other troops, wholly or partly, according to circumstances, would join this movement or hem them in right and left.

(4.) The enemy again shows front towards the XIVth Army Corps.

In this event the IInd and VIIth Corps will take part in the

action from the south.

(5.) Should the enemy retire to the Swiss frontier, all three Corps would at once follow this movement with advanced guards, and later, with the whole army also if necessary, force the enemy to give battle or to cross the frontier.

(6.) The enemy concentrates at Besançon and awaits our attack. In this case the subsistence of the South Army must probably be assured for a longer time than is the case under the present circumstances of the enemy, and therefore the army will not be required to attack strong positions situated perhaps under the protection of the fortress; on the contrary it might await the enemy's attack.

In the existing circumstances, where the three Corps cannot well

support one another directly, even if it were not also desirable, I have not thought it well to omit bringing thus to your Excellency's notice my views as to the situation, so that at all times you may be able to make your dispositions in the desired way, before receiving any orders, in case the circumstances may require a prompt decision.

(Signed) BARON v. MANTEUFFEL,

Commander-in-Chief.

To Generals v. Zastrow, v. Fransecky, and v. Werder.

### APPENDIX CLXVI.

TELEGRAPHIC CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE WAR MINISTRY and General Bourbaki.

(Afternoon of 24th January.)

Bordeaux, 24 Janvier, 1871, 1 h. 59 soir.

Guerre de Bordeaux, à Général Bourbaki, Besançon.

Je crois qu'il serait extrêmement dangereux pour vous de demeurer autour de Besançon où le mieux qui pourrait vous arriver serait d'être désormais paralysé. Il faut à tout prix sortir de cette situation et effectuer, par voie de terre, avec le 15°, 18°, et 20° Corps, le trajet que vous deviez effectuer en chemin de fer. Ainsi, il faut, avec les forces que j'indique, gagner le plus vite possible Nevers, ou mieux encore, la region Auxerre, Joigny, Tonnerre. Vous trouverez dans cette région une vingtaine de mille hommes que j'y ai déjà disposé pour vous y recevoir.

Dans quelle direction précise devrez-vous faire ce mouvement? C'est à vous naturellement de la déterminer, d'après la position de l'ennemi et les conditions du théâtre de la guerre. Mais il faudrait faire en sorte que ce mouvement profitât à reprendre Dôle, protéger Dijon et débarrasser nos communications ferrées au-dessus de

Besançon.

Quant au corps de Crémer et de Bressolles, vous auriez soin de leur assigner de bonnes positions, pour protéger votre propre mouve-

Je répète, en terminant, qu'il faut vous hâter et que votre grand intérêt est, si je ne me trompe, de vous retirer, à tout prix, avec les trois corps sus-indiqués.

(Signé) DE FREYCINET.

2.

Besançon, 24 Janvier, 1871, 7 h. 50 soir.

Général Bourbaki, Besançon, à Guerre, Bordeaux.

Quand vous serez mieux informé, vous regretterez le reproche de lenteur que vous me faites. Les hommes sont exténués de fatigue, les chevaux aussi. Je n'ai jamais perdu une heure, ni pour aller, ni pour revenir.

Je viens de voir tous les commandants de corps d'armée; ils sont d'avis que nous prenions les routes de Pontarlier; c'est la seule direction que l'état moral et physique de nos troupes nous permette de prendre. Vous ne vous faites pas une idée des souffrances que l'armée a endurées depuis le commencement du Décembre. J'avais envoyé une division en chemin de fer, pour s'emparer de Quingey et Mouchard, une autre à Busy, les deux commandées par le Général Martineau. Elles se sont repliées. Pendant que j'ai visité aujourd'hui les troupes de la rive droite du Doubs, le Général Borel est allé placer lui-même à Busy celles du 15° Corps, pour les maintenir sur les positions et faire occuper les ponts de la Loue les plus voisins. Entre Dôle, Quingey et Mouchard, il y a deux corps d'armée ennemis, le 2° et 7°. Demain je compte faire partir le plus vite possible trois divisions pour occuper les positions dont nous avons besoin et l'entrée de Pontarlier. Si ce plan ne vous convient pas, je ne sais vraiment que faire. Soyes sûr que c'est un martyre d'exercer un commandement en ce moment. J'avais prescrit au Général Bressolles de garder le plateau de Blamont et les hauteurs de Lomont; de laisser un poste à Clerval pour empêcher le rétablissement des ponts et d'affecter une division avec les mobilisés à cette mission. J'apprends à l'instant que ces positions sont abandonnées et j'ordonne de les reprendre.

Ŝi vous croyez qu'un de mes commandants un corps d'armée puisse faire mieux que moi, n'hésitez pas, comme je vous l'ai déjà dit, à me remplacer, soit par Billot, soit par Clinchant ou Martineau. Ne comptez pas sur le service des troupes de Bressolles. Je n'y ai jamais

compté. La tâche est au-dessus de mes forces.

(Signé) BOURBAKI.

# APPENDIX CLXVIL

# ORDRE GÉNÉRAL DE MOUVEMENT POUR LE 25 JANVIER, 1871.

Au Grand Quartier Général à Besançon, le 24 Janvier, 1871.

La 1<sup>re</sup> et la 2<sup>e</sup> Division du 15<sup>e</sup> Corps conserveront leurs positions à Busy, Chenecey, moulin de Courcelles et aux forges de Châtillon pour

garder ces passages.

Le 3° Division (Pcytavin) occupera demain matin Ornans, les hauteurs de Scoy en Varais et les hauteurs d'Epcugney près de Cléron pour surveiller et défendre au besoin les passages de la Loue qui existent sur ces points. La rive droite de la rivière sera observée et occupée; l'artillerie sera mise en batterie sur toutes les positions qu'elle jugera convenables à son action. Les travaux défensifs seront exécutés et des reconnaissances poussées sur la rive gauche.

La réserve d'artillerie du 15° Corps montera à Pugey, pour s'y établir. La cavalerie du 15° Corps passera la Loue à Cléron et à Ornans, poussera des reconnaissances sur Coulans, Eternoz, Déservillers, Reugney, Amathay et Longeville, prendra, si c'est possible, ses cantonnements dans ces villages, ainsi que dans celui de Bolandoz

qui est à peu près au centre des points à reconnaître.

La réserve générale de l'armée, la division Crémer et une des divisions du 20° Corps se mettront en route dans les conditions suivantes:—

- (1.) La réserve générale passera le Doubs sur le pont de Velotte, montera par Arguel et Pugey sur le plateau, suivra l'ancienne route de Besançon à Pontarlier par Mérey et Villers et se rendra par Ornans à Chantrans, Silley et Flagey où elle se cantonners.
- (2.) La division Crémer passera le pont de Velotte, suivra la même route que la réserve jusqu'à Pugey et à partir de ce point, elle se dirigera sur Cléron, en passant par Epeugney; elle prendra toutes les dispositions nécessaires pour pouvoir déboucher facilement le lendemain, soit sur Amancey, soit sur Ornans, d'après les renseignements.
- (3.) La division du 20° Corps désignée par le Général Clinchant, franchira le Doubs sur les ponts de Besançon qu'elle aura soin de faire reconnaître à l'avance; elle s'engagera sur la route d'Etalans, en passant par Morre, Mamirolle et l'Hôpital et couchera à Etalans; ces trois colonnes auront soin de s'éclairer au loin, de se tenir, autant que possible, en relation entre elles. Elles seront placées sous le commandement supérieur du Général Crémer; elles seront suivies à 7 ou 8 kilomètres en arrière par leurs convois légers. Le convoi de la réserve d'abord et celui de la division Crémer ensuite, ne franchiront les ponts de Velotte qu'après le passage de la division Crémer. Toutes les précautions militaires seront prises pour protéger le passage du Doubs et le dissimuler le mieux possible à l'ennemi.

Le 18° et 20° Corps l'Armée prendront telles mesures qu'ils jugeront convenables, pour conserver leurs positions actuelles, malgré le départ de ces trois colonnes, sans laisser de points vulnérables dans la ligne occupée par eux. Ils se tiendront prêts à faire mouvement dans l'après-midi ou la soirée.

Le 20° Corps continuera tonjours à garder le pout de Chalèze qui devra être détruit après le passage de ce corps sur la rive

zauche.

Le Général Clinchant aura soin d'envoyer à cet effet au Capitaine du Génie Maillard qui est de service sur le point, un ordre écrit qui prescrira la destruction de cet ouvrage.

Les 18° et 20° Corps ne feront mouvement que sur un nouvel

ordre; il en sera de même pour les grands convois.

Les colonnes qui se mettent en marche demain devront être précédées par des avant-gardes qui seront chargées de fouiller le terrain, avant de laisser s'engager ces colonnes. On fera des distributions nécessaires pour que les corps soient alignés en vivres, autant que possible jusqu'au 29 inclus. Le 18° Corps qui a demandé 30 chevaux pour son artillerie ainsi que le 20° Corps qui en a demandé 40, les feront prendre à Saint-Ferjeux, s'ils no l'ont déjà fait.

Le Grand Quartier Général reste à Besançon.

Le Général Martineau qui est à Pugey se renseignera sur l'état de l'ancienne route de Besançon à Ornans, qui doit être suivie par la réserve générale. Dans le cas où cette route ne serait pas practicable à l'artillerie et aux convois, il aurait à faire prévenir M. le Général Pallu de faire passer son artillerie et son convoi par Epeugney, Cademène, Scey-en-Varais, et Maisières. Toutefois cette artillerie et son convoi ne doivent s'engager dans la partie du chemin qui se trouve au fond de la Loue, qu'après s'être bien assurés qu'Ornans et Cléron sont occupés par nous. Enfin, dans le cas où cette partie de la route serait jugée dangereuse, l'artillerie et le convoi devront à partir d'Epeugney passer par Montrond, Mérey, Viliers, et Tarcenay pour aller rejoindre la grande route d'Ornans.

Le Général Crémer devra de sa personne se rendre à Ornans, pour décider, d'après les renseignements, des dispositions à prendre et de la possibilité de l'occupation de la rive gauche de la Loue par les troupes

de la réserve.

Par ordre:
(Signé) BOREL,
Général Chef d'État-Major Géneral,
Général Commandant-en-Chef.

#### APPENDIX CLXVIII.

DESPATCH FROM GENERAL CLINCHANT TO GENERAL THORNTON COMMANDING AT CHAFFOIS.

Un armistice de 21 jours a été signé le 27; j'en ai reçu ce soir la nouvelle officielle. En conséquence faites cesser le feu et informez l'ennemi, suivant les formes voulues à la guerre, que l'armistice existe et que vous êtes chargé de le porter à sa connaissance.

Pontarlier, 29 Janvier, 1871.

(Signé) CLINCHANT, Général Commandant-en-Chef.

This despatch was based on the following telegrams:-

1.

Bordeaux, le 29 Janvier, 1871, 12 h. 30 (midi 30).

Délégation du Gouvernement à Préfets et Sous-Préfets, Circulaire.

La délégation du Gouvernement établie à Bordeux, qui n'avait jusqu'ici sur les négociations entamées à Versailles, que des renseignements fournis par la presse étrangère, a reçu cette nuit le télégramme suivant qu'elle porte à la connaissance du pays dans sa teneur intégrale:

" Dépêche télégraphique.

"Versailles, 28 Janvier, 1871, 11 h. 15 soir.

"Nous signons aujourd'hui un traité avec Monsieur le Comte de Bismarck. Un armistice de vingt-et-un jours est convenu, une assemblée est convoquée à Bordeaux pour le 15 Février.

"Faites connaître cette nouvelle à toute la France. Faites

exécuter l'armistice et convoquez les électeurs pour le 8 Février. "Un membre du Gouvernement va partir pour Bordeaux.

"JULES FAVRE."
Un décret qui sera ultérieurement publié fera connaître les

mesures prises pour assurer l'exécution des dispositions ci-dessus.

Pour copie conforme:

(Signé) CL. LAURIER.

9

Circulaire de Bordeaux, le 29 Janvier, 1871, 3 h. 30 soir.

Guerre à Généraux commandant Divisions et Subdivisions.

Un armistice de vingt-un jours vient d'être conclu par le Gouvernement de Paris. Veuilles, en conséquence, suspendre immé-

diatement les hostilités, en vous concertant avec le chef des forces

ennemies, en présence desquelles vous pouvez vous trouver.

Vous vous conformerez aux règles pratiques suivies en pareil cas. Les lignes des avant-postes respectifs des forces en présence, sont déterminées sur-le-champ et avec précision par l'indication des localités, accidents de terrain et autres points de repère. Le procèsverbal constatant cette délimitation est échangé et signé des deux Commandants-en-Chef ou de leurs représentants. Aucun mouvement des armées en avant des lignes ainsi déterminées, ne peut être effectué pendant toute la durée de l'armistice. Il en est de même du ravitaillement et de tout ce qui est nécessaire à la conservation de l'armée, qui ne peut non plus s'effectuer en avant des dites lignes.

Donnes également des instructions aux franc-tireurs. Afin d'éviter toute difficulté ultérieure, je vous invite instamment à faire apporter la plus grande précision dans la rédaction des procès-verbaux

et dans la réunion des éléments qui leur servent de bases.

S'il surgissait quelque difficulté imprévue, sur laquelle vous jugeries bon d'être éclairci, référes-m'en par dépêche d'extrême urgence en gagnaut le temps nécessaire dans les négociations.

(Signé) C. DE FREYCINET.

#### APPENDIX CLXIX.

Entre Monsieur le Général Herzog, Général-en-Chef de l'Armée de la Confédération Suisse, et Monsieur le Général de Division Clinchant, Général-en-Chef de la 1<sup>re</sup> Armée Française, il a été fait les Conventions suivantes:—

- (1.) L'Armée Française demandant à passer sur le territoire Suisse, déposera en y pénétrant, ses armes, équipements, et munitions.
- (2.) Ces armes, équipements, et munitions seront restitués à la France après la paix et après le règlement définitif des dépenses occasionnées à la Suisse par le séjour des troupes Françaises.
- (3.) Il en sera de même pour le matériel d'artillerie et ses munitions.
- (4.) Les chevaux, armes, et effets des officiers seront laissés à leur disposition.
- (5.) Des dispositions ultérieures seront prises à l'égard des chevaux de troupe.
- (6.) Les voitures de vivres et de bagages, après avoir déposé leur contenu, retourneront immédiatement en France avec leurs conducteurs et leurs chevaux.
- (7.) Les voitures du trésor et des postes seront remises avec tout leur contenu à la Confédération Helvétique, qui en tiendra compte lors du règlement des dépenses.
- (8.) L'exécution de ces dispositions aura lieu en présence d'officiers Français et Suisses désignés à cet effet.
- (9.) La Confédération se réserve la désignation des lieux d'internement pour les officiers et pour la troupe.
- (10.) Il appartient au Conseil Fédéral d'indiquer les prescriptions de détail destinées à compléter la présente Convention. Fait en triple expédition aux Verrières le 1<sup>er</sup> Février, 1871.

(Signé) CLINCHANT. (Signé) HANS HERZOG, Général.

#### APPENDIX CLXX.

Les Soussignés, munis des pouvoirs en vertu desquels ils ont conclu la Convention du 28 Janvier, considérant que par la dite Convention il était réservé à uné entente ultérieure de faire cesser les opérations militaires dans les Départements du Doubs, du Jura, et de la Côte d'Or, et devant Belfort, et de tracer la ligne de démarcation entre l'occupation Allemande et les positions de l'Armée Française à partir de Quarré les Tombes dans le Département de l'Yonne, ont conclu la Convention additionnelle suivante:—

#### Article I.

La forteresse de Belfort sera rendue au Commandant de l'Armée de Siége avec le matériel de guerre faisant partie de l'armement de la place.

La garnison de Belfort sortira de la place avec les honneurs de la guerre, en conservant les armes, les équipages, et le matériel de guerre appartenant à la troupe ainsi que les archives militaires.

Les Commandants de Belfort et de l'Armée de Siége se mettront d'accord sur l'exécution des stipulations qui précèdent, ainsi que sur les détails qui n'y sont pas prévus, et sur la direction et les étapes dans lesquelles la garnison de Belfort rejoindra l'Armée Française au delà de la ligne de démarcation.

#### Article II.

Les prisonniers Allemands se trouvant à Belfort, seront mis en liberté.

#### Article III.

La ligne de démarcation arrêtée jusqu'au point où se touchent les trois Départements de l'Yonne, de la Nièvre, et de la Côte d'Or, sera continuée le long de la limite méridionale du Département de la Côte d'Or, jusqu'au point où le chemin de fer qui de Nevers par Autun et Chagny conduit à Châlon-sur-Saône, franchit la limite du dit département. Ce chemin de fer restera en dehors de l'occupation Allemande de manière que la ligne de démarcation, en se tenant à la distance d'un kilomètre de la ligne ferrée, rejoindra la limite méridionale du Département de la Côte d'Or à l'est de Chagny et suivra la limite qui sépare le Département de Saône et Loire des Départements de la Côte d'Or et du Jura. Après avoir traversé la route qui conduit de Louhans à Lons-le-Saunier, elle quittera la limite départementale à la hauteur du village de Mallerey, d'où elle se continuera de manière à couper le chemin de fer de Lons-le-Saunier à Bourg à une distance de 11 kilomètres sud de Lons-le-Saunier, se dirigeant de là sur le pont de l'Ain sur la route de Clairvaux d'où elle suivra la limite nord de l'arrondissement de St. Claude jusqu'à la frontière Suisse.

#### Article IV.

La forteresse de Besançon conservera un rayon de 10 kilomètres à la disposition de sa garnison. La place forte d'Auxonne sera entourée d'un terrain neutre de 3 kilomètres à l'intérieur duquel la circulation sur les chemins de fer, qui de Dijon conduisent à Gray et à Dôle, sera libre pour les trains militaires et l'administration Allemande.

Les commandants de troupes de part et d'autre règleront le ravitaillement des deux fortererses et des forts qui dans les Départements du Doubs et du Jura se trouvent en possession des troupes Françaises et la délimitation des rayons de ces forts, qui seront de 3 kilomètres chacun. La circulation sur les routes ou chemins de fer traversant ces rayons sera libre.

#### Article V.

Les trois Départements du Jura, du Doubs, et de la Côte d'Or seront compris des-à-présent dans l'armistice conclu le 28 Janvier en y appliquant pour la durée de l'armistice et pour les autres conditions la totalité des stipulation consignées dans la Convention du 28 Janvier dernier.

Approuvé à Versailles, le 15 Février, 1871.

(Signé)  $\nabla$ 

VON BISMARCK.

Approuvé à Versailles, le 15 Février, 1871.

(Signé) JULES FAVRE.

#### APPENDIX CLXXI.

RETURN OF CASUALTIES IN THE ARMY OF THE SOUTH FROM 13TH JANUARY TO THE CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE FOR BELFORT, AND THE Côte D'Or, Doubs, and Jura Departments.\*

						or	Killed, Died o Younds	of	w	ounde	đ.	8	lissing			Total.	
Army (	Çorp <b>e,</b>	&c.	Staff and Regim	ent.		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
			14th January														Γ
ind 711th		•	42nd Regiment	:		Ξ	-	Ξ	=	1 1	Ξ	=	Ξ	Ξ	111	1 4 6	Ē
			15th January		ı												ļ
ind	•	•	2nd Grenadiers	•	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	_	-	_	1	-
			10th January	<b>'•</b>													١.
bai	•	-	21st Regiment 11th Dragoons	:	:	1	1	=	7	7	=	=	1	=	1	1	=
II <b>th</b>	•	•	77th Regiment	•	•	-	1	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	*	-
			17th January	·•	i					_	١.			١.			١.
ba	•	-	3rd Dragoons 9th Grenadiers	:		1	4	_6	8	17	1	=	2 -	1	3	7 21	-
lith			11th Dragoons 7th Rifle Battalion -	•	:		11	-	_	1	=	=	_	=	_	1 1 3	1:
			8th Hussars	•	-	-	ī	-	-	-	1	-	=	-	-	Ī	ı
			3rd Field Pioneer Compa 53rd Regiment -	ny -	-	=	7	=	=	-	=	=	_	=	=	2	=
			18th January	•	ı												
ind Tith	:	:	3rd Dragoons 39th Regiment	•	-	-	2	1	_	1	_	-	-	-	-	3	
11.00	•	-	19th January	,	آ		_	_						1		•	ľ
lad			•	•		_	1	_	_	_	_	_		_	_	1	_
			14th Regiment	•	:	-	<u> </u>	-	_	1	=	=	7	-	_	1	l –
IIth	•	•	15th Husears	:	- :	=	=	_	-	=	=	=	i	=	=	i	=
			Golts's Detachn	sent.													İ
(IVth		-	30th Regiment	•	-1	_	_	_	_	1	_	_	_	_	_	1	-
th Rec	erve l	D <b>i</b> ▼.	Ortelsburg Landw. Battn Wehlan Landw. Battn.	. :	:	_	_	=		1 1			=	=	=	1 1	1:
			Insterburg Landw. Battn		-	_	_	-	-	_	-	-	2	-	_	1	-
			20th January														
Ind 711th	:	:	11th Dragoons 8th Hussars	:	:	=	1	<u>-</u>	=	-	=	=	=	=	=	1	=
ПAФ	•	-	a. Baden Divisio	n.	ļ												1
			3rd Dragoons		.]	_	_	1	-	1	<b> </b> _	_	_	_	<b> </b> _	1	1

<sup>•</sup> With respect to the casualties of the XIVth Army Corps and the 4th Reserve Division between 13th and 18th January see Appendix CXLI.

			or	Killed, Died ( Vounda	of	W	ounde	<b>a</b> .	3	Lissing			Total.	
Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Ken.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
	b. Goltz's Detachment.													
XIVth	30th Regiment	-	-	-	-		1	-	-	_	-	-	1	-
	21st January.	-							l		1			ĺ
	ACTION AT DOLE.	- 1												
Ilmd	2nd Grenadiers 3rd Drageons		=	7	=	1	24 2	=	=	_	=	1	31 2	=
	TOTAL FOR ACTION AT DOLE.	ł	_	7	_	1	26	_	=		_	1	33	=
	ENGAGEMENTS AT TALANT, FONTALL LES-DIJON, AND MESSIGNT.	ME-	_											
	21st Regiment 61st Regiment	:	1 5 81	nd 1 St	1 3 aff	8	53 156	=	=	6 19	=	81	79 230 d 1 St	
	11th Dragoons 2nd Field Artillery Regiment -	-	- Sur	geon-M	ajor. 	-	1 10	1 8	=	=	=	Sur 1	geon-M l l2	Ajor.   1   20
	TOTAL FOR THE ENGAGEMENTS TALANT, FONTAINE-LES-DIJON, A. MESSIONE.	AT MD		77 nd 1 St		18	220	•	-	25	=	19	322 n-1 1 St geon-M	
	Engagements on the Osnon.				ľ	_		-						Ť
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	TOTAL FOR THE ENGAGEMENTS THE OGNON,	ON		6	5	1	24	8	Ξ	•	Ξ	三	33	18
	22nd January.•				1	1			İ				l	1
lind	21st Regiment	•	-	8	-	-	10	-	and	8 1 1 Ass	_  st.	- an	21 1 Ass	ist.
4th Res. Divn	61st Regiment	•	=	3 1 1	=	1 =	<u>•</u>	1-	= =	urgeon	Ì=	1 - -	iurgeor   18   1   1	1
	23rd January.			ĺ		l		1	ł	l	l	l	l	l
	ENGAGEMENT AT POUILLY.		l			1	1	1				1		
IInd	Staff of 8th Infantry Brigade - 21st Regiment - 61st Regiment - 11th Dragoons - 2nd Field Artillery Regiment -		- 1 2 -	-44 44 1	- 1 2 11	1 3 7 2	104 138	- - 2 8	=======================================	9 11 —	=======================================	1 4 9 - 2	157 190 1 14	-  1  4  19
	TOTAL FOR ENGAGEMENT AT POUR	LLY	3	87	14	13	255	10	ĬΞ	20	ΙΞ	16	362	24
IInd	2nd Grenadiers	•		Ξ	=	1 - -	1 2 2	=	=	=	E	1 -	1 2 2	=

<sup>\*</sup> No. 2 Field Hospital Had Army Corps is not included. It was broken up at Changey, near Daix, by Garibald's Volunteers on 22n 1 January, in contravention of the Geneva Convention.

			01	Killed, Died ( Vounds		W	'ounde	đ.	1	dissing	ŗ.		Total.	
Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.		Officers, &c.	Non.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, drc.	Mea.	Horses.
VIIth	73rd Fusiliers		111111	=		1-1111	4 1 1 1	1 1 00 01 1	1111111	111111	111111	11111	4 8 1 1	
zivu	a. Baden Division.  H.A. Battery - b. Golts's Detachment.	•	-	_	_	1		-	-	-	-	-		-
4th Res. Divn. • Etappen treops •		•	=	1 -	Ξ	111	3	=	111	12	- 12	2 - -	11 4 12	112
Viith Etappen troops -	Ind Grenadiers	•	1111111	1 1 1 1	1:1111	1111111	1 - 2 4		111111	- - - 17	111112		3 1 1 2 5 1 17	1 19
IInd	25th January.  42nd Regiment ENGAUEMENT AT VORGES.	-	-	2	-	_	6		1	_	-	-	8	-
VIIth	13th Regiment	:	- - -	10 6 —		2 - 1	23 25 1		111	-	111	2 1 1	83 84 .1	E
4th Res. Divn	TOTAL FOR EMPAREMENT AT VORCE  15th Regiment	-	- 111111	- - 1 1 1	111111	• 111111	1 2 1 6 1	1 111111		25	111111	4	68 1 2 27 7 2 1	=======================================
lind;	28th January.  EMOADEMENT AT SALIMS.  2nd Grenadiers	•	11111	11 2 2	=======================================	2 - 1 -	71 18 2 1		11111	- - - -	1111	2 - 1	82 20 4 1	=======================================
	TOTAL FOR EMCAGEMENT AT SALI	DTB .	Ξ	15	Ξ	3	93	Ξ		1	Ξ	-3	109	E
Viith -	EMBASEMENT AT BUSY AND VORG  13th Regiment - 15th Regiment - 55th Regiment - 7th Rife Battalion - 8th Hustars -	<b>34.</b>		13 1 2 —	===	11111	2 6 1 5 -	=======================================	1111	===		1-1-1	5 19 2 7	=
lind - • 4th Res. Divn. •	TOTAL FOR EMPAGEMENT AT B AND VORONS.  21st Regiment	COT	<u> </u>  -  -	19	<u> -</u>  =	_ 	14	<u>-</u> -	<u>-</u> -	-	11	- 11	1 4	=

				01	Killed, Died Vounds	of l	W	ounde	<b>a</b> .	¥	lissing			Total.	
Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regime	ent.		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Ken.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Обоеть, кс.	Men.	Bornes.
	27th January														
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VIIth	39th Pusiliers	•	-	_	_	_		7	_	_	1	-	-	9 1 1 1 2	_
th Bes. Divn. •	60th Regiment 25th Regiment	:		_	1	_	_	-	_	=	_	-	=	i	=
	Thorn Landw. Battn	•	•	_	1	-	_	3	-	_	_	-	-	3	-
Ind	28th January 3rd Dragoons	٠.	-	_	1	_	_	_	_	_		_		1	۱_
	61st Regiment	-	•	-	17	_	5	60 2	_	-	-	-	5	77	۱-
ith Res. Divn. •	3rd Res. Lancers - 29th January	•	•	_	_	-	_	•	-	_	_	-	_	•	-
	ENGAGEMENT AT CHAI SOMBACOURT.	PPOIS AS	<b>1</b>												Ì
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·	77th Regiment 15th Hussars	•	•	-	2	_		5 1	=	_	=	-	=	7	1=
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lind	14th Regiment 2nd Rifle Battn	•	•	_	1 2	=	_	- 1	=	_	=	-	-	1	-
Viith	60th Regiment	:	•	_	1	-	_	-	Ξ	=	=	=	=	1	=
XIVth - • 4th Bes. Divn. •	6th Baden Regiment - 3rd Res. Lancers -	:	-	=	1	1	Ξ	1	Ξ	_	_	=	_	1	17
	30th January	7.													1
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	lith Dragoons	•	•			•	-	•	"	_	-	-	_	•	١.
lind	54th Regiment	-	•	-	7	-	-	22	_	-	_	_	_	29 1	-
	2nd Field Artillery Regin		•	-	_	-	-	1	-	-	_	_	_	'	-
	lst February.					l			1						
	ENGAGEMENTS AT POW CLUSE, AND OTE.	TABLIBB	, La				•			l					
lind	2nd Grenadiers -	•	-	=	11	_	3	20 1	-	-	8	-	3	36 1	<u> </u>
	42nd Regiment - • 8rd Dragoons - •	:	:	-	=	=	=	1	3	=	=	-	=	1	1
	9th Grenadiers	•	•	١	93	-	8	179 and	ı —	-	62	-	13	324 and	1 -
	49th Regiment	_			11	_	1 A	ssistS	urg.	_	_		1 A	ssist6   <b>3</b> 6	urg
	2nd Field Artillery Begin	nent -	•	-	ï	-	ĭ	4	-	-	-	-	i	8	<u> </u> –
	TOTAL FOR ENGAGEMEN	HTS AT	Pon-	6	116	-	15	229 and	3	-	87	=	21	402 and	1
	TABLIER, LA CLUSE, AI 2nd February			L		L	1 4	ssistS	urg.				1 A	ssistS	urg
4th Bes. Divn	Ortelsburg Landw. Battn	_		_	_	_	_	3	_	_	_	_	_		-
	4th February	7.				1	•							1	1
	Graudenz Landw. Battn.			<b> </b> _	1	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	1	-
	7th Februar	<b>7</b> .		1		1	1		1						-
	2nd Heavy Reserve Batte	iry .		_	ı	_	<b> </b> _	2	-	_	_	6	<b> </b> _	3	١
	Total Casualties -			23	433	50	65	1186	14	2	188	42	90	1807	13
	1			ı St	and off Sur	geon:	1,,	and	urg.	1,4	' and saistS	urz.	l Sta	and aff Sur	geot
					Major.		on- I AssistSurg.		rg.   1 AssistSurg.			g. I Staff Surgeon Major and 2 AssistSurg			

### SUMMARY OF CASUALTIES BY CORPS.

			Killed, Died Vounds	of	W	/ounde	d.		Missing	ζ.		Total.	
Staff and Regiments.		Officers, &c.	Mee.	Horses.	Officers, do.	Mon.	Hornes.	Officers, &c.	Mon.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
Hand Army Corps			359 and an Sur Major.		56 1 A	979 and esistS	30 urg.	- 1A	120 and ssistS	arg.	M	1458 and af Surg ajor ar	eog-
VIIth XIVth   Baden Division A.C.   Golte's Detachment 4th Reserve Division Etappen Troops		4   2	62 1 3 8	7   1   -	-	165 5 10 27	14	1 ====================================	37 — 2 29	4 - 6 31	14 - 2 - 1	264 6 13 37 29	25 1 -7 31
1 Staff		23 433 50 and 1 Staff Surgeon- Major.			65 1186 44 and 1 AssistSurg.			2 1 A	168 and ssistS	42 arg.	90 1807 136 and 1 Staff Surgeon- Major and 2 AssistSurg.		

Nominal Roll of Officers, those doing duty as such, and Surgeons, who were Killed, Wounded, and Missing.

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.	Wounded.
IInd	16th January.  21st Regiment  11th Dragoons -  17th January.	(1) 2nd Lt. v. Prond- zynski	(1) Cornet v. Kleist.
IInd	3rd Dragoons 9th Grenadiers -	2nd Lt. v. Platen	(1) 1st Lt. Steffen. (2) 2nd Lt. Triest. (3) 2nd Lieut. v. Schack.
	21st January.  Action at Dôle.		·
IInd	2nd Grenadiers -		(1) 2nd Lt. Gaede.
	Engagements at Talant, Fontaine les Dijon, and Messigny.		
11nd	21st Regiment -	(1) 1st Lt. Count Prebentow v. Prze- bendowski	(1) 1st Lieut. v. Woldeck - Arneburg. (2) 2nd Lt. Foss. (3) 2nd Lt. Wilke. (4) Vice SgtMaj. Strack.
	61st Regiment -	(1) Major Priebsch (2) Capt. v. Pirch - (3) 1st Lt. Count v. Schwerin	<ol> <li>Capt. Baudach.</li> <li>1st Lt. Böhmer.</li> <li>2nd Lt. Janke</li> <li>II.</li> </ol>
		(1) 2nd Lt. Raschke I.	(4) 2nd Lt. Riedel.
		(5) Vice SergtMaj. Brassfelch and Staff-	(5) 2nd Lt. Asch-
		SurgMajor Dr. Born	(6) 2nd Lt. Engler. (7) 2nd Lt. Lange (taken prisoner). (8) Vice SgtMaj.
	2nd Field Artillery Regiment.		Beschorner. (1) Capt. Linker.
	Engagements on the Ognon.		
VIIth	39th Fusiliers		(1) 2nd Lieutenant Knomper.

			-
Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.	Wounded.
	22nd January.		Missing.
IInd	21st Regiment-		AssistSurg. Dr.
	61st Regiment		Parndies. 1st Lieut. Luchs.
	23rd January.		
	Engagement at Pouilly.		
	Staff of 8th Infantry Brigade.	• .• • •	(1) 1st Lieut. and BrigAdj. v. Oert- zen of the 20th
	21st Regiment	(1) 2nd Lt. Richardi	Regiment. (1) Capt Baron Gans Edler zu
			Putlitz. (2) 2nd Lt. Brunner. (3) 2nd Lt. Flohr (taken prisoner).
	61st Regiment -	(1) 2nd Lt. v. Putt- kamer	(1) Capt. Kumpie. (2) 1st Lt. Weise.
		(2) 2nd Lt.Schultze	(3) 2nd Lt. Straube. (4) 2nd Lt. v. Fal-
			kenhayn. (4) 2nd Lt. Wenzel. (6) Ensign Mers-
			(7) Ensign v. Born-
	2nd Field Art. Reg.		stedt. (1) Capt. Rhades.
	2nd Grenadiers -		(2) 2nd Lt. Gaedke. (1) 1st Lt. Boll-
<b>VIth</b>	7th Fd. Art. Regt		mann. (1) Capt, Goetz.
XIVth	Goltz's Detachment. 34th Fusiliers	(1) Capt. Sintenis. (2) 2nd Lt. Baron v.	
	24th January.	Wolzogen.	Missing.
Etappen Tps	1st Res. Hussars -		(1) 2nd Lt. Maass.
	25th January.		(-,
	Engagement at Voeges.		• ,
	18th Regiment -		(1) Capt. v. Mayer.
VIIth	78rd Fusiliers -	(1) Capt. Baron v.	(2) 2nd Lt. Weck.
·	7th Rifle Battalion -	Bülow	(1) 2nd Lt. John.
			Missing.
	72nd Regiment -		(1) 2nd Lt. Lüdke.
	·		•

Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.	Wounded.
26th January.  ENGAGEMENT AN SALINS.  2nd Grenadicts - 2nd Fld. Art. Reg		(1) 1st Lt. v. Seltzer. (2) 2nd Lt. Völker. (1) 2nd Lt. v. Döhn.
ENGAGEMENT AT BUSY AND VORGES.  15th Regiment -	(1) 1st Lt. Effnert	
61st Regiment -		(1) Capt. Kriess. (2) 1st Lt. Luchs. (3) 1st Lt. v. Zitzewits. (4) 2nd Lt. v. Schulenburg. (5) 2nd Lt. Freyer.
29th January.  Engagement at Chappois and Som-Bacourt.  53rd Regiment -	(1) 2nd Lt. Baron v. Plettenberg I. (2) 2nd Lt. Schmidt	lekum. (3) 2nd Lt. Edel- brock. (4) Vice SgtMaj.
1st February.  ENGAGEMENTS AT PONTABLIEB, LA CLUSE, AND OYE.  2nd Grenadiers  9th Grenadiers	(1) 1st Lt. Regenspurg (2) 2nd Lt. Freundt (8) 2nd Lt. Leonhardt	(1) 2nd Lieut. Fabricius. (2) Vice-SrgtMaj. Hoffmann. (1) Col. v. Ferentheil. (2) 1st Lt. Protzen. (3) 1st Lt. v. Versen. (4) 1st Lt. Sietzen. (5) 2nd Lt. v. Bug-
	ENGAGEMENT AS SALINS.  2nd Grenadiers 2nd Fld. Art. Reg. ENGAGEMENT AT BUSY AND VORGES.  15th Regiment 28th January. 61st Regiment  CHAFFOIS AND SOMBACOURT.  53rd Regiment  1st February. ENGAGEMENTS AT PONTABLIEE, LA CLUSE, AND OYE.  2nd Grenadiers  -	26th January.  ENGAGEMENT AS SALINS.  2nd Grenadiers  2nd Fld. Art. Reg.  ENGAGEMENT AT BUSY AND VORGES.  15th Regiment  28th January.  61st Regiment  CHAFFOIS AND SOMBACOURT.  53rd Regiment  (1) 2nd Lt. Baron v. Plettenberg I.  (2) 2nd L4. Schmidt  1st February.  ENGAGEMENTS AT PONTARLIER, IA CLUSE, AND OYE.  2nd Grenadiers  (1) 1st Lt. Regenspurg  (2) 2nd Lt. Freundt (3) 2nd Lt. Leon-

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.	Wounded.
IInd -	9th Grenadiers -	(1) 2nd Lt.Gellhaus	(6) 2nd Lt. Kühne. (7) 2nd Lt. Mampe. (8) Vice SgtMaj. Geppert, and AssistSurg. Dr. Buchwaldt. (1) 2nd Lt. v. Putt- kamer. (2) 2nd Lt. Venske. (3) 2nd Lt. Noch-
	2nd Field Art. Regt.		(1) 1st Lt. Abel.



#### APPENDIX CLXXII.

#### CONVENTION RESPECTING THE SURRENDER OF BELFORT.

Done at Perouse, 4 p.m., 16.2.71.

The following Convention has been concluded between the Prussian Lieutenant-General v. Tresckow, commanding the Siege Corps before Belfort, and Colonel Denfert-Rochereau, of the French Engineers, Commandant of Belfort:—

1. Colonel Denfert, in virtue of the special authority delegated to him by the French Government in view of the existing circumstances, surrenders the fortress with its forts to Lieut.-General v. Tresckow.

- 2. In recognition of their brave defence, the garrison are allowed free withdrawal with the honours of war; they will take away the eagles, colours, arms, horses, carriages, and the military telegraph apparatus, as also the baggage of the officers and kits of the men, and the archives of the fortress. The garrison comprise the troops of the line, the Garde Nationale Mobile, the Garde Nationale Mobilisée, the douaniers, and the gendarmes. The Garde Nationale Sédentaire will remain in Belfort, and, before the surrender, will deposit the arms at the Mairie.
- 3. All war material, as also the remaining provisions and ammunition, so far as they are not absolutely required for the departing garrison, besides the garrison stores of every description, and all State property, will be handed over at 10 a.m. on the 18th February to the German Commissioners, in the same state as at the time of signing this Convention, by a Commission to be appointed by the Commandant.
- 4. On the 18th February, at 10 a.m., the German artillery and engineer officers will be admitted to the forts and to the château, for the purpose of taking over the powder magazines and the mines; French officers of the same arms will accompany them.

5. The French garrison must finish the evacuation of Belfort by noon on the 18th, at which time the German troops will take possession of the fortress. The mode of departure will form the subject of

a special supplement.

6. The sick and wounded left behind in the fortress will on their convalescence be conducted across the nearest line of demarcation, taking their arms with them; while those unfit for further service will be sent to their homes.

7. The departing garrison will leave behind for hospital service the necessary surgeons and assistants, who will be treated according to the

stipulations of the Geneva Convention.

8. The German prisoners interned in Belfort, wounded or not, to the number of 7 officers and 243 men, will be handed over to the German troops in their present barracks at 10 a.m. on the 18th.

9. The private property of the officers leaving the fortress, and all

other, will be respected.

10. Colonel Denfert will send to Lieutenant-General v. Tresckow,

as soon as possible, a return of the departing troops, so that their withdrawal may be regulated. The Commission, charged with handing over the sick of both nations and the interned, will also be furnished with returns.

11. The German Administration will help as much possible in providing food, surgeons, and other assistance for the inhabitants

of the town.

The foregoing Convention has been drawn up and subscribed by the following officers. On the part of the Germans, by Major v. Laue, 67th, and Captain v. Schultzendorff, General Staff; on the part of the French, by Commandant Chapelot, 84th Regiment of the Line, and Captain Krafft, Auxiliary Engineers; all provided with full powers from their respective commanders.

Prepared in duplicate in both languages.

(Signed) v. LAUE. (Signed) CHAPELOT. (Signed) v. SCHULTZENDORFF. (Signed) V. KRAFFT.

#### Supplement.

1. The guards and sentries of the fortress will remain posted until relief by the German troops, which will take place immediately after the entry, under the direction of a field officer of each army. They will then be formed into a detachment, and follow the garrison.

2. The departing garrison will march in two columns, each in echelons of 1,000 men, to the Saône and Loire Department, the

separate echelons keeping an interval of at least 31 miles.

On the 17th February four echelons will move off, two to the neighbourhood of Seloncourt—Audincourt—Exincourt—Etupes, the other two to Arcey—Héricourt. Each echelon will be accompanied by a German officer.

3. The garrison will take the necessary food with it. General

v. Tresckow will provide the necessary carriage.

4. During the march through the country occupied by German troops the internal discipline remains in the hands of the officers. All other excesses will be punished according to Prussian regulations. Anyone who is found at a distance exceeding 2½ miles from his regiment or quarter, or any soldier of the departing garrison discovered in Belfort after a lapse of twelve hours, will be treated as a prisoner of war.

Prepared in duplicate in both languages by the undersigned, pro-

vided with full powers.

Perouse, 16.2.71.

(Signed) v. LAUE. (Signed) CHAPELOT. (Signed) v. SCHULTZENDORFF. (Signed) V. KRAFFT.

## APPENDIX CLXXIII.

## RETURN OF CASUALTIES IN THE CORPS\* BESIEGING BELFORT, 19TH JANUARY TO 19TH FEBRUARY, 1871.

			Killed r Died Vound	of	w	ounde	d.	)	dissing	<b>;</b> .		Total.	
Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horres.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Отсетя, &с.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	<b>∦</b> cn.	Horses.
	19th January.												
lst Res. Divn 4th Res. Divn Siege Art	Bromberg Landw, Battn 67th Regiment - Lottzen Landw, Battn Goldap Landw Hattn 1st Co. Wurt. Art	=======================================				2 1 5 5	=======================================	1111	=	=======================================	_ _ _ 1	2 5 8 1	1111
	20th January.												
1st Res. Divn	Schnellemühl Landw. Battn Deutsch-Crone Landw. Battn	=	1	=	_	1	=	=	=	=	=	1	=
	21st January.												l
	CAPTURE OF LE HAUT TAILLIS AND STORM OF PEROUSE.												١
lst Res. Divn	Burg Landw. Battn	2 1 —	19 5 12	=	2 1 2	55 27 60	=	-	=	=	4 2 2	74 32 72	Ξ
	TOTAL FOR CAPTURE OF LE HAUT TAILLIS AND STORM OF PEROUSE.	3	36	Ξ	5	142	Ξ	Ξ	_	Ξ	8	178	Ξ
lst Res. Divn	Stendal Landw. Battn lst Fort. Pion. Co. II A.C	=	2	=	=	8 1	1	-	=	=	-	10 1	1
	22nd January.												l
Debschitz' Dtch.	67th Regiment Liegnitz Landw. Battn	=	=	=	-	3 1	=	=	-1	=	-	3 2	=
	23rd January.												ļ
	ENGAGEMENTS AT ROCHES AND GLAY.												İ
Debschitz' Dtch.	Lauban Landw, Battn,- II Breslau Landw, Battn, - Apenrade Landw, Battn, 6th Reserve Lancers - Ist Light Res. Batty, VIII A.C.	1 - 1	5 -1		1711	13 12 16 —	- - -	1111	- 1 1	=======================================	1 2 -	17 17 17 2	  
	TOTAL FOR THE ENGAGEMENTS AT ROCHES AND GLAY.	2	10	1	1	41	1		2	=	3	53	8
1st Res. Divn			1					l					
Siege Art	Konitz Landw. Battn 67th Regiment - 3rd Fort. Batty. 4th Bav. Art. Regt	=	=	=	=	1	E	=	=	=	Ξ	1	=
	24th January.										l		
Debschitz' Dtch. Slege Art	Hirschberg Landw. Battn. 6th Reserve Lancers 3rd Co. 7th Fort. Art. Regt. 2nd Fort. Ratty. 3rd Bav. Art. Regt.	=	1 2 -	- 2 -	=	2 - 5 2	Ξ	111		E	=	2 1 7	==

<sup>\*</sup> Inclusive of the troops detached from the 4th Reserve Division.

			Killed or Died Wound	of		<b>V</b> ound	ed.		Missin	g.		Total.	
Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horse.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
Debach'tz' Dich. Proncers of Siege Corps.	28th January.  Llegnitz Landw. Battn Württemb. Fort. Rng. Co 28th January.	=	1	-		1	11			_	11	1 1	=
1st Res. Divn  4th Res. Divn Siege Art. Pioneers of Siege	ATTEMPTED STORM OF FORTS DRE HAUTES AND DRE BASSES PERCHES.  Schneidemtihl Landw. Battn 67th Regiment - 1st Fort. Pion. Co. JI A. C. Marienburg Landw. Battn 8th Co. Baden Art. 2nd Fort. Pion. Co. X A. C.	1 2 -	5 8 1 2 —	11111	111111	19 61 7 15	1111		229 35 1 —	111111	49   110	258 104 9 17 44	
Corj s.	TOTAL FOR ATTEMPTED STORM OF FORTS DES HAUTES AND DES BASSES PERCHES.	3	16	Ξ	•	118	Ξ	3	298	Ξ	10	427	Ē
1st Res. Divn Eiege Art	Bromberg Landw. Battn.  Deutsch-Crone Landw. Battn 2nd Res. Lancers  Staff of Bay. Art. Division 4th Bay. Fort. Eng. Co.  27th January.	=======================================	- 1 -	1111	1 1 A	4 2 2 2 2 2	UFg.	11111	=======================================	11111	1 1 A	4 2 1 nist, Si 2	urg.
1st Res. Divn Siege Art Pioncers of Siege Corps.	Konitz Landw. Battn 3rd Fort. Batty. 3rd Bav. Art. Regt 4th Bav. Fort. Eng. Company-	=	=	111	111	2 2 2	111	111		111	111	2 2	Ξ
Siege Artillery -	28th January.  7th Co. 4th Magdb. Fort. Art. Regt 8rd Co. 7th Westp. Fort. Art. Regt 8rd Co. Guard Fort. Art. Regt 1st Co. Würtemb. Art	=	=======================================	111	1111	2 1 1 2	1111	1111	1111		1111	2 1 1 2	=======================================
1st Res. Divn Debechitz' Dtch. Siege Art	29th January.  Bromberg Landw. Battn lst Light Res. Ratty. IX A.C Hirschberg Landw. Battn 4th Fort. Batty. 3rd Bav. Art. Regt	=======================================	= -		1111	1 1 1	- - -		1111	1111		1 1 1 2	1 -
1st Res. Divn Debschitz' Dtch. Ploneers of Siege Corps.	Gnesen Landw. Battn	=	- 1 -		111	2 1	<u>-</u>	==	Ξ	  -  -	111	2 1 1	=
lst Res. Divn Debschitz' Dtch. Siege Art	Halberstadt Landw. Battn Oels Landw. Battn Apenrade Landw. Battn. 7th Co. 4th Blagdb, Fort. Art. Begt	=======================================	- 2 1 1		1 - -	- -	1111		=		<u>-</u> -	 3 1 1	===
1st Res. Divn Debschitz' Dtch. Siege Art	Ist February.  Bromberg Landw, Rettn Liegnitz Landw, Battn Hirschberg Landw, Battn 4th Co. 6th Fort. Art. Regt	=	2 - - 2		1111	-4 3 2	  -  -	=======================================	111	===	==	2 4 3 4	=======================================
Staff of Siege Cps.	2nd February. Engineer Staff	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	_	_	1 0 2	_	-

			Killed or Died Wound	of	W	ounde	d.	,	Missing	<b>3</b> .		Total.	
Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
lat Res. Divn Pioneers of Siege Corpa.	Bromberg Landw. Battn Deutsch-Crone Landw. Battn stendal Landw. Battn Burg Landw. Battn 2nd Baden Fort. Pioneer Co		= 1 = -	=======================================	= -1 =	1 2 1 4 2	=======================================	11111	- - -	===		1 3 2 4 2	===
lst Res. Divn	3rd February. Gnesen Landw. Battn. Pr. Stargardt Landw. Battn.	: -	=	=	=	11 1 1	=	11	=	=	1.1	11 1	=
Debachitz' Dtch. Pioneers of Siege	lst Fort. Pion. Co. II A.C Hirschberg Landw. Battn Apenrade Landw. Battn 6th Res. Lancers - 4th Bav. Fort. Eng. Co		-   -   -   -	- - 1		2 -4		111111	111111		11111	1 1 2 - 4	=======================================
Corps.	4th February.					•		_			-	•	_
Staff of Siege Cps.  1st Res. Divn.  Debschitz' Dtch. Siege Art.  Pioneers of Siege Corps.	Engineer Staff - Gnesen Landw. Battn Stendal Landw. Battn Ist Fort. Pion. Co. II A.C Jauer Landw. Battn Dud Co. 6th Fort. Art. Regt Ist Fort. Pion. Co. VII A.C 2nd Fort. Pion. Co. X A.C 2nd Badden Fort. Pion. Co		- 2 - 1 - 1			1 1 1 4 1 2 1 4		111111111	111111111		-11111111	1 8 1 5 1 8	
las Para Pilara	5th February.											-	
lst Res. Divn Debechitz' Dteh. Siege Art	Gnesen Landw. Battn Burg Landw. Battn 1st Fort. Pion. Co. II A.C Liegnitz Landw. Battn Hirschberg Landw. Battn 3rd Fort. Batty. 3rd Bav. Art. Regt.		-	11111	11111	2 3 1 1 - 5	1111	11111	111111	=======================================	11111	2 3 1 1 1 5	
	6th February.		ļ										
1st Res. Divn Debschitz' Dtch. Siege Art Staff of Siege Cps. Pioneers of Siege Corps.	Burg Landw. Battn Jauer Landw. Battn 3rd Co. 7th Fort. Art. Regt 4th Fort. Batty. 3rd Bav. Art. Regt. Engineer Staff - 1st Fort. Pion. Co. VIII A.C.	=======================================	=======================================	11111	- - - - 1	2 3 1 1		111111	111111	=======================================		2 3 -1 -1	
00. pm.	7th February.						l			}			
	4th Bav. Fort. Eng. Co 8th February.		2	-	-	1	-	_	-	-	-	3	-
Staff of Siege Cps. 1st Res. Divn	Siege Art. Staff.  Könitz Landw. Battn Schneideniuli Landw. Battn Stendal Landw. Battn.  Burg Landw. Battn.  Burg Landw. Battn.		=======================================		1	4 2 2 2 5	=======================================	11111	=======================================	=======================================	1	4 2 2 2	=======================================
Debschitz' Dtch.	Jauer Landw. Battn Ilirschberg Landw. Battn	=		=	=	1 16	=	=	=	=	=	5 1 19	Ξ
Siege Art	2nd Co. 6th Fort. Art. Regt 4th Co. 6th Fort. Art. Regt 1st Fort. Pion. Co. VIII A.C.		6 2 - - -	11111	11-111	9 2 5 2 1	=======================================	11111		=======================================		15 4 5 2 1	
Согра,	2nd Fort. Pion. Co. X A.C 9th February.	-	-	-	-	2	-		_	-	-	2	-
lat Rea. Divn Debschitz' Dtch.	67th Regiment Jauer Lundw. Battn	: =	-	=	2	10 18	=	=	=	=	2 3	10 20	=

			OT	Killed, Died o Founds	of	w	'o <b>und</b> e	1.	1	Clesing	;.		Total.	
Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horse.
Siege Art Pioneers of Siege Corps.	6th Co. 4th Fort. Art. Regt. 3rd Co. Guard Fort. Art. Regt 1st Fort Pion. Co. VII A.C. 4th Bav. Fort. Eng. Comp.	 6	- 1 -	= -	111		1 1			=		- 1 1	1 2	=======================================
Jat Res. Divn Debschitz' Dtch. Siege Art	10th February.  Gnesen Landw. Rattn Striegau Landw. Battn. 1st Co. 6th Fort. Art. Regt.  11th February.	· .	111	<u>-</u>			1 5 3		111	=		111	<b>2</b> 5 3	=
lst Res, Divn  Debschits' Dtch.  Siege Art  Pioneers of Siege Corps.	Schneidemühl Landw. Battn. Stenoal Landw. Battn. Neustadt Landw. Battn. 67th Regiment - Llegnitz Landw. Battn. Hirschberg Landw. Battn. 6th Co. 4th Fort. Art. Regt. 5th Fort. Batty. Zud Bav. Art lat Fort. Pion. Co. VII A.C. 12th February.	t. Begt.	=======================================	- - 2 - 1 -			7 5 1 8 1 1 -		11111111		11111111	11111111	7 6 1 10 1 1	
1st Res. Divn Siego Art	67th Regiment - 7th Co. 4th Fort. Art. Regt. 8th Co. 4th Fort. Art. Regt. 3rd Co. 7th Fort. Art. Regt. 4th Co. Württemberg Art.		=======================================	- 1 1 -	===	=======================================	4 - 3 1 1	=======================================	===	1 = =	=======================================	=======================================	5 1 4 1 1	-
ist Res. Divn 4th Res. Divn Debschitz' Dich. Siege Art	Halberstadt Landw, Battn. Tilsit Landw, Battn. Goldap Landw, Battn. Liegnitz Landw, Battn. Hirschberg Landw, Battn. 7th Co. 4th Fort. Art. Begt. 4th Co. 6th Fort. Art. Begt.			- - 1 - 1			3 1 3 1 2	-	- i				3 1 3 4 1 2 1	
Debechitz' Dtch.	Hirrehberg Landw. Battn.  Total Casualties		11	119	-		580 nd 1 As Surged		3	306	=		1005 1 Am	

<sup>\*</sup> At an explosion in Belfort.

## SUMMARY OF CASUALTIES BY CORPS.

			Killed, r Died o Wounds		٧	<b>Vounde</b>	<b>d</b> .	1	Cleaning	•		Total.	
Staff and Regiment		Officers, &c.	Mea.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Hornes.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
Staff of Siege Corps - lst Reserve Division - th Beserve Division - Debachita's Detachment Siege Artillery		1 6 3 1	63 2 38 12		3 11 2 4 8	346 29 114 51 and	- 2 - 1	- s -	267 3 3	=======================================	4 20 2 7 4	676 34 156 63 and	- 2 - 5
Pioneers of Siege Corps .		_	4		1 AM	ist. Su 40	rgeon.	_	33	_	1 Am	det. Sur   77	rgeom.
Total	•	11	119	4	27 1 Ass	580 and ist. Su	argeon.	•	306	-	41 1 Am	1005 and dat. Su	7 rgeon.

Nominal Roll of Officers, those doing duty as such, and Surgeons who were Killed, Wounded, and Missing.

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.	Wounded.
	19th January.		
4th Res. Div	Goldap Landw. Btn.		(1) 2nd Lt. Ebel.
	21st January.		
	Capture of Le Haut Taillis and Storm of Pérouse.		
1st Res. Div	Burg Landw. Battn.	(1) Capt. Baron Schenk-zu-Schweins- berg	(1) Capt. Hellmuth. (2) 2nd Lt. v. Huet.
	Halberstadt Landw. Battn.	(2) 2nd Lt. Bunder	(1) 2nd L4.Erbreich.
	67th Regiment		(1) 2nd Lt. Krets- mer.
i	23rd January.		(2) Vice SergtMaj. Theune.
	ACTIONS AT ROCHES AND GLAY.		
Debechits De- tachment	Lauban Landw. Bttn. Apenrade Landw. Battn.	(1) 2nd Lt. Schuster (1) Capt. Count v. d. Schulenburg	(1) 1st Lt. Zabeler.
	26th January.		
	ATTEMPTEDSTORM OF FORTS DES HAUTES ANDBASSESPERCHES.		Missing.
1st Res. Div	Schneidemühl Landw. Battn.	1st Lt. Liborius -	(1) Capt. Heinsius, (2) 2nd Lt. Schick, (3) 2nd Lt. Metzler,
	67th Regiment -	(1) 1st Lt. v. den Brincken. (1) 2nd Lieutenant	[Taken prisoners.]
AL D. Di-	Marian Land	Pfannkuch.	(1) 0-1T4 T
4th Res. Div	Battn.	1	(1) 2nd Lt. Lorwein.
Siego Art	8th Compy. Baden Art.		(1) 2nd Lieut. Reinhardt.
Pioneers of Siege Corps	2nd Fort. Pioneer Compy. X. A.C.		(1) 1st Lt. Baron v. Richthofen,
			(2) 2nd Lt. Kraats, [Taken prisoners.]
1st Res. Div	Bromberg Landw. Battn	l	(1) Capt. Dicht.
Siege Art	Staff of Bay. Art. Div.	• • • •	(1) AssistSgn. Dr. Mahler.

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.	Wounded.
1st Res. Div	31st January.  Halberstadt Landw. Battn.  2nd February.		(1) 2nd Lt. v. Bo- dungen.
Staff of Siege Corps 1st Res. Div	Engineer Staff - Stondal Landw. Btn. 4th February.		(1) Capt. Koch. (1) 2nd Lt. Müller, II.
Staff of Siege Corps	Engineer Staff 6th February.		(1) 1st Lt. Adam.
Siege Art Staff of Siege Corps Pioneers of Siege Corps	3rd Co. 7th Fort. Art. Regt. Engineer Staff -  1st Fort. Pion. Com. Vilith A.C.		(1) Ens.Breiderhoff. (1) 2nd Lt.Longard.
Staff of Siege Corps 1st Res. Div Debschitz De- tachment	8th February. Siege Art. Staff.  Konitz Landw. Bttn. Hirschberg Landw. Bttn.	(1) 2nd Lt. v. Stein- keller.	(1) Maj. Neumann. (1) 2nd Lt. Reinicke.
Siege Art	1st Com. 6th Fort. Art. Regt. 9th February. 67th Regiment		(1) 2nd Lt. Klos.  (1) Capt. Günther.  (2) 2nd Lt. Raht.
Debschitz's De- tachment Siege Art.	Jauer Landw. Batt.  3rd Com. Grd. Fort.	(1) 2nd I4 Sahirman	(1) Capt. Angern. (2) 1st Lt. Barchewitz. (3) 2nd Lt. Hoff-mann.
Pioneers of Siege Corps	Art. Regt.  1st Fort. Pion. Com.  VIIth A.C.		(1) Capt. v. Oidt-mann.

### APPENDIX CLXXIV.

RETURN OF CASUALTIES ON THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN TO THE 31ST JANUARY, 1871.\*

				Killed r Died Wound	of	W	7ounde	d.	D	dissing			Total.	
Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
Etappen Troops	27th August- 5th Reserve Hussars		-	1	-	_	-	_	1	-	-	-	1	-
	3rd September. 27th Bav. Landw. Battn. Bav. Etappen Squadron		: =	ī		=	1 2	=	1	35 1		, -	36 4	-
	4th September. 3rd Bav. Landw. Battn. Bochum Landw. Battn.	:	: =	=	=	=	2	=	_	<u>_</u>	=	=	2 1	=
Govint, Troops -	6th September.  Jüterbogk Landw. Battn.	<u>.</u> ·	- -	-	-	_	2	_	-	-	_	-	2	-
	8th September.  Jüterbogk Landw. Battn.  16th September.	•	- -	1	-	-	_	-	-	-	-	+	1	-
	Jüterhogk Landw. Battn. 17th September.†	•	-	1	1	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	2	!
Stappen Troops	Borken Landw. Battn 25th September.	•	-	1	-	-	8	-	1	29	-	1	38	-
	3rd Bav. Landw. Battn. 26th September.	•	-	1	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	2	-
lovrnt. Troops -	3rd Res. Dragoons - 6th October. Erkelens Landw. Battn.			_		_	_		1	6	_	1	•	
	8th October. Kottbus Landw. Battn.		. _		_	1	12	_	_	6	_	1	20	  -
Kappen Troops	Aschersleben Landw. Battn. 3rd Reserve Dragoous - 11th October.	:	=	=	1	=	i	=	=	=	=	Ξ	1	7
-	Etappen Command in Stenay Borken Landw. Battn	•	: =	7	=	=	=	=	2	43	=	2	<del>-</del>	=

 $<sup>^{\</sup>bullet}$  Exclusive of the losses sustained before the fortresses and in the engagements round Belfort.  $\uparrow$  See Part II, Vel. II, p. 30, note  $\updownarrow$ .

			OI	Killed Died Vound	oſ	,	Founde	d.	,	Missin <sub>(</sub>	<b>3</b> -		Total.	
Army Corps.	Staff and Regiment.		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, dro.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, do.	Men.	Horse.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
Govent. Truops -	Brühl Landw. Battn	•	=	1	=	-	2	=	1	97 1 Com	=		100 1 Com	=
	6th Com. 11th Fort. Art. Div	_	_	-	_	_	_	_		Official			Official	
	12th October.													
	Garrison Squadron, 5th Hussars													١.
	Can i mon Squadron, Sta Museurs	•	_	_	-	-	1	-	_	-	1	_	1	1
	15th October.									l				l
Etappen Troops-	Erkelens Landw. Battn	-	-	_	-	-	-	-	_	8	-	-	8	-
•	17th October.				ļ					ł	1			
	3rd Res. Dragoons	:	=	_	=	=	=	=	=	2 2	=	=	2 2 1	=
	18th Ootober.	•	_	_	-	-	1	-	_	-	-	-	1	-
	3rd Res. Dragoons		_	1	_	_	_	_	_	_		_	<sub>1</sub>	
•	19th October.											Ι.	•	-
	Bav. Etappen Squadron .		1	2	_	_	_	_	_	8	10	1	١,	10
	21st October.										1			-
Govrat. Troops -	1st Heavy Res. Cav. Regt	-	-	_	_	-	_	1	_	_	_	_	_	1
•	23rd October.													l
Etappen Troops-	Bochum Landw. Battn	•	1	-	-	-	1	-	_	-	-	1	1	-
	24th October,													l
Govrnt. Troops -	15th Bay, Landw. Battn.	•	-	_	-	-	-	-	_	•	-	-	*	-
	29th October.		1				_	١.						
	2nd November.	•	_	-	_	_	2	-	-	-	-	_	3	-
Etappen Troops-	Bochum Landw, Battn.		_	_	_		1						1	
	3rd November.						•		_		-	_	'	-
	3rd Res. Dragoons		_	_	_	_	1	_	_		_	_	1	l_
	3rd Bavn. Landw. Battn	•	-	-	_	_	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Govint. Troops -	4th November. Sorau Landw. Battn													l
dorina iloope	8th November.	•	-	-	_	_	1	-	-	-	-	_	1	-
Etappen Troops-	3rd Res. Dragoons		_	1	_	_	_	_	_	_			١.	
	9th November.			•				-		_	-	_	1	-
	ard Res. Dragoons	-	_	_	_	_	1	_	_	_	_	_	1	_
	10th November.						_						•	_
	3rd Bav. Landw. Battn	-	_	_	_	-	1	_	_	_	_	_	1	_
	12th November.													
Gvrnt. Troops -	Garrison Squadron 5th Hussars	-		_	<b> </b>	<b> </b>	_	_	<b> </b>	1	_	<b> </b>	1	_

			01	Killed, Died Vounds	of	w	ounde	d.	1	Missing	ş.		Total.	
Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
	19th November.													
	SURPRISE OF CHATILLON-SUR-	Beine.						'		ŀ				į
Etappen Troops-	Unna Landw. Battn	•	-	12	1	2	8	-	A.	120 nd 1 Su Surgeo and 1	0	as E	140 nd 1 Su Surgeo and 1	Q
	5th Res. Hussars	•	1	1	1	-	1	-	P	aymasi   <sup>44</sup>	66 66	Pa	ymesi 46	ют.   6
	23rd November.									l	ļ			l
	Soest Landw. Battn 25th November.	•	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	Mixed Etappen Garrn, of Auxo	<b>4</b> -	-	•	-	_	4	-	-	10	-	-	23	-
	28th November.  5th Res. Hussars 29th November.		_	-	-	-	_	-	_	7	-	_	7	-
	Soest Landw. Battn		-	2	-	-	8	-	-	_	-	-	5	-
	Detmold Landw. Battn	•	_	1	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	1	_
	2nd December.									l				l
Govrnt. Troops -	Düsseldorf Landw. Battn.	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	14	-	1	15	-
	4th December.									ĺ				ĺ
IIIrd	85th Fusiliers 6th December.	•	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	2	-
Govrat. Troops -	60th Regiment	•	-	1	-	-	2	-	-	3	-	_	6	-
	7th December.		_	2			6	2						L
Etappen Troops-	4th Res. Hussars Heavy Res. Battn. VIII A.C 5th Res. Hussars	:	-	=	1	=	1 1	3	=	2 - -	=	=	10 1 1	
	8th December.						1		-	-	-	_	•	-
	Unna Landw. Battn	-	_	2	_	_	3	-	_	1	_	_	6	_
	9th December.	1				l								1
Brd Res. Divn S. Armj	81st Regiment 3rd Field Railway Divn	:	=	2	=	- 1	2	=	- 2	59 139	=	-8	63 139	-
	9th December.		ŀ		l									ı
Govrnt. Troops -	1st Res. Rifle Battn	•	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	_	-	-	6	-
ard Res. Divn	11th December.		_	_	_	,	3	_	_	13	_	1	16	
Govrnt. Trocps -	1st Res. Rifle Battn	:	=	=	=	1	3 2 2	=	=	=	=	-	3 2	=
	12th December.													
	60th Regiment	-	-	1	l _	_	1	<b> </b> _		3	l _	l_		1_

				or	Killed, Died o		w	ounde	d.	N	lissing			Total.	
Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment,			Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
	14th December.									-					MI.
Etappen Troops-	5th Res. Hussars -		-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	_	1	-
	15th December.											W			1962
Govrnt. Troops - Etappen Troops-	Kottbus Landw. Battn. 5th Res. Hussars	-	:	=	1	1	=	7	=	=	=	=	=	8	1
	19th December.									ring		CLA			
Viith	lst Res. Hussars -	-	-	_	_	-	-	-	-	-	3	3	-	3	3
	25th December.														
Govent. Troops -	65th Regiment	-	-	Ξ	3 2	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	6	-
Viith Etappen Troops	Aschersleben Landw. Battn.	-	-	=	6	=	=	1	=	=	7	=	=	9	=
	27th December.														
Govrnt. Troops -	4th Res. Hussars	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	l <b>s</b> t January.														
Etappen Troops-	Detmold Landw. Battn.	-		-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	2nd January.														
Govent. Troops -	II Res. Rifle Battn		-	1	2	3	-	16	1	-	2	-	1	20	4
	4th January.														
!	Prenziau Landw. Battn.			-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
	6th January.														
	4th Res. Hussars -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
	8th January.														
IInd Army -	4th Field Railway Divn.	-	-	-	2	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	4	-
•	9th January.														
Govrnt. Troops - Etappen Troops-	4th Res. Hussars 27th Bay, Landw. Battn.	:	:	_	=	=	=	2	=	=	=	=	=	1	=
	14th January.												-110	1	Page 1
	Halle Landw. Buttn			-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Govent. Troops -	lst Res. Hussars - Deutz Landw. Buttn			=	_	=	=	1	1	=	=	=	=	1 3	1
	4th Res. Hussars -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	3	2	-	3	
	15th January.											1		- STILL	100
Etappen Troops-	Kustrin Landw. Battn Deutz Landw. Battn Bav. Etappen Eng. Com.	-	:	=	-	=	=	3	=	-	7	=	-	1 10 1	=
Zurppun encope	16th January.											1	1112	rest.	-
Govrnt. Troops -	4th Wurtt. Inf. Regt				2		-	2	-	-	14	-	-	18	-
	17th January,			1			1				-	1		THE P	20
XIVth	Deutz Landw, Battn, 5th Field Railway Divn.	-		-	-	=	1	-	-	=	-	-	=	1	-
	18th January	4.510					1		1	1		1			-
Governt, Troops -	1			-		-	-	_	_	-	3 2	3	-	3 2	3

				0	Killed r Died Wound	of	"	Tounde	d.	,	Kissing	<b>;</b> .		Total.	
Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment	<b>.</b>		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Mon.	Horse.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Berne.
	19th January.														
Govrnt. Troops -	4th Württ. Inf. Regt	•	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	_	-	-	_	3	-
	21st January.														l
	Deutz Landw. Battn 1st Res. Rifle Battn 4th Res. Hussars -	:			1 2 —	- 2	111	-	-	111	=	=	111	5 5	=
	22nd January.														
	Geldern Landw. Battn.	-	-	-	1	-	-	7	-	-	7	-	-	15	-
	23rd January.														Ì
	6th Res. Lancers -	•		-	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	2
	24th January.		١												
	Jäterbogk Landw. Battn. 25th January.	.•		_	1	-	_	_	-	_	-	-	_	1	-
	Bouthen Landw, Battn, 6th Res. Lancers Paderborn Landw, Battn,	<u>:</u>		111	1 2	- 1 -	111	=	=		1 41	<u>-</u>		1 1 45	1
	27th January.		1												l
	Beuthen Landw. Batta.	•	-	-	-	-	_	1	-	-	1	-	-	2	-
	28th January.		1						1						1
	Beuthen Landw. Battn. 6th Res. Lancers	:	=	=	=	=	=	-	1	=	=	=	_	-	1
	29th January.		j												١.
Etappen Troops-	Lübben Landw. Battn. 1st Res. Hussars -	:	-	=	=	=	=	1	1	=	=	=	=	1	7
	Total Casualties -	•		4	81	18	7	167	18	Offi Sur	753 and Comm cial, 1 geon, s	Bub- nd I	Offi Sur	991 and Comm rial, I geon, s	Sub- und 1

Nominal Roll of Officers, those acting in that capacity, Surgeons and Officers who were Killed, Wounded, and Missing.

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died Wounds.	Wounded.
	3rd September.		Missing.
Etappen Troops	27th Bav. Landw. Bn.		(1) Lt. Fuchs.
	17th September.		Missing.
	Borken Landw. Batt.		(1) 1st Lt. Willems.
	6th October.		
Govt. Troops -	Erkelenz Land. Batt.		(1) Capt. Ebray.
	8th October.		
	Kottbus Landw. Batt.		(1) 2nd Lt. Krause.
	11th October.		Missing.
	Brülıl Landw. Batt.		(1) Vice SergMaj. Berghausen.
			Missing.
Etappen Troops		<b>.</b> .	(1) LieutCol. v.
	Stenay		Buttlar. (2) Capt. Gnevkow. Also (3) Commt. Official Senft.
			Missing.
Govt. Troops -	6th Com. 11th Fort. Art. Div.		(1) 2nd Lt. Brink.
	19th October.		
Etappen Troops	Bav. Etappen Squad.	(1) Lt. Rudolf.	
-	23rd October.		
	Bochum Land. Batt.	(1) Capt. Thümmel.	
	19th November.		
	SURPRISE OF CHATIL-		
Etappen Troops	LON-SUR-SEINE. Unna Landw. Battn	<i>.</i>	(1) Capt. Bardele-
			(2) 2nd Lt. de Sa-
	j	1	lengre Drabbe.

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed or Died of Wounds.	Wounded.
Ktappen Troops	Unna Landw. Battn		Missing.  (1) 1st Lt. Baron v. Werthern.
			(2) 1st Lt. Kaem-
			(3) 2nd Lt. Brink-
			mann. (4) Vice SergMaj.
	:		Thieme. (5) Vice SergMaj. Mellin.
			(6) Paymr. Schmidt. (7) Sub-Surg. Dr. Hensgen.
	5th Reserve Hussars -	(1) Major v. Alvensleben.	
	2nd December.		Missiug.
Govt. Troops -	Düsseldorf Landw. Battn.		(1) Vice SergMaj. Steinmetz.
	9th December.		
Ist Army -	3rd Field Railway Div.		(1) 1st Lt. Kreut- zinger.
			Missing.
			(1) 1s. Lt. Bürger. (2) 2nd Lt. Grapow.
	11th December.		
3rd Res. Div Govt. Troops -	81st Regiment Ist Res. Riflo Battn	: : : :	(1) Ens. v. Wedell. (1) 2nd Liout. v. Winterfeld.
	2nd January.		Winterfeld.
	IInd Res. Rifle Batt.	(1) Capt. v. Basedow.	
	25th January.		Missing.
Etappen Troops	Paderborn Land. Btn.		(1) 2nd Lt. Poel-mahn.

## APPENDIX CLXXIVA.

Table showing the Number of Troops employed on the Lines of Communication, &c., at the end of January, 1871.

						Bettalions.	Squadrons.	Batteries.	Fort. Art. Cos. or Batteries.	Pioneer Com-
	(Ist Army -	• `	•	•	-	5	1	-	_	
Etappen	IInd Army	•	•	•	•	9	6	_	_	1
troops.	IIIrd Army	-	•	•	-	11	9	2		4
•	Meuse Army	•	•	•	•	4	2		<b> </b>	_
	In Alsace	-	-			221	8	2	10	8
<b>a</b> .	" Lorraine			•	-	814	7	8	15	
Govt.	Kronski's Deta	chme	nt	•		6	2	2	8	8
troops.	For Rheims	•	•			20	5	8	8	2
	" Metz -	-	•	•	•	15	1 6 9 2 8 7 2 5 2	2 3 2 3 1	10	8 2 2
	Total	•	•	•	-	1241	42	18	89	15

#### APPENDIX CLXXV.

H. Q., Versailles, 6.1.71.

To His Excellency General v. Bonin, Governor-General of Lorraine.

According to the reports received here from General v. Werder, it is not improbable that very superior hostile forces are concentrating for an offensive movement against him. Their object may be the relief of Belfort, and a permanent severance of our communications.

In order to defeat such enterprises, the VIIth Corps will shortly be assembled at Châtillon-sur-Seine with thirty-one battalions, and, if necessary, will be still further reinforced by the IInd Army Corps. It is, however, not impossible that before these forces become effective, the enemy may temporarily gain ground in the direction of our main line of communication. In this event, it would be your Excellency's duty to assemble the Government troops now scattered at various etappen points, carefully watch the enemy's possible advance, and take precautions that Toul is sufficiently garrisoned and armed. The defective organisation of the enemy's forces, which are almost entirely destitute of commissariat and ammunition trains, forces them to cling to the railways in their operations. A temporary interruption of these railways would, therefore, entail, if not a complete stoppage, at any rate a considerable delay in the enemy's advance.

Your Excellency will therefore be pleased to take such measures as you may think necessary to cause the Langres—Chaumont and St. Loup—Epinal Railways to be prepared for destruction at various points to such an extent that, if the demolitions be carried out, the repairs would occupy from eight to fourteen days. As regards the line St. Loup—Epinal it might eventually suffice to remove by rail the large timbers which have been brought up to repair the destroyed viaduct at Aillevillers, but have not yet been placed in position.

(Signed) v. MOLTKE.

## APPENDIX CLXXVI.

# RETURN OF CASUALTIES BEFORE THE FORTRESSES OF PFALZBURG, BITSCH, AND LONGWY.

	•		Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.		
Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.			Ken.	Нотвев.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horse.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
	BEFORE PPALEBURG. BETWEEN 12TH AUGUST AND	14												
	DECEMBER, 1870.	14TB				il								
	12th August.		١				i						3	١
Vith	38th Fusiliers 6th Biffe Battn	:	=	,5 ,1	=	-	13	=	=	=	=	<b>→</b>	18 1	=
	14th August.		- 1								١,	i		l
•	51st Regiment 6th Field Art. Regt	:	=	=	=	=	1	=	=	=	=	-	1	=
	16th August.							Ì			١,			1
	51st Regiment	-	-	_	-	-	1	-		_	-	-	1	-
	17th August.				1			1	<b>'</b>		l		•	
	51st Regiment	-	-	7	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	24th August.							1				1		
Rtappen Troops	Sondershausen Landw. Battn.  26th August.	•	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	1-	-	2	1
	Erfurt Landw. Battn	_	_					l_			l_	_	2	1
	27th August.	-	-	_	-	Ī	•	-		_	-	-	•	
	Erfurt Landw. Battn Sondershausen Landw. Battn. 3rd Res. Dragoons	:	=	=	=	2	  - 	E	=	1	=	2		-
	14th September.		1				١.					]		
	Erfurt I andw. Battn Sondershausen Landw. Battn	:	=	=	=	=	6	=	=	2	=	<u> -</u>	8	-
	24tlı November.					l	Ì		1			l		1
Govrnt. Troops -	Sangerhausen Landw. Battn Erfurt Landw. Battn	:	=	1	=	-	-	=	=	=	=	-	1 1	:
	25th November.							1	1		1	1		
	Erfurt Landw. Battn	-	_	1	-	-	_	_	-	-	1-	-	1	-
•	TOTAL CASUALTIES REFORE :	PFALZ-	-	8	F	3	36	=	-	5	1=	3	49	1

	•	Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.		
Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Rogiment.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Hornes.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, do.	Mon.	Sorse.
	Before Bitech.												
	Betwern 8th August, 1870, and 31st January, 1871.												
	8th August.				1	1							,
IInd Bav	1st H.A. Batty, 2nd Art. Regt	-	1	-	<b> </b> –	4	<b> </b> –	-	-	-	-	5	-
	23rd August.				ŀ	1				1			1
Etappen Troops-	7th Regiment	=	=	Ξ	=	1 2 2	Ξ		=	=	_ _ 1	1 2 2	Ξ
	4th September.				l		1			1			İ
	4th Bav. Inf. Regt	=	8	=	2 -	18 11	=	<u>-</u>	=	Ξ	2	21 17	=
j	8th September.			l		1	l .						
	8th Bav. Inf. Regt	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
	11th September.									1			
	4th Fort. Batty. 2nd Bav. Art. Regt 2rd Fort. Batty. 4th Bav. Art. Regt 13th September.	=	1	=	=	3	=	-	=	=	=	3	=
	•		١,							١.,			l
	ard Fort. Batty. 4th Bav. Art. Regt	-	١.	-	-	-	-	_	_	-	_	1	-
	15th September.			l		١.						_	
	3rd Fort. Batty. 2nd Bav. Art. Regt	-	_	-	-	1	-	_	-	-	-	1	-
	16th September.		1	l									l
	8th Bav. Inf. Regt	-	-	-	-	1	_	-	_	-	-	1	-
	17th September.	1	Ì			ł	1						
	3rd Fort. Batty. 2nd Bav. Art. Regt 4th Fort. Batty. 2nd Bav. Art. Regt 3rd Fort. Batty. 4th Bav. Art. Regt	Ξ	Ξ	Ξ	=	1 2 1	<del>-</del>	111	Ξ	=	-	1 2 1	] =
]	29th September.	ł			l	l							ŀ
Govrat. Troops -	8th Bav. Inf. Begt	-	*	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	7	1-
İ	30th September.		l										1
	8th Bav. Inf. Regt 5th Bav. Chev. Regt	=	2	-	=	2	-	1 1	=	=	=	4	=
j	10th October.												
	8th Bav. Inf. Begt	_	-	-	-	1	-	-		-	-	1	1-
	21st December.						1						1
1	8th Bav. Inf. Regt	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	1-
j	20th January.												1
İ	8th Bav. Inf. Regt	_	_		드	2	=		_	<u> -</u>	Ŀ	3	
. ]	TOTAL CASUALTIES BEFORE BITSON -	_	19	_	3	59	1	=	_	_	8	78	1

	Staff and Regiment.			Killed, or Died of Wounds.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total.		
Army Corps, &c.				Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	<b>்</b> மூலா, மீட	Men.	Hornes.	
	Beporl Longwy.  Between 15th November, 1870, and 25th January, 1871.														
	1st December.						Ì								
Vilth	53rd Regiment	- -	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	_	2	-	
	7th December.	1.	- [				ĺ								
	15th liusears	٠  ٠	-	_	-	-	1.	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	
	10th December.	ì	1						Ŀ	_					
	53rd Regiment	1	-	2	_	_	2	-	-	7	-	_	11	-	
Governt, Troops -	13th December. 72nd Regiment	1	-	2			,								
2011at. 2100pg	27th December.	- -	_	2	_	_	١ '	-	_	_	-	_	8	-	
	Oppeln Landw. Battn 2nd Heavy Res. Cav. Regt	: :	-	2	-	<u>1</u>	4	_	_ 1	2 1	_	1 1	8 1	-	
	12th January.	1	1				I								
	Rawicz Landw. Batt	- -	-1	1	_	_	ı	_	_	_	_	_	2	-	
	14th January.		١				l								
	Schrimm Landw, Battn, - Ostrowo Landw, Battn, -	: :	-	2	<u>-</u>	=	7	=	=	=	=	_	9 1	=	
	15th January.		-											ĺ	
	lst Fort. Pion. Com. III A.C	- -	-	2	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	8	-	
	22nd to 24th January.	1	- {												
	Anklam Lendw. Battn. Munster Landw. Battn. Glatz Landw. Battn 5th Com. Guard Fort. Art. Regt. 13th Com. Guard Fort. Art. Regt. 13th Com. 4th Fort. Art. Regt. 2nd Fort. Pion. Com. 1st A.C.			1 - 2 - 1 -	111111		- 1 3 1 6	111111	111111	- - - -	111111	- - - - 1	1 1 5 1 7 -		
	TOTAL CASUALTIES BEFORE LONGWY	-[-	<u> </u>	15	1	2	31	=	1	11	4	3	57	6	
	TOTAL CASUALTIES BEFORE PYALE BURG, BITSCH, AND LONGWY.	•[-	-	42	1	8	126	1	1	16	4	9	184	•	

## Nominal Roll of Officers who were Killed, Wounded, or Missing.

Army Corps, &o.	Staff and Regiment.	Ki	lled, or Wou	r Died inds.	Wounded	
	BEBORE PYALEBURG. BETWEEN 12TH AUG. AND 14TH DEC., 1870 (INCLUSIVE).					
	27th August.					
Etappen Troops	Sondershausen Land. Battalion.	•	•	•		(1) 1st Lieut. v. Michaelis.
	24th November.					(2) 2nd Lt. Enke.
Govt. Troops -	Erfurt Land. Battn		•	•	•	(1) 1st Lt. Boutin.
	BEFORE BITSON. BETWEEN STH AUG., 1870, AND SISTJAN., 1871 (INGLUSIVE).					
•	28rd August.					
Etappen Troops	4th Fort. Batty. 2nd - Bav. Art. Regt.	•	•	•	•	(1) Lt. Beckh.
	4th September.					
	4th Bav. Inf. Regt	•	•	•	•	(1) Lt. Zeier. (2) Lt. Buchert.
	Before Longwy. Between 15th Nov., 1870, and 25th Jan., 1871 (inclusive).					
	27th December.					
Govt. Troops .	Oppeln Landw. Batt.	•	•	•	•	(1) Capt. Gené.
	2nd Heavy Res. Cav. Regt.		•	•	•	Missing. (1) 2nd Lt. Merrem.
	22nd January.					
	and Fort. Pion. Com. Ist A.C.		•	•	•	(1) 1st Lieut. Nau-

## APPENDIX CLXXVII.

# Composition of the Staffs of the Governments-General. (End of January, 1871.)

#### GOVERNMENT-GENERAL OF ALSACE.

Governor-General: Lieut.-General Count v. Bismarck-Bohlen.
Chief of General Staff: Colonel v. Hartmann, War Ministry.
General Staff: (1.) Captain Rhein; (2.) Captain Baron v. Richthoffen, Guard Fortress Artillery Regiment.
Adjutants: (1.) 1st Lieutenant Count v. Kalnein, 3rd Cuirassiers;
(2.) 2nd Lieutenant Baron v. Welczeck, Guard Cuirassiers.

## GOVERNMENT-GENERAL OF LORBAINE.

Chief of General Staff: Colonel Berger.
General Staff: Captain v. Brauchitsch, War Ministry.
Adjutants: (1.) Captain Baron v. Dalwigk-Lichtenfels; (2.) Captain
v. Donop; (3.) 1st Lieut. Mache, 6th Grenadiers.

Governor-General; General v. Bonin.

## GOVERNMENT-GENERAL OF RHEIMS.

Governor-General: Lieut.-General v. Rosenberg-Gruszczynski.\*
General Staff: Major v. Ploetz, 8th Dragoons.
Adjutants: (1.) Major Count v. d. Groeben; (2.) Captain Siber;
(3.) Captain Pedell, 23rd Regiment.

## GOVERNMENT-GENERAL IN VERSAILLES.

Governor-General: Lieut. General v. Fabrice, Saxon War Minister.
Chief of Staff: Major Krug v. Nidda.
Adjutants: (1.) Major v. Helldorff, Saxon Army; (2.) Captain v.
Bülow, 2nd Cuirassiers; (3.) 1st Lieut. v. VoightsRhetz, 8th Cuirassiers; (4.) 1st Lieut. Baron v.
Hausen, 18th Lancers.

Acted for H.R.H. the Grand Duke Frederick of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, from 22.10.70 to 10.1.71.

## APPENDIX CLXXVIII.

RETURN SHOWING THE FRENCH FORCES BEHIND THE MAYENNE ON THE 8TH FEBRUARY, 1871, FROM OFFICIAL STATES.\*

						Officers.	Men.	Horses.
Staffs	•				. [	231	1,889	897
Infantry of line	•		•	-	-	1,124	14,170	1.207
Marine troops	•	•	•		- 1	96	3,308	43
Garde Mobile	•		•		- }	1,443	62,163	410
Garde Nationale	•	•	•		- !	658	79,845	68
Franctireurs				-	- }	217	5,115	79
Cavalry -	•		-	-	- 1	632	9,313	9,030
Artillery -	•		•	-	-	229	12,639	11,476
Engineers -				-	-!	60	2,425	229
Gendarmerio	•				- 1	68	1,727	817
Various services	•	•	•	•	-	161	1,767	2,511
To	tal				. i	1,052	227,361	20,797

## The artillery consisted of :--

5	12-pr.	batteries.	7 4-pr. mountain batteries.
4	8-pr.	••	10 mitrailleuse ,,
4	7-pr.	"	15 batteries of different calibres.
29	4-pr.		74 batteries with 430 guns.

The part of the army which passed to the left bank of the Loire consisted of 128,733 men, 20,048 horses, and 54 batteries.†

The remainder was to defend Brittany, under the command of General de Colomb.

According to Changy," La Douzième Armée de la Loire."
† Joined later by the 26th Corps formed in Guéret.

## APPENDIX CLXXIX.

ENTRE le Chancelier de l'Empire Germanique, M. le Comte Otto de Bismarck-Schönhausen, muni des pleins pouvoirs de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne, Roi de Prusse; le Ministre d'Etat et des Affaires Étrangères de Sa Majesté le Roi de Bavière, M. le Comte Otto de Bray-Steinburg; le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de Sa Majesté le Roi de Wurttemberg, M. le Baron Auguste de Wächter; le Ministre d'Etat, Président du Conseil des Ministres de Son Altesse Royale, Monseigneur le Grand-Duc de Bade, M. Jules Jolly, représentant l'Empire Germanique, d'un côté;

Et de l'autre, le Chef du Pouvoir Exécutif de la République Française, M. Thiers, et le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères M. Jules

Favre, représentant la France;

Les pleins pouvoirs des deux Parties Contractantes ayant été trouvés en bonne et dûe forme, il y a été convenu ce que suit, pour servir de base préliminaire à la paix définitive à conclure ultérieurement.

#### Article I.

La France renonce en faveur de l'Empire Allemand à tons ses droits et titres sur les territoires situés à l'est de la frontière ci-après

désignée.

La ligne de démarcation commence à la frontière nord-onest du canton de Cattenom vers le Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, suit vers le sud les frontières occidentales des cantons de Cattenom et Thionville, passe par le canton de Briey en longeant les frontières occidentales des communes de Montois-la-Montagne et Roncourt ainsi que les frontières orientales des communes de St. Marie-aux-Chênes, St. Ail, Habonville, atteint la frontière du canton de Gorze qu'elle traverse le long des frontières communales de Vionville, Buxières, et Onville, suit la frontière sud-ouest respectivement sud de l'arrondissement de Metz, la frontière occidentale de l'arrondissement de Château-Salins jusqu'à la commune de Pettoncourt dont elle embrasse les frontières occidentale et méridionale pour suivre la crête des montagnes entre la Seille et le Moncel jusqu'à la frontière de l'arrondissement de Sarrebourg au sud de Garde. La démarcation coincide ensuite avec la frontière de cet arrondissement jusqu'à la commune de Tanconville dont elle atteint la frontière au nord, de là elle suit la crête des montagnes entre les sources de la Sarre Blanche et la Verouze jusqu'à la frontière du canton de Schirmeck, longe la frontière occidentale de ce canton, embrasse les communes de Saales, Bourg-Bruche, Colroy-la-Roche, Plaine, Ranrupt, Saulxures, et St. Blaise-la-Roche, du canton de Saales, et coincide avec la frontière occidentale des départements du Bas-Rhin et du Haut-Rhin jusqu'au canton de Belfort dont elle quitte la frontière méridionale non loin de Vourvenans, pour traverser le canton de Delle aux limites méridionales des communes de Bourogne et de Froide Fontaine, et atteindre la frontière Suisse en longeaut les frontières orientales des communes de Jonchery et Delle.

L'Empire Allemand possédera ces territoires à perpétuité en toute souveraineté et propriété. Une Commission Internationale composée de Représentants des Hautes Parties Contractantes en nombre égal des deux côtés sera chargée, immédiatement après l'échange des ratifications du présent Traité, d'exécuter sur le terrain le tracé de la nouvelle frontière, conformément aux stipulations précédentes.

Cette Commission présidera au partage des biens-fonds et capitaux qui jusqu'ici ont appartenu en commun à des districts ou des communes séparés par la nouvelle frontière; en cas de désaccord sur le tracé et les mesures d'exécution, les membres de la Commission en

référerent à leurs Gouvernements respectifs.

La frontière telle qu'elle vient d'être décrite, se trouve marquée en vert sur deux exemplaires conformes de la carte du territoire formant le Gouvernement Général d'Alsace, publiée à Berlin, en Septembre, 1870, par la Division Géographique et Statistique de l'Etat-Major Général, et dont un exemplaire sera joint à chacune des deux expéditions du présent Traité.

Toutefois le tracé indiqué a subi les modifications suivantes de l'accord des deux Parties Contractantes: Dans l'ancien département de la Moselle les villages de St. Marie-aux-Chênes près de St. Privatla-Montagne et de Vionville, à l'ouest de Rezonville, seront cédés à l'Allemagne. Par contre la ville et les fortifications de Belfort resteront à la France avec un rayou qui sora déterminé ultériourement.

## Article II.

La France paiera à Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne la somme

de cinq milliards de francs.

Le paiement d'au moins un milliard de francs aura lieu dans le courant de l'année 1871, et celui de tout le reste de la dette dans un espace de trois années à partir de la ratification des présentes.

## Article III.

L'évacuation des territoires Français occupés par les troupes Allemandes commencera après la ratification du présent Traité par l'Assemblée Nationale siégeant à Bordeaux. Immédiatement après cette ratification les troupes Allemandes quitteront l'intérieur de la ville de Paris ainsi que les forts situés à la rive gauche de la Seine, et dans le plus bref délai possible fixé par une entente entre les autorités militaires des deux pays, elles évacueront entièrement les départements du Calvados, de l'Orne, de la Sarthe, d'Euro et Loir, du Loiret, de Loir et Cher, d'Indre et Loire, de l'Yonne, et de plus les départemonts de la Seine Inférieure, de l'Eure, de Seine et Oise, de Seine et Marne, de l'Aube, et de la Côte d'Or jusqu'à de la rive gauche de la Seine. Les troupes Françaises se retirerent en même temps derrière la Loire qu'elles ne pourront dépasser avant la signature du Traité de Paix Définitif. Sont exceptées de cette disposition la garnison de Paris dont le nombre ne pourra pas dépasser 40,000 hommes, et les garnisons indispensables à la sûreté des places fortes.

L'évacuation des départements situés entre la rive droite de la Seine et la frontière de l'est par les troupes Allemandes s'opérera graduellement après la ratification du Traité de Paix Définitif et le paiement du premier demi-milliard de la contribution stipulée par l'Article II, en commençant par les départements les plus rapprochés de Paris, et se continuera au fur et à mesure que les versements de la contribution seront effectués; après le premier versement d'un demimilliard cette évacuation aura lieu dans les départements suivants: Somme, Oise, et les parties des départements de la Scine Inférieure, Seine et Oise, Seine et Marne, situées sur la rive droite de la Seine, ainsi que la partie du département de la Seine et los forts situés sur la rive droite.

Après le paiement de deux milliards, l'occupation Allemande ne comprendra plus que les départements de la Marne, des Ardennes, de la Haute-Marne, de la Meuse, des Vosges, de la Meurthe, ainsi que la forteresse de Belfort avec son territoire, qui serviront de gage pour les trois milliards restants et où le nombre des troupes Allemandes ne dépassera pas 50,000 hommes. Sa Majesté l'Empereur sera disposé à substituer à la garantie territoriale consistant dans l'occupation partielle du territoire Français une garantie financière si elle est offerte par le Gouvernement Français dans des conditions reconnues suffisantes par Sa Majesté l'Empereur et Roi pour les intérêts de l'Allemagne. Les trois milliards dont l'acquittement aura été différé, porterent intérêt à 5 pour cent à partir de la ratification de la présente Convention.

#### Article IV.

Les troupes Allemandes s'abstiendront de faire des réquisitions soit en argent soit en nature dans les départements occupés. Par contre l'alimentation des troupes Allemandes qui resterent en France, aura lieu aux frais du Gouvernement Français dans la mosure convenue par une entente avec l'intendance militaire Allemande.

## Article V.

Les intérêts des habitants des territoires cédés par la France, en tout ce qui concerne leur commerce et leurs droits civils seront réglés aussi favorablement que possible lorsque seront arrêtées les conditions de la paix définitive. Il sera fixé, à cet effet, un espace de temps pendant lequel ils jouiront de facilités particulières pour la circulation de leurs produits. Le Gouvernement Allemand n'apportera aucun obstacle à la libre émigration des habitants des territoires cédés et ne ne pourra prendre contre eux aucune mesure atteignant leurs personnes ou leurs propriétés.

## Article VI.

Les prisonniers de guerre, qui n'auront pas déjà été mis en liberté par voie d'échange seront rendus immédiatement après la ratification des présents préliminaires. Afin d'accélérer le transport des prisonniers Français, le Gouvernement Français mettra à la disposition des autorités Allemandes à l'intérieur du territoire Allemand une partie du matériel roulant de ses chemins de fer dans une mesure qui sera déterminée par des arrangements spéciaux et aux prix payés en Français pour les transports militaires.

## Article VII.

L'ouverture des négociations pour le Traité de Paix Définitif à conclure sur la base des présents préliminaires aura lieu à Bruxelles immédiatement après la ratification de ces derniers par l'Assemblée Nationale et par Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne.

## Articlo VIII.

Après la conclusion et la ratification du Traito de Paix Définitif

l'administration des départements devant encore rester occupés par les troupes Allemandes sora remise aux autorités Françaises. Mais ces dernières seront tenues de se conformer aux ordres que les commandants des troupes Allemandes croiraient devoir donner dans l'intérêt de la sûreté, de l'entretien et de la distribution des troupes.

Dans les départements occupés la perception des impôts après la ratification du présent Traité s'opérera pour le compte du Couverne-

ment Français et par le moyen de ses employés.

## Article IX.

Il est bien entendu que les présentes no peuvent donner à l'autorité militaire Allemande aueun droit sur les parties du territoire qu'elle n'occupe point actuellement.

## Article X.

Les présentes seront immédiatement soumises à la ratification de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne et de l'Assemblée Nationale Française siégeant à Bordeaux.

En foi de quoi les soussignés ont revêtu le présent Traité

Próliminaire de leurs signatures et de leurs sceaux.

Fait à Versailles le 26 Février, 1871.

(Signé) v. BISMARCK. (Signé) A. THIERS. (Signé) JULES FAVRE.

Les Royaumes de Bavière et de Wurttemberg et le Grand-Duché de Bade ayant pris part à la guerre actuelle comme alliés de la Prusse et faisant partie maintenant de l'Empire Germanique, les soussignés adhèrent à la présente Convention au nom de leurs souverains respectifs.

Versailles, le 26 Février, 1871.

(Signé) COMTE DE BRAY-STEINBURG.

(Signé) BARON DE WÄCHTER.

(Signé) MITTNACHT.

(Signé) JOLLY.

ENTRE les Soussignés, munis des pleius-pouvoirs de l'Empire d'Allemagne et de la République Française, la Convention suivante a été conclue :

### Article I.

Afin de faciliter la ratification des préliminaires de paix conclus aujourd'hui entre les Soussignés, l'armistice stipulé par les Conventions du 28 Janvier et du 15 Février dernier, est prolongé jusqu'au 12 Mars prochain.

### Article II.

La prolongation de l'armistice ne s'appliquera pas à l'Article IV de la Convention du 28 Janvier, qui sera remplacé par la stipulation

saivante sur laquelle les Soussignés sont tombés d'accord :

La partie de la ville de Paris à l'intérieur de l'enceinte, comprise entre la Seine, la Rue du Faubourg St. Honoré et l'Avenue des Ternes, sera occupée par des troupes Allemandes dont le nombre ne dépassera pas 30,000 hommes. Le mode d'occupation et les dispositions pour le logement des troupes Allemandes dans cette partie de la ville seront réglées par une entente entre deux officiers supéricurs des deux armées, et l'accès en sera interdit aux troupes Françaises et aux gardes nationales armées pendant la durée de l'occupation.

#### Article III.

Les troupes Allemandes s'abstiendront à l'avenir de prélever des contributions en argent dans les territoires occupés. Les contributions de cette catégorie dont le montant ne serait pas encore payé, seront annulées de plein droit; celles qui seraient versées ultérieurement par suite d'ignorance de la présente stipulation, devront être remboursées. Par contre, les autorités Allemandes continueront à prélever les impôts de l'atat dans les territoires occupés.

### Article IV.

Les deux Parties Contractantes conserveront le droit de dénoncer l'armistice à partir du 3 Mars selon leur convenance et avec un délai de trois jours pour la reprise des hostilités s'il y avait lieu.

Fait et approuvé à Versailles le 26 Février, 1871.

(Signé) v. BISMARCK. (Signé) A. THIERS. (Signé) JULES FAVRE.

## CONVENTION REGARDANT L'OCCUPATION D'UNE PARTIE DE PARIS PAR LES TROUPES ALLEMANDES.

Versailles, le 26 Février, 1871.

#### § 1.

LES troupes Allemandes occuperont, dès Mercredi le 1 Mars, à 10 heures du matin, le terrain compris entre la Seine (rive droit), l'enceinte depuis le Point-du-Jour jusqu'à la Porte des Ternes, la Rue du Faubourg Saint-Honoré jusqu'à la Rue des Champs Elysées, le Garde Meuble et le Ministère de la Marine, le Jardin des Tuileries, ne réservant toutefois les bâtiments des vivres militaires et la circulation sur les deux Points de l'Alma et de Jéna.

#### 8 2

Il est formellement interdit aux gens armés de franchir la ligne sus-indiquée. Toutefois la circulation pourra rester libre pour toute personne non militaire et non armée.

#### § 3.

La troupe d'occupation aura la facilité de visiter les galeries du Louvre et l'Établissement des Invalides. Les détails de ces promenades seront réglés d'un commun accord par les autorités militaires des deux pays. Il est bien entendu que les soldats n'auront pas leur fusil et seront conduits par des officiers.

#### § 4

Les troupes Allemandes seront logées soit dans les bâtiments publics soit chez les habitants. Une commission mixte, composé des délégués des municipalités et d'un ou de plusieurs officiers Allemands, se réunira Mardi le 28 Février, à 2 heures, au Pont de Sèvres, pour faciliter les détails du logement.

#### 9 5

Les soldats seront nourris par les soins de l'autorité Allemande.

# APPENDIX CLXXX.

# RETURN OF GERMAN TROOPS IN FRANCE ON 1ST MARCH, 1871.

# 1. FIELD ARMY.

				Comba	itante			Total.		scind-
	Тгооре	ı <b>.</b>		excl	iding re and	lery.	Combe exclu Officer Train S	ding and	ery.	Total Effectives, including Non-combatants.
	<del></del>			Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artillery	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Total
	ist Arn	t¥.		Men.	Horses.	Guns.	Men.	Horses.	Guns.	
1760	rmy Corps th Army Corps Infantry Division Res. Division, in	eluline C	- - - - -	22,886 24,276 11,708	1,194 1,207 1,672	84 90 86	=	Ξ	=	40,252 33,012 17,060
Gu 3rd C 3rd C	ard Cavalry Briga luard Cavalry Brig lavalry Division avalry Division	de -	-	6,083	2,280 1,038 2,221 5,049	18 	=	=	=	9,658 1,845 8,054
	Total Ist Army		•			=	64,396	14,661	216	110,6.6
	IIND ARA	er.								
IVth IXth Xth	Army Corps-			22,973 24,019 21,636 22,832	1.143 1,119 1,756 1,223 3,448 2,914 3,016	81 90 84 6 12	= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =		=======================================	31,854 33,165 31,457 32,687 4,272 4,081
6th	"	•	•	<u> </u>	2,642	6		=	Ξ	4,047 3,339
	Total Hnd Army	• •	•	-	_	-	91,460	17,261	378	144,902
<b>3</b> 7101.	Illad An Army Corps, le		,	10.00						
Fal XIth	beck's Brigade Army Corps- av. Army Corps	Before Paris.		18,235 22,103 25,242 22,784	1,189 2,067 2,606	76 84 114 108	=	1 1 1		26,435 31,499 37,646 86,349
	Total Hird Army		•		_	_	88,364	6,740	382	181,927
	ck's Brigade - Army Corps -	]} detach	rd {	5,851 23,463	283 1,181	8 84	-	=	-	6,626 31,187
	Total Vth A.C. a	nd Fabeck	•	-	-	_	29,314	1,464	02	37,813
	MEGSE A									
Bri XIII Wür	d Corps, less Combigades h Army Corps ttemberg Field Div d Landwehr Divisi	rislon -	. c.	29,655 25,413 14,545 11,0 <b>3</b> 8	2,435 8,442 1,699	90 96 54 18	1111			39,208 39,305 21,398 12,567
	Total Mewe Arm	ay •	•				80,646	7,576	259	112,463

			,				
	Combe	uta mts.	l		Total.		<b>1</b>
Тгооря,	excit Office	ding rs and oldiers.	Artillery.	Comba exclu Officer Train S	iding	Artillery.	Total Effectives, incerding Non-combanana.
	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Arti	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Arti	Total
SOUTH ARMY.	Men.	Horses.	Guns.	Men.	Horses.	Guns.	
IInd Army Corps- VIIth ,, ,, (including Knesebeck's	21,519	1,100	84	-	_	-	30,445
Brigade) - XIVth ,, ,, (Bad. Div., Goltz, and	28,366	1,679	84	-	-	-	37,882
lat Res. Division - Krenski's Detachment - 10 Landwehr battallons (for slege of	34,617 10,421 5,707	4,249 568 264	114 24 12	=	Ξ	=	47,043 ° 12,963 7,731
Langres)	9,409	-	_		-	-	9,802
Total South Army		_	-	110,039	7,860	318	145,866
Total Field Army Of which—	-	-	-	464,221	55,562	1,674	683,672
Before Paris In the Departments	=	=	=	169,010 295,211	14,816 41,246	640 1,034	244, <b>3</b> 95 439,277
II.	GARRIS	on Tr	:00rs			•	
Inspector-General of Etappen Ist Army	4,954	135 759	<b> </b> -	_	1 -	<b>I</b> –	5,246
,, ,, ,, lind ,,	9,113 3,450	1,274	8	=	=	=	10,700 11,609
Government-General of Alsace -	4,234 27,176	287 1,211	18	-	=	<b> </b>	4,664
,, ,, Lorraine* -	18,709	990	18	-	=	=	33,451 22,188
Government of Metz (Thionville,	18,466	750	18	_	-	-	23,478
Longwy)	13,170	276	6	_	_	_	16,843
Three Fort. Art. Cos. with 1st Army - Siege Art. South Front of Paris	,=	=	_	=	_	_	543 5,002
Fort. Pioneers ,, Siege Art. N. and E. Fronts of Paris -	-	_	-		-	-	920
Fort. Pioneers ,, ,, -		_=	_	-	=	=	4,548 782
Total Garrison Troops	_	_	_	105,272	5,681	68	139,974
Total Troops in France†	-	-	-	569,493	61,248	1,742	823,646

Not including 10 Landwehr battallons, which are counted with South Army.
 † Exclusive of troops employed at Headquarters on railway and tolegraph duties.

## APPENDIX CLXXXI.

INSTRUCTIONS RELATIVE TO THE EXECUTION OF THE PRELIMINARY AND ARMISTICE TREATY OF 26TH FEBRUARY, 1871.

(1.) The landwehr battalions, reserve rifle battalions, reserve cavalry regiments, reserve batteries, which are now in France and in the German provinces newly acquired, and the depôt battalions of those regiments which are not intended for the permanent occupation of the new provinces, are to be sent home as soon as possible.

(2.) The following are appointed to form the permanent garrison in Alsace:—

## (a.) Prussian troops.

5th Grenadiers. 14th Regiment. 60th 47th 22nd 17th ,, 25th 10th Dragoons. 4th Lancers. 14th Dragoons. 15th 15th Lancers. 2nd Field Division 8th Field Artillery Regiment. H.A. Division 11th " 1st Field Division 2 Companies 8th Fortress 10th Hanoverian Fortress Artillery Division. 11th Hessian 5th Pioneer Battalion. 9th

(b.)

92nd Brunswick Regiment.
One Saxon Regiment.
Two Bavarian Regiments.
One Württemberg Regiment.
One Bavarian Cavalry ,,
12th Fortress Artillery Battalion.

The above regiments of infantry will be detached from their Corps and will be at once transported by rail to Alsace in relief of the present occupation troops.

(3.) The VIIth Army Corps will pass under the direct orders of

the Royal Headquarters. It will henceforth occupy the Meuse and Vosges Departments and also those parts of the Meurtho and Moselle Departments which remain French, and it will relieve as quickly as possible the Government troops hitherto employed there. The 60th Regiment is, as is seen, intended to garrison Alsace, the 72nd to pass for a time to the Xth Army Corps, which will give orders as to the movement of the regiment. The 5th Reserve Lancers will return home.

(4.) The XIIth Army Corps will also pass under the direct orders of the Royal Headquarters, and is intended to occupy the Aisne and Ardennes Departments; the Württemberg Field Division will pass under the same command and will occupy the Marne Department. The Government troops hitherto located in this department will be relieved with the least

possible delay.

(5.) The Ist Army, after entirely evacuating the left bank of the Seine, will be cantoned henceforth in the Departments of Somme, Lower Scine, and Eure (right bank of the Scine), and in the west portion of the Oise Department limited by the Grisons-Beauvais-Breteuil-Amiens road, including the villages on the road.

The troops detached from the Guard and XIIth Army

Corps return to their commands.

The 5th Cavalry Division is placed at the disposal of the Meuse Army, General v. Strantz's Combined Cavalry Brigade and the three reserve batteries of the Vth Corps will at once move off in the direction of Mézières. The march

route will be forwarded to this office.

(6.) The IInd Army, including the IIIrd, IXth, and Xth Corps, the 2nd and 6th Cavalry Divisions will at once move to the eastward between the Loire and Seine, cross the latter river between its source and the embouchure of the Aube. and occupy cantonments in the Upper Marne, Aube (right bank of Seine), and Côte d'Or (right bank of Seine) Departments, limited on the south-east by a line from the source of the latter river near Grancey.

The IVth Army Corps will revert to the Mouse Army, the 4th Cavalry Division to the IIIrd Army, the 1st Cavalry

Division to the South Army.

Of the Xth Corps, the 17th and 92nd Regiments, will be replaced by the 67th and 72nd Regiments now belonging to

the South Army.

1. 1

The Meuse Army, to which are assigned the IVth Army Corps and 5th Cavalry Division, will canton in the Departments of the Oise (so far as this is not occupied by the Ist Army), and of the Seine et Oise (right bank of the Seine and Ourcq Canal), while continuing to occupy Forts St. Denis, l'Est, and Aubervilliers.

The Guard Landwehr Division will be forwarded by rail to Germany, and will at once march upon Rheims.

: (8.) The HIrd Army will evacuate as soon as possible the forts on the left bank of the Seine, carrying away the material; it will occupy on the right bank the Forts Nogent, Rosny, Noissy, and Romainville, hitherto occupied by the Meuse Army. The XIth, VIth, and IInd Bavarian Army Corps, and the 4th Cavalry Division, which again passes to the IIIrd Army, will then cross to the right bank of the Seine and canton in the Seine et Marne Departments, and the available part of the Seine et Oise Department.

The Vth Army Corps will pass to the South Army and will receive instructions to move at once vid Auxerro on Dijon, whither the 19th Regiment, which replaces the 47th now being detached from the army, will be transported by

rail.

(2.) The South Army, to which are attached the Vth Army Corps and 1st Cavalry Division, will occupy cantonments in the Haute Saône, Doubs, and Jura Departments, so far as they have been occupied by the Germans; moreover, the Côte d'Or Department, excepting the part given to the Hud Army and the part bounded by a line drawn from the source of the Seine to Chagny; which, on the moving up of the Hud Army, will fall to the French zone of occupation.

The South Army will occupy Belfort.

The IInd Army Corps will receive the 34th Regiment in

lien of the detached 14th Regiment.

In consequence of the early return of the landwehr troops, &c., attached to the XIVth Corps, and also of the new destinations assigned to the 30th, 34th, 67th, and 25th Prussian Line Regiments, the XIVth Army Corps, the 1st and 4th Reserve Divisions, and v. d. Goltz's detachment may be regarded as broken up.

The arrangements with regard to the personnel and the employment of the administrations, trains, &c., are

reserved.

(10.) The transport of the landwehr troops of occupation now present in the cantonments of the Ist, IInd, IIIrd, Meuse and South Armies will be arranged, as their relief, by line or etappen troops as the case may be, proceeds. To this end the Army Commanders-in-Chief will be good enough to report to this office with the least possible delay the dates at which the presence of the Government troops becomes no longer necessary.

(11.) Lastly, attention is to be given to sending home the ctappen troops at the earliest date. Their duties devolve in the rayons of the different Armics to the line troops of the latter; in the rayons of the XIIth and VIIth Army Corps and the Wurttemberg Division to these troops; in Alsace, &c., to the garrisons in accordance with instructions to be given by the

highest military authorities there.

(12.) With regard to the return of the fortress artillery and fortress pioneer companies (the latter so far as they do not belong to the Government or etappen troops or to the reserve divisions), further instructions will be issued.

(13.) The Inspectors General of Etappen of the Ist, IInd, and IIIrd Armies will remain with their present functions. The latter will also conduct the business of the Meuse Army; the etappen inspection of this Army is to be subsequently placed at the disposal of the South Army.

(14.) The telegraph stations situated in the districts to be

evacuated, and which are worked by officials not on the field establishment, can in the event of their not being previously relieved by the field and etappen telegraph divisions, continue to be thus worked until the departure of the troops; but the military authorities will make arrangements for their security and for providing the necessary means of transport for the officials and the instruments.

(15.) The Army Commanders, Governors-General, &c., will be good enough to concert with regard to the execution of the

reliefs, &c., indicated in the foregoing directions.

The transport of the troops will be reported, as herein set forth, to the respective Line Commissions, which have received corresponding instructions from this office. Meanwhile, all troops about to be transported by rail are to be instructed to conform to any direct requisitions made to them by the Line Commissions.

(Signed) COUNT MOLTKE.

## APPENDIX CLXXXII.

## TREATY OF PEACE, 10TH MAY, 1871.

LE Prince Othon de Bismarck-Schoenhausen, Chancelier de l'Empire Germanique, le Comte Harry d'Arnim, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne près du St. Siége, stipulant au nom de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne, d'un côté; de l'autre, M. Jules Favre, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la République Française, M. Augustin Thomas Joseph Pouyer-Quertier, Ministre des Finances de la République Française, et M. Marc Thomas Eugène de Goulard, Membre de l'Assemblée Nationale, stipulant au nom de la République Française, s'étant mis d'accord pour convertir en Traité de Paix Définitif le Traité de Préliminaire de Paix du 26 Février de l'anné courante, modifié ainsi qu'il va l'être par les dispositions qui suivent, ont arrêté:—

### Article J.

La distance de la ville de Belfort à la ligne de frontière telle qu'elle a été d'abord proposée lors des négociations de Versailles et telle qu'elle se trouve marquée sur la carte annexée à l'instrument ratifié du Traité des Préliminaires du 26 Février, est considérée comme indiquant la mesure du rayon qui, en vertu de la clause y relative du Article I des Préliminaires, doit rester à la France avec la ville et les fortifications de Belfort.

Le Gouvernement Allemand et disposé à élargir ce rayon de manière qu'il comprenne les cantons de Belfort, de Delle, et de Giromagny, ainsi que la partie occidentale du canton de Fontaine à l'onest d'une ligne à tracer du point où le canal du Rhin nu Rhône sort du canton de Delle au sud de Montreux-Château jusqu'à la limite nord du canton entre Bourg et Félon où cette ligne joindrait la limite est du canton de Giromagny.

Le Gouvernement Allemand, toutefois, ne cédera les territoires sus-indiqués qu'à la condition que la République Française, de son côté, consentira à une rectification de frontière le long des limites occidentales des cantons de Cattenom et de Thionville qui laisseront

l'Allemagne le terrain à l'est d'une ligne partant de la frontière du Luxembourg entre Hussigny et Redingen, laissant à la France les villages de Thil et de Villerupt, se prolongeant entre Erronville et Aumetz, entre Beauvillers et Boulange, entre Trieux et Lommeringen, et joignant ancienne ligne de frontière entre Avril et Moyeuvre.

In Commission Internationale dont il est question dans l'Article I des Préliminaires, so rendra sur le terrain immédiatement après l'échange des ratifications du présent Traité pour exécuter les travaux qui lui incombent et pour faire le tracé de la nouvelle frontière conformément aux dispositions précédentes.

## Article II.

Les sujets Français originaires des territoires cédés domiciliés actuellement sur ce territoire qui entendront conserver la nationalité Française, jouiront jusqu'au ler Octobre, 1872, et moyennant une déclaration préalable, faite à l'autorité compétente, de la faculté de transporter leur domicile en Français et de s'y fixer, sans que ce droit puisse être altéré par les lois sur le service militaire, auquel cas la qualité de citoyen Français leur sera maintenue. Ils seront libres de conserver leurs immeubles situés sur le territoire réuni à l'Allemagne.

Aucun habitant des territoires cédés ne pourra être poursuivi, inquiété ou recherché dans sa personne ou dans ses biens à raison de

ses actes politiques ou militaires pendant la guerre.

## Article III.

Le Gouvernement Français romettra au Gouvernement Allemand les archives, documents, et registres concernant l'administration civile, militaire, et judiciaire des territoires cédés. Si quelques-uns do ces titres avaient été déplacés, ils seront restitués par le Gouvernement Français sur la demande du Gouvernement Allemand.

#### Article IV.

Le Gouvernement Français remettra au Gouvernement de l'Empire d'Allemagne dans le terme de six mois à dater de l'échange des ratifications de ce Traité:—

- Le montant des sommes déposées par les départements, les communes, et les établissements publics des territoires cédés;
- Le montant des primes d'onrôlement et de remplacement appartenant aux militaires et marins originaires des territoires cédés qui auront opté pour la nationalité Allemande;

3. Le montant des cantionnement des comptables de l'Etat;

 Le montant des sommes versées pour consignations judiciaires par suite de mesures prises par les autorités administratives ou judiciaires dans les territoires cédés.

## Article V.

Les deux nations jouiront d'un traitement égal en ce qui concerno la navigation sur la Moselle, le canal du Rhin à la Marne, le canal du Rhône au Rhin, le canal de la Sarre, et les eaux navigables communiquant avec ces voies de navigation. Le droit de flottage sera maintenu.

## Article VI.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes, étant d'avis que les circonscriptions diocésaines des territoires cédés à l'Empire Allemand doivent coincider avec la nouvelle frontière déterminée par l'Article I ci-dessus, se concerteront après la ratification du présent Traité, sans retard, sur les mesures à prendre en commun à cet effet.

Les communautés appartenant, soit à l'Église Réformée, soit à la Confession d'Augsbourg, établies sur les territoires cédées par la France, cesseront de relever de l'autorité ecclésiastique Françasse.

Les communautés de l'Église de la Confession d'Augsbourg établies

dans les territoires Français cesseront de relever du Consistoire

Supérieur et du Directeur siégeant à Strasbourg.

Les communautés Israélites des territoires situés à l'est de la nonvelle frontière cesseront de dépendre de Consistoire Central Israélite siégeant à Paris.

## Article VII.

Le payement de cinq cent millions aura lieu dans les trente jours qui suivront le rétablissement de l'antorité du Gouvernement Français dans la ville de Paris. Un milliard sera payé dans le courant de l'année et un demi-milliard au 1er Mai, 1872. Les trois derniers milliards resteront payables au 2 Mars, 1874, ainsi qu'il a été stipulé par le Traité de Paix Préliminaire. A partir du 2 Mars de l'année courante, les intérêts de ces trois milliards de francs seront payés chaque année, le 3 Mars, à raison de 5 pour cent par au.

Toute somme payée en avance sur les trois derniers milliards cessera de porter des intérêts à partir du jour du payement effectué.

Tous les payements ne pourront être faits que dans les principales villes de commerce de l'Allemagne et seront effectués en métal, or ou argent, en billets de la Banque d'Angleterre, billets de la Banque de France, billets de la Banque de Prusse, billets de la Banque Royale des Pays-Bas, billets de la Banque Nationale de Belgique, en billets à ordro ou en lettres de change négociables de premier ordre valeur comptant.

Le Gouvernement Allemand ayant fixé en France la valeur du thaler Prussien à 3 francs 75 centimes, le Gouvernement Français accepte la conversion des monnaies des deux pays au taux ci-dessus

indiqué.

Le Gouvernement Français informera le Gouvernement Allemand, trois mois d'avance, de tout payement qu'il compte faire aux caisses

de l'Empire Allemand.

Après le payement du premier demi-milliard et le ratification du Traité de Paix Définitif, les départements de la Somme, de la Seins-Inférieure, et de l'Eure seront évacués en tant qu'ils se trouveront encore occupés par les troupes Allemandes. L'évacuation des départements de l'Oise, de Seine-et-Oise, de Seine-et-Marne, et de la Seine, ainsi que celle des forts de Paris, aura lieu aussitôt que le Gouvernement Allemand jugera le rétablissement de l'ordre, tant en France que dans Paris, suffisant pour assurer l'exécution des eugagements contractés par la France.

Dans tous les cas, cetto évacuation aura lieu lors du payement du

troisième demi-milliard.

Les troupes Allemandes, dans l'intérêt de leur sécurité, auront la disposition de la zône neutro située entre la ligne de démarcation Allemande et l'enceinte de Paris sur la rive droite de la Seine.

Les stipulations du Traité du 26 Février relatives à l'occupation des territoires Français après le payement de deux milliards restoront en vigueur. Aucune des déductions que le Gouvernement Français serait en droit de faire ne pourra être exercée sur le payement des cinq cents premiers millions.

## Article VIII.

Les troupes Allemandes continueront à s'abstenir des réquisitions en nature et en argent dans les territoires occupés; cette obligation de leur part étant corrélative aux obligations contractées pour leur entretien par le Gouvernement Français—dans le cas où malgré des réclamations réitérées du Gouvernement Allemand le Gouvernement Français serait en retard d'exécuter les dites obligations, les troupes Allemandes auront le droit de se procurer ce qui sera nécessaire à leurs besoins en levant des impôts et des réquisitions dans les départements occupés et même en dehors de ceux-ci, si leurs ressources n'étaient pas suffisantes.

Relativement à l'ulimentation des troupes Allemandes, le régime actuellement en vigueur sora maintenu jusqu'à l'évacuation des forts

de Paris

En vertu de la Convention de Ferrières du 11 Mars, 1871, les réductions indiquées par cette Convention seront mises à exécution

après l'évacution des forts.

Dès que l'effectif de l'armée Allemande sera réduit au-dessous du chiffre de 500,000 hommes, il sera tenu compte des réductions opérées au-dessous de ce chiffre pour établir une diminution proportionnelle dans le prix d'entretien des troupes payé par le Gouvernement Français.

#### Article IX.

Le traitement exceptionnel accordé maintenant aux produits de l'industrie des territoires cédés pour l'importation en France sera maintenu pour un espace dé temps de six mois, depuis le 1er Mars, dans les conditions faites avec les délégués de l'Alsace.

#### Article X.

Le Gouvernement Allemand continuera à faire rentrer les prisonniers de guerre en s'entendant avec le Gouvernement Français. Le Gouvernement Français renverra dans leurs foyers ceux de ces prisonniers qui sont libérables. Quant à ceux qui n'ont point achévé leur temps de service, ils se retirerent derrière la Loire. Il est entendu que l'armée de Paris et de Versailles, après le rétablissement de l'autorité du Gouvernement Français à Paris et jusqu'à l'évacuation des forts par les troupes Allemandes, n'excédera pas 80,000 hommes.

Jusqu'à cette évacuation. le Gouvernement Français ne pourra faire aucune concentration de troupes sur la rive droite de la Loire, mais il pourvoira aux garnisons régulières des villes placées dans cette zône, suivant les nécessités du maintien de l'ordre et de la paix publique.

Au fur et à mesure que s'opérera l'évacuation, les chefs de corps conviendront ensemble d'une zône neutre entre les armées des deux

untions.

Vingt milles prisonniers seront dirigés sans délai sur Lyon, à la condition qu'ils seront expédiés immédiatement en Algérie après leur organisation pour être employés dans cette colonie.

#### Article XI.

Les Traités de Commerce avec les différents États de l'Allemagne ayant été annulés par la guerre, le Gouvernement Allemand et le Gouvernement Français prendront pour base de leurs relations commerciales le régime du traitement réciproque sur le pied de la nation la plus favorisée. Sont compris dans cette règle les droits d'entrée et de sortie, le transit, les formalités douanières, l'admission et le traitement des

sujets des deux nations ainsi que de leurs agents.

Toutefois, seront exceptées de la règle susdite les faveurs qu'une des Parties Contractantes, par des Traités de Commerce, a accordées ou accordera à des États autres que ceux qui suivent:—L'Angleterre, la Belgique, les Pays-Bas, la Suisse, l'Autriche, la Bussie.

Les Traités de Navigation, ainsi que la Convention relative au service international des chemins de fer dans ses rapports avec la douane et la Convention pour la garantie réciproque de la propriété

des œuvres d'esprit et d'art seront rémis en vigueur.

Néanmoins, le Gouvernement Français se réserve la faculté d'établir, sur les navires Allemands, et leurs cargaisons, des droits de tonnage, et le pavillon sous la réserve que ces droits ne soient pas plus élevés que ceux qui grèveront les bâtiments et les cargaisons des nations sus-mentionnées.

## Article XII.

Tous les Allemands expulsés conserverent la jouissance pleine et entière de tous les biens qu'ils ont acquis en France.

Ceux des Allemands qui avaient obtenu l'autorisation exigées par les lois Françaises pour fixer leur domicile en France sont réintégrés dans tous les droits et peuvent, en conséquence, établir de nouveau leur

domicile sur le territoire Français.

Le délai stipulé par les lois Françaises pour obtenir la naturalisation sera considéré comme n'étant pas interrompu par l'état de guerre pour les personnes qui profiteront de la faculté ci-dessus mentionné de revenir en France dans un délai de six mois après l'échauge des ratifications de ce Traité, et il sera tenu compte du temps écoulé entre leur expulsion et leur retour sur le territoire Français, comme sils n'avaient jamais cessé de résider en France.

Les conditions ci-dessus seront appliquées en parfaite réciprocité

aux sujets Français résidant ou désirant résider en Allemagne.

## Article XIII.

Les bâtiments Allemands qui étaient condamnés par les conseils de prise avant le 2 Mars, 1871, seront considérés comme condamnés définitivement.

Ceux qui n'auraient pas été condamnés à la date sus-indiquée seront rendus avec la cargaison en tant qu'elle existe encore. Si la restitution des bâtiments et de la cargaison n'est plus possible, leur valeur, fixée d'après le prix de la vente, sera rendue à leurs propriétaires.

#### Article XIV.

Chacun des deux parties continuera sur son territoire les travaux entrepris pour la canalisation de la Moselle. Les intérêts communs des parties séparées des deux départements de la Meurthe et de la Moselle seront liquidés.

## Article XV.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent mutuellement à étendre aux sujets respectifs les mesures qu'elles pourront juger utiles

d'adopter en faveur de ceux de leurs nationaux qui, par suite des événements de la guerre, auraient été mis dans l'impossibilité d'arriver en temps utile à la sauvegarde ou à la conservation de leurs droits.

#### Article XVI.

Les deux Gouvernements, Allemand et Français, s'engagent réciproquement à faire respecter et entretenir les tombeaux des soldats ensevelis sur leurs territoires respectifs.

### Article XVII.

Le règlement des points accessoires sur lesquels un accord doit être établi, en conséquence de ce Traité et du Traité Préliminaire, sera l'objet de négociations ultérieures qui auront lieu à Francfort.

## Article XVIII.

Les ratifications du présent Traité par Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne d'un côté, et de l'autre par l'Assemblée Nationale et par le Chef du Pouvoir Exécutif de la République Française, seront échangées à Francfort dans le délai de dix jours ou plus tôt si faire se peut.

En foi de quoi les Plénipotentiaries respectifs l'ont signé et y ont

apposé le cachet de leurs armes.

Fait à Francfort, le 10 Mai, 1871.

(Signé) v. BISMARCK.

(Signé) ARNIM.

(Signé) JULES FAVRE.

(Signé) FOUYER-QUERTIER. (Signé) E. DE GOULARD.

#### ARTICLES ADDITIONNELS.

#### Article I.

§ 1. D'ici à l'époque fixée pour l'échange des ratifications du présent Traité, le Gouvernement Français usera de son droit de rachat de la concession donné à la Compagnie des Chemins de Fer de l'Est. Le Gouvernement Allemand sera subrogé à tous les droits que le Gouvernement Français aura acquis par le rachat des concessions en ce qui concerne les chemins de fer situés dans les territoires cédés, soit achevés, soit en construction.

§ 2. Seront compris dans cette concession:

1. Tous les terrains appartenant à ladite Compagnie, quelle que soit leur destination, ainsi que: établissements de gares et de stations, hangars, ateliers et magnsins, maisons de gardes de voic, de.:

2. Tous les immeubles qui en dépendent, ainsi que: barrières, clôtures, changements de voie, aiguilles, plaques tournantes, prises

d'eaux, grues hydrauliques, machines fixes, &c.;

3. Tous les matériaux, combustibles et approvisionnements de

tout genre, mobiliers des gares, outillages des ateliers et des gares,

4. Les sommes dues à la Compagnie des Chemins de Fer de l'Est à titre de subvention accordées par des corporations ou personnes domiciliées dans les territoires cédés.

§ 3. Sera exclu de cette cession le matériel roulant. Le Gouvernement Allemand remettra la part du matérial roulant avec ses accessoires qui se trouvernit en sa possession au Gouvernement Français.

§ 4. Le Gouvernement Français s'engage à liberer envers l'Empire Allemand entièrement les chemins de fer cédés ainsi que leurs dépendances de tous les droits que des tiers pourraient faire valoir, nommément des droits des obligatoires. Il s'engage également à se substituer, le cas échéant, au Gonvernement Allemand, relativement aux réclamations qui pourraient être élevées vis-à-vis du Gouvernement Allemand par les créanciers des chemins de fer en question.

§ 5. Le Gouvernement Français prendra à sa charge les réclamations que la Compagnie des Chemins de Fer de l'Est pourrait élever vis-à-vis du Gouvernement Allemand ou de ses mandataires par rapport à l'exploitation desdits chemins de fer et à l'usage des objets indiqués dans le \$ 2 ainsi que du matériel roulant.

Le Gouvernement Allemand communiquera au Gouvernement Français, à sa demande, tous les documents et toutes les indications qui pourraient servir à constater les faits sur lesquels s'appuieront les réclamations susmentionnées.

§ 6. Le Gouvernement Allemand payera an Gouvernement Français, pour la cession des droits de propriété indiqués dans les §\$ 1 et 2 et en titre d'équivalent pour l'engagement pris par le Gouvernement Français dans le § 4, la somme de trois cent vingt cinq millions (325,000,000) de francs.

On défalquera cette somme de l'indemnité de guerre stipulée dans l'Article 7. Vu que la situation qui a servi de base á la convention conclue entre la Compagnie des Chemins de Fer de l'Est et la Société Royale Grand-Ducale des Chemins de Fer Guillaume-Luxembourg en date du 6 Juin, 1857, et du 21 Janvier, 1868, et celle concluc entre le Gouvernement du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg et les Sociétés des Chemins de Fer Guillaume-Luxembourg et de l'Est Français en date du 5 Décembre, 1868, a été modifiée essentiellement de manière qu'elles ne sont applicables à l'état des choses créé par les stipulations contenues dans le § 1, le Gouvernement Allemand se déclare prêt à se substituer aux droits et aux charges résultant de ces conventions pour la Compagnie des Chemins de Fer de l'Est.

Pour le cas où le Gouvernement Français serait subrogé, soit par le rachat de la concession de la Compagnie de l'Est, soit par une entente spéciale, aux droits acquis par cette société en vertu des conventions sus-indiquées, il s'engage à céder gratuitement dans un délai de six

semaines ces droits au Gouvernement Allemand.

Pour le cas où ladite subrogation ne s'effectuerait pas, le Gouvornement Français n'accordera des concessions pour les lignes de chemin de fer appartenant à la Compagnie de l'Est et situées dans le territoire Français que sous la condition expresse que le concessionnaire n'exploite point les lignes de chemin de fer situées dans le Grand-Duché de Luxembourg.

## Article II.

Le Gouvernement Allemand offre deux millions de francs pour les

droits et les propriétés que possède la Compagnie des Chemins de Fer de l'Est sur la partie de son réseau située sur le territoire Suisse, de la frontière à Bâle, si le Gouvernement Français lui fait tenir le consentement dans le délai d'un mois.

#### Article III.

La cession de territoire auprès de Belfort, offerte par le Gouvernement Allemand dans l'Article I du présent Traité en échange de la rectification de frontière demandée à l'ouest de Thionville, sera augmentée des territoires des villages suivants: Rougemont, Leval, Petite-Fontaine, Romagny, Félou, La Chapelle-sous-Rougemont, Angeot, Vauthiermont, La Rivière, La Grange, Reppe, Fontaine, Frais, Fonssemagne, Cunelières, Montreux-Château, Bretegne, Chavannes-les-Grands, Chavanatte, Suarce.

La route de Giromagny à Remiremont passant au bullon d'Alsace restera à la France dans tout son parcours et servira de limite, en

tant qu'elle est située en dehors du canton de Giromagny. Fait à Francfort, le 10 Mai, 1871.

(Signé) v. BISMARCK. (Signé) ARNIM. (Signé) JULES FAVRE. (Signé) POUYER-QUERTIER. (Signé) E. DE GOULARD.

Les soussignés, après avoir entendu la lecture du Traité de Paix Définitif, l'ont trouvé conforme à ce qui a été convenu entre eux.

En vertu de quoi ils l'ont muni de leurs signatures.

Les trois Articles Additionnels ont été signés séparément. Il est

entendu qu'ils feront partie intégrale du Traité de Paix.

Le soussigné Chancelier de l'Empire Allemand a déclaré qu'il se charge de communiquer le Traité aux Gouvernements de Bavière, de Wurttemberg et de Bade et d'obteuir leurs accessions.

Fait à Francfort s/M. le 10 Mai, 1871.

(Signé) v. BISMARCK. (Signé) ARNIM. (Signé) JULES FAVRE. (Signé) POUYER-QUERTIER. (Signé) E. DE GOULARD.

## APPENDIX CLXXXIII.

# RETURN OF CASUALTIES IN THE GERMAN ARMY IN FRANCE FROM 1ST FEBRUARY, 1871,\* TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE OCCUPATION.

			or	Killed, Died o Vounds	of	w	ounde	1.	M	issing			Total.	
Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.		Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.
Ist Cav. Div Govt. Troops	2nd February. 8th Lancers Garrison Squadron 5th Hussars		-	. <b>=</b>	=	=	1 1	=	-	=	=	-	1 1	=
XIIth	3rd February. 101st Grenadiers		-	_	-	-	1	-	-	_	-	1	1	-
4th Cav. Div	16th February.  2nd B.G. Hussars	•	-	-	_	-	1	-	_	-	-	-	1	-
IVth Vth 3rd Res. Divn	22nd February.  27th Regiment 7th Grenadiers 19th Regiment		111	111	=		1 -	=	- - -	3	=	=	1 1 3	=
VIth	23rd February. 8th Dragoons		-	-	-		1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
VIIth	24th February. 77th Regiment		_	-	-	_	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
5th Cav. Div.	26th February. 4th Cuirassiers		-	1	-	_	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
5th Cay. Div VIIth	27th February.  13th Dragoons	:	=	=	=	=	ł	=	=	=	=	=	1	=
VIth VIIth Govt. Troops	lst March.  5lst Regiment	:	  -  -  -	1 -1	=	- 1 -	=	==	=	Ξ	= 1	- 1 1	1-2	=
Govt. Troops	12th March. Prenzlau Landw, Battn.		_	,	_			_		_				$ $ _

<sup>\*</sup> The losses of the South Army and before Belfort up to the 7th and 19th February, respectively, are shown in Appendix CLXXII and CLXXIII.

		01	Killed, Died Vounds	of i.	"	o <b>unde</b> d.		M	lissi g		Total.		
Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	ОПсет, &с.	Men.	Horses.	Ufficers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Обостя, вс.	Men.	Horses.
	18th March.												
IInd - ·	54th Regiment	-	_	-	_	1	_		_	-	-	1	-
lind	9th Grenadiers	-	_	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
IIIrd - ·	23rd March.  Headquarters Staff	-	-	-	,	1		-	-	-	,	1	-
illra	28th March. 3rd Field Art. Regiment	-	_	_	_	1			_	_	_	,	_
Vth	19th May. 58th Regiment	. _	_	_	_	_	_	_	,	_	_	,	_
VIth	22nd May.		_		$\rfloor$	,	_		_	_	_		_
	28th May.												
Ist Bav	11th Regiment	-	-	-	1	•	-	-	-	-	1	•	-
Xith	94th Regiment	- -	_	<u> -</u>	_	8	_	Ŀ	_	<u> </u> _	_	3	_
	Total	1	4	-	3	27	-	-	4	1	4	35	1

2 B

# NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS KILLED AND WOUNDED.

Army Corps, &c.	Staff and Regiment.	Killed, or Died of Wounds.	Wounded.
VII Govnt. troops -	March 1st.  74th Regiment Küstrin Landw. Btn.  March 28rd.	(I) 2nd Lt. Kettlitz	(1) 2nd Lt. Laeger.
III	Headquarters May 26th.  11th Regiment		(1) 2nd Lieut. v. Viereck of the 12th Dragoons. (1) Lt. Egler.

## APPENDIX CLXXXIV.

RETURN OF AMMUNITION ISSUED TO THE AMMUNITION COLUMNS FROM THE THREE PRUSSIAN RESERVE DEPÔTS AND THE TWO BAVARIAN MAIN COLUMNS DURING THE WAR.

			Issued from	n		
Nature.	R	eserve Dep	ôt.	Main C	olumns.	Remarks.
	No. 1.	No. 2.	No. 8.	Ist Bay. A.C.	IInd Bav.	
<del></del>	Δ	-Artiller	Y AMMUN	ition.		1
6-cm. or 4-pr. shells 9-cm. or 6-pr. ,, 12-pr. shells - 6-cm. or 4-pr. case 9-cm. or 6-pr. ,, 8-cm. or 4-pr.8hrpl 9-cm. or 6-pr. ,, Total -	88,271 26,687 80 200 — 65,247	85,576 54,901 7,46 822 1,502 900 143,945	37,743 17,242 396 98 — 55,479 338,309	21,565* 82,541* 561 867 7,495 63,019		
'	B.—	Small-Ar	и Анипи	ITION.		•
Podewils Werder Needle carbine Pistol	115,864 110,580	5,266,138 	120,970 77,595	3,311,230 858,330 15,740 16,044 4,196,344	1,076,260 29,380 P P 1,105,640	

Under A the return shows the total expenditure of the German field artillery; but under B the ammunition issued to the reservists, &c., sent to join the field army is not included. This amounted in the case of the Prussian reservists to some 8,000,000 or 9,000,000 of rounds. Hence the grand total expenditure of Prussian ammunition was some 20,000,000.

# APPENDIX

# GROSS TOTAL OF AMMUNITION EXPENDED FRENCH

										·	
	8-cm. or 4-pr. field.	9-cm. or 6-pr. field and lort.	12-cm. or 12-pr.	16-cm. or 24-pr.	1 <b>6-</b> cm.	21 cm.	or 6-pr. case.	or 24-pc. solld.	P-cm. or 6-pr.	12-cm. or 12-pr.	16-cm. or 24-pr.
		SI	rells.		Lo		<b>9</b> -68	100	1	Shrapnel	ı <b>.</b>
Licetembers. (9th August.)					N	o retur	n.				
Praissurg. (10th and 14th August, 24th November.)	App	rox. 280	-	_	-	-	-	-	-	-	_
Tout. (16th and 23rd August, 10th to 23rd September.)	3,	414	515	268	-	_	-	-	-	40	4
METS. (17th August to 28th October.)	3,	064	1,808	-	_	_	-	-	_	5	_
STRASSBURG. (23rd August to 27th September.) iege batteries		6,985 383	61,318 —	43,889	3,283 —	600	18 7	=	3,964 203	11,394	6,026
Total for Strassburg									202,	1001 <b>000</b>	ode En
Birson. (23rd August, 11th—17th September.)	,	,	Approx 6,000	-	-	_	-	-	-	-	-
VERDUM. (24th August, 13th—15th October.)	194	1,778	_	-	_	-	_	-	-	-	_
Someone. (12th to 15th October.)	1,:	283	3,211	2,268	-	-	_	-	-	496	172
Schlettstadt. (20th—24th October.)	-	-	1,037	339	_	_	-	_	-	81	50
Neu-Breisacu. (2nd to 10th November.)	-	37	1,962	2,736	880	_	-	-	86	122	74
Tmionville. (22nd—24th November.)	9,	914	3,997	1,500	911	-	-	-	-	1	-
La Fran. (25th—28th November.)		191	719	412	_	_	_	-	_	54	88

# CLXXXV

DURING THE INVESTMENT AND SIEGE OF THE FORTRESSES.

	Prussian	•			French	l.					
į.	26-78.	80-yr.	22.00	27-480.	25.05	12-cm.	15-cm.	Needle.	Wallpiece.	Chassepbt.	Remarks.
	Bomb.		Bom	b and	Bhell.	Shell rifled	is for guns.	c	artridges		
				N	o retur	n.			•		* Including 2,500 60-pr. Baden
_	_	-	-	-	-	-	_	_	_	_	† Only from the two Prussian Divisions. ‡ Including 22,276 needle and 37,837 Minio.
_	_	_	190	192	_	411	_	_	_	_	§ 60-pr. Bavarian,
	-	_	_	_	_	_	_	_		_	
22,828	19,931	17,268*	=	=	=	=	=	131,935†	60,113‡	<u>-</u>	
<b>am</b> muni(	ion.							192,0	)48 cartri	dges.	
_		1,100\$	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	-	
_	-	-	1,730	_	_	2,554	1,861		-	_	
	_		720	210	_	_	_		-	_	
_	201	274	-	1	_	_	_	_	_	<u>-</u>	
_		894]	_	_	425	_	1,978	_	_	<b>-</b>	
~	_	_	_	_	283	_	-	_	_	-	
_	_	<u>-</u> :	400	_	-	-	_	-		_	

**											
	8-cm. or 4-pr. Sold.	9-cm. to 6-pr. field and fort.	12-cm. or 12-pe.	16-cm. or 24-pr.	16-cm.	21-cm.	er 6-pr. case.	or 24-pr. solid.	9-cm. or 6-pr.	12.cm. or 12-pr.	16-m. or 36-pr.
•		SI	nells.		ng :lla.	1	3		Shrapael.		
BELFORT. (3.12.70. to 13.2.71.)	1,448	1,719	42,551	33,468	3,128	1,164	3	_	277	2,093	1,028
Монти́ду. (12th—13th December.)		311	1,121	493	620	140	1	_	_	-	-
PARIS. (22.12.70. to 26.1.71.) South Front	: =	613	18,680 26,111	26,843 21,519	3,830 7,990	2 886 239		=	=	248 612	80 298
Tot a for Paris	-								110,	286 roun	de gwa
Pinosure. (28.12.70, to 9.1.71.)					No	retur	ı.				
Winitare. (31.12.70. to 2,1.71.)								1,	<b>6</b> 00 rou	nds for	12-cm.,
Bocnor. (5th January.)	1,	518	_	-	_	_	_	_	-	-	_
Lonewy. (17th—24th January.)		380	8,841	1,818	-	-	_	_	-	213	-

1	Prussian.			1	rench.						
7-pr.	25-рт.	50-pr.	22-cm.	27 cm.	22-cm.	12-cm.	15-cm.	Needle.	Wallpiece.	Channepôt.	Remarks.
	Shell.			Shell.		Shell rifled		C	artridges.		
3,947	3,128	3,697*	670	6,755	-	_	7,896	_	2,130	3,434†	Including 2,089 60-pr. Baden.
_	_	_	_	-	-		-	-	_	_	† Tabatière. ‡ Mitrailleuse.
=	=	347	=	1		=	-	=	_	_	
ammuni	tion.					<u></u>			·		
				No	retur	١.					
8,300 ros	inds for 1	J-co.									
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	_	-	
-	_	-	76	-	-	-	-	_	-	14‡	

## APPENDIX CLXXXVI.

Maximum percentage of Sick in the Field Army during the War, and on 19th February, 1871.

	During War.	19 Feb.,	. (0)	During War.	19 Feb., 1871.
Ist Army Corps VIIIth 17th Inf. Division 3rd Reserve 3rd Cavalry 5th 3rd Guard Cav. Brig. Etappen troops IIIrd Army Corps IVth "	20 · 0 25 · 0 29 · 0 11 · 0 9 · 0 14 · 0 15 · 0 17 · 0 39 · 0 13 · 2	12 · 0 22 · 0 21 · 0 7 · 0 6 · 0 12 · 0 5 · 0 30 · 0 10 · 0	Guard Corps (exc. 3rd Grd. Cav. Brig.) XIIth Army Corps Württemberg F. Div. Siege Art. (Paris) Etappen troops IInd Army Corps VIIth XIVth Cluding siege corps	26·2 26·0 17·6 13·4 19·0 24·7 83·7	20·6 22·2 13·5 13·4 3·7 16·6 26·4
IXth " - Xth " - Xth " - Xth " - Xth " - Xth " - Xth " - Xth " - Xth " - Xth " - Xth " - Xth " - Xth " - Xth " - Xth " - Xth " - Xth Army Corps - Xth Army Corp	27 · 2 33 · 5 13 · 6 13 · 7 16 · 0 27 · 0 32 · 0 11 · 2	15 · 3 22 · 7 7 · 0 10 · 0 8 · 3 10 · 5 12 · 8 15 · 8 7 · 9	cluding sieve corps at Belfort and Krenski's Detmt.) - Troops of Gov. Gen. Alsace - Ditto Lorraine Ditto Metz Ditto Rheims	20·5 10·9 17·2 16·7 13·1	19·8 7·8 11·5 11·0 9·8
VIth "XIth "Guard Landw. Div. 1st Bav. Army Corps IInd "Siege Artillery (Paris) Etappen troops	42 7 11 0 52 0 13 0 15 7 12 8	26·2 8·0 21·0 6·5 14·1 8·0			

## APPENDIX CLXXXVII.

In taking leave of those my brave and victorious troops who remain behind on foreign soil, my heart prompts me to express to Your Majesty our deep and joyous gratitude for the loving care and help bestowed through the initiative and protection of Your Majesty upon the army by those at home throughout the Fatherland. German unity, by the agency of the Central Committee for the Relief of the Sick and Wounded, became accomplished in the domain of humanity, while the political unity of our Fatherland was still in the circle of our wishes. From the commencement of hostilities this Committee became a solidly organised body, in which the local societies of all German States were represented, and to which even the American associations have extended their hand across the ocean. It is with joy that I have seen how by this union of all the German forces, supported by the general spirit of self-sacrifice and the indefatigable activity of those who devoted their strongth and time to this laborious work, results have been attained which exceeded all expectation and have essentially contributed to maintain the strength and spirits of the army amid the heavy burdens of war.

The thankful remembrance of this will never cease to live in the army and in the nation. I cannot better testify my appreciation and gratitude than in begging Your Majesty to express them yourself,

in my name, to the Central Committee of the Associations.

Nancy, the 14th March, 1871.

WILLIAM.

Her Majesty the Empress and Queen.

## APPENDIX CLXXXVIII.

TABLE SHOWING THE MONTHLY AVERAGE OF EFFECTIVES IN THE GERMAN FORCES DURING THE WAR, 1870—71.\*

			Men.			Horses.
August 1970	∫ field	-	780,723	•	•	213,159
August, 1870	l garrison	-	402,666	•	•	87,214
	Total		1,183,389	Total		250,878
	∫ field -		813,280	•		218,093
September, 1870	garrison		850,288			84,100
	Total		1,163,518	Total		252,198
	ffeld -		840,857			225,401
October, 1870	garrison		860,799			88,785
	( 8					
	Total	•	1,210,656	Total	•	259,186
November, 1870	∫field -	•	827,271	•	•	225,856
21010111001, 2010	l garrison	•	890,880	•	•	82,601
	Total		1,217,651	Total	-	258,457
Danamban 1970	∫field -	•	841,196	•		227,860
December, 1870	l garrison	-	404,611	•	•	81,618
	Total		1,245,807	Total		259,478
T 100.	f field -		913,967	•		232,689
January, 1871	garrison		398,826	•	-	81,619
	Total	-	1,312,793	Total		264,808
	ffield -		936,915		_	232,398
February, 1871	garrison		413,872			31,837
	( 8					
	Total	-	1,350,787	Total	•	263,735
March, 1871	{ field -	•	925,800	•	-	233,196
	} garrison	•	424,608	•	•	82,812
	Total	-	1,850,408	Total	-	265,508
April, 1871	∫field -	•	717,572	•	•	205,936
лри, 1011	l garrison	•	366,614	•	•	84,780
	Total	•	1,084,186	Total	•	240,666
Man 1971	∫ field -	•	671, <b>4</b> 51	•	•	195,712
May, 1871	l garrison	-	320,248	•	•	88,548
	Total		991,699	Total		229,255
T. 1051	field -		502,815		-	155,878
June, 1871	garrison	-	866,392	•	•	57,568
	Total	•	869,207	Total	•	212,946

According to the returns of the Special Commission. These numbers include officers, officials, surgeons, sick and other non-combatants.

## APPENDIX CLXXXIX.

# SUMMARY OF THE TOTAL STRENGTH OF THE GERMAN ARMY DURING THE WAR OF 1870-71.

					Employed i i.e., cros French	wed the	Left at home.		
					Officers, surgeons, and officials.	Men.	Officers, surgeons, and officials.	Men.	
Prussin and t									
the North	Germ	an Co	nteae	ra.	26,822	847,796	7.039	244,595	
	:	:	•		1,102	56.272	882	15,363	
Hesse ·			•	•	438	18,676	121	8,112	
Total for No	orth	Germ	an C	on-					
federation			-		27,862	922,744	7,542	268,070	
Bavaria -	•	-	•	•	3,842*	180,902	1,352	44,004	
Warttemberg	-	•	-		823	29,410	264	18,060	
Baden -	•	•	-	•	574	30,198	161	18,604	
Gra	nd tot	al -	•	•	38,101	1,113,254	9,319	838,788	

<sup>•</sup> Besides 797 civil officials.

## APPENDIX CXC.

RETURN OF REINFORCEMENTS SENT TO THE GERMAN ARMY FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE WAR UNTIL BEGINNING OF MARCH, 1871.

Posses Also Dosses	tina Dietriat			Officers.	N.C.O.'s		Field Guns.		
From the Recruiting District.		Onicers.	and men.	Horses.	8-cm. or 4-prs.	9-om. or 6-prs.			
Guard Corps			•	97	17,471	1.195	14		
Ist Army Corps		-		81	9.564	1,346	14		
IInd "		-		101	11,962	1,296			
IIIrd "	•	•	-	125	17,096	2,069	2	_	
IVth ,,	•	•	-	118	9,910	1,114	_	i	
Vth ,,	-	•	-	86	9,803	1,148		<b>!</b> —	
VIth "		•	-	84	4,796	694	4	l —	
VIIth ,,	•	•	-	96	18,838	1,749	1	l —	
VIIIth ,,	•	•	-	141	15,350	ั 87 เ	5	- 3	
IXth ,,	-	-	•	71	18,520	1,044	. 10	8	
Xth "	•	•	•	115	11,933	1,876	9		
XIth "	•	-	•	84	10,800	1,322	27*	_	
XIIth "	•	•	•	82	11,228	989	1		
25th Division	•	•	•	27	4,640	877	8		
Total for the No	orth	Gern	nan						
. Confederation	•	•	•	1,308	161,420	17,090	90	. 9 .	
Ist and IInd Ba	vari	an Ar	my	1	, i	1 .	l	1	
Corps -	•	•		770	47,487	8,005	18	10	
Württemberg D	ivisio	on •	•	76	7,836	988	1	_	
Baden Division	•	-		18	8,847	825	-	_	
From Central	Hors	e De	pðt	1	1	l	į.	1	
for special con		•	•	-	_	654	-	-	
Grand to	tal	•	•	2,172	220,590	22,012	104	12	

<sup>•</sup> Of these, 24 for the 22nd Division.

## APPENDIX CXCI.

# Summary of strength of German Depôt Troops at the beginning of March, 1871.

			Cor	pe.					Officers.	N. C. O.'s and men.	Horses
Guard C	lorps	•	•	•	•	•	•	-	178	9,412	2,080
Ist Arm	y Ĉoi	TD8	•	•	•	•	•	-	195	11,490	1,649
IInd	,,	•	•			•	•	-	182	10,810	1,329
IIIrd	**		•	•		•	•	-	165	11,882	1,700
IVth	1)		•		•	•		-	205	11,000	1,788
Vth	"		•	•	•	•		-	156	9,905	1,707
VIth	"				•		•	.	186	11.527	1.664
VIIth	"			-	•	•	•	-	166	10.878	1,266
VIIIth	"		•		•	•			231	18,522	1,240
IXth	"					•	•		216	11.887	1,380
Xth	"					•		.	195	10.028	2,011
XIth	"					•			163	9,266	1,410
XIIth	"					•		.	151	12,044	1,617
25th Di			•	•	•	•	•		94	5,987	637
Total for	r Nor	th Ge	rma	n Co	nfed	leration	n -	.	2,477	148,663	21,435
1st and	2nd 1	Bavari	ian A	rmy	Con	rps	•	- 1	658	37,879	3,648
Wartter						• •		-	115	11,509	941
Baden	•	•	•	•	-	•	•	-	43	6,633	584
		Total	l for	Ger	man	Army		- [	3,288	204,684	26,603

# APPENDIX CXCII.

RETURN OF TROPHIES CAPTURED BY THE GERMANS DURING THE WAR. (Note.—There are no records of the number of small arms captured.)

		In the fle	In the field and before fortesets.	e e	Sur	Surrendered.			Total.	ם	
	Captured.	Fagies and colours.	Field guns and mitralileuses.	Fortress guns. Eagles and colours.	Field guns and mitrailleuses.	Fortress guns.	.amra Ilam8	Fagles and colours.	Fleld guns and mitralleuses.	Fortress gams.	.amta ilam8
~	At Weissenburg and Worth	•	3	1	1		H	۵	2	ı	1
64		1		2 -	<b>3</b>	876	_	2	3	876	280,000
<b>*</b>	At Beaumont and Bedan	•			¥	2 5		<b>3</b>	₹′	2	
• •	On the Loire up to the second occumation of Origins by the Germans	1 •	• 2	- 2		<u> </u>	_	•	, <b>%</b>	52	
9		-	_	 	-	1	1	-	23	1	ı
-	During the operations against Le Mans	•	_		1	1	I	•	11	_	1
80	ttles in	•		  -	<b>I</b>	<b>2</b>	1	æ	2	3	ı
<b>a</b> 9	8	•		_	18	1 5	١	۰ م	2 5	1	1
3	General and in Parts:—At Lichtenberg, Lutzelstein, Marsal, Vitry le Français	• 1		_	<b>B</b> 1	_	98	•~	<b>3</b> 1	7,01	
	In the (b) In September and October: -At Laon, Toul, Soissons, Schlettstadt -	1	1	-	1	3	4,000	**	ı	3	4
=	complete (c) To the end of 1870:—At Verdun, Neu-Breisach, Montmedy,	-	   	_	_	3	77,000	-	1	3	77,000
	(4) From January, 1871, to the peace: -At Mézières, Rocroy, Peronne.	)		• 		-				•	
	Longwy, Bitsch	1	<u>.</u> 1	-	 	\$	9,000	~	ı	\$	<b>6</b> 00
12	As Bellort	1	1		  -	3	8	1	ı	ī	ă S
2	The character of the contraction	•			1	1	ı	•	1	ı	ı
	Total · · · · · · Total	9	255	25	1,660	6,422	863,000	101	1,915	6,626	886,800
				1							

# APPENDIX CXCIII.

RETURN SHOWING THE TOTAL LOSSES DURING THE WAR (UP TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE OCCUPATION).

	Killed	L, or Di Wound	ed of 8.	v	Vounde	d.		Missing	ζ.		Total.	
Staff and Regiment.	Officers, &c.	Ven.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Officern, &c.	Ken.	Horses.
Headquarter Staff of 1st Army , 2nd , Grand Luke of Mecklenburg's Detachment Guard Corps	1 172 1 Ass	2706 and istSur	geon,	1 238 Also	- - 6672 2 Staff	- 378 Surgs.	- - 1	319	_ 	1 Ac	1 9697 Staff-SunistSu	rg.,
lst Army Corps	61	1595	311 152	Also : 167 Also : 1 Ass	529] 2 Staff (   319] 3 Staff ( sistant ) 1b-Surg	Surgs. ! 83 Surgs., Surg.,	1	460   165   Also istant S	6	319 Also 2 229 1 Stafi 3 Sta 2 Assi	aymast   7346     Staff S   4163     Also   Surg   Surg	656 urge., 241 Major, 100a,
Ilird Army Corps IVth Army Corps	172 63		138	2 Staf 4 Sta 3 Ass 132	8299 Also Surg. off Surg istant 5 8029	Majs., geons, Surgs.   159	1	391 197	18	581   2 Staff 4 Sta 8 Ass	11348   Also SurgA off Surg. Istant 8   4062     Staff 8	1078 fajora, cons,
Vith Army Corps	97	Staff Staff	182   187   24	4 Anni 1 St 290	Staff	eon.   164   17gs.   8	1 - 3	846 80 827	18 	1 Su 388 Also 3	b-Surge   8604     8604     864ff 8   1060     8743	urga.,
VII.Ith Army Corps  1Xth Army Corps (including 25th Div.)		1707   1799	•	325 Also 1 242	nistant :   6124   Staff !   Chapla   4767   Staff !	434 Surg., in.   254	2	351 174 Also	13 43	473 Also 1 863	and sistant     8182   Staff     Chaplai   6740   Staff S	855 Surg. n.
Xth Arnay Corpe  [21st Division, Corpe Artillery, &c.	110	2128	416	2 Su 234 Also 5 Asa 1	h-Surge   4704   Staff     Istant S   Chaplai	oons.   807 Burgs., Jurgs.,	16	b-Surge 1036 Also Istant S	62 Surge.	3 Su 350 Also 9 Ans	b-Surge   7867   Staff &  stant S  Chaplai	ons.   796  arg., urgs.,
XIth Army Corps 22nd Division-a	88 Also	747 1 Chap	225 dain.	Also 1 167 Also 1 A	Assist.   2749   Staff   Staff   Staff   4203	Surg.   131   Surg.     Surg.	1 1 Ass	171 462 Also sistant	5 Surg.	Also I 223 Also I 2 Assi	l Staff S istant S Chaplai	Surg.   361; surg., nrgs., n.
Aillith Army Corps  Head Quarter Staff - 17th Division -	}	Also Surg	•	Also 1	Ansint.	Surg.			- 9 Surg.,	1 Staff 1 Ass 1 150 Also 1	6643   Also   Surg.     stant 8   2562   Staff 8	Major. Surg. 260
2nd Landw. Division- 22nd Division- XIVth Army Corps	11 47	14 102 715	2 15 145	6 10 141 Also	84 307 2538 I Field		1 5 5 Sta	stant S 89 298 Also off Surg istant S	19 cona.	3 Ase 6 22 193 Also 5 2 Ass	istant 8 111 498 3546 Staff 9 Fant 8 Id Surg	297 297 297

<sup>•</sup> For losses of 22nd Division after 4th January, 1871, see Xilith Army Corps.

		Ī		, or Di Wounds		W	ounde	ı.	1	Cissing			Total.	
Staff and Regiment.			Обсета, фс.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, dec.	Men.	Horses.	Officers, &c.	Men.	Horses.	Ufform, &c.	Ke.	Horne
Ist Bav. Army Corps -	•	-	196	1768	636	350	6964	562	12	2270 Also	141		11002 Also	1269
IInd Bay, Army Corps- Württemberg Field Division	:	:	71 37	787 641	89 121	107 79	2475 1736 Also insenta	91 80 Sung.	I Intn	dnce. (   599   178	Mein 1	178 117	dnce. 0:   3811     2555     Also   imental	181 209
Baden Field Division* Strassburg Siege Corps†	•	-	9	77	36	16		21	-	31	12	25	393   Assist.	72
Belfort Siege Corpet -	•	-	8	123	5	32 Also	492 Assist	25 Surg.	-	56	3	40 Also 1	671   Assist.	31
Guard Landwehr Division 1st Reserve Division-	:		10	67 210	10	1 As:	270   1072   Staff   sistant :   Paymas	surg.,	4 1 As	349 Also sistant	Surg.	2 A	1631 1 Staff S sistant i Paymasi	28 arg., sarg.,
			2 St#fi 2 Sta 1 Am 1	Also	Majors, eons., Surg., in,	2 Staff 1 Reg 19 S 1 Fi 21 As 4 St	79684 Also /Surg rimenta taff Sur sistant ab-Surg Chapla Payman	Majora, il Surg., geons, geon, Surgs., eons, sins.	6 St 11 An 1 S 1 Intr	10208 Also aff Surg sistant ab-Surg adnee.	reons, Surgv., reon,	27 Staff Surgeons,		
2nd Landwehr Division 3rd Reserve Division -	:	-	26	and	46	51	1338 and	•	-3	612 and	•	and :	2271 Staff S	
4th Reserve Division -	•		1 <b>Assi</b> 12	stant Si 222	urgeon 66	36	aff Surj   859   Sub-Si	27	1 St	aff Sur		50	irtant Su   1495   Sub-Sn	102
1st Cavalry Division - 2nd Cavalry Division - 3rd Cavalry Division - 4th Cavalry Division -	:	•		51 42 38 62 TSurg.stant S		24 13 4 15	146 79		1 8	109 83 82 150 aff Sur ssistant	107 133 geon,	1 Sta 1 S	271 199	eon.
5th Cavalry Division -	•	•	17	227	519		If Surg	Major	6 2	182	1	75 1 St	11101 Surg.	Major.
6th Cavalry Division - Etappen and Government tr	- 00p#	•	13	162	22	28	Chaple 537	nin. 29	16 1 Cui	616 must. 6 iub-Sur Payma	12s Official, geon.	1 Co	847   Chaplai   1315   mmst. O Sub-Sur,   Payman	Micial, reon,
Siege Artillery before Paris Fortress Pioneers before Par 1st Division of the Field An Reserve Park - 3rd Field Railway Division		ion	- <sup>9</sup>	1 2	=	25 1 1	10	-	- - 2	189	= -	34	11	- ·
4th Field Hallway Division Total casualties of the Germ	an Arm	- y -	3 Sta 2 S 3 An	26397 If Surgitaff Surgitaff Surgitarital distant di Chapi Payma	7325 -Major geons, Surgs., uin	3 Sta 1 Re 20 S 1 H 21 A 5 S	84301 If Surg. giment Staff Surfield Su issistant Sub-Sur Chapk Payma	-Majo al Sur rgeon rgeon t Surg grons, sins,	102 8 S 12 A 2 S 1 I Int	12752 itaff Sursistani ul-Sur Paynu induce.	1723 rgeons, Surgs, geons, uster, Official	6155 i Sta l Re 30 l 136 A 7 S	123 16: If Surg. Igiments Igiments Staff Sur Iteld Sur I	Majors, il Surg., rgeona, rgeon, £.:rgs., reods, ins, ster, Official,

<sup>•</sup> The losses of this Division are included in the Siege Corps before Strassburg and in the XIVth Corps.
• Excluding the Guard Landwehr Division and lat Reserve Division.
• Excluding the lat and 4th Reserve Division.
• See XIIIth Army Corps.
• Including losses before the fortresses.

# CASUALTIES TO OFFICIALS ON THE FIELD RAILWAY SERVICE.

Killed, or		of Wo	unds	•	•	-	•	2
Wounded	•	-	-	•	-	•	•	5
Missing	-	•	•	•	•	•	•	27
		m						_
		Total	•				-	84

By accidents on the railway, 14 officials were killed and 17 wounded.

# FRANCO-GERMAN WAR, 1870-71.

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